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“In a world become ‘game-ified’ against its will, Class Wargames 
provides the field manual for the only game that matters – that 
of history.”
 – McKenzie Wark, author of The Beach Beneath the Street and Gamer Theory
“Richard Barbrook’s approach to the Situationist International is 
so left field, he leaves virtually every other author addressing the 
subject looking like a dull academic plodder. Were he still alive, 
Barbrook’s fellow iconoclast Guy Debord would heartily approve 
of such unacceptable theory.”
 – Stewart Home, avant-garde pornographer and Paul Hamlyn Foundation prize winner
“Richard Barbrook’s book is a jubilant manifesto for ludic art and 
revolution – each in service of the other – for a participatory future. 
By bringing Situationist disciplines into a contemporary context, he 
shows how thinkers, gamers, artists, hackers and educators can resist 
assimilation, and their creative endeavours escape perversion, by the 
deadly, dominating forces of neoliberalism.”
 – Ruth Catlow, co-founder of Furtherfield and creator of Rethinking Wargames
“Like H.G. Wells, Guy Debord saw wargames as a valuable means 
of ludic subversion of established societal and military hierarchies. 
In this impressively eclectic and erudite book, Richard Barbrook 
explains with infectious enthusiasm how he and his group have 
striven to use ludic ideas to inspire and inform a new generation 
of radicals.”
 – Philip Sabin, Professor of Strategic Studies at King’s College London and author of 
     Simulating War
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And time demands its toll.’ 
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‘Spectacular domination’s first priority is to eradi-
cate historical knowledge in general; beginning with 
just about all rational information and commentary 
about the most recent past. With consummate skill, 
the spectacle organises ignorance of what is about to 
happen and, immediately afterwards, the forgetting 
of what has nonetheless been understood. History’s 
domain is the memorable, the totality of events 
whose consequences will be lastingly apparent. As 
thus, inseparably, history is knowledge that should 
endure and aid in understanding, at least in part, 
what is to come. In this way, history is the measure 
of genuine novelty.’
– Guy Debord
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illustrations
Xenographs by Alex Veness
Inside Cover: María Mencía with Class Wargames at Cold War Modern 
in the Victoria & Albert Museum, London, England, on 31st October 
2008.
Frontispiece: Richard Barbrook and Ilze Black playing The Game of 
War at Alex Veness’ Bankside flat in London, England, on 28th October 
2008.
Chapter 1: Richard Barbrook and Malcolm McLaren with Class 
Wargames at the Wunderbar Festival in the Baltic Centre for Contem-
porary Art, Gateshead, England, on 14th November 2009.
Chapter 2: Stefan Lutschinger and Danilo Mandic with Class Wargames 
at What Is To Be Done? The Urgent Need to Struggle in the ICA, London, 
England, on 13th October 2010.
Chapter 3: Ilze Black, Lucy Blake and Stefan Lutschinger with Class 
Wargames at Cold War Modern in the Victoria & Albert Museum, Lon-
don, England, on 31st October 2008.
Bibliography: Fabian Tompsett, Mark Copplestone and Richard Bar-
brook with Class Wargames at Cyberfest 2008 in the State Hermitage 
Museum, St. Petersburg, Russia, on 27th November 2008.
Index: Alex Veness with the Xenon-Eye scanner camera at Occupation 
Studios, London, England, on 14th March 2014.
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1: Pump House opening positions for Guy Debord’s The Game of War. 
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2: Rio de Janeiro opening positions for Guy Debord’s The Game of War. 
Page 224 
3: 1800 Marengo campaign scenario for Guy Debord’s The Game of 
War. Page 226
4: 1918 battle of Kazan scenario for Chris Peers’ Reds versus Reds. Page 
228
5: 1805 battle of Austerlitz scenario for Guy Debord’s The Game of 
War. Page 336
6: 1802 battle of Fort Bedourete scenario for Richard Borg’s Com-
mands & Colors: Napoleonics. Page 338
7: Haldon Forest opening positions for H.G. Wells’ Little Wars. Page 
340 
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Xenon-Eye by Alex Veness
Xenon-Eye is a hybrid camera constructed by Class Wargames co-
founder, Alex Veness, combining a hacked digital scanner (to become a 
photographic plate) and a Victorian camera.
Xenon is a gas, rare in nature, but easily synthesised, whose name de-
rives from ancient Greek, meaning ‘strange’ or ‘peculiar’. Xenon gas 
creates brilliant, white light in all digital scanners’ built-in lamps. In 
everyday use, these lamps light streams of documents placed on scan-
ners’ un-illuminated glass beds.
During its hack from document-reader to camera-plate, Alex Veness 
stripped a xenon lamp from an everyday scanner and re-named it Xe-
non-Eye. Fitted to a camera-back, Xenon-Eye can see lens-based images 
only because its bright xenon lamp is absent, otherwise it would blind 
its own scanner-head, instead of recording images projected by its cam-
era’s antique lens. Nevertheless, the scanner’s lost xenon lamp lives on 
under the camera’s new name.
Employing customised software to override the scanner’s alarm at its 
severe hacking, and to make it a stable, functioning camera-plate, Alex 
Veness has used Xenon-Eye to document Class Wargames’ public events 
since 2007, especially the playing of Guy Debord’s The Game of War at 
national and international venues.
Xenon-Eye’s lack of empathy, its predilection for representing humans 
as unnatural grotesques, can be understood as a parodic visual aesthetic 
for neoliberalism. As awareness grows of unchecked markets’ indiffer-
ence to human welfare, these images come to define the individual’s 
true identity within the presiding system’s logic: distorted, extruded 
and forced into unbearable forms. Far from showing people ‘as they 
really are’, Xenon-Eye shows them ‘as they really exist’: unwilling actors 
within the current socio-economic logic.
When the disillusioned majority finally throw off the shackles of 
spectacular capitalism, there will be no use for Xenon-Eye, and it will 
be ritually destroyed. Until that time, it will continue to record the 
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colourless, painful distortions suffered by citizen-players, unwillingly 
forced to endure the intolerable indeterminacy of free markets and the 
distressing brutality of economic liberalism for the benefit of a tiny, 
super-wealthy elite; an increasingly despised bankocracy.
¡Hasta la victoria, siempre!
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class wargames players
Richard Barbrook – University of Westminster
Ilze Black – Queen Mary, University of London
Lucy Blake – Software Developer
Mark Copplestone – Copplestone Castings
Rod Dickinson – University of the West of England
Elena Vorontsova Duffield – WRN Broadcast
Stefan Lutschinger – Middlesex University
Fabian Tompsett – London Psychogeographical Association
Alex Veness – University of the Arts London
Class Wargames
• puts on participatory performances of Guy Debord’s The Game of 
War and other subversive politico-military games;
• investigates gaming as a metaphor for social relations under 
repressive neoliberalism;
• celebrates the craft skills of gamers as artistic expression;
• creates a social space where lefties can meet & play with each 
other;
• re-enacts the proletarian struggles of the past in ludic form;
• trains the militants of the cybernetic communist revolution to 
come.
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Class Wargames on Campaign 2007–2013
Exhibitions
The Institute of Psychoplasmics, Pump House Gallery, Battersea Park, 
London, England, 9th April–26th May 2008.
Class Wargames – ‘The Game of War’, HTTP Gallery, London, England, 
26th September–20th October 2009.
Class Wargames Presents Guy Debord’s ‘The Game of War’, Institute of 
Contemporary Interactive Art, University of Bath, Bath, England, 19th 
January–26th February 2011.
Tomorrow Never Dies – European Cultural Congress, Design Gallery, 
Wroclaw, Poland, 8th–11th September 2011.
Games People Play, Centre for Contemporary Art and the Natural World,
Haldon Forest Park, Exeter, England, 6th April–30th September 2012.
Invisible Forces, Furtherfield Gallery, McKenzie Pavilion, Finsbury Park,
London, England, 16th June–11th August 2012.
Performances
23rd October 2007 – London Games Festival Fringe, 01zero-one, Lon-
don, England. 
19th April 2008 – Salute ’08, Excel Centre, London, England.
26th April 2008 – The Institute of Psychoplasmics, Pump House Gallery, 
London, England.
10th May 2008 – 1968 & All That, Conway Hall, London, England.
31st October 2008 – Cold War Modern, Victoria & Albert Museum, 
London, England.
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27th November 2008 – Cyberfest 2008, State Hermitage Museum, St. 
Petersburg, Russia.
20th April 2009 – Guy Debord’s ‘The Game of War’, Universidade 
Federal do Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
29th April 2009 – Guy Debord’s ‘The Game of War’, Café com Letras, 
Belo Horizonte, Brazil.
25th July 2009 – Guy Debord’s ‘The Game of War’, Plan 9, Bristol, England.
26th–27th September 2009 – Guy Debord’s ‘The Game of War’, HTTP 
Gallery, London, England.
10th October 2009 – Crash/Crush Festival 2009, Bed Elze Gallery, The 
Hague, Netherlands.
27th October 2009 – Guy Debord’s ‘The Game of War’, Department of 
Media & Communications, University of Middlesex, London, England. 
8th November 2009 – Market Forces: Share International Festival of Arts 
and Digital Culture, Turin, Italy. 
14th November 2009 – Wunderbar Festival, Baltic Centre for 
Contemporary Art, Gateshead, England.
14th November 2009 – Guy Debord’s ‘The Game of War’, Estonian 
Academy of Arts, Tallinn, Estonia.
28th November 2009 – Guy Debord’s ‘The Game of War’, Yugoslav 
Workers’ Club, Lokativ, Vienna, Austria.
19th December 2009 – Resonance FM’s Media Playground, The Foundry, 
London, England. 
27th January 2010 – Guy Debord’s ‘The Game of War’, Housmans 
Bookshop, London, England.
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7th February 2010 – Transmediale 10, Haus der Kulturen der Welt, 
Berlin, Germany.
16th February 2010 – Class Wargames Presents Guy Debord’s ‘The Game 
of War’, Centre for the Study of Democracy, University of Westminster, 
London, England.
7th March 2010 – Gender & Politics Free School, London Free School, 
London, England.
21st March 2010 – Skill Share Bazaars of Haringey, Tottenham Chances, 
London, England. 
14th May 2010 – Birkbeck Debord Reading Group, Birkbeck College, 
London, England.
30th July 2010 – Parque del Sol 10, St. Pölten, Austria.
18th September 2010 – H.G. Wells Festival, Folkestone, England. 
13th October 2010 – What Is To Be Done? The Urgent Need to Struggle, 
ICA, London, England.
28th November 2010 – The Futurological Congress, Center for the History 
of East Central Europe, Lviv, Ukraine.
9th January 2011 – Artists’ Talk and ‘The Game of War’ Participatory 
Performance, Institute of Contemporary Interactive Art, Bath, England. 
26th February 2011 – Participatory Re-performance of H.G. Wells’ ‘Little 
Wars’, Institute of Contemporary Interactive Art, Bath, England.
19th June 2011 – Virtual Futures 2.0, University of Warwick, Coventry, 
England.
25th June 2011 – Guy Debord’s ‘The Game of War’ meets Vasily Chapayev, 
Vse Svobodny Bookstore and Literary Club, St. Petersburg, Russia. 
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2nd July 2011 – Guy Debord’s ‘The Game of War’ meets Takako Saito’s 
‘Liquor Chess’, Tsiolkovsky Bookstore, State Polytechnical Museum, 
Moscow, Russia.
27th July 2011 – Guy Debord’s ‘The Game of War’ meets ‘Chapayev and 
Void’, Galereya Revolutsija, Irkutsk, Russia.
24th August 2011 – Guy Debord’s ‘The Game of War’ meets McKenzie Wark’s 
‘Beach Beneath the Street’, Housmans Bookshop, London, England. 
2nd December 2011 – Guy Debord’s ‘The Game of War’ meets Takako Saito’s 
‘Liquor Chess’, Raylab, London, England. 
8th–9th June 2012 – Guy Debord’s ‘The Game of War’, Live-Art-Festival: 
Postspectaculism, Hamburg, Germany.
23rd June 2012 – Class Wargames Picnic & Subversion: Guy Debord’s ‘The 
Game of War’, Furtherfield Gallery, London, England.
30th June 2012 – Class Wargames Picnic & Subversion: 1791 Haitian 
Revolution version of Richard Borg’s ‘Commands & Colors: Napoleonics’, 
Furtherfield Gallery, London, England.
18th August 2012 – Guy Debord’s ‘The Game of War’, Centre for 
Contemporary Art and the Natural World, Exeter, England.
19th August 2012 – H.G. Wells’ ‘Little Wars’, Centre for Contemporary 
Art and the Natural World, Exeter, England.
28th October 2012 – Guy Debord’s ‘The Game of War’, Housmans 
Bookshop, London, England.
31st October 2012 – 1791 Haitian Revolution version of Richard Borg’s 
‘Commands & Colors: Napoleonics’, Housmans Bookshop, London, 
England.
12th December 2012 – Guy Debord’s ‘The Game of War’, Housmans 
Bookshop, London, England.
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24th March 2013 – Guy Debord’s ‘The Game of War’, Cowley Club, 
Brighton, England.
13th April 2013 – The Life & Legacy of C.L.R. James, WEA London 
Region, London, England.
23rd April 2013 – Playgrounds of Insubordination, Leipzig Centre for 
the History and Culture of East-Central Europe, University of Leipzig, 
Leipzig, Germany.
30th November 2013 – Spielsalon 2013, Kunsthalle Fredericianum, 
Kassel, Germany.
Class Wargames also hosted the Ludic Science Club at the FleaPit, 
London, England, in 2008–2009; and at Firebox, London, England, 
in 2013.
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Games Played on Campaign 2007–2013
Guy Debord, The Game of War (1977)
Historical Period
18th and 19th century Horse-and-Musket warfare.
Protagonists 
The players are divided into two teams of North or South.
Pieces
The armies of North and South are both made up of the same number 
of pieces: 9 infantry, 4 cavalry, 1 foot artillery, 1 horse artillery, 1 
marching general and 1 mounted general. Each unit occupies one 
square and no stacking is allowed. 
Board
The board is a 20 by 25 grid of 500 squares divided down the middle 
along its longest side. The North and South halves of the board 
are distinguished by the asymmetrical locations of their common 
geographical features: 2 arsenals, 3 fortresses and a mountain range 
broken by a pass. 
Movement
Taking alternative turns, the players of North and South can move up 
to 5 pieces of their armies on each go. Troops on horseback move two 
squares while those on foot move one square. Pieces can move both 
orthogonally and diagonally. Mountain squares are impassable. 
Combat
Each side is allowed to initiate one combat per turn. Infantry and 
artillery units are stronger in defence than attack. Cavalry pieces can 
charge the enemy which makes them stronger in attack than defence. 
Fortresses and passes give extra strength to their defenders and prevent 
the enemy’s cavalry charging. The outcome of combat is resolved by 
calculating the total points of the various units on both sides which 
can bring their combined strength to bear on the square under dispute. 
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If the defence is equal or stronger than the attack, this side wins. If 
the attack is one point stronger than the defence, the enemy unit has 
to retreat on its next turn or be eliminated. If it is two or more points 
stronger, then the defending piece is immediately removed from the 
board.   
Other Factors
Infantry, cavalry and artillery pieces can only move and fight if they 
are in direct or indirect contact with at least one of the two arsenals 
on their side of the board. These lines of communications radiate 
outwards either orthogonally or diagonally from the arsenals. The two 
generals can provide relay links for the supply route connecting a piece 
to its arsenal. Any unit which is attacked while out of contact with an 
arsenal is automatically destroyed.
Victory Conditions
The progress of the game is focused upon the North and the South’s 
attempts to outmanoeuvre each other’s army with the aim of breaking 
its lines of communications to its two arsenals. When a player occupies 
an enemy arsenal, they can only destroy it with their one allotted 
combat in the next move. Final victory is secured when one side 
captures both of its opponent’s arsenals.
Further Information 
The full set of rules for The Game of War can be found in Alice Becker-
Ho and Guy Debord’s eponymous book and on the Class Wargames 
website.
Chris Peers, Reds versus Reds (2008)
Historical Period
1917–1921 Russian Civil War.
Protagonists 
The players are divided into two teams of Bolsheviks or Social 
Democrats.
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Pieces
Both sides’ armies are made up of 28mm Russian Civil War figurines 
from Copplestone Castings’ Back of Beyond series. The Bolshevik army 
consists of 40 Kronstadt sailors, 40 regular soldiers, 1 Lewis machine-
gun team, 1 Maxim gun team, 2 commissars and Leon Trotsky. The 
Social Democratic army consists of 40 Czechoslovak Legionnaires, 40 
peasant militiamen, 1 Maxim gun team, 1 field artillery piece and a 
general.
Board
The terrain is constructed out of 28mm scale buildings, walls and trees 
which represent a village and its outskirts on the approach to Kazan in 
Tatarstan, Russia.
Movement
The Bolsheviks and Social Democrats move one unit alternately until 
they both have completed this part of the turn. The two armies can 
activate as many as their units as they want on each go. Infantry figurines 
and the Lewis machine-gun team move two 1-to-6 dice throws x 6 
inches (15 cm) in open terrain and one dice throw x 6 inches (15 cm) 
within the village. The Maxim gun team and the artillery piece move 
one dice throw x 6 inches (15 cm) in open terrain with penalties for 
moving within the village.
Combat
After all movement is completed, the two armies can engage in combat. 
Both ranged firing and hand-to-hand fighting are decided by throwing 
1-to-6 dice. Infantry with rifles and machine guns get bonuses if the 
enemy figurines are in close order and penalties if they’re at long range, 
stationary for that turn and/or behind cover. The Social Democrats’ 
artillery piece is aimed by this player guessing the coordinates of the 
target on the terrain. Riflemen and the artillery piece throw one dice, 
the Lewis machine-gun team get three dice and the Maxim gun team 
has six dice. One enemy figurine is removed if the final score is 4, 5 or 6. 
Hand-to-hand fighting is resolved in a similar manner with the soldiers 
on each side throwing 1-to-6 dice with bonuses for overwhelming odds 
and/or penalties for attacking someone in cover. If the final score is two 
or more than the opponent’s, the enemy figurine is killed and removed 
from the game.
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Other Factors
Any unit which suffers significant casualties must test its morale. If it 
throws a 1-to-6 dice score less than its designated morale rating, the 
unit is routed and flees off the board. The Kronstadt sailors and the 
Czechoslovak Legionnaires have a higher morale rating than regular 
troops and peasant militiamen. 
Bolshevik units can only move and fight if they are no further than 24 
inches (60 cm) from Leon Trotsky.
Leon Trotsky and the Bolshevik commissars can prevent a unit on their 
side from routing by shooting one of its soldiers.
The Czechoslovak Legion will withdraw from the board if one or more 
Bolshevik units reach the middle of the village.
Victory Conditions
The Bolsheviks win the game if they drive all of the Social Democrat 
units out of the village. The Social Democrats win if they don’t. 
The Bolsheviks immediately lose the game if Leon Trotsky is killed.
Further Information
The full set of rules for Reds versus Reds is available on the Class 
Wargames website.
Richard Borg, Commands & Colors: Napoleonics (2010)
Historical Period
1792–1815 Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars.
Protagonists 
In our 1802 battle of Fort Bedourete scenario, the players are divided 
into two teams of Haitian Jacobins or French Bonapartists.
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Pieces
The Haitian Jacobin army consists of 2 veteran infantry units, 5 regular 
infantry units, 3 militia units, 1 Parisian sans-culotte riflemen unit, 
1 heavy cavalry unit, 2 light cavalry units, 1 foot artillery unit, Jean-
Jacques Dessalines, Henri Christophe and Toussaint L’Ouverture. The 
French Bonapartist army consists of 2 French light infantry units, 5 
French line infantry units, 3 colonial infantry units, 1 colonial cavalry 
unit, 2 French foot artillery units, 2 generals and Charles Leclerc. Each 
unit occupies one hex and no stacking is allowed except for generals. 
Board
The board is a 13 by 9 grid of 97 hexes which represents Fort Bedourete 
and its immediate environs. The bastion is made up of 3 hexes on a 
hill in the centre of the board with a village hex to its west and a river 
running north to south to its east. There are wood and hill hexes along 
both sides of the river bank. There are also forest hexes scattered across 
the northern and southern edges of the board. 
Movement
The two armies take alternate turns. Each side is dealt 6 command 
cards from the pack provided with the game which are used to activate 
their units on the board and/or implement special actions. When a 
card is played, a new one is picked up. Units can only fight and move 
when activated by a command card except for Toussaint and the unit 
accompanying him. Each of the different types of infantry, cavalry and 
artillery units is able to move in any direction up to the number of 
hexes designated in the game’s army charts. Units must finish their 
move as soon as they enter a river, forest, fortification or village hex.
Combat
Both ranged fire and hand-to-hand combat are decided by throwing 
the special dice provided with the game. The number of dice thrown 
and their effects are determined by the type and quality of the units 
involved, firing range, the terrain of the hex and card bonuses. 
Depending upon the results of these dice throws, units can either lose 
one or more of their constituent blocks and/or be forced to retreat. 
Infantry can form squares to defend themselves against cavalry, but 
their side will temporarily be deprived of one command card until they 
 
24 25
come out of this formation. The presence of a general and/or nearby 
units will negate the effects of a dice throw forcing a retreat.
Other Factors
If in the same hex at any point during his move, Toussaint can activate 
one Haitian unit on every turn without needing a command card. This 
unit can only move when accompanied by Toussaint.
If Toussaint is in an adjacent hex to a French colonial militia unit, the 
Haitian player may throw one dice to persuade it to defect and join the 
cause of national liberation. 
Victory Conditions
Each army needs 6 flags to win the game. One flag is gained for each 
destroyed enemy unit and for the sole occupation of the hexes which 
make up Fort Bedourete. 
The Haitians immediately lose the game if Toussaint is either killed or 
captured. 
Further Information
The full set of rules is contained in GMT Games’ Commands & Colors: 
Napoleonics. The opening positions and special rules for the 1802 battle 
of Fort Bedourete scenario are available from the Class Wargames 
website.
H.G. Wells, Little Wars (1913)
Historical Period
Early-20th century industrialised warfare.
Protagonists 
The players are divided into two sides representing armies of the major 
powers just before the outbreak of the First World War in 1914.
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Pieces
Both sides’ armies are made up of 54mm Britains’ toy soldiers and 
cannon. Other manufacturers’ products can be used if they look like 
they might have been owned by Wells’ children. Each player’s army 
consists of 50 infantry figurines, 25 cavalry figurines and 3 artillery 
pieces.
Board
The terrain is constructed out of wooden block buildings, twigs 
representing trees and square wooden boards of different sizes for the 
hills.   
Movement
Taking turns, each side can activate all or some of its figurines on its 
go. Infantry can move up to 12 inches (30 cm) and cavalry can move 
up to 24 inches (60 cm). Artillery pieces can only move if they’re 
accompanied by at least four figurines. Depending upon the type of 
their crew, they will move at either infantry or cavalry speed. Artillery 
pieces cannot move and fire on the same turn.
Combat
Hand-to-hand combat is decided by comparing the number of figurines 
on each side in the melee. If they are equal, all of the soldiers on both 
sides are killed. The superior side takes prisoners of the numerical 
difference between the two sides if its opponent’s troops are too far 
away from the other soldiers of their army. The rest of this combat is 
resolved by removing equal numbers of figurines from both sides until 
the inferior side is eliminated.
As long as they’re accompanied by four or more figurines, artillery 
pieces can fire up to four matchsticks on each move. If a matchstick 
directly or indirectly hits an enemy soldier, it is immediately removed 
from the game.
Other Factors
The length of each player’s move is determined by the size of their army. 
They are allocated one minute for each group of 30 or less figurines and 
one minute for each artillery piece. As their army suffers casualties, the 
length of their move will diminish in proportion to its reduction in 
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size. As soon as their allotted time is over, players must immediately 
stop moving their army, engaging in hand-to-hand combat or firing 
artillery pieces.
Victory Conditions
The winner of the game is the player who kills all of the toy soldiers in 
the other side’s army first.
Further Information
The full set of rules for Little Wars is available in Wells’ eponymous 
book and on the Class Wargames website.

1.0: the art of war
‘The [Situationist] game is the 
spontaneous way [that] everyday 
life enriches and develops itself; 
the game is the conscious form of 
the supersession of spectacular art 
and politics. It is participation, 
communication and self-realisation 
resurrected … It is the means and 
the end of total revolution.’
The English Section of the Situationist International, 
The Revolution of Modern Art and the Art of Modern 
Revolution, page 21.
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1.1: Playing with Passion
On Saturday 26th April 2008, in the Pump House gallery of London’s 
Battersea Park, I found myself facing Fabian Tompsett across the 
board of Guy Debord’s The Game of War. Agreeing that I would play 
South and he would be North, we began by secretly writing down the 
deployment of our pieces on this simulated battlefield. As shown in 
Diagram 1 on page 110, the starting positions of these two rival armies 
diagonally mirrored each other. The South’s troops were concentrated 
on the east of the board while the North’s soldiers were grouped in 
front of its western arsenal. Winning the dice throw to decide who’d 
go first, Fabian made the opening move and I quickly responded with 
mine. For this match at the Pump House gallery, we’d both decided 
to adopt Napoléon Bonaparte’s winning strategy in the 1797 Italian 
campaign. Our main force would keep the enemy’s army pinned down 
in the centre while an outflanking cavalry attack – like that of the 
French raid led by Charles Dugua against the Austrian supply base at 
Trieste – would seize his undefended arsenal.1 As turn followed turn, 
Fabian and I soon got into the familiar rhythm of Debord’s game. We 
no longer had to consult the rules to know what we should be doing. 
We didn’t need a timer to hasten our decisions. Thanks to our teenage 
obsession with wargames, we were both endowed with an instinctive 
ability to manoeuvre our miniature armies to the maximum advantage 
over the board.
Within a half-dozen moves, the South’s western arsenal was no more 
and I was on the verge of taking the North’s eastern bastion. The 
contest at this point must have seemed equally balanced to most of 
the audience at the Pump House gallery, yet I knew that I was already 
losing the game. Foolishly, like the Prussian generals fighting Bonaparte 
in 1806, I’d let my troops in the centre become separated from each 
other. After one of its infantry pieces was taken in a skirmish on the 
open terrain between the two mountain ranges, my army was soon in 
rapid retreat to a more secure position as I desperately tried to avoid a 
1 See Emmanuel de Las Cases, Mémorial de Sainte-Hélène, pages 285–286; and David 
Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon, pages 122–125.
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repetition of the Duke of Brunswick’s humiliation at Jena-Auerstädt.2 
I’d lost the initiative on the battlefield and was fumbling for a response. 
Once again, Fabian had the psychological advantage over me. Only a 
week earlier at the Salute ’08 wargames convention, he had trounced 
me twice in quick succession. During the year that we’d been playing 
The Game of War, no one from our crew had been able to surpass him. 
Fabian was the master of the cunning attack and the impregnable 
defence. Above all, he understood how to intimidate his opponents 
into believing that they’d lost the game. For those in the know, the 
outcome of this match was preordained. At the Pump House gallery, 
I’d met my Waterloo. 
Then, suddenly, the impossible happened: Fabian made the fatal error 
of leaving his mounted general unprotected. Seizing the moment, I 
inflicted the blow which would clinch the game by launching a cavalry 
charge to take this vital piece. As with Joachim Murat’s division at 
the battle of Eylau in 1807, my brave warriors paid a high price for 
their audacity, but their sacrifice wasn’t in vain.3 Fabian had become 
Bonaparte in the 1812 Russian campaign. Deprived of the supply 
lines provided by its most mobile general, the strength of his army 
slowly dissipated with each move that it made towards the Moscow 
of my eastern arsenal.4 For almost an hour, Fabian tried everything to 
retrieve the situation. Like Bonaparte facing the combined might of 
aristocratic Europe in 1814, he used all of his tactical cunning to delay 
the strategically inevitable.5 But, at last, the decisive moment came: my 
infantry and artillery made an attack that succeeded in cutting Fabian’s 
army into two. With his forces helpless, he ruefully conceded the game. 
The emperor had been forced to abdicate his throne. Still not quite able 
to believe what had just happened, I raised my arms in triumph and 
 
2 See Carl von Clausewitz, Notes sur la Prusse dans sa Grande Catastrophe 1806, pages 
81–135; and David Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon, pages 467–497.
3 See David Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon, pages 535–551.
4 See Carl von Clausewitz, The Campaign of 1812 in Russia, pages 94–100; and 
Michael Josselson & Diana Josselson, The Commander: a life of Barclay de Tolly, 
pages 91–165.
5 See Carl von Clausewitz, Campagne de 1814; and David Chandler, The Campaigns 
of Napoleon, pages 945–1004.
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exclaimed: “I’ve won! I’ve won!! I’ve won!!!”  After so many defeats at 
his hands, victory over Fabian was sweet.6 
6 Photos of this game can be seen in the Events 2008 section of the Class Wargames 
website.
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1.2: The Exhibition Piece
When Fabian and I fought our exciting match of The Game of War at 
the Pump House gallery in 2008, Class Wargames was still a regiment 
of raw recruits on this simulated battlefield. Founded in the previous 
year, all of our members had – in their different ways – been heavily 
influenced by the practical innovations and theoretical insights of the 
Situationist International. What had initially brought us together was 
our curiosity about the puzzling absence of any detailed discussion 
of Debord’s The Game of War in the increasing number of laudatory 
journalistic and academic accounts of this New Left movement’s 
impressive achievements. For these admirers, his ludic experiment 
was nothing more than a poetic metaphor for Debord’s pugnacious 
attitude to life. Serious grown-ups would never waste their valuable 
time actually playing this frivolous diversion. However, in his 1989 
autobiography, Debord had proudly insisted that The Game of War was 
his most important legacy to the future generations: a ludic meditation 
on the Situationists’ many years of hard fighting against the class 
enemy.7 But, when we read the contemporary hagiographies of the 
International, we would find only the briefest mention of the long 
hours that he’d dedicated to designing and refining this board game. 
For today’s hipster artists, political dissidents and radical intellectuals, 
discovering that their Situationist hero was a nerdy male wargamer was 
an embarrassment which had to be passed over as quickly as possible.8 
Unconvinced by this dubious rewriting of history, we’d formed Class 
Wargames to investigate why Debord had been so convinced that his 
military simulation was the culmination of his life’s work as a cultural 
and political revolutionary. Our vital task would be to promulgate a 
new subversive wisdom: playing The Game of War was the prerequisite 
for understanding how to apply the insights of Situationism in the 
early-21st century. 
Our 2008 event at the Pump House gallery was only Class Wargames’ 
7 See Guy Debord, Panegyric, pages 63–64.
8 ‘Even among the inadequate milieu of hobbies, wargaming ranked very low. The 
non-believer regarded it – at best – as the province of socially inadequate geeks, at 
worst of gun-toting belligerents.’ Harry Pearson, Achtung Schweinehund!, page 98.
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third public performance of Debord’s greatest creation. Crucially, 
despite having successfully mastered the mechanics of this military 
simulation, we then still didn’t fully comprehend the cultural and 
political teachings embedded within The Game of War. Rereading his 
marvellous memoir, we’d discovered that Debord believed that he’d 
lived his own life according to the rules of his ludic masterpiece. For 
one of the more perceptive chroniclers of Situationism, this intimate 
revelation meant that The Game of War was undoubtedly his  ‘… most 
autobiographical work’.9 Over the next few years, Class Wargames would 
come to appreciate the profoundness of this smart analysis. When the 
contest at the Pump House gallery had taken place in 2008, we were 
at the beginning of a long campaign of ludic mischief which would 
span three continents across the globe. Little did we then realise, Class 
Wargames had embarked on our own idiosyncratic recapitulation of 
Debord’s wonderful career. As exemplified by the Pump House match, 
the first phase of this campaign was focused upon promoting The Game 
of War as a Situationist leftfield artwork. As we gained experience by 
repeatedly playing Debord’s simulation, the members of our collective 
would soon find themselves also following his personal trajectory from 
cultural sabotage into communist agitation. In this second stage of 
our campaign of ludic subversion, Class Wargames would increasingly 
celebrate The Game of War as Debord’s masterpiece of Situationist 
political propaganda. Inspired by his love of toy soldiers, we would also 
reinforce this offensive manoeuvre by playing hobbyist wargames, such 
as Chris Peers’ Reds versus Reds, Richard Borg’s Commands & Colors: 
Napoleonics and H.G. Wells’ Little Wars. Every deadly weapon must be 
mobilised for the revolutionary cause. 
By becoming hardened veterans of mock combat, Class Wargames 
was eventually able to move into the third phase of this campaign 
of ludic subversion. At our 2008 event in the Pump House gallery, 
we’d distributed a leaflet which confidently described The Game of 
War as a ‘Clausewitz simulator’ without truly realising what we were 
9 Vincent Kaufman, Guy Debord, page 267. Also see Guy Debord, Panegyric, pages 
63–64.
34 35
saying.10 It would take four years of playing and research before 
Class Wargames was ready to embrace the pedagogical possibilities 
of Debord’s enthusiasm for refighting past conflicts. By moving their 
model armies across a miniature terrain, the participants at our public 
performances of The Game of War, Reds versus Reds, Commands & 
Colors: Napoleonics and Little Wars were learning the military theory 
which would be required to secure a decisive proletarian victory on the 
social battlefield. Our campaign had opened with an attack of aesthetic 
disruption which was next followed by an audacious assault of political 
proselytism. For this third stage of our ludic offensive, we would now 
devote our energies as members of Class Wargames to disseminating 
the skills of revolutionary leadership amongst the masses. Every worker 
had to know how to defeat the capitalist enemy. 
Back in 2008, when the Pump House match was being played, we’d 
been far from possessing these key insights into Debord’s insurgent 
ambitions for The Game of War. At this point in time, promoting 
Situationist political propaganda and military pedagogy were the – as yet 
undefined – goals of future phases of our campaign of ludic subversion. 
Instead, on that hot summer afternoon in Battersea Park, the opening 
stage of this offensive against spectacular domination was dedicated to 
advancing boldly on the front of heterodox art. Tellingly, as soon as the 
contest between Fabian and I was concluded, the members of Class 
Wargames couldn’t celebrate the success of our event over a drink in 
the Battersea Park café until we’d carried out one last very important 
task. Before the Pump House gallery opened the next morning, our 
facsimile of The Game of War had to be returned to its allotted place 
in Pil and Galia Kollectiv’s The Institute of Psychoplasmics exhibition. 
During the six weeks of their fabulous show, its gold-and-silver board 
and pieces were on display alongside paintings by Seth Coston, pottery 
by Francis Upritchard and a video installation by Amanda Beech in an 
upstairs room.11 Discerning visitors to the gallery would have instantly 
recognised our contribution to this show from the striking black and 
10 See Class Wargames, ‘Communiqué #1’. The 1965 prototype of The Game of War 
was entitled Kriegspiel Clausewitz-Debord. See Emmanuel Guy, ‘Où l’on Fait le 
Portrait de Guy Debord à Travers les Livres et son Jeu de la Guerre’, page 178. 
11 For more about these other participants in the exhibition, see Pil and Galia Kollectiv, 
The Institute of Psychoplasmics.
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white photographs of Guy Debord and Alice Becker-Ho playing The 
Game of War in his valedictory 1978 film: In Girum Imus Nocte et 
Consumimur Igni.12 Now, for the first time, they could appreciate his 
ludic experiment in all of its metallic glory. Thanks to a small grant 
from the London Games Festival Fringe ‘07, Class Wargames had been 
able to build a twice-sized replica of Debord’s 1977 original design 
for The Game of War. In an intense burst of co-operative labour, we’d 
transformed 15 kilograms of pewter – along with some aluminium, 
wood and screws – into an exquisite artwork. Standing at waist height, 
our gold-and-silver recreation of The Game of War glistened seductively 
in the summer sun inside the whitewashed ambience of the Pump 
House gallery. Laid out in the opening positions in their book of the 
game, the pieces on the board commemorated the historical moment 
in the Auvergne when Debord and his partner began playing this 
exemplary contest.13 All that was missing were these two Situationists 
moving abstract shapes across a stark grid in search of victory. Within 
the sanctified space of The Institute of Psychoplasmics exhibition, playing 
at war had become a beautiful artwork.
Opened in 1999 during a refurbishment of Battersea Park, the Pump 
House gallery was the beneficiary of an ambitious lottery-funded 
investment in cultural institutions undertaken by the British state.14 
For most of the 20th century, public subsidies for contemporary 
art had been justified on moral and aesthetic grounds. Culture was 
a respite from economics. But, by the time that Tony Blair was 
elected prime minister in 1997, his New Labour government had 
embraced a much more utilitarian concept of art. Under neoliberal 
globalisation, manufacturing was irreversibly shifting from the North 
to the South. Like other developed countries, Britain would have 
to earn its living from the expanding businesses of the information 
society: banking, consultancy, computing and the media. According 
to Blair’s gurus, the building of new museums, galleries and concert 
venues acted as a catalyst for this post-Fordist restructuring of the 
12 See Guy Debord, In Girum Imus Nocte et Consumimur Igni, pages 149–150, 177, 
185–186, 194; and the cover band of Alice Becker-Ho and Guy Debord, Le Jeu de 
la Guerre.
13 See Alice Becker-Ho and Guy Debord, A Game of War, page 39.
14 See Pump House Gallery, ‘About Us’.
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national economy.15 With London as second only to New York as a 
marketplace for contemporary art, high culture was itself a growing 
sector of employment.16 More importantly, cities across the world were 
now in competition to provide an attractive environment for a new 
generation of entrepreneurs and workers: the ‘creative class’. Educated, 
tolerant and mobile, they congregated in those locations which 
nurtured their hipster lifestyles – and the companies which wanted to 
employ them would inevitably follow them there.17 For New Labour, 
public subsidies for art institutions provided the urban infrastructure 
for these burgeoning creative industries. Culture was the cutting-edge 
of economics.18 
Although the initial capital investment for the Pump House gallery came 
from a New Labour initiative, it was the local Conservative-controlled 
council that had covered the costs of The Institute of Psychoplasmics 
exhibition. In early-21st century England, even parsimonious Tories 
were willing to spend taxpayers’ money on experimental art shows. 
For what had once been an affront to bourgeois good taste was now 
a pragmatic vote-winning policy. Contemporary artists like Damien 
Hirst and Tracey Emin were media celebrities. The Tate Modern had 
become the most popular tourist venue in London. Gallery openings 
were reported like the launches of new films, plays or albums. 
Multinational corporations and banks eagerly sponsored exhibitions 
and bought up innovative works for their own collections. Modern art 
had become mainstream in Blair’s Britain.19
Paradoxically, the popularity of looking at unique or rare objects in a 
gallery space was boosted by the rapid spread of computing, the Net and 
mobile telephony across the world. With more and more time spent 
15 See Stuart Hall and Martin Jacques, New Times; and Geoff Mulgan, Connexity.
16 See Chris Smith, Creative Britain; and GLA Economics, Creativity. 
17 For the manifesto of this post-industrial economic strategy, see Richard Florida, The 
Rise of the Creative Class. The antecedents of this prophecy are traced in Richard 
Barbrook, The Class of the New. 
18 Labour’s arts minister calculated that the creative industries in 1998 contributed ‘... 
almost 4 per cent of [Britain’s] GDP.’ Chris Smith, Creative Britain, page 15.
19 See Julian Stallabrass, Contemporary Art, pages 50–100; and and GLA Economics, 
Creativity.
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staring at screens, visiting exhibitions offered a visceral alternative for 
those immersed within the virtual environment. Like fans of live music 
and theatre, gallery audiences savoured the pleasures of a transient 
and physical experience. Crucially, whether from the classroom or the 
media, increasing numbers of people were now knowledgeable about 
contemporary art. When they went to a gallery, they were able to 
recognise and understand what they saw there.20 Back in the 1990s, the 
YBAs had achieved celebrity status first in England and then globally 
by mixing and matching from iconic late-20th century art movements: 
Abstract Expressionism, Pop, Conceptualism and Minimalism.21 
Both these artists and their admirers were determined to appropriate 
the aesthetic genealogy of modern sensibility. Contemporary art was 
the heir of a long and hallowed tradition of insurrectionary cultural 
movements: the avant-garde. 
Since the early-19th century, each generation had witnessed a small 
group of young artists declaring war upon the conventional tastes 
of their elders. By adopting the avant-garde moniker from the brave 
soldiers who scouted the way forward for the main body of an army on 
campaign, these radicals proclaimed themselves as the pioneers of the 
future in the present.22 Across the decades, these cliques have opened 
their offensive against the old order by embracing the four leitmotifs 
of cultural subversion: innovative aesthetics, new technologies, 
bohemian lifestyles and radical politics. Although initially rebuffed 
with hostility or indifference, these avant-garde movements had 
eventually triumphed over the arbiters of good taste. Fortunately, as 
soon as one surge of artistic insurgency had become respectable, the 
next cohort of young dissidents would quickly emerge to challenge 
20 For the steady growth in art audiences, see Mayor of London, Cultural Strategy, 
pages 72–84. 
21 YBAs was the trendy acronym for Young British Artists such as Damien Hirst, 
Tracey Emin, Sarah Lucas and the Chapman brothers, see Julian Stallabrass, High 
Art Lite; and Brook Adams, Lisa Jardine, Martin Maloney, Norman Rosenthal and 
Richard Shone, Sensation.
22 The most popular training manual of 19th warfare laid down that: ‘The ... advanced 
guard should be composed of light troops of all arms, containing some of the élite 
troops of the army as a main body, a few dragoons prepared to fight on foot, some 
horse artillery, pontooniers, sappers, etc. ...’ Antoine-Henri de Jomini, The Art of 
War, page 264. Emphasis in original.
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this new stylistic orthodoxy.23 When the Tate Modern opened in 2000, 
its curators had prominently displayed a timeline of the leading 20th 
century avant-garde groups and their most famous members across one 
wall of the third floor concourse of the gallery. For the mandarins of 
‘Cool Britannia’, the grand narrative of modern art was a history of its 
rebellious artists.24  
There could be no doubt that The Institute of Psychoplasmics exhibition 
at the Pump House gallery was showcasing the recreation of a lost 
classic of the 20th century’s cultural upheavels. By adopting a minimal 
aesthetic, Debord had identified The Game of War with an illustrious 
avant-garde heritage. In their simplicity, its gold-and-silver board and 
pieces evoked Aleksandr Rodchenko’s red-and-black Chess set for the 
USSR Workers’ Club at the 1925 Exposition Internationale des Arts 
Décoratifs in Paris. Even more strikingly, the forts on the South side 
of the board closely resembled the castles in Marcel Duchamp’s Buenos 
Aires Chess Set 1918–19.25  For the hip audience of the Pump House 
gallery, Debord had chosen his historical references well. In exhibitions, 
books and lecture halls across the world, Rodchenko and Duchamp 
were lauded as heroic figures who’d helped to define the new aesthetic 
of the machine age: Modernism. Emerging from the turbulent times 
of the First World War and the 1917 Russian Revolution, it was their 
generation of radical artists that marked the final break with the 
cultural shibboleths of the 19th century art establishment. Symbolism 
and abstraction now superseded realism and ornamentation. During 
the 1920s, Rodchenko and Duchamp were at the forefront of the 
transformation of this new style into a fully-fledged multi-media 
phenomenon of paintings, sculptures, readymades, poetry, novels, 
plays, prints, posters, music, fashion, photography, films and – last but 
23 See Raymond Williams, The Politics of Modernism, pages 31–80; and Peter Bürger, 
Theory of the Avant-Garde.
24 See Sara Fanelli, Tate Artist Timeline. In the late-1990s, Cool Britannia was a briefly 
fashionable phrase which identified the YBAs and Britpop bands with the reforming 
early years of the New Labour government, see Dick Pountain and David Robins, 
Cool Rules, pages 174–5: and John Harris, The Last Party, pages 242–3, 325–328, 
355–360.
25 See Margarita Tupitsyn, Rodchenko & Popova, page 119; and Larry List, ‘Chess as 
Art’, page 136.
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not least – games.26 For both artists, creating their Chess sets contributed 
to the democratisation of the Modernist aesthetic. Symbolism and 
abstraction mustn’t be confined to the gallery within industrial society. 
When Chess sets became mass produced Modernist artworks, every 
pawn could dream of being a queen. 
By sampling the iconography of Rodchenko and Duchamp for The 
Game of War, Debord was doing much more than showing respect to 
a couple of early-20th century style gurus. At the peak of their careers, 
both artists had been leading figures in the two celebrated avant-garde 
movements that today still epitomise the emancipatory potential of 
the creative imagination: Constructivism and Surrealism. Many of 
their illustrious peers had confined their ambitions to overturning 
the establishment’s aesthetic orthodoxy. Modernism meant making 
innovative work with a contemporary sensibility. However, for 
Rodchenko and Duchamp, this cultural rebellion was only a means 
to an end. Enthusiastically identifying themselves with the utopian 
promises of the Bolshevik leadership of the 1917 Russian Revolution, 
they were members of avant-garde movements dedicated to inventing 
new forms of expression which could spark off an all-encompassing 
social transformation. On the one hand, the Constructivists – like 
their Bauhaus comrades in Germany – applied their aesthetic skills 
to designing the everyday objects that would make a better world for 
working people. On the other hand, the Surrealists created disturbing 
imagery which – by tapping into the unconscious – would liberate 
the minds of the masses. These two avant-garde movements had 
adopted different artistic strategies, but they both shared the same 
political aspiration. By overthrowing the stifling conventions of 
bourgeois taste, its members hoped to endow the proletariat with the 
intellectual confidence to join the revolutionary Left and begin the task 
of building a new world. In the Constructivists’ and Surrealists’ avant- 
 
 
 
 
 
26 See Christina Lodder, Russian Constructivism; and Jacqueline Chénieux-Gendron, 
Surrealism, pages 29–110.
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garde interpretation, Modernism meant making cutting-edge art with 
a Bolshevik sensibility.27  
Fulfilling this imperative in their Chess sets, Rodchenko and Duchamp 
had done much more than transform a humble object into a thing of 
beauty. For them, these artworks contributed to furthering the collective 
liberation of humanity. Constructivist and Surrealist Chess sets proved 
that it was the exploited – not the exploiters – who now owned the 
imaginary future: the promise of better times to come in the present. 
Like political militants of the Bolshevik party, radical artists from these 
avant-garde movements were opening the way forward for the main 
forces of the proletarian offensive against monopoly capitalism. Their 
vital role involved not only leading the assault against the cultural 
dominance of the bourgeoisie, but also inspiring the working masses 
with visionary imagery. Avant-garde artists were Red Guards on the 
aesthetic front of the class war.28
It is not surprising that the strong influence of Duchamp’s Buenos Aires 
Chess Set can be detected in Debord’s design for The Game of War. 
For dissidents growing up in 1950s France, the Surrealists epitomised 
the revolutionary daring of the previous generation. Radicalised by 
the disaster of the First World War, Duchamp and his comrades had 
seen their aesthetic mission as breaking the hegemony of bourgeois 
ideology over the general public.29 For these avant-garde provocateurs, 
the subversive power of their artworks was confirmed by rejection and 
hostility from the defenders of tradition. Each exhibition, film show, 
performance or publication was a guerrilla raid into enemy territory.30 
Imitating the fierce rhetoric and ideological intensity of a Bolshevik 
sect, this avant-garde movement had unashamedly identified its 
27 See Christina Lodder, Russian Constructivism; Éva Forgács, The Bauhaus Idea and 
Bauhaus Politics, pages 38–45, 182–193; and Helena Lewis, Dada Turns Red, pages 
26–96.
28 See Raymond Williams, The Politics of Modernism, pages 37–48; and Peter Bürger, 
Theory of the Avant-Garde, pages 47–59.
29 See André Breton, ‘Legitimate Defence’; and Helena Lewis, Dada Turns Red, pages 
26–36.
30 See Surrealist Group, ‘Manifesto of the Surrealists Concerning L’Age d’Or’; and 
Helena Lewis, Dada Turns Red, pages 92–96.
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impressive aesthetic and technical innovations with the Communist 
cause. The name of their magazine proudly affirmed their collective 
identity: Surrealism In The Service Of The Revolution. Leon Trotsky 
was the comrade general of these avant-garde artists – and they were 
aesthetic partisans of the Trotskyist Fourth International.31
In their movement’s formative period, the Surrealists had enjoyed how 
the psychological serendipities of chance were revealed in the Victorian 
game of constructing random verbal or visual sequences: Exquisite 
Corpse. When played with insight, such childish pastimes were able to 
free the creative imagination from the confines of capitalist rationality.32 
Building upon this Surrealist insight, Duchamp had declared that Chess 
too was an artwork. Throughout his long career, its black-and-white 
chequered board and the Staunton pieces didn’t just provide evocative 
political and sexual metaphors for his paintings, readymades, sculptures 
and films.33 Duchamp argued that a revolutionary aesthetic experience 
could also be found within the patterns and rhythms of Chess itself. The 
‘mechanical dance’ of Black and White moving their pieces across the 
board was a non-utilitarian activity which satisfyingly realised the anti-
bourgeois ambitions of avant-garde art. By the 1930s, this enthusiastic 
amateur was not only a leading light of his local club, but also playing 
in international tournaments and writing match reports for the press. 
A decade earlier, André Breton – the pope of Surrealism – had teasingly 
predicted that his friend Duchamp was in danger of giving up art for 
Chess. However, the pioneer of readymades had an irrefutable response 
to this prognosis. Duchamp was an avant-garde artist – and he’d 
decided that playing Chess was making Modernist art.34
In the 1930s, Alberto Giacometti added his own quirky contribution to 
this Surrealist fascination with games by producing an unsettling series 
of ludic sculptures. While Duchamp had looked for artistic heterodoxy 
31 See André Breton, Diego Rivera and Leon Trotsky, ‘Towards a Free Revolutionary 
Art’; and Helena Lewis, Dada Turns Red, pages 77–92, 140–160.
32 See Alastair Brotchie and Mel Gooding, Surrealist Games, pages 10–12. 
33 Howard Staunton was the mid-19th century English Chess champion who 
appropriately lent his name to the ubiquitous set design of the industrial epoch, see 
Richard Eales, Chess, pages 137–138.
34 See Francis Naumann and Bradley Bailey, Marcel Duchamp: the art of Chess.
42 43
in the movement of the Chess pieces, his comrade instead mocked 
the alienation of everyday life by ensuring that his creations were 
unplayable.35 Ironically, by confounding their true purpose, Giacometti 
had also inadvertently revealed how games could be domesticated 
within the gallery system. By emphasising their purposelessness 
and uniqueness, his avant-garde artworks set themselves apart from 
the mass produced amusements of consumer capitalism. In contrast 
with Duchamp’s Chess sets, Giacometti’s sculptures excluded any 
participation by the audience in the creative process. His Surrealist 
games were games without players. The board and pieces had become 
objects of contemplation for visitors in a gallery.
When New York took over from Paris as the capital of Modernism in the 
late-1940s, its artistic stars and critics had initially shown little interest 
in Duchamp’s and Giacometti’s  ludic experiments. Clement Greenberg 
and his acolytes were much more concerned with how Surrealism had 
anticipated the anti-realist aesthetics of Abstract Expressionism.36 
It was not until the early-1960s that the Fluxus group rediscovered 
the subversive possibilities of art games. Coordinated by George 
Maciunas, this avant-garde movement’s performances, exhibitions and 
publications were dedicated to breaking down the barriers between its 
artists and their audiences.37 In 1964, inspired by Duchamp’s example, 
Fluxus began issuing a series of special Chess sets designed by Takako 
Saito. Instead of being identified by shape, their pieces were recognised 
through smell, sound or tactile sensation. Designed to befuddle its 
players, she famously created a set made out of glasses filled with 
coloured alcoholic drinks: Liquor Chess.38 Contributing to this project, 
Yoko Ono in 1966 expressed her outrage at the American invasion 
of Vietnam by constructing the Play It By Trust (All White Chess Set) 
which wittily sabotaged the game’s competitive mechanism by making 
all of the squares on the board and both sides’ pieces in the colour 
that symbolised peace within Western culture. Inspired by Giacometti, 
35 See Mary Flanagan, Critical Play, pages 90–93.
36 See Clement Greenberg, ‘Avant-garde and Kitsch’; and T.J. Clark, ‘Clement 
Greenberg’s Theory of Art’.
37 Macunias had been an inveterate wargamer since childhood, see Emmett Williams 
and Ann Noel, Mr Fluxus, pages 15–16.
38 See Carolus Chess, ‘Takako Saito’.
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this New York avant-garde movement also began including rules for 
participatory games in its series of Fluxboxes along with the texts, scores 
and sculptures which so delighted the recipients of these miniature 
artworks. Like a DIY version of the group’s live performances, these 
ludic experiments promised that everyone now had the opportunity 
to make Modernist art.39 Unfortunately, as those who did try to follow 
their instructions soon discovered, the influence of Giacometti on these 
games wasn’t entirely benign. Confounding their radical aspirations, 
the playability of the Fluxboxes was always secondary to their aesthetic 
impact.40
Living in the epicentre of Cold War Modernism, the best of New 
York’s artists had by the 1960s learnt from Duchamp’s readymades 
how to transform the imagery of consumer capitalism into Pop Art. 
Andy Warhol’s Factory was the 1920s European vision of multi-media 
creativity in its improved and efficient American version: a cultural 
production line of paintings, prints, photography, films, publications 
and music.41 But, for those with a more radical imagination in the 
1960s, a revival of the revolutionary ambitions of the 1920s avant-
garde movements promised much more. Another iteration of 
Modernism could only deliver stylistic and technical innovations. 
What was needed instead was a radical cultural shift that would 
catalyse a profound social transformation. Excited by this avant-
garde prophecy, artists on both sides of the Atlantic began staging 
interactive performances and exhibitions in their search for new ways 
to express collective forms of creativity. By inviting the audience to 
participate in making their artworks, they weren’t just ensuring that 
these happenings were spontaneous and ephemeral experiences which 
escaped the stultifying control of curators, collectors and critics.42 Best 
of all, these new forms of Surrealist gaming did have multiple players. 
In his manifesto on the organisation of happenings, Michael Kirby 
proclaimed the ambitious goal of this new avant-garde: ‘… to “break 
39 See Celia Pearce, ‘The Aesthetics of Play’, pages 69–72; and Thomas Kellein, Fluxus.
40 See Mary Flanagan, Critical Play, pages 112–113; and Thomas Kellein, Fluxus.
41 See Marco Livingstone, Pop Art, pages 62–91, 114–139, 194–219; and Andy 
Warhol, Popism.
42 See Michael Kirby, Happenings; and Mariellen Sandford, Happenings and Other Acts. 
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down” the “barrier” between presentation and spectator and to make 
the passive viewer [into] a more active participator.’43
On 27th May 1963, the Smolin gallery in New York hosted the one and 
only performance of The First and Second Wilderness: a Civil War Game. 
With Kirby as the master of ceremonies, a group of artists staged their 
recreation of this bloody confrontation in the 1861–5 American struggle 
to crush the slave owners’ rebellion.44 Four Union and Confederate 
generals in full uniform ordered infantry, cavalry and artillery pieces 
to be moved 1 or 2 squares across a gridded map laid out on the floor. 
As the game progressed, American football cheerleaders explained its 
rules, resolved combats with a spinner, updated the score board and 
kept up a running commentary on the action to the accompaniment 
of the taped noises of firing weapons and galloping cavalry. Watching 
on, the audience cheered or booed as the two sides won or lost pieces 
and territory in this theatrical contest. As its grand finale, the evening 
culminated in the burning of the Wilderness scenery along with a 
slideshow of death and destruction photographs from the original 
1864 battlefield.45 The New York avant-garde had won an interesting 
aesthetic victory on that evening. Building upon the achievements of 
the Constructivists and the Surrealists, they’d successfully transformed 
playing wargames into making art.
43 Michael Kirby, ‘The New Theatre’, page 43. For the Surrealist antecedents of this 
imperative, see Peter Bürger, Theory of the Avant-Garde, page 53.
44 The First and Second Wilderness battles took place between  5th–12th May 1864, see 
James McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, pages 718–734.
45 See Michael Kirby, ‘The First and Second Wilderness’.
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1.3: History Repeating Itself 
By displaying our replica of The Game of War in the Pump House gallery, 
Class Wargames was making its contribution to the rediscovery of this 
forgotten icon of 20th century avant-garde art. In this first phase of our 
campaign of ludic subversion, our activities were devoted to upholding 
the Situationist banner of cultural rebellion. For the knowledgeable 
visitors to the show in Battersea Park, Debord’s gold-and-silver board 
and pieces were clearly in the lineage of the earlier Modernist artworks 
of Rodchenko, Duchamp, Giacometti, Saito, Ono, Maciunas and 
Kirby. Yet, paradoxically, the inclusion of The Game of War within 
The Institute of Psychoplasmics exhibition had required the temporary 
prevention of its primary purpose: enabling two sides to engage in 
simulated combat against each other. Inside the gallery space, the 
pieces were laid out on the board in the starting positions for the match 
in Becker-Ho and Debord’s eponymous book.46 However, there were 
no chairs for North and South to sit at the table and begin playing the 
game. Should any curious visitor try to pick up the pieces, they would 
quickly discover that they were firmly stuck to the board with museum 
wax. If spotted, they risked the embarrassment of the curatorial staff 
scolding them for touching the exhibits. When placed inside the Pump 
House gallery, The Game of War became a museum object. As with one 
of Giacometti’s ludic sculptures, there was no next move.
There was poignancy in this immobility. Back in 1977, Debord had set 
up a company with his publisher Gérard Lebovici to manufacture and 
distribute The Game of War: Les Jeux Stratégiques et Historiques. Like 
Duchamp marketing his Chess sets and Maciunas selling Fluxboxes by 
mail order, these two conspirators embarked on a publicity campaign 
to promote their first product. The four hand crafted metal sets which 
featured in the iconic photographs from In Girum Imus Nocte were 
commissioned. Debord and Becker-Ho wrote their book of the game. 
The rules were published in both French and English. Plans were made 
to manufacture cheap cardboard copies of The Game of War. Debord 
was convinced that his company had a potential best-seller on its hands 
 
46 See Alice Becker-Ho and Guy Debord, A Game of War, page 39.
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which would soon join Chess, Draughts and Bridge as a game played 
in the cafés, clubs and homes of the more proletarian and bohemian 
neighbourhoods. Everyone could be a player of The Game of War.47 
Then, on 5th March 1984, Lebovici was murdered in a Mafia-style hit 
by an unknown assassin in a Paris underground car park. Deprived 
of its generous patron, the promotional campaign for The Game of 
War went into terminal crisis. Debord even stopped showing his films 
in France and withdrew his books from publication in protest at the 
brutal murder of his friend.48 On that fateful evening in 1984, The 
Game of War had lost its key player – and was almost forgotten for the 
next few decades. When Class Wargames’ facsimile was put on show 
in the Pump House gallery, the frozen pieces of the 1977 gold-and-
silver set became a disturbing memorial to those harsher times in which 
Debord’s game had been invented. 
In spring 2008, the gold-and-silver pieces of our replica were 
temporarily immobilised in The Institute of Psychoplasmics exhibition 
for a dialectical purpose: seducing the Pump House’s audience into 
making the next move for themselves. Intrigued visitors could purchase 
the recently published English translation of Debord and Becker-Ho’s 
book with its cardboard game in the gallery shop – or download RSG’s 
unauthorised computer version.49  Participation not contemplation 
should take precedence when appreciating this avant-garde artwork. A 
year earlier in spring 2007, Class Wargames’ first attempts to play The 
Game of War had used a homebrew board and pieces made from my 
early-1970s teenage collection of 16th century Hapsburg and Ottoman 
toy soldiers. Inspired by the discovery of its rules in the back of Len 
Bracken’s biography, we’d come together to find out whether this 
ludic experiment was worth investigating.50 By carefully studying the 
moves of Debord’s match with Becker-Ho in their book, we eventually 
worked out the formal structure of this ritualised combat. Much to our 
 
47 See Alice Becker-Ho and Guy Debord, A Game of War, page 7; and Alex Galloway, 
‘Debord’s Nostalgic Algorithm’.
48 See Guy Debord, Considerations on the Assassination of Gérard Lebovici.
49 See Guy Debord and Alice Becker-Ho, A Game of War; and Radical Software Group, 
Kriegspiel. 
50 See Len Bracken, Guy Debord – Revolutionary, pages 240–251. 
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surprise and delight, the members of Class Wargames enjoyed playing 
The Game of War.51
In a serendipitous coincidence with the imperialist demonology 
of the 2000s, the recycled Hapsburg and Ottoman figurines of our 
home-made set mimicked the conflict between the Christian West 
and the Muslim East in the US government’s War on Terror. Taking 
inspiration from this DIY version, we wondered whether the imminent 
40th anniversary of the May ’68 French Revolution could be celebrated 
by re-imagining Debord’s game as a conflict between protesters and 
police on the streets of Paris. For the Left’s pieces, infantry would 
be represented as workers, cavalry as students and artillery as rioters 
with Molotov cocktails. The mounted general had to be Guy Debord 
and, for the marching general, Daniel Cohn-Bendit – the instigator 
of the student protests at Nanterre University that had sparked off 
this uprising – would be a good choice. For the forces of reaction, the 
remix was also obvious: infantry as street cops, cavalry as riot police, 
artillery as tear gas grenadiers, the mounted general as French President 
Charles de Gaulle and the marching general as his prime minister 
Georges Pompidou. With the pieces sorted, the board’s terrain features 
could easily be given a Paris 1968 makeover. The fortresses would be 
turned into street barricades, the mountains into apartment blocks, 
the passes into alleyways and the arsenals into television centres or 
newspaper headquarters. Enthused, we contacted Mark Copplestone 
– one of England’s top figurine designers – to find out whether he’d 
be interested in making the pieces for this new set as a member of the 
Class Wargames collective.52 The May ‘68 version of The Game of War 
would be the must-have souvenir of the 40th anniversary of the almost 
revolution of the baby boomer generation.
Fortunately, Rod Dickinson had a much better idea. Around the cover 
of the 2006 Gallimard edition of Le Jeu de la Guerre was a purple 
band with a vivid colour photograph of Debord’s 1977 set design. He 
insisted in our group meetings that Class Wargames had to build its 
51 In contrast, as a warning to all leftist games designers, the admirable politics of 
Bertell Ollman’s Class Struggle didn’t compensate for its dull play. 
52 For examples of Mark’s work, check out the Copplestone Castings website.
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own replica of this iconic version of The Game of War. Rod had acquired 
international artistic recognition for his re-enactments of unsettling 
moments in recent history: the 1978 Jonestown mass suicide; the 
1993 Waco massacre; and the 1961 Milgram experiment.53 Respecting 
this experience, the rest of the collective was quickly convinced by his 
argument that making a May ’68 remix of The Game of War would 
be a mistake. Class Wargames should instead focus its attention 
upon Debord and Becker-Ho playing their illustrative contest in the 
Auvergne. The artistic investigation of this special historical moment 
required the construction of a faithful facsimile of the 1977 set design. 
The Game of War was meant to be played with its original board and 
pieces.
By staging re-enactments, contemporary artists showed how 
much they’d learnt from the 1960s avant-garde’s happenings and 
performances. Like Fluxus and Kirby, they also invited the audience to 
participate in the making of the artwork. Taking inspiration from the 
lively subculture of hobbyists who devoted their spare time to historical 
and fantasy role-playing, the goal of these avant-garde artists was to 
aestheticise – and subvert – this fascination with reliving the past.54 
By witnessing for themselves the actors in The Milgram Experiment 
inflicting apparently dangerous electric shocks on another human 
being, the audience at Rod Dickinson’s 2002 recreation understood 
how they too might have succumbed to obeying immoral orders when 
bullied by authority figures. Empathy intensified not only the personal 
experience of the artwork, but also the political resonance of this 1960s 
American psychologist’s research.55 
A year earlier, on 17th June 2001, Jeremy Deller mobilised both veterans 
of the 1984–5 British miners’ strike and members of re-enactment 
societies for a participatory performance of The Battle of Orgreave. By 
reliving together this decisive confrontation in the Tory government’s 
 
53 For more details on these projects, see Rod Dickinson’s website.  
54 See Inke Arns and Gabriele Horn, History Will Repeat Itself; and Sven Lütticken, 
Life, Once More.
55 See Rod Dickinson, ‘The Milgram Re-enactment’; and Steve Rushton, The Milgram 
Re-enactment.  
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war against the organised working class, both its creators and onlookers 
affirmed that their own collective memory of these dramatic times was 
much more accurate than the media-promoted official accounts of this 
historical turning-point. In Deller’s happening, those who’d been there 
at the original battle of Orgreave on the 18th June 1984 were joined in 
a common experience by those who’d taken part in its re-enactment 17 
years later.56 The avant-garde artwork now meant – most wonderfully 
– a public celebration of the Yorkshire coalfield communities’ lost 
alternative to neoliberal globalisation: the live action role-playing game 
as the possibilities of the past challenging the limits of the present.57
With Rod Dickinson as a member, Class Wargames soon learnt how 
to make its own contribution to re-enactment art. The 2008 match at 
The Institute of Psychoplasmics exhibition was followed by further public 
performances of The Game of War in other gallery spaces, including 
the Victoria & Albert Museum in London and the State Hermitage 
Museum in St. Petersburg. Learning from these experiences, Class 
Wargames became determined to involve the audience more in our 
events. Equipped with travelling versions of its board and pieces, we 
began organising participatory contests of Debord’s ludic invention 
during 2009 at art venues and educational institutions across Europe 
and in Brazil.58 The Game of War had to be experienced as a DIY 
artwork. Built by Lucy Blake, our website also encouraged people to 
try playing Debord’s game for themselves by providing its rules, board 
designs and other background information. Over the summer of 2009, 
with funding from the Arts Council of England, Class Wargames next 
completed a short film directed by Ilze Black explaining the origins 
and principles of The Game of War.59 After its launch in September at 
Furtherfield’s HTTP gallery in London, the collective’s campaign to 
56 See Jeremy Deller and Mike Figgis, The Battle for Orgreave; and Jeremy Deller, The 
English Civil War Part II. For eyewitness accounts of the vicious police repression 
against the striking miners, see Dave Douglass, Ghost Dancers; and Jim Coulter, 
Susan Miller and Martin Walker, State of Siege.  
57 Revealingly, one of Deller’s goals in staging The Battle of Orgreave performance 
was to politicise the usually apolitical hobby of historical re-enacting, see Matthew 
Higgs and Jeremy Deller, ‘In Conversation’, page 190. 
58 For photographs of these performances, see the Events 2008 and Events 2009 
sections of the Class Wargames website.
59 See Ilze Black, Class Wargames Presents Guy Debord’s The Game of War.
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promote Debord’s game was reinvigorated. By combining screenings of 
the film with participatory contests, Class Wargames received a warm 
welcome on its 2009–11 European tour: Crash-Crush in Rotterdam, 
Wunderbar at the Baltic in Gateshead, Transmediale 10 in Berlin, The 
Futurological Congress in Lviv and many other interesting venues.60 
During this first stage of our campaign of ludic mischief, our role 
at these events was to enable the members of the audience to turn 
Situationist theory into ludic practice. For a brief moment of time, the 
players of The Game of War were the makers of avant-garde art.
In these early years of the project, Class Wargames used performances, 
exhibitions, film, leaflets, xenographs, club nights, radio shows and 
social media to evangelise for the playing of The Game of War in its 
1977 analogue design. The RSG digital version was a useful training 
tool, but this computerised contest lacked the tactile pleasures of the 
original version. Unlike in the 1990s, now that people were spending 
so much time looking at screens at work and in the home, there was 
no longer anything artistically adventurous about turning his physical 
invention into a virtual object. Best of all, by moving the gold-and-
silver pieces across its board, the 21st century players of our twice-size 
facsimile were directly connected with the famous photos of Debord 
and Becker-Ho competing with each other over thirty years earlier. Like 
The Milgram Experiment and The Battle of Orgreave, Class Wargames’ 
recreation of The Game of War was a public invitation for people 
to relive an evocative moment from the recent past for themselves. 
Debord and Becker-Ho had used this version of the board and pieces 
in their Auvergne hideaway. By playing with the 1977 analogue set, 
contemporary admirers of the Situationist International weren’t just 
participating in the continuation of this transitory communal artwork. 
More importantly, as we would investigate more deeply in the next two 
phases of our campaign of ludic subversion, they were also taking their 
first lesson in the political and military teachings of The Game of War. 
 
By touring with its replicas of the 1977 set, the members of Class 
Wargames had committed themselves to realising the most subversive 
ambition of re-enactment art: enabling the collective exploration of 
60 For the photographs of these events, see the relevant years in the Events section of 
the Class Wargames website.
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‘… the relevance of what happened in the past for the here and now.’61 
In the early-21st century, The Game of War was a memory of the mid-
20th century rebirth of the cultural avant-garde. More than fifty years 
on, Situationism still provided the tactical manual for today’s leftfield 
artists: media outrages, appropriated material, urban interventions and 
user-generated content. In this first stage of Class Wargames’ campaign 
of ludic subversion, the players of Debord’s game were able to return 
to the times of the group’s founders who combined these subversive 
cultural techniques together for the first time. By moving its pieces 
across the board, they briefly became Debord and Becker-Ho in the 
mid-1970s playing each other in their Auvergne cottage. During these 
matches, they could experience The Game of War as a transitory co-
operative artwork which embodied these teachings of Situationism. 
In its public performances, Class Wargames’ task was to help their 
participants to carry out this transformation of cultural theory into 
avant-garde practice for themselves. Everyone who played The Game of 
War was a Situationist. 
As long as these ephemeral contests lasted, our ludic re-enactments 
became collective celebrations of Debord as the master tactician of 
leftfield art. In this first phase of our campaign of ludic subversion, 
our vital mission was to remind contemporary radicals of how much 
they were indebted to the very special moment in the late-1950s when 
the European avant-garde had redefined its identity. Moving analogue 
pieces across the board of The Game of War was an excellent method 
of understanding this original version of today’s cultural dissidence. 
Players could discover for themselves how the expertise of the most 
advanced avant-garde art movement of the May ‘68 generation had 
been materialised in its simulated combat between North and South. 
Playing The Game of War was a DIY lesson in Situationist history. 
As Debord repeatedly emphasised, the perpetuation of spectacular 
domination depended upon the enforced loss of memory of what had 
already been experienced. Studying the history of the International’s 
artistic adventures didn’t just reveal the inspiration for The Game of 
War. More importantly, knowledge of what had taken place in this past 
moment in time explained why the avant-garde tactics of Situationism 
61 Inke Arns, ‘History Will Repeat Itself ’, page 43.
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still hadn’t lost all of their critical edge in the early-21st century. As 
the leitmotif of this first stage of our campaign of ludic subversion, 
Class Wargames’ re-enactments of The Game of War paid homage to 
the unique moment when the codification of these techniques was the 
smartest response to the emerging Fordist methods of social control 
which still shaped the modern epoch of neoliberal globalisation. The 
lessons of history were there to be learnt on the game board. 
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1.4: The New Radicals
On 28th July 1957, Guy Debord was one of the eight representatives 
from the Lettrist International, the Movement for an Imaginist Bauhaus 
and the London Psychogeographical Association who came together at 
the Italian mountain village of Cosio d’Arroscia to form an organisation 
with the world-historical mission of resurrecting the European avant-
garde: the Situationist International.62 In this task, these leftfield artists 
were united in their certainty that the cultural upheavals of the early-20th 
century had run their course. Amongst the champions of Modernism, 
there’d always been an ambiguity about whether this new aesthetic had 
any wider social meaning. In the 1920s, the Constructivists and the 
Surrealists had argued that the primary purpose of making innovative 
art was advancing the worldwide proletarian revolution. Yet, for many 
of their contemporaries, the creative imagination had little to do 
with political commitment. Modernism only meant inventing new 
styles and types of art which distinguished them from their teachers 
and mentors. Unfortunately for these young artists, the forces of 
reaction weren’t convinced by this confinement of cultural rebellion 
within the gallery system. In 1930s France, the ideologues of both the 
Catholic bourgeoisie and the Stalinist bureaucracy had denounced 
the degeneracy and worthlessness of Modernist art. Confirming the 
Surrealists’ position, the flouting of aesthetic orthodoxies was seen in 
itself as a subversive act. Whether they liked it or not, all cutting-edge 
artists had to realise that they too were cultural revolutionaries. For the 
Surrealists like the Constructivists, Modernism was an insurrectionary 
call to arms against the philistine rulers of the planet. 
At their inaugural 1957 congress, the founders of the Situationist 
International knew that their first task was explaining the strange fate 
of the 1920s avant-garde movements. Over in the Russian-occupied 
half of the continent, the totalitarian state had contemptuously 
crushed the small bands of dissident artists. By the time that Debord 
and his comrades met at Cosio d’Arroscia, the revolutionary dreams 
of Constructivism had long been forgotten and replaced by a kitsch 
62 See Jean-Jacques Raspaud and Jean-Pierre Voyer, ‘Situationist Data’, page 176.
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Stalinist version of 19th century academic taste: Socialist Realism.63 
But, at least, the radical artists in the East had preserved their integrity 
in defeat. For the Situationists, the real horror lay in the fate of the 
avant-garde movements in the capitalist West. On the American side 
of the 1945 Yalta Agreement’s partition line, the cultural establishment 
had opted for a much more insidious – and effective – strategy for 
neutralising leftfield artists: fame and money. Once feared and ridiculed, 
the masterpieces of the avant-garde were now given pride of place in 
the top galleries, praised in textbooks and lauded in the academy. By 
the late-1950s, the utopian visions of Constructivism had become the 
hi-tech style of big government and big business. Surrealism’s aesthetic 
and technical innovations were now an essential reference point for 
advertisers, film directors and designers. The term itself had even 
entered everyday speech as a synonym for bizarre.64 Tellingly, for the 
progenitors of the Situationist International, the prerequisite for this 
official recognition of these 1920s avant-garde movements had been 
the disappearance of their revolutionary politics. Only by removing 
Bolshevism from Surrealism could its psychologically disturbing 
imagery be enjoyed without ever having to question the ideological 
conformity of the capitalist system. Seduced by celebrity status and 
hard cash, Breton, Duchamp and Giacometti had been made safe for 
mainstream audiences with their heretical opinions explained away as 
an artistic eccentricity. Worst of all, thanks to the Stalinists’ censorship 
of experimentation and abstraction, the CIA-funded Congress of 
Cultural Freedom was able during the 1950s to co-opt other less 
principled avant-garde veterans as heroes of American tolerance and 
refinement. Far from inspiring the global insurrection of the exploited 
as had once been imagined, the aesthetic and technical innovations 
of Modernism were now strengthening the cultural hegemony of 
the ruling elites of the West.65 Assembled in Cosio d’Arroscia, the 
progenitors of the Situationist International had a vituperative name 
 
63 See October – Association of Artistic Labour, ‘Declaration, 1928’; and Igor 
Golomstock, Totalitarian Art.
64 See Serge Guilbaut, How New York Stole the Idea of Modern Art; and Jane de Hart 
Mathews, ‘Art and Politics in Cold War America’.  
65 See Serge Guilbaut, How New York Stole the Idea of Modern Art; and Frances Stonor 
Saunders, Who Paid the Piper?.
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for this corrupt domestication of the 1920s avant-garde movements: 
recuperation.66
The invitees to the 1957 conference were all seekers of a superior 
strategy for the Red fighters on the aesthetic front. More than anything 
else, they’d been brought together by a common commitment to 
devising innovative forms of art which couldn’t be recuperated by secret 
police agents, rich collectors, bourgeois critics or cultural bureaucrats. 
Like their Modernist predecessors, these young artists applied their 
creativity to both the old and the new: industrial painting, altering 
2nd hand pictures, experimental films, seditious graffiti, self-published 
journals and collaged books.67 Crucially, these founders of Situationism 
were determined to avoid the fate of recuperation which had tarnished 
their Surrealist elders. The new avant-garde now realised that aesthetic 
and technical innovations were deadly weapons which could be turned 
against their inventors. Fortunately, by being self-critical about their 
own practice, these makers of radical art were able to resume the 
ideological assault against bourgeois hegemony. The Situationists were 
convinced that the tactical ploys of their new strategy were already 
battle-tested. By combining them together, the International would re-
ignite the cultural revolution in the heartlands of the capitalist system. 
Artists were – once again – in the front line of the class war.68 
In the early-1950s, Debord had first acquired a reputation within 
West European avant-garde circles for his experimental films. Turning 
Kazimir Malevich’s Suprematist paintings into cinema, Hurlements en 
Faveur de Sade featured an alternating all-black or all-white screen with 
a soundtrack of mumbled voices and, for its final 24 minutes, complete 
silence except for the mechanical whirring of the celluloid projector. 
Unlike his contemporaries who would soon become the celebrated 
directors of the French New Wave, Debord wasn’t interested in making 
66 See Guy Debord, ‘Report on the Construction of Situations’, pages 18–20; and 
Raoul Vaneigem, A Cavalier History of Surrealism.
67 See Peter Wollen, ‘Bitter Victory’, pages 35–55; and Laurent Chollet, L’Insurrection 
Situationniste, pages 34–111.
68 See Guy Debord, ‘Report on the Construction of Situations’; and the Situationist 
International, ‘The Adventure’.
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Modernist versions of Hollywood blockbusters.69 Instead, reviving the 
Surrealists’ shock tactics, his film had been a premeditated affront to the 
expectations of the sophisticated audiences of alternative movies. Little 
did they realise, it was only when they began loudly protesting against 
the lack of any images let alone a plot in Hurlements en Faveur de Sade 
that Debord had succeeded in completing his subversive artwork: the 
spectators were now making their own cinematic experience.70
On 9th April 1950, Michel Mourre – a fellow member of the Lettrist 
International – had confirmed the potency of this avant-garde 
technique with a daring hoax perpetrated at Notre Dame cathedral in 
Paris. Dressed as a priest, he’d ascended into the main pulpit and given 
a sermon on the delights of atheism to the assembled worshippers and 
tourists until he was dragged away by the church’s security guards. 
Most wonderfully, the outraged reaction of clerics, politicians and 
the media to this desecration of French Catholicism’s principal shrine 
magnified this minor stunt into a major scandal.71 The tactical lessons 
of this successful raid into enemy territory were clear. If they chose 
the correct target, a select band of artists could create political theatre 
that promulgated their revolutionary message to the masses. Best of 
all, whether they responded positively or negatively to these subversive 
interventions, their audiences inadvertently found themselves 
participating in the creation of a collective artwork. The new avant-
garde had discovered its first retort to recuperation: provocation.
Inspired by the Surrealists’ collages, the founders of Situationism began 
making subversive re-workings of the detritus of popular culture. By 
painting over pictures found in flea markets, Asger Jorn poked fun at 
the 1950s New York art establishment’s horror of kitsch. Taking clips 
from mainstream movies provided big name actors, evocative dialogue 
and expensive sets for Debord’s experimental films. When the speech 
bubbles in children’s comics were replaced with the International’s 
 
69 See Dorota Ostrowska, Reading the French New Wave, pages 1–96.
70 See Guy Debord, Hurlements en Faveur de Sade; Anselm Jappe, Guy Debord, pages 
48–50; and Thomas Levin, ‘Dismantling the Spectacle’, pages 78–85.
71 See Guy Debord, In Girum Imus Nocte et Consumimur Igni, page 163; and Greil 
Marcus, Lipstick Traces, pages 279–284.
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insights, superheroes became propagandists for libertarian communism, 
cowboys debated the best form of revolutionary organisation and porn 
stars analysed the theoretical weaknesses of the French Left.72 More 
than anything else, these satirical remixes would come to define the 
distinctive look and feel of Situationism. By the 1950s, Bolshevik and 
Anarchist publications had become unimaginative not only in their 
content, but also in their design. Rejecting this po-faced militancy, the 
Situationists advocated stealing back what had been the Left’s in the 
first place. Evoking the gift-giving festivals of the indigenous peoples 
of the Northwest Pacific, Debord and his comrades had already shown 
the effectiveness of this subversive tactic in the Lettrist International’s 
free journal: Potlatch.73 Learning from this experiment, politicised 
artists were now urged to reinsert the revolution back into Modernism 
through a wilful disregard for the copyright laws. Above all, they could 
enjoy mocking the idiocies of the mass media and the gallery system. 
Playful irony was the leftfield artists’ antidote to advertising hype, 
bureaucratic dogmatism and cultural timidity. The new avant-garde 
had found its second tactical response to recuperation: détournement.74
Living on the margins of conventional society, the founders of 
Situationism treasured the inner city neighbourhoods with their dodgy 
bars, cheap restaurants and affordable accommodation which provided 
them with sanctuary. Because avant-garde artists in the 1820s admired 
the undisciplined lifestyles of gypsies, such quarters in Paris had long 
been identified with what the French had once believed to be the 
homeland of the Roma people: Bohemia.75 As much a state of mind as 
a particular place, this distinct community of cultural dissidents had 
since then survived – and flourished – despite the constant threats of 
penury, censorship and eviction. Although the location within Paris 
72 See Asger Jorn, ‘Detourned Painting’; René Viénet, ‘The Situationists and the New 
Forms of Action against Politics and Art’; and Steef Davidson, Political Comics, 
pages 56–77.
73 See Potlatch 1954/1957. The Situationists discovered this tribal gift economy in a 
1923 classic of anthropology that had also inspired their Surrealist predecessors: 
Marcel Mauss, The Gift.
74 See Guy Debord and Gil Wolman, ‘Methods of Détournement’; and the Situationist 
International, ‘Détournement as Negation and Prelude’.
75 See Jerrold Seigel, Bohemian Paris, pages 23–25.
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moved over time, the bohemian quarter was always the starting point 
of each new avant-garde movement in France: Romanticism, Realism, 
Impressionism, Cubism and Surrealism. During the late-1950s, like 
these illustrious predecessors, Debord and his fellow Lettrists had also 
met in bars, cafés and rented rooms to plot their aesthetic insurrection. 
Forging a common identity through intoxication, promiscuity and 
intense debates, young rebels once again sallied forth from their 
underground headquarters to overthrow the French art establishment. 
Coming from the first generation to grow up after the defeat of 
fascism, Debord’s coterie revelled in their rediscovery of the subversive 
possibilities of the bohemian neighbourhood.76 By forming the new 
avant-garde, they had become ‘... the alcoholic intellectuals of the non-
working classes.’77 
By the time that the Situationist International was inaugurated, their 
favourite inner city districts of Paris were already under siege by greedy 
developers and ambitious politicians. In the mid-19th century, the 
authoritarian regime of Louis Bonaparte had destroyed the medieval 
street system not only to enrich the property speculators amongst its 
supporters, but also to break up the proletarian quarters which were 
home to its bitterest opponents.78 Thwarting this nefarious scheme, 
radical artists had kept faith with their bohemian community. When 
the rebuilding was over, the centre of cultural dissidence had shifted 
to the disreputable area of Montmarte with its cabarets, brothels and 
cheap flats.79 As this area was gentrified in the 1890s and 1900s, the 
avant-garde next returned to its old haunts in the university district on 
the Left Bank. Half a century later, Debord had discovered his metier 
as a revolutionary artist in the bars, cafés, cinemas, theatres, lecture 
halls and bookshops of this bohemian neighbourhood.80 Yet, ironically, 
76 See Guy Debord, On the Passage of a Few Persons Through a Rather Brief Unity of 
Time, pages 13–18; Jean-Michael Mension, The Tribe; and Greil Marcus, Lipstick 
Traces, pages 345–366.
77 McKenzie Wark, The Beach Beneath the Street, page 17. 
78 See Henri Lefebvre, Writings on Cities, pages 75–77, 81; and Malcolm Easton, 
Artists and Writers in Paris, pages 57–146.
79 See Jerrold Seigel, Bohemian Paris, pages 215–365.
80 See Paul Webster and Nicholas Powell, Saint-Germain-des-Prés; and  Jean-Michael 
Mension, The Tribe.
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it was the influx of young rebels like him that began the process of 
gentrification in this quarter too. As in Montmartre at the end of the 
19th century, their presence both alarmed and excited the monopolists 
of wealth and power. For the Right, the redevelopment of the inner city 
in Paris provided the opportunity not only to deprive the avant-garde 
enemy of its base of operations, but also to make money out of this 
newly fashionable area of town.81 
The progenitors of Situationism knew that the first step in defending 
their bohemian quarter was dealing with the traitors in the Left’s own 
ranks. Committed to improving the living standards of their core 
supporters, the leaderships of both the Social Democratic and Stalinist 
parties in France had convinced themselves of the political and social 
benefits of urban renewal. Enabling people to move from inner city 
slums to modern apartments in the suburbs was a vote winner. They 
knew that no self-respecting worker wanted to live like a dissolute artist. 
Countering this puritanical assumption, the Situationists emphasised 
the sociability and communality of their bohemian neighbourhood. 
Inspired by Thomas De Quincy’s opium-fuelled wanderings around 
Victorian London and Charles Baudelaire’s admiration for the dandy 
flâneurs of Second Empire Paris, members of the International mapped 
their emotional and intellectual responses to the urban environment 
while under the influence of alcohol and hashish. For those who 
knew how look beyond the glitter of consumerism, premonitions 
of the metropolis as a proletarian playground were everywhere.82 
Anticipating the great transformation to come, Situationist architects 
began planning the building of their libertarian communist city: the 
Haçienda. In this imaginary future, every worker would be able to live 
like a bohemian artist. The new avant-garde had developed its third 
tactical counter to recuperation: psychogeography.83 
In its formative period, the Situationist International borrowed much 
of its theoretical analysis from the writings of a dissident Marxist 
81 See Henri Lefebvre, Writings on Cities, pages 77–85.
82 See Guy Debord, ‘Theory of the Dérive’; and Abdelhafid Khatib, ‘Essai de 
Description Psychogéographique des Halles’.
83 See Ivan Chtcheglov, ‘Formulary for a New Urbanism’; Guy Debord and Constant, 
’La Déclaration d’Amsterdam’; and Vincent Kaufman, Guy Debord, pages 137–145. 
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sociologist at Nanterre University: Henri Lefebvre. In a series of path-
breaking books, he’d shown how the advent of Fordism had extended 
the dominance of capital beyond the factory and the office into 
everyday life. Far from being a peripheral issue, what happened in the 
streets and inside the home was now at the centre of the class struggle.84 
Proletarian strategy needed updating to deal with this new form of 
bourgeois order. Confounding the Left’s expectations, the achievement 
of full employment and consumer plenty had led to greater loneliness 
and more alienation. Capitalism hadn’t been weakened – it had 
become more insidious. In its 19th century liberal incarnation, poverty 
and repression had kept the proletariat in subordination. Now, with 
the arrival of Fordism, more sophisticated mechanisms of domination 
had taken their place. Architecture, shopping, advertising, fashion and, 
above all, the media were the guardians of this new epoch of capitalism: 
the bureaucratic society of controlled consumption.85
From Lefebvre’s writings, the Situationists came to understand that 
the recuperation of the 1920s avant-garde movements was integral to 
this transition from liberalism to Fordism. When watching television 
occupied almost as much time as working and sleeping in most people’s 
lives, the cultural question was now the essence of Left politics.86 This 
meant that the new avant-garde must engage with the hopes and desires 
of the majority of the population. In the past, the only inhabitants 
of bohemia had been a tiny group of leftfield artists. But, with the 
arrival of the consumer society, increasing numbers of young people 
were joining this aesthetic insurgency against bourgeois conformity. In 
their fashions, music and sexuality, they flaunted their disdain for the 
conservative lifestyle of their parents’ generation. Most wonderfully, 
this emergence of youth subcultures promised the democratisation of 
the libertarian mores of the avant-garde amongst the proletariat as a 
whole.87 However, as Debord and his comrades also realised, the co-
option of Constructivism and Surrealism had proved that aesthetic 
84 See Henri Lefebvre, Critique of Everyday Life Volume 1; and The Production of Space.
85 See Henri Lefebvre, Everyday Life in the Modern World.
86 See Guy Debord, The Society of the Spectacle, pages 12–23, 112; Anselm Jappe, Guy 
Debord, pages 72–8; and Peter Wollen, ‘Bitter Victory’, pages 41–43.
87 See the Situationist International, ‘Ideologies, Classes and the Domination of 
Nature’, pages 106–108.
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innovation by itself was no longer inherently revolutionary. Given 
time, the art establishment and the mass media could assimilate the 
most extreme avant-garde rebellion and, once depoliticised, make it 
into a weapon of bourgeois hegemony. The revolt into style failed by 
succeeding. 
Fortunately, taking their cue from both the Surrealists and Lefebvre, 
the Situationists realised that the most effective response against 
recuperation could be found – in prototype – in the wild and joyful 
energy of protests, riots, strikes and festivals. During these outbursts 
of collective emotion, the market and the state temporarily lost their 
dominance over humanity.  Détournement was much more than an 
artistic technique. In Budapest during the 1956 Hungarian Revolution 
and in Los Angeles during the 1965 Watts Uprising, the gift-giving 
potlatches of tribal communities had reappeared for a brief moment in 
a modern hi-tech form. When liberated from the alienating discipline 
of bureaucratic orders and capitalist commodities, people became 
playful, hedonistic and sharing. The Situationists were convinced that 
these spontaneous premonitions of libertarian communism revealed 
the winning tactic for victory on the cultural battlefield.88 The early-
20th century avant-garde movements had been recuperated because 
their members were only a small minority of society who could be 
easily bought off. Gratifyingly, it was impossible for the ruling elite 
of Fordism to welcome the massive crowds of carnival into its ranks 
without undermining its own exclusivity. The essence of revolutionary 
art had been revealed. It was not inventing a new aesthetic with 
new technologies that would liberate humanity, but providing the 
circumstances where everyone could freely express themselves. Inspired 
by this libertarian vision, Jorn proclaimed that making art collectively 
was a premonition of the communist future in the capitalist present. 
The avant-garde had forged its ultimate weapon against recuperation: 
participatory creativity.89 
Equipped with these four tactics, the Situationist International 
88 See Guy Debord, ‘Report on the Construction of Situations’; and the Situationist 
International, ‘The Decline and Fall of the Spectacle-Commodity Economy’.
89 See Asger Jorn, ‘Critique of Economic Policy’, pages 25–34; and Raoul Vaneigem, 
The Revolution of Everyday Life, pages 186–199.
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was now ready to launch a new cultural revolution. Led by artists, 
insurrectionary politics became an avant-garde game. Like its 
Surrealist forebear, the International mimicked the ideological zeal 
and party fealty of the sectarian Left. There was a theoretical journal, 
manifestos, congresses, factions, expulsions and, in Debord, even 
a maximum leader.90 Extremist Marxist rhetoric was proclaimed to 
outrage the custodians of bourgeois order. Revolutionary politics had 
become artistic détournement. Identifying participatory creativity as 
the premonition of social emancipation, the Situationists played this 
avant-garde game as an experiment in self-management. If artists could 
be militants, then the rest of the working class could also organise their 
own lives without the interference of managers, experts, enforcers and 
propagandists.91 Capitalism was a competitive game with winners 
and losers. Egoism and conformity were the inevitable result. In its 
place, inspired by the writings of Johan Huizinga, the Situationist 
International would initiate a new co-operative game where everybody 
was a winner. Instead of passively consuming the media spectacle, its 
participants would be actively creating their own social life. For the 
Situationists, hedonistic play was the radical antithesis of alienated 
labour. Within its ‘magic circle’, intimacy and imagination could 
triumph over isolation and conformity.92 Like Duchamp, Maciunas 
and Kirby, Debord and his comrades celebrated the collective playing 
of games as the epitome of non-utilitarian activity. Emancipated from 
both the market and the state by participating in these collective 
artworks, exploited workers would be reborn as avant-garde artists. In 
this Situationist revolution, libertarian communism was re-imagined 
as the potlatch game of human emancipation: ‘… born of the passion 
of playing … [where] ... group activity facilitates the self-realisation of 
each individual.’93
90 See Peter Wollen, ‘Bitter Victory’; and McKenzie Wark, The Beach Beneath the Street, 
pages 61–66.
91 See Guy Debord, ‘Perspectives for the Conscious Alteration of Everyday Life’.
92 See the Situationist International, ‘Contribution à une Definition Situationniste du 
Jeu’; and Johan Huizinga, Homo Ludens, pages 1–27, 46–75.  
93 Raoul Vaneigem, The Revolution of Everyday Life, page 198. 
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1.5: The English Section of the Situationist International
During the first stage of our campaign of ludic subversion, the members 
of Class Wargames became enthusiastic practitioners of the four tactics 
of Situationist avant-garde art. Most wonderfully, we’d discovered 
that the intelligent application of their technique of provocation was 
still effective in the early-21st century. The public playing of military 
simulations was guaranteed to annoy the more moralistic activists of 
the pacifist Left. The tough Marxist terminology of our propaganda was 
an affront to the liberal sensibilities of the acolytes of Post-Modernism. 
Through our performances and publications, we were applying 
the Situationist tactic of détournement to politicise the apolitical 
hobbyist subculture of wargaming. We were also connoisseurs of the 
psychogeography of both the locations of our interventions and the 
terrain of Debord’s miniature battlefield.94 In this opening stage of our 
campaign, we’d proved ourselves to be diligent pupils of the avant-
garde lessons embodied within The Game of War.
Above all, Class Wargames’ interactive performances were putting 
the fourth – and most audacious – imperative of Situationist art 
theory into practice. Like the ludic experiments of Surrealism and 
Fluxus, Debord’s The Game of War made possible a brief moment of 
participatory creativity within an alienated world. When moving the 
pieces across its board, the audience were no longer passive consumers 
of cultural commodities. Instead, by agreeing to observe a common 
set of rules, they could become artists making their own artwork. As 
Debord planned in the 1970s, these 21st century players of The Game 
of War experienced a fleeting premonition of the libertarian communist 
future in the present. Everyone was creative while taking part in this 
simulated combat. For Class Wargames, these collective performances 
of The Game of War were always – at least in part – re-enactments 
of the paradigmatic match between Debord and Becker-Ho in their 
94 ‘The terrain does not merely constitute space, a formless mass of thinly spread 
squares. It is transmuted into psychogeography by the opposing armies which 
confront each other on the board, whose contestation determines the strategic 
pinch-points where the successful player uses their tactical advantage to ensure that 
they enjoy victory.’ Richard Barbrook and Fabian Tompsett, Class Wargames Presents 
Guy Debord’s The Game of War, page 15.
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Auvergne hideaway. Looking back at this iconic moment in history 
enabled the players around its board to understand how Situationist 
ideas could decipher what was happening now. 
As event followed event during this first phase of our campaign 
of ludic mischief, Class Wargames soon realised that its members 
were also engaged in another form of historical re-enactment. Most 
revealingly, our performances of The Game of War were becoming 
homages to the 1960s pioneers of English Situationism. It was their 
proselytising that had first interpreted the new avant-garde knowledge 
from the continent for the inhabitants of this off-shore island of 
Europe. It was their publications and actions that had introduced the 
English to the illicit pleasures of combining the four artistic tactics 
of Situationism: provocation, détournement, psychogeography and 
participatory creativity. Class Wargames was the grateful beneficiary of 
this missionary work. For over four decades, this English appropriation 
of Situationism had provided an instruction manual for radical avant-
garde artists across the globe. Based in London, Class Wargames proudly 
identified itself with an illustrious lineage of DIY culture. Thanks to 
these 1960s trailblazers, English Situationism was now identified with 
the Sex Pistols, the Haçienda and Banksy. At Class Wargames’ events, 
the collective playing of The Game of War was the ludic re-enactment 
of this aesthetic revolution. By activating its board and pieces, anyone 
could be a punk artist.
In 1974, Chris Gray published the first major English-language 
collection of Situationist writings which codified his generation’s 
avant-garde interpretation of the International’s programme: Leaving 
the 20th Century. Within its bright green covers, readers found – in 
whole or in excerpts – an exhilarating analysis of contemporary 
capitalism which was far superior to anything found in the sacred texts 
of the Bolshevik and Anarchist sects that then dominated New Left 
politics in England. The Decline and Fall of the Spectacular Commodity 
Economy took delight in praising the insurgent energy of rioting and 
looting. The Revolution of Everyday Life poured scorn upon the myth 
that new information technologies could liberate humanity from its 
woes. The Society of Spectacle condemned the overwhelming majority 
of the Left for succumbing to bourgeois recuperation – and looked 
forward to the imminent victory of the workers’ councils over the 
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Fordist enemy. Moving beyond the tired slogans of Bolshevism and 
Anarchism, these impassioned critiques directed their fury against the 
new media-saturated consumer societies of Western capitalism. As 
Gray’s book revealed, the Situationist International had developed the 
most advanced political theory for analysing the modern world. For 
its appreciative readers, Leaving the 20th Century would become the 
intelligent voice of ‘the hard-but-hidden edge of student revolution in 
the late [nineteen] sixties.’95
In his introduction, Gray told the story of how the Situationist 
International had been formed to resurrect the rebel cause of avant-
garde art. It was by searching for new forms of heterodox creativity that 
Debord and his comrades had come to understand the sophisticated 
methods of social control emerging within consumer capitalism. 
The recuperation of Constructivism and Surrealism had proved that 
the commodification of aesthetic and technical innovation could 
neutralise the ideological message of even the most radical of artworks. 
If it wanted to avoid this disgrace, the reborn avant-garde must adopt 
a more advanced strategy for disrupting the dull routines of everyday 
life under Fordism. In Leaving the 20th Century, Gray assembled a 
selection of articles, manifestos, reports and polemics which outlined 
the four Situationist tactics of pranks, remixing, urbanism and DIY 
culture. The theoretical writings of the International gave a smart 
political rationale to this practical handbook for aesthetic subversion. 
Gray explained that provocation, détournement, psychogeography and 
participatory creativity weren’t just techniques for exposing the new 
mechanisms of Fordist domination. Above all, they provided the most 
effective stratagems for combating spectacular capitalism. Perceptive 
readers of Leaving the 20th Century could have no doubt. Situationism 
was avant-garde art in the service of revolutionary politics – and vice 
versa.96
By compiling Leaving the 20th Century, Chris Gray defined the English 
interpretation of this new subversive doctrine for his anglophone 
readership. As the next four decades would reveal, he’d published the 
95 Tony Wilson, 24 Hour Party People, page 118.
96 See Christopher Gray, Leaving the 20th Century, pages 1–6.
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tactical manual that would make Situationist-style pranks, remixing, 
urbanism and DIY culture into the cutting-edge of this West European 
country’s avant-garde art scene. Leaving the 20th Century was the original 
version of the Sex Pistols, the Haçienda and Banksy. The lasting impact 
of this book was Gray’s reward for his pioneering work in promoting 
the ideas of the Situationist International in England. During the first 
decade of its existence, this new avant-garde movement had made slow 
progress in establishing an outpost on the other side of the channel. 
Ralph Rumney had attended the 1957 inaugural meeting at Cosio 
d’Arroscia and Alexander Trocchi was a valued member of the group. 
In 1960, the 4th conference of the Situationist International had been 
held in East London. Don Nicholson-Smith had worked with Debord 
and his comrades during the early-1960s while he was living in Paris. 
After his move to Copenhagen in 1961, Gordon Fazakerley had played 
a leading role in the International’s breakaway Scandinavian Section.97 
Yet, despite these close connections, the overwhelming majority of 
English leftfield artists and activists had remained unaware of the new 
avant-garde teachings from mainland Europe. Instead, their attention 
was determinedly fixed on the exciting events taking place in the USA. 
Across the Atlantic, youthful radicals were already pioneering the heady 
mix of revolutionary politics and personal liberation which would 
come to epitomise the seditious spirit of the baby boomer generation.98 
Sharing a common language, English rebels had been heavily influenced 
by American alternative culture since the arrival of jazz music in the 
1920s. Four decades on, young malcontents were eager to embrace the 
subversive ideals of the hippie movement. They too would overturn the 
established order by creating a New Left counter-culture in England: 
protest groups, rock bands, community media, arts spaces, housing co-
ops and free festivals. On this West European island during the 1960s, 
the template for the youth insurrection against the American empire 
was made-in-the-USA.99 
97 See Ralph Rumney, ‘The Vague Interview’; Alexander Trocchi, ‘Invisible Insurrection 
of a Million Minds’; Gill Woodward, ‘Interview with the Author and Ilze Black’; 
and Gordon Fazakerley and Jacqueline de Jong, ‘Drakabygget’.
98 See George Katsiaficas The Imagination of the New Left; and Carl Davidson, The New 
Radicals in the Multiversity.
99 See Richard Neville, Playpower; and George Melly, Revolt into Style.
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It was at this key historical moment that Gray and Nicholson-Smith 
made their intervention which would fundamentally reshape the social 
imagination of England. In 1966, they’d both helped to produce the 
first issue of Heatwave which had been set up as the London offshoot 
of the Chicago Surrealist revivalists’ Rebel Worker.100 Like the American 
underground press, this new magazine also championed the New 
Left’s seductive synthesis of political and cultural dissent.101  Heatwave 
became one of the first publications in England which could happily 
place a revolutionary call to arms next to beat poetry, artistic illustrations 
and autobiographical accounts of drug-taking within its pages. In 
comparison, the Bolshevik or Anarchist publications of the time 
seemed very staid.102 More than anything else, what would mark out 
Heatwave from its rivals on the traditional Left was its enthusiasm for 
the nation’s multifarious youth subcultures. Adding Paris Situationism 
into the mix alongside Chicago Surrealism, Charles Radcliffe praised 
their exuberant defiance of bourgeois conformity as a spontaneous form 
of proletarian rebellion. With the advent of Fordism, the bohemian 
lifestyle of the avant-garde was being democratised. Every alienated 
worker now had the opportunity to become a hedonistic artist in their 
leisure time. While acknowledging the ever-present danger of capitalist 
recuperation, Radcliffe concluded by emphasising that: ‘The youth 
revolt … has … made its first stumbling political gestures with an 
immediacy that revolutionaries should not deny, but envy.’103
This first revelation of the teachings of Situationism in the pages of 
Heatwave marked the culmination of two decades of searching for the 
avant-garde theory that could ignite a cultural insurrection in England. 
From the late-1940s onwards, as the country slowly recovered from its 
wartime sacrifices, official approval and funding of Modernist art had 
encouraged a burst of aesthetic and technical experimentation. In quick 
succession, young English artists recapitulated the stylistic achievements 
of their early-20th century predecessors who’d applied the principles of 
100 See Charles Radcliffe, ‘Two Fiery Flying Rolls’, pages 327–329, 346–351.
101 For the history of these US publications, see David Armstrong, A Trumpet to Arms; 
and Mitchell Goodman, The Movement Towards a New America, pages 359–432.
102 See Heatwave #1 and #2 in Franklin Rosemont and Charles Radcliffe, Dancin’ In the 
Streets, pages 381–486.
103 Charles Radcliffe, ‘The Seeds of Social Destruction’, page 400.
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symbolism and abstraction to painting, sculpture, photography, film, 
fashion, graphic design and theatre. For most of them, Modernism 
only meant making innovative art with a contemporary sensibility. 
Aesthetic rebellion had been stripped of its revolutionary politics. 
Yet, despite this recuperation, the British establishment’s toleration 
of cultural heterodoxy did begin to change the wider society. By the 
beginning of the 1960s, there was a flourishing bohemian scene of 
alternative galleries, cinemas, theatres, clubs and college venues across 
the country.104 Eduardo Paolozzi, Richard Hamilton and Peter Blake 
had already created the first distinctively English contribution to 
Modernism: Pop Art.105 Inspired by the avant-garde intransigence 
of the Constructivists and the Surrealists, radical artists now began 
organising happenings which subverted the commercial logic of the 
gallery system. During the mid-1960s, John Latham’s Skoob Tower 
ceremonies and Adrian Mitchell’s Collage-Events were admired as 
transient moments of participatory creativity that couldn’t be packaged 
and sold to connoisseurs, curators or collectors.106 When hydrochloric 
acid was eating away Gustav Metzger’s nylon-and-metal sculptures, 
the museum object had definitely met its aesthetic nemesis: Auto-
Destructive Art.107 Most wonderfully, these avant-garde interventions 
heralded the early stirrings of a hedonistic transformation of stuffy 
English society as a whole. On 11th June 1965, Trocchi had acted as 
the master of ceremonies at the International Poetry Incarnation in 
London’s Albert Hall. Bringing together the literary stars of the beat 
generation, this happening became the first mass gathering of the 
English hippie subculture. As the Situationists had argued, avant-garde 
art would become truly subversive when it began remaking everyday 
life in its own image.108
What the editors of Heatwave had found in Paris was a dedicated 
group of intellectuals who were at the forefront of the New Left’s 
104 See Jeff Nuttall, Bomb Culture, pages 11–103; and Simon Frith and Howard Horne, 
Art into Pop, pages 27–70.
105 See Marco Livingstone, Pop Art, pages 32–45, 92–113.
106 See Jeff Nuttall, Bomb Culture, pages 114–125.
107 See Gustav Metzger, Damaged Nature, Auto-Destructive Art, pages 25–63.
108 For eye-witness accounts of this event, see Jonathon Green, Days in the Life, pages 
64–74.
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melding of political and aesthetic rebellion. In contrast with the 
worthy publications of the Bolshevik and Anarchist sects, each issue of 
Internationale Situationniste – with its metal cover, gloss paper pages, 
minimalist layout and ironic illustrations – was a beautiful artwork. 
In this journal, Debord and his comrades had long championed the 
DIY ethos which was now driving the hippie generation’s direct action 
campaigns.109 Since the late-1950s, they’d been arguing that the new 
youth subcultures were latest iteration of the avant-garde insurrection. 
For the Heatwave group, what emphatically distinguished the 
Situationists from their American peers was their theoretical rigour. The 
writers of Rebel Worker and other underground papers in the USA also 
enthusiastically promoted a mix of participatory politics and leftfield 
culture. However, it was only the Situationist International that had 
formulated a detailed and penetrating analysis which could explain the 
new forms of class struggle emerging within Fordist abundance. 
Most impressively, in The Decline and Fall of the Spectacular Commodity 
Society, they’d provided a lucid analysis of the world-historical 
significance of the 1965 Watts Uprising which had eluded the Bolsheviks 
and Anarchists. Far from deploring the looting of shops by the rioters 
like other Left groups, the Situationists had extolled this ‘potlatch of 
destruction’ as the revolutionary moment when the African-American 
youth of Los Angeles had broken the tyranny of consumer capitalism 
over everyday life by taking what they needed by force. Just like avant-
garde artists, disenfranchised inner-city proletarians wanted to do 
things for themselves. In 1966, determined to forge a formal alliance 
with the instigators of this new wisdom, a delegation from Heatwave 
made a pilgrimage to Paris. After an intense meeting in Debord’s flat, 
Gray, Nicholson-Smith and Radcliffe – along with Tim Clark – were 
inducted into full membership of the Situationist International.110 
Returning to London, these four friends set to work on producing 
translations of the key texts from the French – and applying their 
theoretical insights to what was taking place at home. For the first time, 
Situationism had acquired an English accent. Thanks to its four newest 
109 See Laurent Chollet, L’Insurrection Situationniste, pages 21–111; and Günter 
Berghaus, ‘Happenings in Europe’.
110 See Charles Radcliffe, ‘Two Fiery Flying Rolls’, pages 357–366.
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recruits, the locals now had a clever interpretor of the new avant-garde 
teachings from the continent.
The founders of the English Section were fervently convinced that the 
1960s youth rebellion was the harbinger of a fully-fledged proletarian 
revolution. During its short period of agitation, this group would never 
grow beyond a dozen or so supporters.111 Yet, despite these limited 
resources, they took upon themselves the difficult task of popularising 
the Situationists’ sophisticated interpretation of this New Left prophecy 
amongst the nation’s political and aesthetic dissidents. To realise their 
ambition, the English Section would first have to overcome the old 
Left orthodoxy that Modernist art and popular culture were implacable 
enemies. In his 1957 classic The Uses of Literacy, Richard Hoggart had 
mourned the corruption of the children of the English working class 
by American-style consumerism. Dancing mindlessly to Top 40 hits in 
coffee bars wearing the latest fashions was a betrayal of everything that 
their valiant socialist forebears had fought and suffered for.112 Growing 
up during the post-war boom, the militants of the English Section 
instinctively knew the fallacy of this old school Left argument. What 
Hoggart and his acolytes couldn’t comprehend was the subversive 
potential of the new forms of popular culture. Aided by the recent 
arrival of immigrants from the Caribbean and the presence of African-
American military personnel in the country, young people in England 
were learning how to shed their parents’ imperialist prejudices and 
appreciate the pleasures of jazz, blues, rock ‘n’ roll, ska and soul music. 
Better contraception and more tolerant sexual attitudes were removing 
their fear of the puritan patriarch. Pot, speed and acid were helping 
them to lose their British stiffness and inhibitions.113 Every concert, 
publication, party, screening, performance, demonstration, happening 
and exhibition was liberating social space from the grasp of the 
philistine establishment.114 For the members of the English Section in 
the mid-1960s, Situationism was the subversive doctrine that explained 
111 See Gill Woodward, ‘Interview with the Author and Ilze Black’.
112 See Richard Hoggart, The Uses of Literacy, pages 205–272.
113 See George Melly, Revolt into Style, pages 3–124; and Mick Farren, Give the Anarchist 
a Cigarette, pages 5–114.
114 See Charles Radcliffe, ‘The Seeds of Social Destruction’.
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why this loosening of controls over everyday life had transformed 
what it meant to be a political revolutionary. Under Fordism, the Left 
required a theoretical analysis which was focused upon ‘… bringing the 
subjective and objective together.’115
During the late-1950s, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament had 
been the first mass movement in Western Europe since the early-20th 
century that had combined direct action protests and bohemian lifestyles 
into one rebellious movement. Crucially, these English pioneers of 
the New Left had no problems in making a clear distinction between 
their hatred for American atomic weapons and their admiration for 
American musicians, writers and painters.116 As in other developed 
countries of the period, the rapid growth of youth subcultures gave 
confidence to those who were looking for more militant forms of 
political involvement than traditional parliamentary, trade union or 
student politics. Instead of delegating leadership to elected officials, 
these activists organised demonstrations, occupations and wildcat 
strikes that enabled them to take power into their own hands. It was 
this vehement rejection of the old Left’s bureaucratic hierarchies that 
would create the New Left’s distinctive identity.117 Like avant-garde 
artists, its youthful activists also dreamt of a participatory future. As the 
most advanced current of this new working class, the English Section 
would provide the intelligent theory which illuminated the proletariat’s 
arduous path from spectacular capitalism to libertarian communism.
Much to their delight, Gray and his comrades had discovered a 
prototype of the New Left insurgency close to home. In 1965, the 
Provo movement in Amsterdam had successfully mobilised a motley 
coalition of young workers, students and drop-outs in protest against 
the apathy and conservatism of Dutch society.118 In both issues of 
Heatwave, they published enthusiastic reports calling for the lessons 
of this uprising to be studied – and applied – in England. If the New 
115 Gill Woodward, ‘Interview with the Author and Ilze Black’.
116 See Jeff Nuttall, Bomb Culture, pages 44–52; and Jonathon Green, Days in the Life, 
pages 5–7, 23–25.
117 See David Widgery, The Left in Britain 1956–1968; and George Katsiaficas, The 
Imagination of the New Left.
118 See Richard Kempton, Provo; and Richard Neville, Playpower, pages 21–24.
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Left could shake up sleepy Amsterdam, just imagine what could be 
achieved in Europe’s capital city of youth subcultures: London.119 Yet, 
to their dismay, the founders of English Situationism found their Dutch 
comrades’ attempts at theorising the 1960s generation’s turn towards 
participatory politics unconvincing. Like Rebel Worker claiming descent 
from the US branch of Surrealism, the Provos had traced their lineage 
back to Anarchism. Both of these New Left groups were trying to 
understand what was now with what was past. Fortunately, by joining 
the Situationist International, the English Section had avoided making 
the same mistake. The modern world could only be understood with 
its most up-to-date theory.
In 1967, English Section published a pamphlet containing one of the 
most notorious Situationist texts: Mustapha Khayati’s On the Poverty 
of Student Life. A year earlier, sympathisers of the International at 
Strasbourg University in France had taken control of its student union. 
Diverting funds from their intended purposes, they’d paid for the 
printing and distribution of free copies of Khayati’s blistering attack on 
the multiple failings of the French higher education system. When these 
young militants were subsequently prosecuted for misappropriating 
the student union’s money, the shock and outrage expressed by 
reactionary politicians, professors, judges and media commentators 
during the court case created invaluable publicity for the pamphlet’s 
arguments amongst its intended audience.120 Showing their admiration 
for this successful application of the Situationist tactic of provocation 
in Strasbourg, the English Section updated the title of John Reed’s 
famous book on the 1917 Russian Revolution for its translation of 
Khayati’s pamphlet: Ten Days That Shook The University. The target 
of this détournement was well chosen. With student militancy on the 
rise, the Bolshevik sects were already fantasising about establishing Red 
Bases in the nation’s campuses which would ignite the ‘Coming British 
Revolution’.121 However, any unsuspecting reader who – from the 
pamphlet’s title – thought that the English Situationists might share 
119 See Charles Radcliffe, ‘Two Fiery Flying Rolls’, pages 351–355.
120 See the Situationist International, ‘Nos Buts et Nos Méthodes dans le Scandale de 
Strasbourg’; and Vincent Kaufman, Guy Debord, pages 178–82.
121 See Alexander Cockburn and Robin Blackburn, Student Power; and Tariq Ali, The 
Coming British Revolution. 
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this illusion would have been quickly disappointed. Far from praising 
students as the new political vanguard, Khayati’s diatribe castigated 
them for their passivity and timidity. Most of these trainee intellectuals 
didn’t even have the courage to protest against the ideological 
stupidities of the university curriculum. The only good thing about 
studying in higher education was that living off a student grant was 
easier than working in a boring job.122 By publishing this polemic, the 
English Section had delineated itself against the dominant orthodoxy 
within the New Left. No minority – especially not a minority of radical 
students – could substitute itself for the working class as a whole. The 
proletarian revolution was poetry made by all.  
Not surprisingly, traditionalists amongst the 1960s British Left were 
also highly suspicious of the student protest movement.  Dedicated 
to Labour party and trade union politics, they ‘… saw the new [youth 
pop] culture as a distraction from the real issues.’123 What made 
Khayati’s pamphlet stand out was its contempt for this anachronistic 
attitude without making the opposite error of uncritically enthusing 
about campus militancy. Crucially, this Situationist theorist argued 
that the bohemian lifestyles of artists, hooligans and students were a 
premonition of the communist future in the capitalist present.124 In 
their appendix to Ten Days That Shook The University, the English 
Section provided its own interpretation of this compelling prophecy. 
Through their hedonistic and spontaneous lifestyles, avant-garde art 
movements and youth subcultures were prefiguring the shape of things 
to come. In both the West and the East, experts were predicting that – 
with the greater economic productivity brought about by through the 
convergence of computing, telecommunications and media into the 
Net – people would soon no longer need to devote most of their waking 
hours to boring work in factories and offices.125 Vaneigem’s scepticism 
about technological utopianism was temporarily forgotten. In their 
appendix to Khayati’s pamphlet, the English Section proclaimed that 
122 See Mustapha Khayati, ‘On the Poverty of Student Life’, pages 319–326.
123 Michael Crick, Militant, page 56.
124 See Mustapha Khayati, ‘On the Poverty of Student Life’, pages 326–337.
125 See Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media, pages 346–359; and Triple 
Revolution Committee, ‘The Triple Revolution’.
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the total emancipation of humanity was imminent. Within a decade 
or so, when the imaginary future of the information society arrived, 
alienated workers would be reborn as artist-intellectuals – and everyday 
life would become spontaneous, creative and playful. Cybernetic 
communism was a Situationist game where everyone is a winner.126 
The title of English Section’s appendix said it all: The Revolution of 
Modern Art and the Art of Modern Revolution.
126 The English Section was echoing the radicals in the East who argued that the 
invention of the Net would realise the disappointed promises of participatory 
democracy and economic self-management of the 1917 Russian Revolution, 
see Radovan Richta, Civilisation at the Crossroads; Aksel Berg, ‘Cybernetics and 
Education’; and Richard Barbrook, Imaginary Futures, pages 136–161.
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1.6: Power to the People!
The 1967 translation of Khayati’s pamphlet with its long afterword 
turned out to be the one and only official publication of the English 
Section of the Situationist International. As a test of loyalty, the Paris 
headquarters ordered its London outpost to sever all contacts with a 
fiery New York magazine: Up Against the Wall Motherfucker. Debord had 
always been suspicious about the English Section’s susceptibility to the 
psychedelic romanticism of the American hippie subculture. Now they 
would have to choose which side were they on. Not surprisingly, when 
this request from Paris was politely refused, its three remaining members 
were summarily expelled from the International.127 Undaunted by this 
break with the mainland, the founders of English Situationism began 
1968 by launching their own magazine: King Mob Echo. Reinforced 
by fresh recruits, they were now ready to launch their assault against 
the British establishment. Announcing its licentious ambitions, this 
New Left journal was named after a graffiti celebrating the insurgent 
multitude – ‘His Majesty King Mob’ – who’d burnt down Newgate 
jail during the 1780 Gordon Riots in London.128 Although lacking the 
production values of Internationale Situationniste, its pages provided 
a similarly idiosyncratic melange of political diatribes and cultural 
polemics. Freed from French supervision, the writers of King Mob Echo 
could now happily mash up the insights of Debord, Jorn, Vaniegem 
and Khayati with those of William Blake, Karl Marx, Wilhelm Reich, 
Antonin Artaud and Ben Morea. Adapting to local conditions, English 
Situationism was finding its own voice.129
Then, in May 1968, the long-dreamt-of-revolution unexpectedly 
took place in France. A few months earlier, inspired by the scandalous 
 
127 See the Situationist International, ‘The Latest Exclusions’; and David Wise, ‘A 
Hidden History of King Mob’. For the story of these American comrades, see Black 
Mask & Up Against The Wall Motherfucker, The Incomplete Works.
128 See David Wise, ‘A Hidden History of King Mob’. For the 18th century ‘political 
riots’ that inspired this name, see George Rudé, Hanoverian London, pages 205–
227.
129 See the 6 issues of this magazine in the English Section of the Situationist 
International, King Mob Echo, pages 71–129.
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activities of the Strasbourg Situationists, a small group of activists 
at Nanterre University had decided that they too would provoke 
the academic establishment and – when it predictably overreacted – 
their more hesitant peers would be swept up into their campaign of 
direct action.130 Over the weeks that followed, the wildest hopes of 
these New Left agitators were fulfilled. Their localised confrontation 
with the university authorities in Nanterre quickly spread to other 
campuses across France. By the beginning of May, students and police 
were fighting each other in the streets of Paris. As the barricades went 
up and the Sorbonne was declared a liberated zone, the Stalinist and 
Social Democratic trade unions called for a general strike in solidarity 
with this youthful protest movement. For a brief moment, France 
appeared to be on the brink of a fundamental societal transformation. 
Massive demonstrations filled the streets of Paris and other major 
cities. Ten million people were out on strike. Workers were taking over 
the factories. Students were occupying the universities. Peasants were 
supplying free food to the protesters. Doctors and nurses were running 
the hospitals. Footballers declared that from now on they’d manage the 
football teams. On the walls of Paris, a revolutionary slogan proclaimed 
this new dispensation: ‘Be realistic, demand the impossible!’131
Across the channel, the members of King Mob were mesmerised by the 
social upheaval that was shaking France. For those who understood, 
the Situationists were the occult theorists behind the May ‘68 French 
Revolution. Most gratifyingly for their English admirers, it was 
the International’s searing attacks on consumer society which had 
inspired the striking posters and evocative slogans that would come 
to symbolise these dramatic events.132 In Paris and other cities, the 
insurgent crowds were realising the International’s libertarian vision 
of the proletarian revolution as a playful outburst of festive street 
130 See Daniel Cohn-Bendit and Gabriel Cohn-Bendit, Obsolete Communism, pages 
25–28.
131 See the instant journalist histories of May ‘68: Allan Priaulx and Sanford Ungar, The 
Almost Revolution; and Patrick Seale and Maureen McConville, French Revolution 
1968.
132 See Vladimir Fisera, Writing on the Wall; and Mésa, Mai 68 – Les Affiches de l’Atelier 
Populaire.
78 79
theatre.133 Above all, the Situationists had kept faith with their most 
important strategic principle: ‘We shall not lead, we will only detonate!’ 
As the revolutionary crisis of May ‘68 reached its climax, Debord and 
his comrades joined up with the most radical elements amongst the 
Nanterre students and the libertarian communist sects to form the 
Committee for the Maintenance of the Occupations. Convinced 
that the moment of victory was near, these Situationists urged the 
striking workers to administer the death blow against the society of the 
spectacle by seizing control of the institutions of political, economic 
and ideological domination. Now more than ever, the old adage was 
true that any revolution that is made half-way was doomed to failure. 
The wage increases promised by the French bosses were meaningless 
when the abolition of the wage system was in sight. The leadership 
of Social Democratic and Bolshevik parties was obsolete when people 
were taking control over their own lives. Cybernetic communism would 
soon make everyone into players in a ludic celebration of mutual desire 
and collective creativity. There could be no compromises with the old 
system.134 
When the strikers reluctantly went back to work and order was 
eventually restored in France over the summer of 1968, the 
Situationists could take pride in the uncompromising political 
positions which they’d championed during these revolutionary events. 
If nothing else, the International had proved that it was possible for 
the New Left to resist the temptations of bourgeois recuperation. 
Emboldened by the inspiring example of  insurrectionary France, King 
Mob now set to work on applying the lessons of May ‘68 at home. 
Only a few months earlier, these young agitators had had no hesitation 
in placing themselves in the front line of the violent confrontation 
 
 
 
133 ‘[Jean-Jacques] Lebel regarded his participation in the burning down of the Paris 
Stock Exchange on 24th May 1968 as the pinnacle of his career as a happenings 
artist.’ Günter Berghaus, ‘Happenings in Europe’, page 375.
134 For the International’s analysis of its involvement in the May ’68 Revolution, see 
the Situationist International, ‘Beginning of an Era’; and René Viénet, Enragés and 
Situationists in the Occupation Movement. 
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with the police outside the US embassy in London at the end of a 
massive demonstration against the American invasion of Vietnam.135 
Over the next two years, the growing circle of militants influenced by 
King Mob became heavily involved in two direct action campaigns in 
West London: the Claimants’ Union which mobilised the recipients 
of state benefits and Up Against the Law which protested against 
police harassment of hippies and immigrants.136 These activists threw 
themselves into Notting Hill’s thriving underground arts scene. They 
took part in the liberation of a privately owned garden to provide a 
community playground for the deprived inhabitants of this bohemian 
neighbourhood.137 As innovators of graffiti art, they defiantly expressed 
their disdain for the affluent society by daubing a slogan in large white 
letters on a nearby motorway intersection: ‘Same thing day after day 
– tube – work – dinner – work – tube – armchair – TV – sleep – tube – 
work – how much more can you take? – one in ten go mad – one in five 
cracks up.’ In a celebrated action on 21st December 1968, members 
of King Mob – including one dressed up as Father Christmas – went 
to a central London department store where they gave away the toys 
on the shelves to the children who were there with their parents. In 
the ensuing pandemonium, as the TV news and the press gleefully 
reported, security staff had to seize back the shop’s property from 
crying kids while the police tried to arrest these Situationist subverters 
of the holy season of mass consumption.138 The lessons of the Notre 
Dame and Strasbourg scandals had been well learnt in London. The 
spectacle could be turned against itself. 
 
 
135 See David Wise, ‘A Hidden History of King Mob’; and, for eye-witness accounts of 
this protest, Jonathon Green, Days in the Life, pages 240–246.
136 Living amongst Afro-Caribbeans, these white radicals were able to learn from the 
Black Power movement’s strategy of self-reliance, see John Williams, Michael X, 
pages 81–93; and Jonathon Green, Days in the Life, pages 343–353.
137 See David Wise, ‘A Hidden History of King Mob’; and John Barker, ‘Interview with 
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‘Interview with the Author and Ilze Black’. 
80 81
In 1970, a handful of English activists formed the world’s first – and 
only – Situationist terrorist group: the Angry Brigade.139 Over the 
next two years, their feats of revolutionary daring would repeatedly 
grab the lead item on the TV news bulletins and the front page 
headlines in the newspapers. Blowing up the homes of smug Tory 
ministers and bullying Ford factory managers cheered up disgruntled 
workers who were forced to consume the tendentious monologue 
of the media spectacle. Bomb attacks against the Miss Word beauty 
contest and the Biba fashion boutique sabotaged the relentless sexist 
commercialisation of women’s lives.140 As John Barker emphasised, in 
stark contrast with other early-1970s New Left terrorist groups like the 
Weather Underground in the USA, the Angry Brigade never showed 
any interest in launching a direct assault on the security apparatuses 
of the bourgeois state. Instead, its revolutionary actions were carefully 
targeted on disrupting the consensual complacency of the mass 
media.141 After much effort, the British police eventually identified the 
likely perpetrators of the Angry Brigade’s campaign of violent protest. 
At the end of 1971, a house was raided in East London, incriminating 
evidence was somehow found and – after a famous trial at the country’s 
top court – four New Left activists were sentenced to long terms in jail. 
Not surprisingly, the mass media was jubilant at this victory of law ‘n’ 
order over the young defendants in the dock. The spectacle had had its 
revenge on the defilers of the spectacle.142 
Paradoxically, the demise of the Angry Brigade confirmed the arrival 
of Situationism as a distinct political current within the English 
New Left. Back in 1968, the small band of activists who’d published 
King Mob Echo had been almost alone in their enthusiasm for the 
theoretical insights of the International. At this historical moment, 
139 In contrast, the International’s headquarters was contemptuous of the New Left’s 
fascination with urban guerrilla warfare, see Gianfranco Sanguinetti, On Terrorism 
and the State.
140 See the group’s communiques in Jean Weir, The Angry Brigade, pages 23–39.
141 See John Barker, ‘The Weatherman Meets the Angry Brigade’; and ‘Interview with 
the Author and Ilze Black’. John Barker was one of the four people sentenced to 
10 years in jail for the Angry Brigade’s campaign. For the story of the Weather 
Underground, see Dan Berger, Outlaws of America. 
142 See Gordon Carr, The Angry Brigade; Stuart Christie, Edward Heath Made Me Angry; 
and John Barker, ‘Review Article: Anarchy in the UK’.
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the overwhelming majority of the New Left in England still hadn’t 
moved beyond the rigid ideological dividing lines of the 1917 Russian 
Revolution. Amongst this milieu, Situationism was too libertarian for 
its Bolsheviks and too Marxist for its Anarchists – and much too arty 
for both of them. Worst of all, this new avant-garde paradigm from 
the continent flouted the sociological shibboleths of early-20th century 
Left politics. King Mob was wasting its time trying to organise hippie 
drop-outs, petty criminals and welfare claimants in inner city London. 
Factory workers were the only section of the proletariat which could 
overthrow the capitalist system. For this iteration of the New Left, 
reviving the revolutionary past was the sole path to the socialist future.
Yet, by the time that the first issue of King Mob Echo appeared in 1968, 
the post-Fordist remaking of the working class was already underway 
within England’s deprived urban neighbourhoods. In contrast with 
the majority of the New Left, the activists of this magazine had 
realised that – when the local population wasn’t directly employed in 
manufacturing – community activism and cultural subversion were 
now the most effective forms of collective resistance. As its extreme 
manifestation, the armed actions of the Angry Brigade had expressed 
the ferocity of this growing youth revolt against the society of the 
spectacle.143 A generation had been radicalised and was looking for a 
intelligent political theory to explain their deep hatred of consumer 
conformism. During the early-1970s, in the pages of OZ, iT and 
other English alternative publications, this more advanced Situationist 
interpretation of New Left theory was now given extensive coverage.144 
Their readers welcomed its brilliant intellectual confirmation that the 
libertarian mores of the hippie subculture prefigured the destruction 
of the entire rotten capitalist system. For them, the writings of 
Situationism provided the tactical manual for an intoxicating fusion 
of activism and art into the all-transforming revolution of everyday 
life. As the editor of the English underground newspaper Friends later 
recollected, the brightest minds of his generation now possessed:  ‘... 
[the] rational explanation for our irresponsible behaviour and urges 
143 See John Barker, ‘Interview with the Author and Ilze Black’.
144 See Angelo Quattrocchi, ‘The Situationists are Coming’; and Nigel Fountain, 
Underground, pages 58–59.
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... [the theory] to see everything, absolutely everything, in terms of 
political activity.’145
145 Alan Marcuson in Jonathon Green, Days in the Life, page 250.
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1.7: The Last Gang in Town
In 1969, Martin Housden and his Situationist friends in West London 
decided to launch an assault against the media spectacle by setting up 
their own rock band: Thanatos. With their celebrity status, country 
mansions and aristocratic friends, the rich and pampered pop stars who 
dominated the nation’s airwaves were the epitome of the recuperation 
of the new youth subcultures by the entertainment industry. Learned 
in the avant-garde tactics of Situationism, Thanatos sought to subvert 
the fans who worshipped these false idols. Combining provocation 
and détournement, its planned repertoire included songs with lyrics 
taken from Jack the Ripper’s letter taunting the police and William 
Blake’s Tyger, Tyger poem. The messages in Thanatos’ tunes would never 
fit comfortably into the Top 40 playlist. Above all, these songs were 
devised as communal scratch renditions. Everyone was going to be a 
star at their performances. By breaking down the barriers between the 
fans in the auditorium and the musicians on the stage, Thanatos would 
prove that the masses could make their own media.146
Unfortunately, the ambitions of this methedrine-inspired Notting Hill 
fantasy were never fulfilled at the time. Yet, in this thought experiment, 
these admirers of King Mob had anticipated the winning strategy which 
would soon become the leitmotif of English Situationism. During their 
short-lived association in the late-1960s, what had distinguished this 
island outpost of the International from the mainland headquarters 
was its close involvement with London’s youth subcultures.147 Despite 
their enthusiasm for teenage hooligans, Watts rioters and Strasbourg 
students, Debord and his comrades had always stayed aloof from the 
1960s’ new manifestations of bohemianism. Above all, they’d kept faith 
with the industrial proletariat as the revolutionary subject of history. 
During May ‘68, it was only when workers began occupying their 
factories and offices that the dominance of capital had been seriously 
threatened. In contrast, the activists of King Mob were convinced that 
the members of youth subcultures now made the best soldiers for anti-
spectacular warfare. Mods, bikers, beatniks and hippies were the true 
146 See Martin Housden, ‘Interview with the Author and Ilze Black’.
147 See Charles Radcliffe, ‘Two Fiery Flying Rolls’, pages 374–375.
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revolutionaries of everyday life.148 Given its geographical location, this 
ideological divergence of the English Section from its French mentor 
was almost inevitable. Speaking the same language as the Americans 
and situated on the same continent as the Europeans, London was 
a sweet point of the emerging global youth counter-culture. Having 
lost an empire, the English had discovered a new role: turning on the 
world. Paris might have had the May ‘68 Revolution, but London 
had the Rolling Stones, the Kinks and the Who.149 Not surprisingly, 
like Up Against The Wall Motherfucker and the Yippies in America, 
the militants around King Mob Echo dreamt of transforming this late-
1960s cultural rebellion into a fully-fledged social revolution.150 The 
Paris headquarters just didn’t get it. Youth movements were the new 
revolutionary subject of history. The English Situationists had learnt to 
speak in the local dialect.
In 1974, Gray published Leaving the 20th Century to codify these 
insights. This founder of King Mob had been horrified by the bombings 
and shootings of the Angry Brigade. His book would provide English 
malcontents with a more subtle interpretation of the Situationists’ 
strategy for New Left insurgency.151 In its introduction, Gray explained 
that his compilation was deliberately selective. It was no accident that 
most of the texts in Leaving the 20th Century came from the ‘... initial, 
predominantly ‘artistic’, period of Situationist activity.’152 During this 
formative stage, the International had formulated its cutting-edge 
combination of four avant-garde tactics: provocation, détournement, 
psychogeography and participatory creativity. With great skill, Gray 
devised Leaving the 20th Century as an instruction manual of cultural 
mischief for English Situationists. The armed actions of the Angry 
Brigade had ended in defeat. Learning from this reverse, the next 
148 See Charles Radcliffe, ‘The Seeds of Social Destruction’; and the English Section of 
the Situationist International, The Revolution of Modern Art and the Modern Art of 
Revolution, pages 22–24.
149 See George Melly, Revolt into Style; and Simon Frith and Howard Horne, Art into 
Pop, pages 71–93.
150 For the manifestos of these US New Left media pranksters, see Black Mask & Up 
Against The Wall Motherfucker, The Incomplete Works; and Jerry Rubin, Do It!.
151 See David Wise, ‘A Hidden History of King Mob’; and Richard Parry, ‘Preface’.
152 Chris Gray, Leaving the 20th Century, page 6.
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iteration of English Situationism must rediscover the delights of 
radicalising the nation’s disaffected youth subcultures. By carefully 
studying the texts in Leaving the 20th Century, its readers could learn 
the intricacies of the International’s four stratagems for fighting the 
media spectacle. Best of all, when they were successfully put into 
practice, everyone could become a Situationist.    
By publishing Leaving the 20th Century, Gray became a proselytiser for 
the democratisation of avant-garde art in England. Across the world, 
visitors to galleries and exhibitions were drawn from the most privileged 
and educated sections of society. Amongst this minority, it was only a 
select few who were capable of understanding – and appreciating – how 
avant-garde artists were subverting aesthetic orthodoxy.153 Yet, back in 
the 1920s, the Surrealists and Constructivists had briefly broken out of 
this cultural ghetto by identifying themselves with the Bolshevik cause. 
Radicals knew that it was possible to create the seemingly impossible: 
avant-garde art with mass appeal. With Surrealism and Constructivism 
having been largely recuperated, Leaving the 20th Century was a primer 
in the new subversive teachings from the continent which promised 
to revive this heady moment of aesthetic rebellion for the hippie 
generation. By studying Gray’s book, English activists could learn 
how to apply the four tactics of Situationism to disrupt the turgid 
monologue of the media spectacle. In bohemian neighbourhoods 
across the country, there was already a thriving scene of rock bands, 
underground newspapers, head shops, communal squats, night clubs 
and free festivals. In his book, Gray had provided its denizens with 
battle-tested stratagems for radicalising this youth subculture. The 
insights of the avant-garde would no longer be confined within the 
gallery system. The most revolutionary art was going to be made out 
in the streets. 
While compiling Leaving the 20th Century, Gray linked up with a 
new generation of cultural subversives. In 1970, from their safe base 
at Croydon Art School, a group of friends led by Jamie Reid had 
started a leftfield magazine: Suburban Press. Learning from their King 
Mob  predecessors, these young activists soon became adepts of the 
153 See Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction; and Pierre Bourdieu and Alain Darbel, The Love of 
Art.
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International’s four tactics of aesthetic insubordination. Over the 
next few years, this English Situationist journal published thoughtful 
articles on the alienated spaces of modern life and the social impact of 
teenage disaffection. Even better, its readers were provided with the 
artistic means to put theory into practice inside the covers of Suburban 
Press. The more daring among them could stick up the magazine’s 
flyers announcing a free shopping day at their local supermarket and 
plaster its official-looking posters denouncing the lies of the media 
monopolists around their neighbourhoods.154 Endowing this revival of 
the avant-garde interpretation of Situationism with his prestige as a 
founder of King Mob, Gray asked Reid to design the layout of Leaving 
the 20th Century. Bombs and guns had proved their ineffectiveness in 
the anti-spectacular struggle. In its new iteration, English Situationism 
must instead focus upon the International’s four techniques of artistic 
subversion. As would soon become apparent, Gray’s message did 
successfully reach its intended audience. Leaving the 20th Century was 
about to become the tactical manual for the next upsurge of youth 
rebellion. 
What – in the authoritative accounts – has given such historical 
importance to Suburban Press was its role as the harbinger of the punk 
movement in England. During the late-1960s, Reid had met Malcolm 
McLaren and Vivienne Westwood when they were all art students. 
Together, they’d discovered the ideas of Situationism by hanging 
around the periphery of the King Mob scene.155 By 1971, Reid’s two 
colleagues had teamed up to open a clothes shop at the cheaper end of 
London’s Kings Road. For McLaren and Westwood, alternative fashion 
was much more than applied art. In their store, the ideas of Suburban 
Press would become tools of aesthetic dissent. Like the writers of King 
Mob Echo, they too were convinced that drop-outs, students and petty 
criminals were now the most rebellious elements within English society. 
Having studied Leaving the 20th Century, they set to work on applying 
its four Situationist tactics of artistic subversion to mobilise these 
disaffected young people for the revolutionary cause. Unfortunately, 
McLaren and Westwood’s initial attempts to radicalise Teddy Boys and 
154 See Jamie Reid and Jon Savage, Up They Rise, pages 17–46.
155 See Fred Vermorel, ‘At The End, They Even Stole His Death’, pages 206–208.
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bikers floundered on the nostalgic rigidity of these outsider subcultures. 
In their shop’s next makeover, sexual fetishists eagerly bought its new 
line of S&M clothing, but they too proved to be politically timid. 
Innovating and appropriating, McLaren and Westwood eventually 
found a group of eager recruits for their Situationist media uprising: 
the punks.156 It was these devotees of their clothes shop that quickly 
became the catalysts of a radical transformation of the styles and 
attitudes which defined London’s bohemian scene. Punk defiance not 
hippie pacifism was now the order of the day. As the Clash eulogised 
in their stirring song, this youth subculture took pride in being the 
London Trained Bands of the new English Civil War.157
By 1976, the Suburban Press posse was in command of the burgeoning 
punk movement. With a mixture of guile and chutzpah, McLaren 
was presiding over the rise of its seminal rock group: the Sex Pistols. 
Westwood devised the outrageous fashions that shocked both suit-and-
tie commuters and denim-clad hippies. Reid’s cut-and-paste designs 
for the Pistols’ flyers, posters, record covers and adverts marked this 
new youth subculture’s aesthetic break with the psychedelic 1960s. 
Bernie Rhodes – another Suburban Press contributor – was managing 
the Clash with its heady combination of amphetamine-powered tunes, 
tough political slogans and paint-splattered clothes. Fred Vermorel – a 
co-conspirator of McLaren’s from his student days – was the learned 
chronicler of the punk movement. With Leaving the 20th Century 
as their tactical manual, these art school alumni were applying the 
four Situationist techniques of aesthetic dissidence to foment a new 
youth subcultural insurrection. Denouncing the hippie pop stars for 
selling-out labelled them as ‘boring old farts’. Mixing and matching 
the fashions of Teds, bikers, Mods, S&M enthusiasts, glam stars and 
rent boys became the unique punk look. Swearing on a family TV 
programme set off a media storm that made the Sex Pistols into headline 
news. Banned from playing in venues across the country turned this 
band into the must-see live act of the moment. Being dropped by one 
multinational record label quickly led to a bidding war between its 
156 See Fred and Judy Vermorel, Sex Pistols, pages 214–225; and Jon Savage, England’s 
Dreaming, pages 27–129.
157 See The Clash, Give ‘Em Enough Rope. For the decisive role of the London Trained 
Bands in the 1642 English Revolution, see Wilfrid Emberton, Skippon’s Brave Boys.
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rivals to sign the Sex Pistols. Confirming the analysis of Leaving the 20th 
Century, big business was as eager as ever to make money out of artistic 
subversion. Armed with this knowledge, the English Situationists were 
able to turn this process of recuperation against itself. Having secured 
a new contract with a music company, they now had the means to 
disseminate their insurrectionary message to the masses. In the summer 
of 1977, while the British establishment smugly commemorated the 
25th anniversary of Elizabeth Windsor’s accession to the throne, the Sex 
Pistols released a killer tune lambasting this celebration of hypocrisy 
and deference: God Save The Queen. When this record became the best-
selling single of Jubilee week, the powers-that-be fixed the pop charts 
to prevent an anti-monarchist diatribe taking the Number One spot.158 
Most wonderfully, through this shocking Situationist détournement of 
the national anthem, buying a punk commodity had become a scream 
of proletarian defiance: ‘We’re the flowers in the dustbin, we’re the 
poison in your human machine, we’re the future, your future!’159
In its late-1970s iteration, English Situationism had won a notable 
victory over the spectacular enemy. Sabotaging the Queen’s Jubilee 
was the fulfilment of the revolutionary ambitions of King Mob and 
Suburban Press – and much more. The turgid protests of the Bolshevik 
and Anarchist sects against this monarchist humbug had no resonance 
outside the usual suspects. In contrast, the intelligent application 
of Situationist tactics had succeeded in shattering the carefully 
constructed media image of the British people united in subservience 
to their bourgeois sovereign. What Thanatos had dreamt in 1969, 
the Sex Pistols realised in 1977. It was possible to release a Number 
One single that was unplayable on the Top 40 countdown show. In 
1978, with money from the band’s best-selling records, McLaren 
began making a film with Julien Temple that told the fabulous tale 
of how the Sex Pistols had battle-tested the International’s tactics for 
subverting the media spectacle: The Great Rock ‘n’ Roll Swindle. The 
infamous provocations, clever détournements, psychogeographic 
evocations and communal celebrations of the glory days of punk were 
158 See Fred and Judy Vermorel, Sex Pistols, pages 10–93; and Jon Savage, England’s 
Dreaming, pages 107–367.
159 Sex Pistols, God Save The Queen.
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all lovingly remembered in its melange of music videos, documentary 
footage, cartoon sequences and fictionalised re-enactments. Despite 
these genuflections to the genre, McLaren and Temple’s film was no 
hagiographic rock documentary. Like Leaving the 20th Century, this 
movie provided a tactical manual for sabotaging the society of the 
spectacle.
Not surprisingly, writing his own history, McLaren cast himself as the 
Situationist mastermind behind the rise and fall of the Sex Pistols. 
Paying respect to King Mob, the film opened with a riotous crowd 
running with torches through the city streets of late-18th century 
London. Arriving at a gallows, these ne’er-do-wells started stringing 
up effigies of the Sex Pistols and then setting them on fire. No one – 
especially not the members of this iconic punk band – could escape 
retribution for elevating themselves above the mutinous multitude. 
Towards the end of the film, McLaren hammered home this anti-
recuperation message. A young punk pretended to be the submissive 
fan of a decadent hippie rock star, but – as soon as they were alone – she 
revealed herself as his ruthless assassin. In the film’s opening sequence, 
McLaren proclaimed his Situationist antidote for the corrupting 
powers of the music industry. Having lost their charismatic front man, 
the members of the band were holding auditions for a new lead singer. 
The title of this talent show said it all: ‘Anyone Can Be A Sex Pistol’.160 
The film was a mess and the group was falling apart, but McLaren 
could still take satisfaction in the greatest achievement of the punk 
movement: the upsurge in participatory creativity across England. 
Over the course of The Great Rock ‘n’ Roll Swindle, McLaren helpfully 
summarised the tactical lessons of his adventures with the Sex Pistols 
into 10 commandments of cultural subversion for young dissidents.161 
In cinemas and video stores across the world, the revolutionary 
teachings of English Situationism were now available to one and all.
When, as a 19-year-old student in spring 1976, I went to see Patti 
Smith, Talking Heads and the Ramones at their first gigs in London, 
160 See Julien Temple, The Great Rock ‘n’ Roll Swindle; Jon Savage, England’s Dreaming, 
pages 497–541; and Joel McIver, The Making of the Great Rock ‘n’ Roll Swindle.
161 See Jamie Reid and Jon Savage, Up They Rise, pages 86–87.
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there was no doubt that punk meant New York. This American city 
had defined the lo-fi sound and ripped-and-torn style of our new 
generation of cultural rebels. Even the name itself came from there.162 
Yet, before the year was out, it was London that was the undisputed 
global centre of the punk movement. The Sex Pistols and the Clash 
were now the leaders of the pack – and the pioneering New York bands 
had become their imitators. Once again, London had benefited from 
its unique linguistic and geographical position. Living in the capital 
of anglophone Europe, avant-garde innovators could take influences 
from both continents and then combine them into something 
superior. The initiators of punk in New York may have broken with 
the tunes and fashions of the hippie counter-culture, but they’d 
been unable to devise a hard-edged political strategy for preventing 
a repetition of its sad story of sold-out stars and broken promises. 
Fortunately, thanks to their proximity to Paris, their peers in London 
did have an effective response to recuperation by the music industry. 
In Leaving the 20th Century, they’d found a persuasive explanation for 
why the 1960s rock ‘n’ roll rebels had capitulated to the class enemy. 
Just like Modernist artists in earlier times, these hippie radicals had 
underestimated the seductive power of the cultural mandarins. 
Money and celebrity were the bourgeoisie’s most dangerous weapons 
in the spectacular phase of capitalist domination. Exemplifying this 
recuperative process, underground musicians had been turned into 
pop stars whose privileged lifestyle negated their radical image. Playing 
an electric guitar might offend the older generation, but it was no more 
inherently revolutionary than making an abstract painting. Even if the 
message in the music was still sometimes subversive, rock ‘n’ roll had 
sold out to sleazy entrepreneurs obsessed with selling records, concert 
tickets and merchandising. Worst of all, the DIY ethos of the hippie 
movement had long been forgotten. The audiences at rock concerts 
were relegated to worshipping the lucky few who – through talent or 
hype – had made it on to the stage. Fortunately, by adopting the avant-
garde tactics described in Leaving the 20th Century, English punks 
in the late-1970s now knew how to foment an aesthetic revolution 
that couldn’t be recuperated by the corporate enforcers of spectacular 
capitalism. They would not suffer the same shameful fate as their 
162 See NME, Punk 1975–1979, pages 18–35; and Mike Evans, N.Y.C. Rock, pages 
103–131.
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hippie predecessors. When they were art school students, McLaren 
and his co-conspirators had come to understand that ‘culture was a 
game’ under Fordism.163 For a decade, they’d gained experience in the 
anti-spectacular struggle. Now, under guidance of these Suburban Press 
veterans, the punks would become the best players of the culture game. 
Equipped with the four avant-garde tactics of Situationism, this late-
1970s youth rebellion now had the skills to beat the class enemy. This 
time, the Left would win. 
In his 1993 autobiography, Johnny Rotten – the lead singer of the Sex 
Pistols – contemptuously dismissed the claim that Situationist theory 
had inspired the punk movement as ‘bollocks’ and ‘nonsense’.164 Yet, 
for me, the opposite is true. It was at a Sex Pistols gig in summer 1976 
that a Saint Martins College of Art student first told me about the 
insights of Situationism. Like many others from my generation, I 
would soon be absorbing the teachings of the International at second-
hand through punk records, fanzines, posters and leaflets. In its English 
avant-garde version, Situationism made sense because its theoretical 
insights described what we were already doing. Inside the 100 Club, 
the punters on the dance floor were as much the stars of the show as 
the members of the Sex Pistols on the stage. As the pogoing crowds at 
these concerts instinctively understood, rejecting the media spectacle 
meant making your own media.  Whether they knew it or not, every 
punk was a Situationist.165
When the God Save The Queen scandal was at its height, Debord phoned 
McLaren to thank him ‘… for getting my record to Number One!’ As 
this veteran of Suburban Press later proudly recollected: ‘I agree[d] with 
him. It was his idea, yes!’166 London had to show maximum respect to 
Paris. It was the Situationists’ tactics of provocation, détournement, 
psychogeography and participatory creativity that had recruited a 
turbulent multitude to the punk subculture. During their brief career 
163 Fred Vermorel, ‘At The End, They Even Stole His Death’, page 207.
164 John Lydon, Rotten, page 4. Also see Stewart Home, Cranked Up Really High, pages 
24–28.
165 See Jon Savage, England’s Dreaming, page 351–358.
166 Malcolm McLaren in Joel McIver, The Making of the Great Rock ‘n’ Roll Swindle, 
page 61.
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in the late-1970s, the Sex Pistols didn’t just change the way that young 
people in England dressed and the music that they listened to. More 
importantly, this band’s records and concerts acted as a call to arms for 
the excluded across the country. Adopting the punk attitude meant 
embracing the DIY ethos.167 If anyone could be a Sex Pistol, then they 
too could become a musician, set up a record label, organise a club 
night, publish a fanzine, be a fashion designer or make a film. Within 
a year of the 100 Club gigs, almost every city and town in Britain had 
its own alternative punk scene which operated outside the constraints 
of the corporate entertainment industry. The bohemian avant-garde 
was being democratised across the whole country. The December 1976 
issue of the Sideburns fanzine summarised this new DIY wisdom: ‘This 
is a chord. This is another. This is a third. Now form a band.’168
In 1982, Factory Records opened a nightclub in Manchester named 
after the Situationist vision of the libertarian communist city of the 
future: the Haçienda. This moniker was no whim. Having discovered 
Leaving the 20th Century in the early-1970s as a student, Tony Wilson 
– the father figure of Factory Records – was a long-standing admirer 
of the avant-garde teachings of Situationism. When he signed a new 
band to this label, he’d always give them a copy of Gray’s book for 
guidance. Through its releases, Factory promoted the punk subculture’s 
DIY style of music-making. Like his peers in London, Wilson saw 
himself as devotee of the English Section’s artistic interpretation of 
Situationism.169 The building of the Haçienda was the next stage in 
Factory’s multi-media campaign of leftfield records, concerts, posters, 
badges and publications. With its name taken from the pages of Leaving 
the 20th Century, this Manchester venue was founded to provide a 
transient space for participatory creativity. By the late-1980s, at the 
Haçienda as elsewhere across England, banging house tunes and good 
Es were helping young people divided by gender, income, ethnicity, 
sexuality and education to find a communal identity on the dance 
167 Three decades later, the lead singer of the Buzzcocks remembered with pride that: 
‘... punk was about being an active participant not a passive consumer.’ Pete Shelley 
in Sam Bridger, Punk Britannia.
168 Sideburns in Jon Savage, England’s Dreaming, page 280.
169 See Tony Wilson, 24 Hour Party People, pages 50–51, 117–118; and Simon 
Reynolds, Rip It Up and Start Again, pages 92–97, 173–197.
92 93
floor. Echoing the moral panic over punk a decade earlier, politicians, 
experts and the media poured scorn on the irresponsibility, criminality 
and hedonism of this rave subculture. Determined to restore social 
discipline, the Tory government passed legislation clamping down on 
unauthorised parties where DJs were dropping the new underground 
sound.170 No wonder that these British defenders of bourgeois morality 
felt threatened. Within the confines of clubs like the Haçienda, the 
dance floor really was a proletarian playground. As the Situationists 
had predicted, the democratisation of avant-garde art was the remaking 
of everyday life.
Both McLaren and Wilson were excellent students of Leaving the 20th 
Century. From Gray’s book, they’d learnt the new avant-garde wisdom 
from the continent – and then successfully applied its four tactics of 
cultural subversion to ferment dissent amongst the nation’s youth. In 
the late-1960s, King Mob had only a dozen members. Two decades 
later, as exemplified by the iconic status of the Sex Pistols and the 
Haçienda, English Situationism had become a mass phenomenon. 
Although most of them had never read Leaving the 20th Century, young 
people across the country were enthusiastically putting its avant-garde 
theory into practice. Their fanzines, indie labels, pirate radios and 
DJ parties ensured that participatory creativity was now the leitmotif 
of leftfield culture. Ironically, in this aesthetic victory, McLaren and 
Wilson had also opened the way for the recuperation of English 
Situationism. As the 1980s progressed, their imitators began occluding 
the subversive politics that had inspired the four tactics of subcultural 
rebellion championed by Leaving the 20th Century. In Tory Britain, 
as the Left suffered defeat after defeat, the Situationists’ advocacy of 
the seizure of power by workers’ councils increasingly seemed like a 
chimera. There was no alternative to neoliberal globalisation. 
Reviving the less confrontational interpretations of Modernism, the 
1980s boosters of Post-Modernism had provided the intellectual 
justification for this forgetting of the revolutionary mission of avant-
170 See Mathew Collin, Altered State, pages 138–236; and Sheryl Garratt, Adventures in 
Wonderland, pages 160–195.
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garde art. Aesthetic innovation was once again an end in itself.171 Under 
this Post-Modernist dispensation, the four tactics of Situationism now 
became the cutting-edge template for promoting new bands, new 
TV programmes, new fashions, new movies or new publications. The 
Haçienda was nothing more than the name of a Manchester nightclub. 
In The Great Rock ‘n’ Roll Swindle, McLaren had set himself the task of 
discrediting the first – and favoured – enemy of the punk rebellion: 
the music industry. Brilliantly, he’d formulated the 10 lessons of pop 
subversion for his youthful audience of Situationist warriors. But, by 
the time that the film was released in 1980, it was the swindler who’d 
been swindled. Richard Branson’s Virgin Music – the English exemplar 
of hippie capitalism – now owned the Sex Pistols brand. McLaren and 
his punk protégés were locked into a bitter lawsuit over the money spent 
on making the film.172 For those of a cynical disposition, The Great 
Rock ‘n’ Roll Swindle could be interpreted in a very different way than it 
was originally intended. Far from being a searing critique of spectacular 
capitalism, this film was a business manual for entrepreneurial success 
within the rapidly expanding creative industries. As the Sex Pistols and 
the Haçienda had both proved, outrage, remixing, urbanism and DIY 
culture were clever techniques for attracting the attention of the fickle 
youth market. For the busy executive, McLaren had even helpfully 
summarised his Situationist strategy into 10 easy-to-remember sound 
bites: ‘...giving [media] capitalists a ‘radical’ rationale for what they 
ought to do in their own interest anyway.’173 The class enemy had 
learnt how to play and win the avant-garde cultural game.
In its original 1957 French meaning, such recuperation was the 
contemptible mark of failure. However, two decades later, the English 
punks had begun the process of turning this negative into a positive. By 
creating their rock ‘n’ roll classics in the late-1970s, the Sex Pistols had 
been able to exert a subversive influence on youth subcultures across the 
world. Making a  Top 40 record was now the most radical expression 
171 See Frederic Jameson, Postmodernism; and Neville Wakefield, Post-Modernism.
172 See Joel McIver, The Making of the Great Rock ‘n’ Roll Swindle, pages 127–162; and 
Jon Savage, England’s Dreaming, pages 522–541.
173 David Widgery, Beating Time, page 64.
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of avant-garde artistry.174 Thanks to this pop incarnation, provocation, 
détournement, psychogeography and participatory creativity became 
increasingly identified as the aesthetic legacy of the English punk 
subculture. In 1989, Greil Marcus published a book which would come 
to define this Sex Pistols version of Situationism: Lipstick Traces. More 
than a decade after the band’s demise, this American music journalist 
fascinated his readers with exciting revelations about the French origins 
of the English punk movement. Behind Johnny Rotten was Malcolm 
McLaren – and behind him stood Guy Debord. Curiously, in this 
influential narrative, a strange slippage in time took place. For most 
of the book, his account focused on the Situationists’ adventures as 
a bohemian community of avant-garde artists in the decade before 
the International’s greatest moment: the May ’68 French Revolution. 
Excited more by London than Paris, Marcus emphasised that what was 
truly important about Debord’s writings was their artistic influence on 
McLaren and – through him – on the Sex Pistols. In Lipstick Traces, 
Situationism meant punk outrages, appropriations, psychogeography 
and DIY media. Tellingly, Marcus overlooked that these cultural 
tactics were supposed to be combined into a political strategy which 
could deliver a proletarian victory in the class war. In his admiring 
codification of English Situationism, this American acolyte had 
inadvertently exposed its recuperative failings. Like its Modernist and 
hippie predecessors, the punk movement had also been systematically 
assimilated into the cultural establishment. Their aesthetic innovations 
might have transformed the tastes and styles of an entire generation, 
but the institutions of spectacular capitalism had survived and were 
now more powerful than ever. As Marcus’ book revealed, the English 
Situationists had forgotten that the International was founded not just 
to create a new aesthetic. More than anything else, its driving ambition 
had been to catalyse the revolutionary transition into the next stage of 
human civilisation: libertarian communism. Leftfield art was in the 
service of Left politics.
A year before the publication of Lipstick Traces, Stewart Home issued his 
own manifesto of avant-garde experimentation: The Assault on Culture. 
By locating the International within the history of late-20th century 
174 See Simon Reynolds, Rip It Up and Start Again, pages 361–382 403–417, 491–515.
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Modernism, this London-based novelist explained how the Situationists’ 
four tactics of aesthetic insurgency had emerged out of a much wider 
milieu of artistic dissidence in Cold War Europe. In complete contrast 
with Marcus, Home strongly repudiated the growing cult of Debord 
as the prophet of punk rock rebellion. Instead, most of the credit for 
inventing the subversive techniques of English Situationism should be 
attributed to Jorn, Fazakerley and their colleagues in the Scandinavian 
Section of the International. When the International split in 1962, it 
was Debord’s faction which had insisted that art must be subservient to 
politics. Rejecting this old Left attitude, the Scandinavian Situationists 
had instead emphasised that cultural rebellion was now the most 
subversive strategy for sabotaging spectacular capitalism.175 Yet, 
despite his very different reading of the same history, Home’s central 
argument in The Assault on Culture complemented that of Marcus in 
Lipstick Traces: punk rock was avant-garde art. Crucially, both authors 
emphasised the subversive power of this burst of aesthetic innovation. 
King Mob’s dream that youth subcultures were the harbinger of the 
all-transforming proletarian revolution might not have been realised. 
But, despite this disappointment, the punk movement had succeeded 
in undermining the deferential and puritanical attitudes imposed upon 
their parents’ generation. Thanks to these two opinionated books, 
English Situationism could now take pride in its own radical history 
and local roots. As this West European nation prepared to leave 20th 
century, leftfield writers, journalists and film-makers popularised a 
compelling narrative of four decades of cultural deviancy in London. 
The fans of punk could now make sense of this inspirational outburst 
of youth rebellion. In his 1992 The West Eleven Days of My Life 
publication, Tom Vague celebrated the bohemian psychogeography 
of Notting Hill which had nurtured both King Mob and the Clash. 
In his 1997 Anarchy in the UK book, he traced the hidden lineage 
that connected the Angry Brigade with the Sex Pistols. Reversing 
the Situationist position, libertarian communism was now placed in 
the service of avant-garde art. The primary importance of his heroes’ 
revolutionary politics was endowing their cultural dissidence with a 
radical edge. The precise language of Marxist theory was transformed 
175 See Stewart Home, The Assault on Culture, pages 31–49; and Fabian Tompsett, 
‘Preface’, pages 3–15. For the adventures of the Scandinavian Situationists, see 
Mikkel Bolt Rasmussen and Jakob Jakobsen, Expect Anything Fear Nothing. 
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into wild verbal provocations against the ideological conformity of 
bourgeois society. By mixing Chris Gray and Malcolm McLaren with 
Greil Marcus and Stewart Home, Tom Vague had perfected the English 
translation of the International’s ideas: Pop Situationism.
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1.8: The Writing on the Wall
On 26th–27th September 2009, Class Wargames hosted its Game of War 
Weekend at Furtherfield’s HTTP gallery in London.176 Taking pride 
of place in the front room stood our twice size replica of Debord’s 
1977 gold-and-silver metallic set. Around the surrounding walls, Alex 
Veness had hung his eerie xenographs of people playing The Game of 
War. Taken with a scanner-camera, these pictures created ‘… a visual 
aesthetic that describes contemporary experience: liquid, ephemeral 
and uncertain.’177 In the back room, a new film was on continuous 
loop: Class Wargames Presents Guy Debord’s The Game of War. With 
financial help from the Arts Council of England, we’d been able to 
make a Situationist video primer for this Situationist game. Like its 
inventor’s later films, Class Wargames Presents Guy Debord’s The Game of 
War was driven by the analytic wisdom provided by its voiceover and 
telling quotations. Imitating our mentor, the script was suffused with 
the provocative phraseology of Marxist theory. Following Debord’s 
advice, this movie’s imagery was carefully chosen to resonate with the 
audience’s deep immersion within the media spectacle. Interspersed 
with clips of Class Wargames’ performances, Ilze Black – its director – 
had constructed a visual détournement of the 21st century’s vast store 
of fictional and documentary representations of the dramatic political 
and military conflicts of human history. Thirty years on, Debord’s 
plagiarist techniques of film-making were still at the cutting-edge of 
avant-garde cinema.178
In our ‘Communiqué #7’ distributed to those attending the Game 
of War Weekend, Class Wargames proselytised for the Situationist 
possibilities of the new information technologies. Remixing films 
was expensive and difficult in the 1970s when Debord had made The 
Society of the Spectacle and In Girum Imus Nocte with celluloid stock 
in an editing room. Three decades later, Ilze was cutting and pasting 
a movie from our collection of videos and DVDs with Final Cut on a 
176 For more details about this event and its accompanying exhibition, see Furtherfield, 
‘Class Wargames – Game of War’.
177 Alex Veness, Xenon-Eye, on page 10 above.
178 See Guy Debord, ‘On The Society of the Spectacle’; and ‘The Use of Stolen Films’.
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Mac laptop. Ironically, just like its open source rivals, such commercial 
software and hardware were now also potent weapons against the 
copyright monopolists of the creative industries. In the early-21st 
century, the avant-garde artistic tactic of détournement had become 
firmly embedded within everyday life. Above all, our multi-media 
show at the HTTP gallery celebrated The Game of War as the formative 
expression of Situationist ludic science. During those hot afternoons 
of that autumn weekend, Class Wargames laid out its resin copy of 
Debord’s 1977 set in the courtyard outside the exhibition. By moving 
the pieces across the board at these two participatory performances, 
visitors to Furtherfield’s space were completing the making of this 
collective artwork for themselves. As the teams of North and South 
battled for supremacy, they were learning to engage with the avant-
garde tactic of participatory creativity. Everyone could become a Pop 
Situationist.
Three years before these two Class Wargames performances at 
Furtherfield’s HTTP gallery, Gary Genosko – a Canadian academic 
– had tartly observed that the devotees of Debord should be thankful 
that: ‘At least, [The Game of War] … has not become a popular parlour 
game.’179 Like one of Giacometti’s sculptures, his ludic experiment was 
an unplayable avant-garde artwork. Since its formation in 2007, Class 
Wargames’ had been determined to overturn this flawed assumption. 
During the first phase of our campaign of ludic subversion, we’d shown 
how people who played The Game of War with Debord’s 1977 set could 
return to the special times when the four heretical tactics of Situationist 
cultural sabotage had been devised – and then think about how they 
could be re-imagined for the 21st century. Most gratifyingly, Ruth 
Catlow – Furtherfield’s co-founder – had enthusiastically participated 
in our materialisation of Debord’s collective ludic artwork at the 
Game of War Weekend. When formulating the strategy for the first 
stage of our campaign of aesthetic subversion, we’d been inspired by 
her pioneering contributions to this new type of creative expression. 
Back in 2003, evoking Saito’s and Ono’s Fluxus sets, Catlow had 
modified a computer Chess game to mark her outrage at the American 
invasion of Iraq: Rethinking Wargames. In this 3-sided version, while 
179 Gary Genosko, ‘[Review of ] Vincent Kaufman’, page 3.
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Black and White attacked each other with the back row pieces, a 
third player manoeuvred both sides’ pawns in an effort to block this 
confrontation. The anti-imperialist message of this avant-garde piece 
of software was unambiguous. As peace was established on the board, 
its checkered squares of combat slowly turned into a lush green field. 
In this Situationist détournement of Chess, the pawns could thwart the 
queen.180
From 2003 onwards, Catlow and Marc Garrett – her Furtherfield 
co-conspirator – had been stalwarts of London’s computer art games 
scene. In their exhibitions and publications, they’d lauded the avant-
garde possibilities of this modern form of aesthetic imagination. 
Myfanwy Ashmore’s 2000 Mario Battle No.1 and Jodi’s 2004 Max 
Payne Cheats Only challenged the competitive and hierarchical logic 
of the commercial gaming industry. Tiltfactor’s 2009 Layoff and 
Jeremy Bailey’s 2009 Warmail delivered a strong political message in 
ludic form.181 In Catlow and Garrett’s influential Artists Re:thinking 
Games book written with Corrado Morgana, the Situationist tactic 
of détournement was praised for giving theoretical clarity to what 
these artists were already doing.182 Fifty years on, the insights of the 
International were flourishing within this new avant-garde paradigm. 
In its 2001 Can You See Me Now? and 2003 Uncle Roy All Around 
locative media games, Blast Theory had combined playing on-line and 
on the city streets.183 In 2006, Ilze Black from Class Wargames had 
helped to create the Porta2030 wireless network in East London which 
demonstrated how a local neighbourhood could be playfully remapped 
by its own inhabitants.184 With the aid of new digital technologies, 
 
 
180 See Ruth Catlow, Rethinking Wargames; and Mary Flanagan, Critical Play, pages 
113–116.
181 See Furtherfield, Zero Gamer; and Ruth Catlow, Marc Garrett and Corrado 
Morgana, Artists Re:thinking Games.
182 See Corrado Morgana, ‘Introduction Artists Re:thinking Games’.
183 See Blast Theory, Blast Theory; and Anne-Marie Schleiner, ‘Dissolving the Magical 
Circle of Play’, pages 7–8.
184 See Porta2030, You Are the Net, You Are Porta-Porter; and Ruth Catlow, ‘Let’s Do 
Lunch [2005]’.
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anyone could – if only for a brief moment – put the Situationist tactic 
of psychogeography into practice.185 
Earlier in that year, on 25th July 2009, Class Wargames had attracted a 
small and enthusiastic audience for its performance at Plan 9’s Summer 
of Dissent festival in Bristol. Most appropriately, this collective playing 
of The Game of War coincided with a major exhibition by the local 
artist who’d become the nation’s most skilled practitioner of Pop 
Situationism: Banksy vs Bristol Museum.186 The long queues outside 
the City Gallery were confirmation of King Mob’s insistence that the 
members of dissident youth subcultures made the best recruits for anti-
spectacular warfare. Banksy had come out of the skateboard and DJ 
party scenes in early-1990s Bristol. Thanks to punk, the avant-garde 
teachings of English Situationism were now learnt on the streets as 
the leftfield tactics of media subversion.187 Not surprisingly, when 
Banksy had started stencilling his striking designs around the city, 
the municipal authorities hadn’t appreciated the artistic importance 
of his trip-hop graffiti. Delightfully, two decades later, these images 
were now being officially honoured as the local roots of Banksy’s rise to 
international stardom. Inside the Bristol City Gallery, the ironic style 
and anti-authoritarian attitudes honed in illegal graffiti had expanded 
to include prints, paintings, statues, installations and animatronics. 
Most wonderfully, a multi-media happening had been allowed to 
take over the municipal museum for three months – and the entrance 
was free. Combining outlaw anonymity with celebrity status, Banksy 
had carefully negotiated the many temptations of recuperation which 
can ensnare successful avant-garde artists. As the large crowds from 
very diverse backgrounds at the Bristol City Gallery proved, Pop 
Situationism now had a mass public.188
185 See Marc Tuters, ‘The Locative Commons’.
186 See Banksy, Wall and Piece. Tellingly, seven years earlier, Banksy had collaborated 
with Jamie Reid on The Centre of Attention’s 2002 anti-Jubilee exhibition: Vive la 
République!
187 See Steve Wright, Home Sweet Home; and Gil Gillespie, The Naked Guide to Bristol, 
pages 74–107.
188 See the Bristol Evening Post, ‘Banksy Comes Home For Bristol Show’; and Tim 
Adams, ‘The Graffitist Goes Straight’.
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The 2009 Banksy exhibition was a public celebration of the rebellious 
spirit of avant-garde art. Within the hallowed space of a municipal 
museum, the idiocies and crimes of big government and big business 
were being mocked to popular acclaim. For the few months of the 
show, the recuperators had been recuperated at the Bristol City 
Gallery. Elsewhere in the world, the four tactics of Pop Situationism 
had produced equally impressive results on the cultural battlefield. 
In 1990s New York, Critical Art Ensemble, RTMark and the Yes 
Men utilised provocation and détournement to launch daring media 
sabotage operations against corporate malefactors.189 At the peak of 
that decade’s dotcom boom, Etoy corporation – an Austrian net.art 
project – had played the winning move of participatory creativity in 
the cultural game by mobilising its many fans in a virtual Toywar to 
disrupt the shopping website of eToys – an American on-line retailer 
which wanted to steal its name.190 The avant-garde techniques of Pop 
Situationism were now in sync with the historical moment.191 From 
the mid-1990s onwards, the most utopian hopes of the International 
seemed to be becoming an everyday reality through the rapid spread 
and increasing power of computer networks. Soon, for the first time, 
the whole population would be able to make their own media. The 
pleasurable task of alter-globalisation agitators, leftfield artists and 
community groups was to lead the way into this digital future. At 
conferences like the Next 5 Minutes, Ars Electronica, Transmediale 
and ISEA or on mailing lists like nettime, Rhizome and Syndicate, the 
four aesthetic tactics of Pop Situationism were updated into ‘The ABC 
of Tactical Media’.192 Like punks and ravers before them, the activists 
of radical websites, alternative publications, independent labels, pirate 
radios, video collectives, squatted buildings, techno parties and free 
festivals were creating ‘temporary autonomous zones’ outside of the 
189 See Critical Art Ensemble, The Electronic Disturbance; Julian Stallabrass, Internet 
Art, pages 91–95; and the Yes Men, The Yes Men.
190 See Etoy, ‘The ToyWar-Story’; and Julian Stallabrass, Internet Art, pages 96–102.
191 See Mark Dery, ‘Culture Jamming’; and Richard Barbrook, ‘The Hi-Tech Gift 
Economy’.
192 See David Garcia and Geert Lovink, ‘The ABC of Tactical Media’; and Adilkno, 
Media Archive. 
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cultural establishment’s controls.193 Living in the late-1990s boom 
years of neoliberal globalisation, these youthful dissidents conceded 
that the International’s dream of the workers’ councils overthrowing 
spectacular capitalism was an impossibility. Fortunately, this defunct 
revolutionary political strategy had also inspired four avant-garde art 
tactics which had never been more relevant. Above all, for these new 
media enthusiasts, the Situationist technique of détournement was 
the premonition of the dissolution of intellectual property within the 
Net’s ‘hi-tech gift economy’. Much to the horror of the music and 
film industries, their copyright commodities were metamorphosing 
into virtual potlatches. Although no sensible person could any longer 
believe in hardware communism, everyone was now a practitioner of 
software communism. In this iteration of Pop Situationism, political 
revolution had been superseded by cultural rebellion. As the 21st 
century arrived, the Haçienda could only be built in cyberspace.194
In 1992, Sadie Plant – an English academic – published the intellectual 
rationale for the Post-Modernist codification of Pop Situationism: The 
Most Radical Gesture. Like Marcus, Home and Vague, her narrative 
focused upon the subversive influence of the avant-garde artistry of 
the International. Crucially, by emphasising his penetrating analysis of 
media domination, Plant began the process of welcoming Debord into 
the pantheon of French master-thinkers who fascinated the ideological 
imagination of late-20th century Euro-American Cultural Studies: 
Louis Althusser, Roland Barthes, Jacques Derrida, Julia Kristeva, Jean-
François Lyotard, Jean Baudrillard, Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze 
and Félix Guattari.195 Back in the 1960s and 1970s, the founders of 
this new academic discipline in England had determinedly ignored the 
theoretical insights of Situationism. They’d known that King Mob had 
been not only a pioneer of the critical analysis of youth subcultures, 
but also the inspiration for their most radical manifestation: the punk 
 
 
193 See Hakim Bey, T.A.Z.; and George McKay, ‘DiY Culture’. For a critique of this 
techno-utopian moment, see Richard Barbrook, ‘The Holy Fools’.
194 See Richard Barbrook, ‘The Hi-Tech Gift Economy’; and ‘Cyber-communism’.
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movement. However, as adherents of the Bolshevik tradition, Stuart 
Hall and his colleagues at the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary 
Cultural Studies were repelled by the revolutionary ambitions of the 
Situationist International. Instead, in their writings, they argued 
that the updated Stalinist socio-linguistic theory promoted by Louis 
Althusser and his post-structuralist acolytes was the only credible 
method for understanding the new youth subcultures.196 Befuddled 
by bourgeois hegemony, the masses could only be liberated by the 
small group of illuminated intellectuals who understood this esoteric 
doctrine. Not surprisingly, as intransigent opponents of libertarian 
communism, Hall and his fellow post-structuralists anathematised 
the anti-spectacular analysis of their Situationist rivals as a ‘terrorist 
ideology’.197 For them, it was unthinkable that there could be a smarter 
alternative to their revamped version of Stalinist socio-linguistics. Most 
notoriously, when Subculture: the meaning of style appeared in 1979, 
Dick Hebdige from the Birmingham Centre systematically airbrushed 
the English Situationists out of his account of the punk movement that 
had been fermented by them. Like the Bolshevik tyrant who’d ordered 
the ‘linguistic turn’ in social theory, these British disciples of Althusser 
were determined to purge their opponents on the Left from the history 
books.
By the early-1990s, even amongst the teachers of Cultural Studies, 
Hebdige’s academic falsification had lost all credibility. Thanks to the 
writings of Marcus, Home and Vague, the punk movement was now 
widely recognised as the epitome of Pop Situationism. For those in 
the know, Debord not Althusser was the most intelligent critic of the 
media-saturated societies of contemporary capitalism. It was at this 
moment of ideological crisis that Plant’s book came to the rescue of the 
beleaguered theoretical paradigm of Euro-American Cultural Studies. 
In an impressive feat of intellectual legerdemain, she attempted to 
196 See Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, On Ideology; and Stuart Hall and 
Tony Jefferson, Resistance through Rituals. For the original version of this mandarin 
analysis, see Joseph Stalin, Marxism and  Problems of Linguistics; and Ethan Pollock, 
Stalin and the Soviet Science Wars, pages 104–135.
197 When I was a post-graduate Politics student at Essex University in 1978–9, this was 
the phrase used by Chantel Mouffe to explain why we were banned from quoting 
Debord in our essays! 
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reconcile the irreconcilable. The Society of the Spectacle now became 
a brilliant anticipation of this academic discipline’s elitist theories of 
sign systems, ideological state apparatuses, discursive practices, hyper-
reality, bio-power and semiotic war-machines. Most gratifyingly, 
this meant that the masses who were making DIY media couldn’t 
dispense with the leadership of the illuminated few. In her remix, 
the Situationist International’s avant-garde art tactics had become 
completely divorced from its revolutionary political strategy. Ironically, 
by refusing to subsume his identity within a New Left sect, Debord 
had allowed himself to be recuperated as an eccentric individualist. 
The hardline Marxist language of his theoretical writings was now 
cherished as a punk provocation against bourgeois discourse. His 
devotion to libertarian communism had become nothing more than a 
romantic pose. For these 1990s adepts of Post-Modernism, Debord’s 
political intransigence was instead admired because it had endowed 
him with those most elusive qualities within neoliberal capitalism: 
authenticity and integrity. Unlike so many of his New Left peers, he’d 
scornfully refused the rewards of a counter-cultural career like lucrative 
jobs, newspaper interviews, lecture tours, TV appearances, celebrity 
friends and public honours. Never succumbing to recuperation, the 
commander-in-chief of the Situationist International had always kept 
steadfast to his implacable beliefs: ‘... the hipster’s Che Guevara.’198
After the defeat of the May ’68 Revolution, Debord – with Becker-
Ho – had gone into internal exile in the Auvergne countryside where 
– as he later confessed – he drank too much and wrote too little.199 
Paradoxically, in the Post-Modernist version of Pop Situationism, 
this artist-theorist’s unflinching political commitment to libertarian 
communism became transmuted into unimpeachable proof of his 
moral incorruptibility. For his many admirers in academia and the 
art world, Debord’s greatest creation was his heroic role in 1970s and 
1980s as the lone bohemian prophet standing firm against the tawdry 
temptations of fame and money. Pop Situationism could now be re-
interpreted as an avant-garde philosophy for aesthetic self-realisation. 
198 McKenzie Wark, The Spectacle of Disintegration, page 14. Also see Anselm Jappe, 
Guy Debord, pages 45–124; and Vincent Kaufman, Guy Debord, pages 209–269.
199 See Guy Debord, Panegyric, pages 33–34.
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In 2001, one of his English biographers was moved to proclaim: ‘The 
power which [Debord] … leaves us with today is the power to say No: 
to look the negative in the face and live with it forever.’200
When the Tate Modern in London opened in 2000, a timeline of the 
leading 20th century avant-garde movements was prominently displayed 
across one wall of its third floor concourse. Placed between Pop Art 
and Fluxus, the Situationist International was given due respect for its 
impressive aesthetic and cultural innovations between the 1950s and 
1970s. Ironically, despite being responsible for the 1962 expulsion of 
the artists from the movement, Debord and Vaneigem were the only two 
of its members whose names appeared in this timeline.201 Decades after 
they were first published, Situationist texts still provided a provocative 
analysis of the mutating manifestations of avant-garde art. Appropriated 
by Iain Sinclair, Peter Ackroyd and Will Self for their urban musings, 
psychogeography had already entered the English language during the 
1990s as a fashionable phrase for the hipster appreciation of inner city 
neighbourhoods.202 With the help of Marcus, Home, Vague and Plant, 
the Situationist techniques of provocation, détournement, urbanism 
and participatory creativity had taken their rightful place within the 
gallery system. Not surprisingly, this recognition of the International’s 
achievements had been accompanied by their recuperation. During 
the 1990s, the YBAs achieved fame and fortune by stripping the four 
Situationist tactics of their radical proletarian politics. Once the 21st 
century was reached, innovative curators were championing art spaces 
as the privileged site of participatory creativity. Incorporated into the 
grand narrative of avant-garde art, Situationism had become another 
exotic oddity for the delectation of people visiting galleries as a leisure 
activity.203 By the time that the Game of War Weekend was held at 
Furtherfield in 2009, totemic items from Jamie Reid and Vivenne 
Westwood were to be found in the permanent collections of the Tate 
200 Andy Merrifield, Guy Debord, page 149. Also see Stewart Home, ‘The Self-
Mythologisation of the Situationist International’.
201 See Sara Fanelli, Tate Artist Timeline.
202 See Merlin Coverley, Psychogeography, pages 111–137.
203 See Julian Stallabrass, High Art Lite, pages 67–68; and Nicholas Bourriaud, 
Relational Aesthetics, pages 79–104. Also see Dick Pountain and David Robins, Cool 
Rules, pages 126–128.
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Modern and the Victoria & Albert museum. Thirty three years after 
the banning of God Save The Queen, Pop Situationism had become a 
Post-Modernist national treasure. 
When Class Wargames had opened the first phase of our campaign 
of ludic subversion, we knew that its members were fighting on an 
artistic terrain shaped by this counter-cultural defeat-in-victory. 
Fortunately, the four avant-garde tactics laid down in Leaving the 20th 
Century could still be applied with great effectiveness within the early-
21st century’s information society. By focusing its players’ attention 
on military competition, our performances of The Game of War were 
a punk provocation against American-led imperialist expeditions to 
Iraq and Afghanistan. With its gridded terrain and abstract pieces, 
Debord’s ludic invention was a sly détournement not only of Chess and 
Draughts, but also of family board games like Risk and Stratego. When 
the collective playing of The Game of War took place at the launch of 
the Brazilian edition of my Imaginary Futures book at the Café com 
Letras in Belo Horizonte on 29th April 2009 or as part of (C)hor 29 
Novembar’s  40th anniversary celebrations for the founding of the 
Yugoslav Workers’ Club at the Lokativ in Vienna on 28th  November 
2009, the Situationist tactic of psychogeography was being successfully 
implemented at a unique moment in a special place. Above all, as Class 
Wargames’ ‘Communiqué #5’ emphasised, these transitory experiences 
of participatory creativity with The Game of War had revolutionary 
cultural implications: ‘Competition on a board is a prophecy of co-
operation in everyday life.’ 
When Malcolm McLaren attended our 2009 performance at the Baltic 
Centre for Contemporary Art in Gateshead, the founding father of the 
punk movement immediately grasped the avant-garde ambitions of our 
artistic project. Everyone must be given the opportunity to learn how 
to become a Pop Situationist.During this first phase of our campaign 
of ludic subversion, Class Wargames’ primary task was to facilitate 
those brief passages of time which realised the most utopian hopes 
of the 20th century’s avant-garde movements: the aestheticisation of 
social existence. By playing The Game of War, passive spectators were 
transformed into active creators. Like Kirby’s The First and Second 
Wilderness or Blast Theory’s Uncle Roy All Around, Debord’s ludic 
invention was an interactive collective artwork. Anticipating the DIY 
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ethos of the Net, The Game of War transformed its players into artists. 
At Class Wargames’ performances, the stars of the show were the 
members of the audience who decided where the pieces would move 
on the board. In this iteration of Pop Situationism, our communal re-
enactments of The Game of War were a 21st century invocation of the 
original version of the Sex Pistols, the Haçienda and Banksy. We were 
diligent pupils of the English Section of the International.
In 2008, Anne-Marie Schleiner revealed her ultimate ambition for 
Situationist gaming: the abolition of all rules. Like the Surrealists and 
Fluxus, this American artist-academic had discovered the aesthetic 
pleasures of unplayable games. Mesmerised by the Post-Modernist 
master-thinkers of Cultural Studies, the limit of her ambition was to 
foster an ideological revolt against the dominant semiotic codes.204 
Curiously, in this remix of Pop Situationism, Schleiner never discussed 
The Game of War. Seen as a geeky oddity within Debord’s oeuvre, 
his ludic experiment was too easily overlooked by his contemporary 
admirers. In its performances and propaganda for the first phase of our 
campaign, Class Wargames deployed the techniques of re-enactment art 
to combat the Post-Modernists’ lamentable loss of historical memory. 
According to his admiring biographers, The Game of War was invented 
at a crucial point in the legend of Guy Debord. Having detonated 
the May ‘68 French Revolution, he’d been forced to retreat to an 
Auvergne village. Like the memoirs of Bonaparte dictated during his 
1815–21 exile at St Helena, The Game of War was Debord’s summation 
of a lifetime of world-historical struggles.205 As we stressed at our 
performances, playing with its analogue 1977 board and pieces meant 
returning to this special moment when the four cultural tactics of Pop 
Situationism were combined together in ludic form for the first time. 
When North and South engaged in simulated combat, the audacious 
goal of the International was fully revealed: ‘… history is made mobile 
again, in an irreversible time where strategy can reverse the course of 
events.’206 Under Class Wargames’ guidance, the avant-garde art of The 
 
204 See  Anne-Marie Schleiner, ‘Dissolving the Magical Circle of Play’, pages 12–16.
205 See Vincent Kaufman, Guy Debord, page 267.
206 McKenzie Wark, 50 Years of Recuperation, page 30.
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Game of War was once again in the service of revolutionary politics. 
Understanding the past was the precondition of defining the future.
Over that sultry September weekend in 2009, the players at the 
Furtherfield gallery collectively agreed to obey the strict rules of 
Debord’s game. In making this collective artwork, they were enjoying 
participating within the transient space of ludic sociability designed 
by the maximum leader of the Situationist International. Through 
activating the gold-and-silver board and pieces of our replica of the 
1977 analogue set, these participants in The Game of War were learning 
the tactical and strategic lessons of proletarian dissidence that Debord 
had embedded within its instruction manual. The radical message 
of this ludic détournement could only be understood by personally 
experiencing the ebb-and-flow of its ritualised combat. Like the 12 
issues of Internationale Situationniste, The Game of War was created as a 
beautiful artwork. Crucially, by promoting the 1977 set as a lost classic 
of the late-20th century avant-garde, Class Wargames had manipulated 
the aesthetic allure of its gold-and-silver board and pieces to trash the 
Post-Modernist recuperation of English Situationism. Now that the 
name of Debord was written on the wall of the Tate Modern, every 
intelligent person must try playing The Game of War at least once. They 
weren’t educated if they hadn’t. Once seduced into obeying its rules, 
these players would momentarily find themselves living a 21st century 
simulation of the Situationist cultural revolution. By taking command 
of North and South, they were putting the International’s four avant-
garde tactics into practice. As the first stage of our campaign of ludic 
subversion reached its climax on that September 2009 weekend at 
Furtherfield’s HTTP gallery, we could take pride in our hard-won 
mastery of the English Section’s punk strategy of Pop Situationism. In 
these two participatory performances of The Game of War, avant-garde 
art and revolutionary politics were combined in dialectical unity. Class 
Wargames had issued the orders of combat to the assembled masses: 
Play-It-Yourself!
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Diagram 1
Pump House opening positions for Guy Debord’s The Game of War

Victor Pelevin, Chapayev and Void, page 36.
2.0: the skilful general
‘In actual fact, all the changes that 
happen in the world only take 
place because of ... highly sensi-
tive scoundrels. Because, in reality, 
they do not anticipate the future 
at all, but shape it, by creeping 
across to occupy the quarter from 
which they think that the wind 
will blow. Following which, the 
wind has no option but to blow 
from that very quarter.’
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2.1: The Test of Battle
It was in the early evening of 14th October 2010 and the members of 
Class Wargames were getting ready to make their contribution to What 
Is To Be Done? The Urgent Need To Struggle season curated by Chto Delat? 
at the ICA in London. During a six weeks residency for the gallery that 
autumn, this Russian avant-garde movement was publishing an issue 
of its eponymous magazine, putting on an exhibition of multi-media 
artworks and – which is where we came in – also hosting a series of 
talks, screenings and performances. By adopting Chto Delat? as their 
name, the members of the group emphasised their rejection of aesthetic 
experimentation for its own sake. In late-19th century Russia, this 
phrase had first achieved fame as the title of Nikolai Chernyshevsky’s 
science fiction novel: What Is To Be Done? Inside its pages, the author 
had popularised the inspiring ideal of a self-sacrificing intellectual 
dedicated to liberating the masses from oppression and exploitation.1 
Paying homage to this guru of the Russian Left, V.I. Lenin borrowed its 
title for his 1902 Bolshevik manifesto on revolutionary organisation. 
Updating Chernyshevsky’s vision, he’d argued that radical intellectuals 
should band together to provide a unified leadership for the plethora 
of political, social and national movements opposed to monarchical 
rule: the vanguard party.2 Like its appropriation for the artistic avant-
garde, this military metaphor of the detachment which opened the way 
forward for the main army was used to eulogise the audacious role of 
the enlightened minority who were proselyting for the future in the 
present. 
According to Lenin, the primary task of the vanguard party was 
publishing a national newspaper which would spread its incendiary 
ideas amongst the increasingly disaffected inhabitants of the Tsar’s 
territories.3 When the Bolsheviks eventually seized power during the 
1 For the importance of this novel for Russian opponents of the Tsar, see Franco 
Venturi, Roots of Revolution, pages xxii–xxv, 129–186.
2 See V.I. Lenin, What Is To Be Done?, pages 96–188; and Lars Lih, Lenin, pages 
64–72.
3 See V.I. Lenin, What Is To Be Done?, pages 189–220; and Lars Lih, Lenin, pages 
73–83.
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1917 Russian Revolution, this political strategy was vindicated by 
victory. Ideological unity in opposition had prefigured the Left’s firm 
leadership over the workers and peasants which delivered a decisive 
triumph over the monarchist enemy. Inspired by this heroic example, 
disaffected intellectuals throughout the 20th century tried to imitate 
this Bolshevik model of revolutionary organisation with more or less 
success. They too would form a vanguard party that could mobilise 
the masses to sweep away the established order. By harking back to 
Chernyshevsky’s novel and Lenin’s pamphlet, the activists of Chto 
Delat? had committed themselves to reviving this revolutionary project 
which had been discredited in its birthplace by the 1991 implosion 
of the Soviet Union. On the ICA’s website, they explained that their 
group had been founded in 2003 as a ‘... self-organising platform for 
cultural workers ... [dedicated to] ... merging political theory, art and 
activism.’4 Seven years later, these Russian dissidents had seized the 
opportunity – for the short period of The Urgent Need To Struggle show 
– to fulfil this insurgent ambition in London. The radical manifesto 
of the Eastern vanguard would be proclaimed inside the temple of 
Western Modernism: ‘Art should exist not for museums and dealers, 
but in order to develop and articulate a new mode of emancipated 
sensuality. It should become an instrument for seeing and knowing the 
world in the totality of its contradictions.’5
With both personal and professional links to the Russian homeland of 
Chto Delat?, Class Wargames was honoured to be asked to participate 
in their programme of cultural mischief. During the three years of the 
first phase of our campaign of ludic subversion, we’d acquired plenty 
of experience in organising successful avant-garde art events. On that 
October evening in 2010, as the ICA bar filled up with expectant 
punters, Ilze Black waited for the correct moment and then clicked 
play on the DVD of Class Wargames Presents Guy Debord’s The Game 
of War. Like the Chto Delat? exhibition next door, this movie also 
took pleasure in detourning the ambiguous iconography of the 1917 
Russian Revolution. It was no accident that our audiovisual celebration 
4 ICA, ‘Chto delat? (What is to be done?) – The Urgent Need to Struggle’.
5 Chto Delat?, ‘A Declaration on Politics, Knowledge and Art’. Most notably, the ICA 
was where Pop Art was invented in 1950s England, see Marco Livingstone, Pop Art, 
page 33.
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of Debord’s military simulation began with the Orchestra of the USSR 
Defence Ministry performing The Internationale over the opening 
credits. During the early-20th century, the Bolsheviks had transformed 
this inspiring anthem of workers’ liberation into a marching song of 
Russian imperialism. But, by sampling their martial version in our 
film, Class Wargames was able to thwart these despicable recuperators. 
Evoking both military discipline and proletarian rebellion, this Stalinist 
remix of The Internationale now provided a very appropriate soundtrack 
for the opening section of our 21st century exposition of The Game of 
War. The Left had stolen back what was its in the first place. 
After the screening of the Class Wargames film was over, the audience 
was then given its chance to put Situationist theory into practice. 
Divided into two teams, they took their places on either side of the 
board and pieces laid out on a table in the ICA bar. It was quickly 
decided that Fabian Tompsett would mentor the players of the South 
while Russell King – a veteran wargamer – was placed in charge of 
those who’d taken the role of the North. After a short explanation of 
the rules, the making of the communal artwork of The Game of War got 
underway. As they manoeuvred and fought with their miniature armies, 
the players of North and South were soon caught up in the intense 
drama of this simulated battlefield. Through their moves and counter-
moves, these rival teams led by Fabian and Russell had become joined 
together in their mutual implementation of the Situationists’ avant-
garde tactic of participatory creativity. They were both competing and 
collaborating with each other. The discussions about The Game of War 
around the table were as important as the action on the board. Inside 
the convivial atmosphere of the ICA bar on that autumn evening in 
2010, Class Wargames was realising one of its primary goals as an 
avant-garde art group:  ‘… creating moments in time and space where 
the fate of an arsenal is experienced at an intense emotional, creative 
and intellectual level.’6
As in the 2008 Pump House scenario shown in Diagram 1 on page 
110, Debord and Becker-Ho had both chosen an initial deployment 
 
6 Richard Barbrook and Fabian Tompsett, Class Wargames Presents Guy Debord’s The 
Game of   War, page 20.
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that grouped their pieces together into one large block for the exemplary 
game in their book.7 However, as we played match after match during 
the first phase of our campaign of ludic subversion, Class Wargames 
became increasingly dissatisfied with this concentrated placement and 
instead honed a new opening set-up which scattered the forces of North 
and South across the length of the board. For those trying out The 
Game of War for the first time, this layout of the two sides’ pieces was 
much more entertaining because it favoured an aggressive playing style. 
When we’d begun with Debord and Becker-Ho’s starting positions, 
unfamiliarity with the rules meant that newbies were reluctant to make 
any moves that endangered their armies’ defensive security. If we hadn’t 
intervened as umpires, these games would have taken far too long to 
get a result. Fortunately, by breaking up each side’s initial deployment 
into two or three brigades of mixed infantry, cavalry and artillery units 
to create the initial deployment in Diagram 2 on page 224, we could 
ensure that first time players were forced to go over onto the attack. As 
the facilitators of The Game of War, our job now became encouraging 
them to risk everything on this Situationist battlefield. Courage not 
caution would be the key to victory. On 20th April 2009 at the UFRJ 
in Rio de Janeiro, I was the master of ceremonies when both North and 
South had thrillingly found themselves within one move of taking each 
other’s last arsenal after 90 minutes of hard fought combat. Djahjah 
Bonorandi and Thiago Novaes – the generals of the two sides – had 
never played The Game of War before that balmy summer evening 
in this university’s café. It was the South that beat the North with a 
nifty cavalry move – and both of them who would be winners of this 
symbolic confrontation.8 By creating a memorable contest with our 
new initial deployment for The Game of War, these Brazilian comrades 
had proved themselves to be adepts of the English strategy of Pop 
Situationism. Best of all, they now knew that putting Debord’s cultural 
theory into ludic practice was a most enjoyable experience. From then 
onwards, the dispersed opening positions laid down in Diagram 2 on 
page 224 would be named the Rio de Janeiro scenario in their honour.
7 See Alice Becker-Ho and Guy Debord, A Game of War, page 39.
8 See the photographs in the Events 2009 section of the Class Wargames   
website.
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When planning our event for The Urgent Need To Struggle festival at the 
ICA, the members of Class Wargames decided that the time had arrived 
to experiment with a new initial layout for The Game of War. Rather 
than scattering the pieces across the board to optimise playability 
as before, we instead placed the contesting sides in a deployment 
which would let us re-enact one of the most famous confrontations 
in military history: the 1800 Marengo campaign.9 In retrospect, 
the creation of this new scenario for The Game of War marked the 
definitive shift from the first to the second stage of our campaign of 
ludic subversion. The celebration of Situationist avant-garde art was 
turning into the advocacy of Situationist political propaganda. But, at 
the time, our attention was focused on a much more prosaic problem. 
For any traditional wargamer, the abstract structure of Debord’s ludic 
invention would be the major obstacle to fulfilling our ambitious goal 
of recreating the Marengo campaign with any credibility. Unlike the 
Avalon Hill and SPI simulations which were so popular with American 
hobbyists around the same time that it was first published, The Game of 
War hadn’t been designed as a ‘… paper time machine … [the] object 
of which is to enable the player to recreate a specific event ...’10 In 
1980, Mark McLaughlin’s War and Peace had utilised more than 1,000 
counters and a 44cm x 120cm board for its 10 ‘historically accurate’ 
scenarios which modelled the military campaigns between 1805 and 
1815 that had decided the fate of Bonaparte’s empire. As the inventors 
of Avalon Hill and SPI games were only too well aware, it was this 
obsessive attention to detail that shifted products to their nerdy male 
customers. However, Debord had contemptuously dismissed his 
American peers’ obsession with faithfully simulating military history. 
In its explanatory book, he insisted that The Game of War  was ‘… 
not the latest in the long line of simplified recreations of battles past 
…’11 Taken literally, this meant that it was impossible to re-enact the 
Marengo campaign with his 1977 ludic masterpiece. The pieces of 
The Game of War didn’t represent the French and Austrian regiments 
that had fought in the 1798–1802 War of the Second Coalition. Its 
9 See James Arnold, Marengo & Hohenlinden; David Chandler, The Campaigns of 
Napoleon, pages 264–304; and Reginald Burton, Napoleon’s Campaigns in Italy, 
pages 103–133.
10     Jim Dunnigan, The Complete Wargames Handbook, page 13.
11 Alice Becker-Ho and Guy Debord, A Game of War, page 9.
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board wasn’t a stylised map of the different provinces of Europe during 
that period.12 For our contribution to the Chto Delat? season at the 
ICA, the first task of Class Wargames would be explaining how the 
abstract construct of The Game of War could be applied to the historical 
circumstances of the 1800 Marengo campaign.
In the introduction to his and Becker-Ho’s book, Debord provided an 
insight into his motivations for devoting so much time to this ludic 
project by quoting the opening line of a 16th century poem about 
Chess: ‘What we play is a representation of war.’13 The games produced 
by Avalon Hill, SPI and their imitators were flawed not just because 
trying to simulate a particular battle or campaign restricted the choices 
of armchair generals to what had happened during those particular 
historical circumstances. More seriously, so their customers could fight 
conflicts from many different epochs without difficulty, American 
designers adopted a common format for most of their publications: 
hex maps, cardboard counters, terrain penalty charts, zones of control 
and combat results tables. Not surprisingly, the experience of playing 
Henry Plantagenet at Agincourt in 1415 became very similar to that 
of taking on the role of Georgy Zhukov at Stalingrad in 1942.14 As 
in a 1950s range of Ford motor cars, each Avalon Hill or SPI game 
had the same engine underneath its distinctive chrome.15 Through this 
insight, Class Wargames now knew how to adapt Debord’s creation 
for our own purposes. When analysed in its formal mechanics, The 
Game of War was no more abstract than the rigidly themed simulations 
of its US rivals. In his introductory notes, Debord explained that ‘… 
the aim has been, with the minimum workable territorial, force-level 
and temporal limitations, to incorporate all of the main difficulties and 
means encountered universally in the conduct of war.’16 This meant 
12 This literalist approach was espoused by a 1983 game: Joseph Angiolillo, Napoleon’s 
Italian Campaigns.
13 Alice Becker-Ho and Guy Debord, A Game of War, page 9.
14 This can be seen in two celebrated SPI and Avalon Hill games: Jim Dunnigan, 
Agincourt; and Lindsley Schutz and Thomas Shaw, Stalingrad.
15 In 1986, Debord castigated the American game designers who’d been using ‘… the 
same colourful simulation for an infinity of historically specific battles over the last 
two decades.’ Guy Debord, ‘Letter to Floriana Lebovici’, page 388.
16 Alice Becker-Ho and Guy Debord, A Game of War, page 9.
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that – like the Avalon Hill and SPI system – The Game of War could 
also provide a universal engine for simulating armed combat. All that 
Class Wargames needed to do was add the identifying chrome for its 
intervention in the Chto Delat? festival at the ICA. 
Following this revelation, we were able to embed the historical 
specificity of the 1800 Marengo campaign within the formal structure 
of The Game of War. Comprising of infantry, cavalry and artillery units, 
its pieces could easily represent the French and Austrian armies in this 
conflict. Best of all, when the South became the West and the North was 
the East, the board could be imagined as the Central European lands 
over which these two nations had fought so bitterly.17 The mountains 
and passes reproduced the terrain obstacles of not only the Alps and 
the Apennines, but also the Rhine, Danube and Po rivers. The South’s 
line of forts were the frontier cities of Strasbourg, Geneva and Genoa 
while those of the North became the garrison towns of Mantua, Zurich 
and Bratislava. For the French player, their left arsenal symbolised 
Paris and the right one was Marseille. Their Austrian opponent’s left 
arsenal became Trieste and the right one was Vienna. Enthused by this 
psychogeographical interpretation of Debord’s board, Class Wargames 
set to work on devising the starting positions for the two sides in The 
Game of War shown in Diagram 3 on page 226 which would enable 
us to recreate the Marengo campaign. Taking on the role of the 
Austrians, the North’s army was divided into two strong contingents 
simultaneously pushing forward at the front of both flanks. As the 
French, the South’s army consisted of a line of weak outposts with the 
bulk of its forces held back in the centre of the board. Like the rival 
commanders who’d clashed in 1800, the players of both sides could 
only win by making the most of these very different opening positions. 
The Austrians would have to break through their enemy’s defensive 
line before the French were able to mobilise the concentrated power 
of their reserve corps.18 It was the players that could master time and 
17 See Maps 35–39 in Vincent Esposito and John Elting, A Military History and Atlas 
of the Napoleonic Wars; and the Marengo campaign map in David Chandler, The 
Campaigns of Napoleon, pages 272–273.
18 For a military analysis of the French and Austrian strategies, see David Chandler, 
The Campaigns of Napoleon, pages 264–304; and Reginald Burton, Napoleon’s 
Campaigns in Italy, pages 103–134.
120 121
space who would be the winners of this ritualised combat. In the ICA 
bar on that October night, the rival teams of North and South weren’t 
just building a collective avant-garde artwork together. By choosing 
this Marengo deployment for The Game of War, Class Wargames 
had turned this tabletop battlefield into an exacting test in military 
leadership. In this second stage of our Situationist campaign of ludic 
subversion, every proletarian must learn about the decisive role of the 
skilful general in the key moments of revolutionary history.
When the game at the Chto Delat? festival began, the North appeared 
to be in a very strong position. Like the Austrians in 1800, Russell’s 
forces were already threatening to outflank their opponent on both 
sides. Most temptingly, there was only one infantry piece in a fort 
between his army and the South’s eastern arsenal. Taking command, 
Russell persuaded his team of players that North’s should seize the 
initiative by launching an attack on its left. Two cavalry pieces started 
moving forward towards their target while the accompanying infantry 
and artillery were swung into the centre to cover this advance. With 
some deft manoeuvring, the South’s fort would be cut off from supply, 
the infantry piece guarding it taken and then, lacking any defence, the 
enemy’s eastern arsenal was doomed. With Marseille gone, the road to 
Paris would be wide open. As an experienced player of both figurine 
and board games, Russell was confident that he chosen the strategy that 
made the most of the Austrian army’s initial deployment. His side was 
already determining the pace of the game with its aggressive opening 
moves. As long as they kept the initiative on the battlefield, the players 
of the North would prevail. 
Sitting next to Russell, Billy Cass didn’t share the optimism of his 
commander-in-chief. Having participated in our performances of The 
Game of War on previous occasions, he well understood the dangers of 
the North’s opening position. Far from being an advantage, the division 
of its army into two outflanking forces had weakened both of them. 
Crucially, neither contingent was capable of resisting the combined 
power of the South’s reserve corps. Instead of widening the gap 
between its two flanks by advancing further on the left, the North had 
to concentrate all of its forces in the centre. Over the next hour-and-a-
half, Fabian’s team would confirm the wisdom of this strategic analysis. 
Like the French position in 1800, the South’s initial deployment 
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was much stronger than it looked. Although most of its pieces were 
placed far from the action at the back of the board, they benefited 
from being grouped together in the centre. The task of the South’s 
outposts was to slow down the enemy’s advance until this numerical 
superiority could be brought to bear on one of the two flanks of the 
North’s divided army. In the 1800 Marengo campaign, Bonaparte 
had committed his reserves to a French offensive against the Austrians 
in Italy rather than in Germany.19 On that 2010 evening in the ICA 
bar, Fabian and his comrades chose the alternative option. As move 
followed move, the South’s massed cavalry, infantry and artillery pieces 
steadily advanced towards the North’s right flank. Having problems in 
seizing the fort covering their opponent’s eastern arsenal, the attention 
of Russell’s team was at first occupied elsewhere. Like André Masséna’s 
troops stubbornly defending Genoa in 1800, this lone infantry unit 
was buying valuable time for the South in this game of the Marengo 
scenario at the ICA bar.20 
Much too late, Russell finally realised that his side had made the 
wrong opening moves. He should have listened to Billy’s warnings. 
The North’s right flank was too weak to resist the overwhelming 
strength of the South’s reserve army which was now bearing down on 
it. Advised by Fabian, Elena Vorontsova Duffield – our new Leningrad-
born member of Class Wargames –  launched a series of devastating 
attacks that took piece after piece from the opposition. In response, 
Russell called off the attack on the South’s eastern arsenal, but his army 
couldn’t be concentrated in time to prevent the total annihilation of 
its right flank. Even the North’s marching general had to be sacrificed 
in this debacle. As the South’s forces began advancing into the centre 
between the two mountain ranges, Rod Dickinson intervened to 
help the North in organising a last minute counter-attack which 
succeeded in taking an enemy cavalry unit. However, it was obvious 
to all that this brief triumph couldn’t reverse the inevitable outcome 
of the game. Bringing the rest of their forces into action, Elena and 
19 For Bonaparte’s strategic options in 1800, see David Chandler, The Campaigns of 
Napoleon, pages 264–270; and Reginald Burton, Napoleon’s Campaigns in Italy, 
pages 103–110.
20 For an account of the siege of Genoa in 1800, see James Arnold, Marengo & 
Hohenlinden, pages 67–78.
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Fabian were quickly able to overwhelm the North’s remaining defences. 
With their army reduced to a handful of pieces, Russell’s team was 
forced into a humiliating surrender.21 Once again, the French had 
trounced the Austrians in this key confrontation in the 1798–1802 
War of the Second Coalition. As we packed up the board and pieces, 
the members of Class Wargames could take pride that we’d completed 
our mission for The Urgent Need To Struggle festival. Our avant-garde 
art group hadn’t only created a transitory moment of participatory 
creativity inside the ICA bar. Above all, in our re-enactment of the 
1800 Marengo campaign, we’d also shown how The Game of War was 
an excellent tool for teaching about the vital role of military leadership 
within revolutionary struggles. We were now ready to move into the 
second phase of our campaign of ludic mischief. Taking our cue from 
the name of Chto Delat?, what needed to done by Class Wargames was 
to popularise the collective playing of The Game of War so that today’s 
Left activists could learn the Situationist political precepts materialised 
within the ebb-and-flow of its ritualised combat. 
21 For the photos of this game, see the Events 2010 section of the Class Wargames 
website.
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2.2: The Storming of the Winter Palace
Two years before the Marengo scenario game was fought during the 
Chto Delat? season at the ICA in London, Class Wargames had sent 
its own expeditionary force out to the wild East. On 27th November 
2008, we’d had the pleasure of hosting an evening of ludic subversion 
for Cyberfest 2008 at the Youth Educational Centre of the State 
Hermitage Museum in St. Petersburg.22 Having recently joined our 
ranks, Stefan Lutschinger – a Viennese philosopher who was working 
as a curator-in-residence at the National Center for Contemporary Art 
– had shown his mettle by securing the invitation to participate in 
this wonderful exhibition. By arranging our performance at the Winter 
Palace, his goal was to promote Debord’s teachings to the activists, 
artists and academics of the Russian Left. In the 2000s, Situationism 
was still esoteric knowledge in the East. Many of the key texts weren’t 
available in translation and its four tactics of cultural subversion had 
been mainly learnt from second-hand sources.23 Stefan was determined 
to help remedy this deficiency. As in many other countries, nearly two 
decades after the breaching of the Berlin Wall, Russian radicals had 
only partially liberated themselves from the ideological legacy of the 
Stalinist past. During the Cold War, the propagandists of both East 
and West had agreed that the Soviet Union was a non-capitalist society: 
‘really existing socialism’. Even for most of its opponents on the Left, 
the Russian system was the flawed precursor of the communist future 
while its American rival was defending a dying system.24 Back in the 
1960s, what had marked out the Situationists was their fierce rejection 
of this geopolitical mystification. Crucially, they’d insisted that the 
Soviet Union wasn’t any variety of socialism. Instead, it was a backward 
form of capitalism. When the Bolsheviks had seized power in 1917, 
Russia was an overwhelmingly peasant country. Needing to mobilise 
 
22 For its programme of events, see Cyland MediaLab, ‘Cyberfest 2008 in Saint 
Petersburg’.
23 In 2008, the publication of the first Russian edition of The Society of the Spectacle was 
only a decade old.
24 For a New Left overview of this theoretical confusion, see Paul Thompson and Guy 
Lewis, The Revolution Unfinished?
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the impoverished population behind its industrialisation drive, the new
ruling elite had imposed its ideological monopoly upon Soviet society: 
the ‘concentrated spectacle’. The promises of communist equality were 
now transformed into justifications of bureaucratic privilege. Terrorised 
by state violence, everyone had to submit to the ‘absolute celebrity’ at 
the apex of the totalitarian pyramid of power: Joseph Stalin.25
By identifying the Soviet Union as state capitalist, the Situationists had 
foretold its inevitable demise. In the West, the socio-economic system 
was much more evolved than in the East. Under Fordism, capitalism 
had become a consumer society providing a dazzling array of both 
commodities and ideologies: the ‘diffuse spectacle’. The advertising 
agency was a more sophisticated – and much more effective – method 
of social control than the secret police. For the Situationists, the bitter 
geopolitical rivalry between the two superpowers hid their common 
purpose of dominating humanity.26 Unlike most of the Left, Debord 
and his comrades were neither surprised nor dismayed by the eventual 
outcome of the Cold War. During the 1990s, the once distinct Russian 
and American versions of capitalism had finally fused into a single 
global regime of class domination: the ‘integrated spectacle’. With 
the profusion of information technologies, the centralisation of power 
could now be combined with a cornucopia of choice. As the mutant 
offspring of Stalinist propagandists and Fordist publicists, the rulers of 
neoliberalism had become adept at hiding their hegemonic ambitions 
beneath ideological stupefactions. Above all, one of their favourite 
political tropes was forgetting the unsettling moments of recent history 
when the rebellious proletariat had asserted its desire for collective 
emancipation. The integrated spectacle was a perpetual present where 
no radical social change was – or ever had been – possible.27 When 
Stefan arranged our invite to Cyberfest 2008, Class Wargames had 
been given the task of promulgating the Situationist antidote to this 
intellectual chicanery: remembering the tumultuous events of the past 
century in ludic form. Our duty was to re-enact the revolution.
25 See Guy Debord, The Society of the Spectacle, pages 41–42, 70–84.
26 See Guy Debord, The Society of the Spectacle, pages 25–34, 42–46.
27 See Guy Debord, Comments on the Society of the Spectacle, pages 5–23.
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The location within the Hermitage for Class Wargames’ first engagement 
in Russia was very appropriate. We were playing Situationist games in 
what had once been the offices of the General Staff of the Imperial 
Army. Our audience had to climb the same staircase to the top-floor 
as the Bolshevik troops who seize the Winter Palace at the climax of 
Sergei Eisenstein’s October film.28 Inspired by this evocative setting, 
Class Wargames was determined that its intervention at Cyberfest 2008 
must offend the ideological pieties of the 21st century Russian elite. 
Under Vladimir Putin’s regime, a revitalised nationalist hegemony 
was being constructed by eclectically sampling from the contradictory 
iconography of the country’s recent turbulent history. Two decades 
after the collapse of the Stalinist system, Leningrad had regressed to St 
Petersburg and the Hermitage was being repainted in gaudy monarchist 
colours. At the same time, the Russian victory over Nazi Germany and 
the achievements of Soviet cosmonauts were still symbols of patriotic 
pride. Seeking legitimacy for its corrupt hold on power, the ruling 
oligarchy had promiscuously appropriated the symbolism of both 
the Tsarist and Bolshevik past for its Post-Modernist version of the 
integrated spectacle.29 
Echoing Debord, Chto Delat? emphasised in its writings that what was 
absent from this patriotic melange was any memory of the libertarian 
dreams of the 1917 Russian Revolution.30 For a brief moment, the 
common people of this country had pioneered new ways of conducting 
politics, making art, organising the economy and fighting wars that 
promised to deliver the whole of humanity from oppression, ignorance 
and poverty. For its intervention at Cyberfest 2008, Class Wargames 
wanted to invoke these disappointed hopes of the early-20th century 
Left in its own idiosyncratic style. Back in 1963, as the concluding 
contribution to the Situationists’ Destruction of RSG-6 exhibition in 
28 This was a key scene in the fifth and final act of this historical drama, see Murray 
Sperber, ‘Eisenstein’s October’, page 24.
29 See Andrew Jack, Inside Putin’s Russia, pages 14–27; and Chrystia Freeland, Sale of 
the Century, pages 345–351.
30 For their theoretical analysis of how Boris Yeltsin’s neoliberal presidency blocked 
the revival of participatory democracy in early-1990s Russia, see Artemy Magun, 
‘The Post-Communist Revolution in Russia and the Genesis of Representative 
Democracy’, pages 64–68, 73–74. 
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Odense, Michèle Bernstein had created tableaus of model soldiers to 
rewrite the course of proletarian history in our favour: Victory of the 
Paris Commune; Victory of the Spanish Republicans; and Victory of the 
Workers’ Councils of Budapest.31 Four decades before Deller’s artistic 
celebrations of hobbyist subcultures, this founding member of the 
International was already detourning figurine wargaming for the 
avant-garde cause. Living with Debord at the time, she’d witnessed her 
co-conspirator’s lifelong enthusiasm for miniature replicas of fighting 
men.32 Most wonderfully, like the kitsch paintings that Jorn found 
in flea markets, these metal warriors were an aesthetic affront to the 
mandarins of the art world. Unlike the Surrealist and Fluxus games 
with their minimalist sensibility, toy soldiers were valued for the precise 
historical accuracy of their poses, uniforms and equipment. By placing 
her Situationist dioramas of detourned military figurines inside this 
Danish gallery in 1963, Bernstein wasn’t only politicising the apolitical 
hobby of wargaming, but also undermining the cultural hierarchies of 
bourgeois society. Visitors to the Destruction of RSG-6 exhibition didn’t 
need an expensive arts education to appreciate the political message 
of her avant-garde intervention. Many years later, when I’d told her 
that we’d started playing The Game of War with my teenage collection 
of 28mm Hapsburg and Ottoman figurines, Bernstein laughed and 
said: ‘Guy would have approved. I used to buy toy soldiers for him – 
boys will be boys!’33 For the Situationists, fighting battles with realistic 
miniatures was making avant-garde art.
Taking our cue from Bernstein’s visionary tableaus for the Destruction 
of RSG-6 exhibition, Class Wargames was determined to play at 
revolutionary politics with toy soldiers in the Hermitage. Mark 
Copplestone was already designing and selling figurines for re-fighting 
the epic struggles of the 1917–1921 Russian Civil War.34 With him as 
31 See Mikkel Bolt Rasmussen, ‘To Act In Culture While Being Against All Culture’, 
pages 102–104.
32 A few figurines from his extensive collection were featured in the 2013 exhibition 
about Debord’s life at the Bibliotèque Nationale in Paris, see Emmanuel Guy, ‘Où 
l’on Fait le Portrait de Guy Debord à Travers les Livres et son Jeu de la Guerre’, page 
174.
33 Michèle Bernstein, ‘Conversation with Author’.
34 See the Back of Beyond section of the Copplestone Castings website.
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a member, Class Wargames could make a punk provocation against 
the simplification of this conflict into the choice between rival forms 
of authoritarian rule: the Tsarist Whites and the Bolshevik Reds. 
Challenging this historical orthodoxy, we deployed opposing armies 
of toy soldiers on a miniature terrain inside the Winter Palace to 
re-enact a key battle that had helped to decide which faction of the 
Russian Left would monopolise the revolutionary cause. Between 5th–
10th September 1918 around Kazan, two types of Reds – Bolsheviks 
and Social Democrats – had fought against each other for their 
own interpretation of radical democracy: the Congress of Soviets or 
the Constituent Assembly.35 By emerging as the victor in this Volga 
campaign, Lenin’s vanguard party had defined what it meant to be a 
revolutionary for rest of the 20th century and beyond. 
For Debord, the polarisation of the whole world into Eastern and 
Western social systems during the Cold War had been the culmination 
of this violent split between rival Left factions in the Russian Civil War. 
On one side, the disciples of Bolshevism championed the Soviet Union 
and the concentrated spectacle. On the other, the adepts of Social 
Democracy supported the USA and the diffuse spectacle. In both cases, 
the revolutionary parties of the working class had been recuperated as 
bulwarks of the capitalist system. Far from the Left seizing state power, 
it was the bourgeois state that had taken over the Left. Confounding 
Marx’s hopes, the Marxist leaders of the oppressed had become the new 
oppressors. According to Debord, this double betrayal in the 1910s 
and 1920s marked the moment when spectacular domination had 
consolidated its hold over modern society. Prevented from collectively 
determining their own destiny in the workers’ councils, the masses were 
relegated to passively observing the machinations of their managerial 
masters.36 The fierce rivalry between the private and public owners 
of capitalist property was just a factional squabble within the same 
35 See Ewan Mawdsley, The Russian Civil War, pages 76–95; and Geoffrey Swain, 
Russia’s Civil War, pages 43–58. With the exception of those who’d rallied to the 
Bolsheviks, the Socialist Revolutionaries – the Left’s peasant party which had won 
a majority of seats in the 1917 elections for the Constituent Assembly – supported 
the Social Democrats in this confrontation.  
36 See Guy Debord, The Society of the Spectacle, pages 66–67, 82–85; Comments on the 
Society of the Spectacle, pages 5–7.
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ruling class. In both the East and the West, the ‘order-givers’ ruled 
over the ‘order-takers’.37 When we were preparing for our performance 
for Cyberfest 2008, the members of Class Wargames were well aware 
that – despite the ending of the Cold War many years previously – the 
Left in Russia as elsewhere still didn’t fully grasp the seditious message 
of this Situationist refutation of the early-20th century split between 
Social Democracy and Bolshevism. In the perpetual present of the 
integrated spectacle, the complexities of the past could only conceived 
as simplified myths of good guys against bad guys. Countering this 
Post-Modernist axiom, the careful study of history had now become 
a proletarian virtue. Understanding exactly what had happened was 
the precondition of knowing how to build a better future. If we 
wanted to exorcise the lingering ideological malfeasance of the Cold 
War, Class Wargames knew that our performance for Cyberfest 2008 
had to encapsulate the formative tragedy of 1917 in microcosm. Like 
Constructivism preceding Situationism, Chris Peers’ Reds versus Reds 
would be played before Guy Debord’s The Game of War.38
With the snow falling outside, we prepared our two toy soldier armies 
for their tabletop battle at the Winter Palace. Mark would command 
the Social Democratic forces of the Constituent Assembly who were 
defending a village which blocked the road to Kazan in the Tatarstan 
region of Russia. Most of his team’s troops were peasant militia of 
doubtful quality, but they were backed up by a contingent of hardened 
veterans from the Czechoslovak Legion. I would take charge of the 
Bolshevik fighters for Soviet rule whose mission was to take this village 
on the Volga. Our army not only had more and better soldiers in 
its ranks, but also included an elite regiment of Kronstadt sailors.39 
Best of all, my role as commander-in-chief would be represented 
by a 28mm model of the Bolsheviks’ most charismatic leader: Leon 
Trotsky.40 Having placed the figurines on the terrain in the opening 
 
37 See Paul Cardan, Modern Capitalism and Revolution, pages 1–26.
38 See the explanations of this game’s scenario in Class Wargames, ‘Communiqué #5’; 
and Mark Copplestone, ‘Not Just A Game of Toy Soldiers’.
39 The army lists for this Reds versus Reds game are on page 22 above.
40 For his own account of how he led the Bolsheviks to victory in the Kazan operation, 
see Leon Trotsky, My Life, pages 411–426.
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positions shown in Diagram 4 on page 228, everything was now ready 
for Class Wargames’ initial contribution to Cyberfest 2008. As soon 
as the audience arrived and settled down, the Reds versus Reds game 
commenced. Having the initiative, my band of Bolsheviks decided to 
launch an attack on the village with the large group of regular troops on 
our right flank. In response, Mark’s Social Democratic forces opened 
up with rifles, machine guns and artillery to check our advance, but 
their firepower fortunately proved to be ineffective. Within a couple 
of moves, our right flank forces were engaged in fierce hand-to-hand 
fighting with the defenders of the village. In this combat, we had the 
advantage of not only pitting tough regulars against raw recruits, but 
also having a Bolshevik commissar standing behind them who would 
shoot anyone who might be tempted to run away from the fray. 
While Mark and his comrades were preoccupied with preventing the 
disintegration of their left flank, my side next sent our shock troops 
of Kronstadt sailors into the centre of the village to confront the 
Czechoslovak Legion with some of their comrades moving forward 
to distract the Social Democrats’ right flank. Then, as the game was 
reaching its deciding moment, Mark’s conscripts on the other side 
of the village broke and ran after suffering heavy casualties in their 
melee with our regular troops. Facing the combined might of the 
whole Bolshevik army, the Czechoslovak Legion was soon also forced 
to withdraw. Realising that their position was now hopeless, Mark’s 
team gracefully accepted defeat in this game of Reds versus Reds. As 
in September 1918, the Soviet forces had once again achieved their 
objective. Having taken this village on the Volga river, they could now 
advance unopposed to the gates of Kazan. Above all, the Bolsheviks 
had secured their monopoly control over the Red side in the Russian 
Civil War.41  
While waiting for our event to begin, the chic audience of Cyberfest 
2008 had carefully checked out the two games on display which we 
were about to play. Despite its cultural and intellectual kudos, it wasn’t 
Debord’s Modernist ludic artwork that had caught their attention. 
Instead, like the audience for Bernstein’s dioramas in Odense, the 
 
41 Photographs of this game are in the Events 2008 section of the Class Wargames 
website.
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crowd at the Hermitage was fascinated by the intricate details of the toy 
soldiers and scenery which Mark had skilfully made for the Reds versus 
Reds game. The uniforms and weaponry of his beautifully painted 
Russian Civil War figurines were as historically accurate as possible. 
The miniature buildings of his exquisitely constructed Volga village 
were in the appropriate style of the period. When he’d designed its 
minimalist board and pieces, Debord had endowed The Game of War 
with an avant-garde aesthetic. In contrast, the creative inspiration for 
Mark’s Reds versus Reds soldiers and terrain came from outside high 
culture. He was an artisan who made his living within the hobbyist 
subculture of figurine wargaming. Like the fans of Avalon Hill and SPI 
simulations, these toy soldier enthusiasts were military history buffs 
who wanted to re-fight the battles of the past. However, they were not 
satisfied by moving cardboard pieces across a hex board. Instead, their 
desire for historical authenticity could only be satisfied by commanding 
large armies of figurines in the correct uniforms confronting each other 
across convincing looking terrain. 
Unfortunately, this form of simulation also had its drawbacks. Focused 
on the joys of collecting toy soldiers and constructing scenery, these 
hobbyists had ensured that ‘… most realistic wargames are not much 
more than moving dioramas.’42 They’d been trapped by the dilemma 
of trying to combine fidelity to the past in both the appearance of 
the battlefield and the experience of combat. At Cyberfest 2008, Class 
Wargames didn’t make the same mistake. In his explanatory notes, 
Mark pointed out that the toy soldiers and terrain in our re-enactment 
of the 1918 Kazan operation were only ‘… representing in symbols 
(which in this case are paradoxically almost-realistic models) elements 
of historical reality, perceptions of Russia and, as the game progresses, 
the passing of time.’43 Reinforcing his argument, he’d placed an 
interactive version of a Malevich painting on the edge of the board 
which tracked this confrontation between the two opposing Red 
forces. When mapped as abstract shapes, the movement of our figurine 
armies became a dynamic Constructivist design. In this opening move 
42 Peter Tanner, ‘Games Without Commanders?’, page 38.
43 Mark Copplestone, ‘Not Just A Game of Toy Soldiers’. Also see Stefan Lutschinger, 
Malevich: A Suprematist board game.
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of our contribution to Cyberfest 2008, we’d successfully revealed the 
avant-garde art hidden inside the hobbyist subculture of toy soldier 
wargaming. 
When playing Reds versus Reds at the Hermitage, I’d intuitively known 
what to do. Like Mark and Fabian, I’d also been an enthusiastic 
figurine wargamer during my teenage years. Growing up in the 1970s, 
we’d all read the classic texts of H.G. Wells, Donald Featherstone, Peter 
Young and Charles Grant.44 These pioneers of the hobby had claimed 
that they’d devised sets of rules which created ‘… the greatest possible 
realism, to permit the tactics and practices with model soldiers that 
conform to those used in real warfare of the period ...’45 However, for 
our generation, their techniques for simulating combat were far too 
simplistic. The publications of the Wargames Research Group had 
offered a much more historically rigorous system for re-fighting the 
conflicts of the past. In their wake, as the decades past and the rule 
books grew ever longer, all types of warriors, weaponry and topography 
were given their own dice modifiers. Unfortunately, in this drive for 
accuracy, playing wargames became hard work.46 Eventually, the 
wisdom of this hobby’s pioneers was rediscovered. Simplicity was a 
virtue not a vice. Reflecting this 21st century trend, the Reds versus Reds 
rules that Chris Peers had devised for our intervention at Cyberfest 2008 
were definitely old school wargaming. They only covered a limited 
variety of troops, armaments and terrain features. Movement, combat 
and morale were all decided by dice throws.47 They included jokey rules 
like allowing Bolshevik commissars to rally a retreating Soviet regiment 
by shooting one of its number for cowardice. While The Game of War 
provided a cerebral duel of wills in ludic form, Reds versus Reds was 
an amusing diversion for grown-up boys.48 Inspired by Bernstein’s 
44 See H.G. Wells, Little Wars; Donald Featherstone, War Games; Peter Young and J.P. 
Lawford, Charge!; and Charles Grant, The War Game. 
45 Donald Featherstone, War Games, page 23.
46 See Sue Laflin-Barker, ‘History of Wargames Research Group’; and Harry Pearson, 
Achtung Schweinehund!, pages 113–135.
47 This old school feel was enhanced by having the movements and firing ranges of the 
different figurines designated in obsolete imperial measurements.
48 Chris Peers’ Reds versus Reds rules were a shortened and adapted version of his 
popular Contemptible Little Armies set.
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Situationist dioramas, Class Wargames’ performance for Cyberfest 2008 
was dedicated to detourning this hobbyist method of fighting with 
figurines for its own seditious purposes. On that November evening 
inside the Winter Palace, I’d had great fun pretending to be the 28mm 
model of Leon Trotsky leading the Bolshevik army in its assault on 
Kazan. But, if this simulated battle was to have any wider resonance, 
Class Wargames would carefully have to explain the radical message 
embedded within its toy soldier playtime to the shrewd audience 
of Cyberfest 2008. Although still engaged in the first phase of our 
campaign of ludic subversion, we were already moving into its next 
stage of propagating Situationist revolutionary politics.
While the Reds versus Reds match was taking place at the Hermitage, 
Fabian kept up a running commentary on what was happening on the 
tabletop battlefield. In between elucidating the ebbs and flows of this 
simulated combat, he slowly revealed the iconoclastic reasoning that 
had inspired our détournement of figurine wargaming. By re-fighting 
the 1918 Kazan operation in miniature, Class Wargames was breaking 
with the Left’s tired ways of thinking about the world-historical 
significance of the 1917 Russian Revolution. As Debord and Bernstein 
had realised, playing with toy soldiers was debating proletarian politics 
by other means.49 It was no accident that we were hosting Reds versus 
Reds in the iconic building that had provided the spectacular stage 
set for the rousing final scenes of Eisenstein’s October: the Winter 
Palace. For decades, this film has provided documentary imagery 
of the dramatic events that’d taken place in Russia during 1917.50 
Thanks to Eisenstein’s skills as a movie director, generations of viewers 
have been convinced that Lenin’s vanguard party came to power in 
a popular insurrection that culminated in the seizure of the Winter 
Palace which was then the headquarters of the national government. 
However, as Fabian now explained to the attendees of Cyberfest 2008, 
they’d mistaken a sectarian myth for historical reality. Far from being 
contemporary news reporting, Eisenstein’s movie was an avant-garde 
artwork made a whole decade after the political upheavals that were 
portrayed in its narrative. During the intervening period, the Soviet 
49 See Class Wargames, ‘Communiqué #5’.
50 See David Bordwell, The Cinema of Eisenstein, pages 95–96.
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state had been holding annual celebrations to mark its triumph over 
the Social Democratic supporters of the Constituent Assembly in 
Russia’s former capital city.51 Through these artistic re-enactments, the 
historical memory of 1917 was systematically rewritten to justify the 
Bolshevik regime’s monopolisation of the Red cause. Tragically, the 
bureaucratic spectacle had supplanted proletarian democracy.52
As Fabian emphasised in his commentary during our Reds versus Reds 
game, Eisenstein’s depiction of the storming of the Winter Palace in 
October was a cinematic fantasy. By the time that this iconic event 
occurred, the fate of Russia had already been decided. Under Trotsky’s 
leadership, ‘small armed detachments ... [of party activists, skilled 
engineers and military personnel] ... guided from a single centre’ 
had successfully carried out a coup d’état during the previous two 
days by commandeering the barracks, utilities and communication 
hubs of the capital city.53 The fall of the Winter Palace was then 
inevitable. In October 1917, the urban masses had carried on with 
their personal affairs while this transfer of state power between the 
rival Red factions had taken place without their direct participation.54 
Not surprisingly, the new Bolshevik regime felt threatened by its 
lack of democratic legitimacy. Holding annual re-enactments of the 
ousting of the advocates of the Constituent Assembly from national 
government would become its avant-garde artistic solution to this 
political conundrum. For the 1920 third anniversary celebrations in 
Petrograd, Nikolai Yevreinov directed 10,000 amateur actors in a mass 
performance of Storming the Winter Palace on a Constructivist stage set 
placed in front of the building itself. In this theatrical production, the 
51 For a description of these festivities, see Vladimir Tolstoy, Irina Bibikova and 
Catherine Cooke, Street Art of the Revolution, pages 55–67, 87–120, 137–139, 
140–143, 146–147, 150, 162–163, 171–189.
52 See Guy Debord, The Society of the Spectacle, pages 41–42.
53 Leon Trotsky, History of the Russian Revolution, page 272. Also see Curzio Malaparte, 
Technique du Coup d’État, pages 33–65; and Earl Ziemke, The Red Army, pages 
11–14.
54 The famous memoir that inspired the script for October admitted that: ‘… a few 
blocks away [from the Winter Palace] we could see the trams, the crowds, the 
lighted shop-windows and the electric signs of the moving-picture shows – life going 
on as usual … all the theatres were open …’ John Reed, Ten Days That Shook The 
World, page 95. Also see Leon Trotsky, History of the Russian Revolution, page 249.
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Bolshevik coup d’état was re-imagined as a workers’ uprising. This time 
around, the city’s population did participate in the daring assault on 
the Social Democratic government’s headquarters.55 Seven years later, 
when Eisenstein was commissioned to make October, he created the 
avant-garde movie version of this ideological fabrication. Since ‘… the 
historical storming [of the Winter Palace] was something of a letdown 
… [his film] improved on it, focused it, and, for many contemporaries, 
made it seem more truthful than before.’56 The vanguard party’s re-
enactments of this historical event had successfully smothered what 
had really happened in Petrograd a decade earlier. Far from being an 
eyewitness documentary, Eisenstein’s October was the 1927 film of 
the Bolshevik dictatorship’s live action role-playing game of the 1917 
Russian Revolution.  
On that November evening in the Hermitage, the 28mm figurine of 
Trotsky commanding the Soviet forces in Reds versus Reds symbolised 
our utter contempt for the vanguard party’s spectacular recuperation 
of proletarian democracy. Producing October after this revolutionary 
leader’s fall from power, Eisenstein had been forced to minimise his 
decisive role in the dramatic events of 1917. Yet, despite the pressures 
of official censorship, Trotsky was still the hidden star of the 10th 
anniversary cinematic commemoration of the founding of the Bolshevik 
state. A few fleeting glimpses were enough to hint at what’d been edited 
out of the film.57 Like Lenin, Trotsky had become the role model for 
leftist intellectuals who wanted to reinvent themselves as hard men 
of action. He was the radical agitator that had not only successfully 
organised the October 1917 coup d’état, but also led the Red Army 
to a stunning victory in the 1917–1921 Russian Civil War. Here was 
the impoverished journalist from the provinces who’d transformed 
himself into the charismatic general in a white leather uniform on a 
55 See Vladimir Tolstoy, Irina Bibikova and Catherine Cooke, Street Art of the 
Revolution, pages 137–138; and David Bordwell, The Cinema of Eisenstein, page 82.
56 James von Geldern, Bolshevik Festivals, page 2. Also see Susan Buck-Morss, 
Dreamworld and Catastrophe, pages 147–163.
57 An explanatory title was even added to the film which falsely claimed that Trotsky 
had opposed the Bolsheviks’ seizure of power! For the Stalinist rewriting of the 
October script, see David Bordwell, The Cinema of Eisenstein, pages 13, 80; and 
Murray Sperber, ‘Eisenstein’s October’, page 10.
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thoroughbred horse.58 Most tellingly, Stalin – Trotsky’s bitterest rival 
– had also adopted a military style of dress when he took over as the 
maximum leader of Bolshevism. In the decades that followed October 
1917, this exhilarating vision of the ‘prophet armed’ would inspire 
revolutionary leaders in developing countries across the world: Mao 
Zedong, Võ Nguyên Giáp, Josip Tito, Che Guevara, Samora Machel 
and Yasser Arafat.59 Even though they’d paid formal homage to Stalin’s 
pragmatic cunning, these warrior intellectuals always remained in debt 
to Trotsky’s heroic image. They too believed that the man in a uniform 
was the epitome of socialist rectitude: ‘political power grows out of a 
barrel of a gun.’60 
58 See the admiring account of his rise to power in Isaac Deutscher, The Prophet Armed.
59 See Robert Taber, The War of the Flea; and Geoffrey Fairbairn, Revolutionary 
Guerrilla Warfare.
60 Mao Zedong, ‘Problems of War and Strategy’, page 224.
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2.3: The Armed Struggle
When we hosted the performance of Reds versus Reds for the Cyberfest 
2008 festival, Class Wargames was still engaged in the first phase of 
our campaign of ludic subversion. As adepts of Pop Situationism, we 
were committed to implementing the International’s four tactics of 
cultural sabotage to counter the recuperation of avant-garde art. This 
détournement of hobbyist wargames within the psychogeographically 
resonant space of the Hermitage wasn’t just a provocation against 
aesthetic snobbery and pacifist moralism. More importantly, our 
collective playing of Chris Peers’ military simulation constituted one 
of those transitory moments of participatory creativity which were so 
treasured by the English Situationists. Having achieved this decisive 
breakthrough on the cultural front, Class Wargames was now able to 
initiate the second stage of our campaign of ludic mischief. Paralleling 
Debord’s own trajectory, the making of avant-garde art would become 
the propagation of libertarian communist politics. By playing Reds 
versus Reds inside the Winter Palace, Class Wargames was attacking the 
Bolshevik mythology of Eisenstein’s October which still haunted the 
imagination of the 21st century Left. Far from championing proletarian 
emancipation, the two toy soldier armies on the replica Kazan battlefield 
were fighting for rival forms of capitalist domination: the concentrated 
spectacle or the diffuse spectacle. On this 2008 evening at the 
Hermitage, the amusing pastime of figurine wargaming had acquired a 
serious political purpose. Under the integrated spectacle, what passed 
for historical analysis was suffused with tired movie cliches. But, 
when the Bolshevik and Social Democrat teams moved Mark’s 28mm 
miniatures into ludic combat, this passive contemplation of the past 
was transformed into active engagement with the dramatic events that 
have defined what it meant to be on the Left since the 1917 storming 
of the Winter Palace. Crucially, by placing the outcome of the Russian 
Civil War in doubt once again, Class Wargames was exorcising the 
malign influence of its ideological certainties over the present. There 
was nothing inevitable about the victory of the Bolsheviks. With some 
clever moves and luckier dice throws, the Social Democrats might 
instead have become the new masters of the Russian empire. There was 
everything to play for in our Reds versus Reds game at the Hermitage.
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In his commentary, Fabian explained that our toy soldier simulation 
at Cyberfest 2008 was re-enacting the militarised recuperation of the 
democratic hopes of the 1917 Russian Revolution. During the opening 
years of the First World War, the absolute monarchy had proved itself 
incapable of fulfilling the primary duty of any state: defending the 
national territory from foreign invasion. Discredited on the battlefield, 
the once-all-powerful despotism of the Tsars was swept away in 
February 1917 by a spontaneous outbreak of street demonstrations led 
by women workers in the country’s patriotically renamed capital city: 
Petrograd.61 Over the next few months, the disintegration of Russian 
state accelerated under the combined impact of military defeats at 
the front and social rebellion at home. As the chaos spread, rival Red 
sects fiercely quarrelled over which of them should determine the new 
political settlement. What would give the edge to Lenin’s vanguard 
party in this faction fight was its growing support amongst the 
disaffected rank-and-file members of the Russian armed forces.62 In 
October 1917, having secured the loyalty of the city’s garrison, the 
Bolsheviks took over the national government by seizing control of 
Petrograd in the name of the forthcoming 2nd Congress of Workers’ 
and Soldiers’ Soviets. Appearing on its platform just after the fall of the 
Winter Palace, Lenin and Trotsky announced that the downtrodden 
masses were the new masters of Russia: ‘Comrade toilers, remember 
that you yourselves are now governing the state … Your Soviets are now 
the organs of state power with full competence to decide all questions.’63 
Three months later, on 19th January 1918, the new government 
in Petrograd sent a contingent of Kronstadt sailors to dissolve the 
Constituent Assembly which – despite the voters having given an 
overwhelming mandate to the parties of the Left – inconveniently 
only contained a minority of Bolshevik deputies.64 Breaking with the 
61 The historical experts all agree that: ‘There was no central leadership [at the 
beginning of the Russian Revolution] from any [political] party or well-known 
figure.’ Oskar Anweiler, The Soviets, page 101.
62 See Isaac Deutscher, The Prophet Armed, pages 249–324; and Mark von Hagen, 
Soldiers in the Proletarian Dictatorship, pages 13–21.
63 V.I. Lenin, ‘To the Population’, page 419. Emphasis in the original. Also see Leon 
Trotsky, History of the Russian Revolution, pages 281–318. 
64 See Evan Mawdsley, The Russian Civil War, pages 5–8.
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political strategy of Marx and Engels, Lenin and Trotsky insisted that 
the dictatorship of the proletariat could no longer be realised through 
securing a socialist majority in a bourgeois parliament.65 Polemicising 
against their Red opponents, these Bolshevik leaders declared that 
the direct democracy of the Congress of Soviets had now superseded 
the representative democracy of the Constituent Assembly. As if to 
confirm this analysis, the Social Democrats who dominated the Left 
in the German parliament would – before the year was out – be 
collaborating with the most reactionary elements of the old ruling class 
to block any radical change in the aftermath of their nation’s defeat in 
the First World War.66 In 1919, at the 1st Congress of the Communist 
International in Moscow, the Russian Bolsheviks proclaimed themselves 
as the champions of the new libertarian politics of Soviet democracy 
– and that the task of revolutionaries across the world was to apply 
these lessons of October 1917 in their own nations.67 For rest of the 
20th century, the warrior intellectuals of the Leninist vanguard party 
became the living embodiment of a militarised version of socialism. 
The Russian Civil War had proved that the possessors of property 
would brutally resist any diminution of their social power. As Trotsky 
argued, the Left must understand that: ‘… [the] question as to who 
is to rule the country … will be decided … not by references to the 
paragraphs of the constitution, but by the employment of violence.’68 
The Reds could only prevail in the class struggle by becoming better 
soldiers than their White enemies. Paradoxically, if they wanted to run 
their own lives through workers’ councils, the masses would first have 
to learn how to obey the orders of their Bolshevik officers without 
question. Military discipline had become the precondition of radical 
democracy.
65 In what would become an ideological leitmotif of the Bolshevik regime, Lenin’s 
State and Revolution justified this dramatic reversal in position by selectively quoting 
from Marx and Engels’ own writings! For the orthodox Marxist critique of this 
intellectual trickery, see Karl Kautsky, The Dictatorship of the Proletariat.  
66 See Franz Neumann, Behemoth, pages 3–29.
67 See V.I. Lenin and Yukko Rakhia, ‘Theses and Report on Bourgeois Democracy and 
the Dictatorship of the Proletariat’; and Leon Trotsky, ‘Manifesto of the Communist 
International to the Workers of the World’.
68 Leon Trotsky, Terrorism and Communism, page 75.
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In his commentary for the Reds versus Reds game at Cyberfest 2008, 
Fabian took delight in pointing out that our toy soldier armies were 
re-enacting the historical moment that had fixed this authoritarian 
perversion of Left politics. With a grin on his face, he pointed towards 
the 28mm models of Leon Trotsky and the two Bolshevik commissars. 
The decisive role of these figurines in our Reds versus Reds game was a 
ludic metaphor of Situationist enlightenment. At the turning point 
of this contest at the Winter Palace, my team had ordered one of our 
commissars to execute a member of the wavering regular unit on our 
right flank which had prevented a potentially disastrous retreat. From 
then onwards, the Bolsheviks’ victory in this rerun of the 1918 Kazan 
operation was assured. As Fabian now revealed, the players of Reds versus 
Reds in the Hermitage had just experienced the recuperation of Soviet 
democracy by the Leninist leadership of the concentrated spectacle for 
themselves. If the Bolshevik side wanted to prevail in this Russian Civil 
War game, dissent in the ranks must be dealt with harshly. In Chris 
Peers’ rules, there was no provision for simulating the fighters of the 
Red Army assembling in a Workers’ and Soldiers’ Soviet to decide how 
to fight the enemy collectively. Trotsky and his commissars were the 
sole order-givers for the Bolshevik forces on the Kazan battlefield.
When planning our contribution to Cyberfest 2008, Class Wargames 
envisaged this match of Reds versus Reds as our ludic refutation of 
not only the historical fabrications of Eisenstein’s October movie, but 
also the contemporary hucksters of vanguard politics. For almost 
two decades, the intellectual apologists of the integrated spectacle 
had loudly proclaimed that the collapse of the Soviet Union proved 
there was no alternative to neoliberal globalisation. Whoever the 
voters elected into power, the government must implement social and 
economic policies favouring big business and big banks.69 Thanks to the 
magic of the free market, the rapid spread and increasing capabilities 
of network technologies were creating a ‘new paradigm’ where anyone 
with entrepreneurial zeal had the opportunity to be both rich and 
69 Most notoriously, the victorious American empire was identified as the philosophical 
apogee of human civilisation in Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last 
Man.
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hip.70 But, by the time that we’d arrived in St Petersburg for Cyberfest 
2008, this neoliberal dogma was already past its sell-by date. Only a 
month earlier, the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers had precipitated 
a financial panic which heralded the beginning of the most serious 
economic recession in the USA and Europe since the 1930s. When 
children were prevented from living better lives than their parents, 
laissez faire capitalism had failed the test of human progress. Not 
surprisingly, those dissidents who’d held firm to their Bolshevik beliefs 
felt vindicated. As exemplified by the name of Chto Delat?, there’d 
always been admirers of Lenin and Trotsky on the Left even when the 
global economic system was booming. Now, after nearly two decades 
of being on the wrong side of history, these Russian revolutionaries’ 
intransigent opposition to bourgeois democracy and capitalist markets 
no longer appeared anachronistic. The romance of Bolshevism was 
back in fashion. In a 21st century re-match, the losing side in the Cold 
War game might win this time around. 
When we’d played Reds versus Reds at the Winter Palace, Class Wargames 
was making Situationist political propaganda against the Bolshevik 
recuperators of Situationism. Across the world, there were parties and 
sects which were still upholding the Leninist line within the labour 
movement. However, for the sophisticated attendees of Cyberfest 2008, 
their political tactics of selling newspapers, organising demonstrations 
and contesting elections were strictly old school. In St Petersburg as 
in London, a heady infusion of New Left theory had been required 
to sell the Bolshevik revival to these denizens of bohemia. Within 
the academy, Toni Negri, Slavoj Žižek and Alain Badiou were the 
intellectual gurus of this new iteration of the totalitarian ‘Communist 
hypothesis’. Imitating the pranksters of Pop Situationism, they’d 
outraged the scholarly guardians of liberal democracy by praising 
the murderous regimes of Lenin, Stalin and Mao.71 Alongside this 
punk tactic of provocation, they’d also enthusiastically embraced the 
technique of détournement. Back in the 1980s, in Žižek’s homeland of 
70 See Kevin Kelly, New Rules for the New Economy; and Peter Leyden, Peter Schwartz 
and Joel Hyatt, The Long Boom. For a more sceptical view, see Richard Barbrook and 
Andy Cameron, ‘The Californian Ideology’. 
71 For one of the more thoughtful responses from the Right to their enthusiasm for 
Bolshevik cruelty, see John Gray, ‘The Violent Visions of Slavoj Žižek’.
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Slovenia, the members of Laibach, Irwin and Red Pilot had pioneered 
the satirical remixing of the heroic Modernist past to question the 
conformist Post-Modern present: the retro-garde.72 With their 
musicians dressed as 1940s Yugoslav Partisans, these artists from NSK 
launched a ferocious multi-media assault against not only the kitsch 
culture promoted by the bloodthirsty nationalists of the Balkans, 
but also the corporate art favoured by gallery curators in the West.73 
Copying this successful appropriation of Situationist tactics, the 2000s 
promoters of the totalitarian Communist hypothesis resurrected 
the discarded language of the Bolsheviks to critique the ideological 
hegemony of neoliberalism. In their 21st century détournement of the 
Cold War stand-off, there now was a Left alternative to the tyranny 
of the global financial markets: Lenin’s Russia, Tito’s Yugoslavia and 
Mao’s China.74 But, by returning to the Stalinist origins of semiotic 
structuralism, Negri, Žižek and Badiou had also proclaimed the 
concentrated spectacle as the only antidote to the integrated spectacle. 
Communism was a contemplative hypothesis not a lived activity. Once 
again, the Bolshevik intellectuals were the privileged few who would 
lead the indoctrinated masses forward into the totalitarian past: ‘… the 
authority of the [vanguard] Party is … a new type of knowledge linked 
to a [revolutionary] collective political subject’.75
In the summer of 2008, while Class Wargames was preparing for 
its Russian expedition, an impassioned pamphlet was published in 
France which would codify this revival of vanguard politics for the 
youthful activists of the anti-capitalist protest movements: the Invisible 
Committee’s The Coming Insurrection. Three decades before he’d joined 
up with Žižek and Badiou to champion the totalitarian Communist 
hypothesis, Negri had first gained notoriety as the prophet of the 
72 ‘... the retro-principle  ... appropriates all those texts (signs, images, symbols and 
forms of rhetoric) which retrospectively have become identification signs for artistic, 
political, religious or technological ‘salvation utopias’ of the 20th century.’ Inke Arns, 
‘Irwin (NSK) 1983–2002’. Emphasis in the original.
73 NSK was the acronym of this retro-garde art movement: Neue Slowenische Kunst. 
For their adventures, see Alexei Monroe, Interrogation Machine. 
74 This nostalgia for militarised socialism led to the insistence that the greatest 
achievement of May ‘68 was the New Left’s fascination with the vanguard politics 
of October 1917, see Alain Badiou, The Communist Hypothesis, pages 41–100. 
75 Slavoj Žižek, Revolution at the Gates, page 188. 
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left of the New Left in 1970s Italy: the Autonomists. Relegated to a 
subordinate role by the Cold War partition of Europe, this country’s 
Stalinist party was revolutionary only in rhetoric and imagery. 
Imitating the Social Democrats, its pragmatic leaders had limited their 
ambitions to improving the living standards and political influence 
of the industrial working class within the Fordist system.76 Not 
surprisingly, the May ‘68 generation was unimpressed by this reformist 
strategy. Like the Situationists, the Italian Autonomists dreamt of a 
more participatory form of politics. Rejecting parliamentary and 
trade union representation, these courageous activists adopted the 
revolutionary tactics of wildcat strikes, university occupations, street 
fighting and community media.77 Frightened by this outburst of 
proletarian insubordination, the Stalinists had supported the Italian 
establishment’s savage clampdown on the Autonomists in the late-
1970s. Framed as a terrorist, Negri was forced into exile while other 
prominent members of the movement were jailed or went into hiding. 
The Italian New Left uprising had been crushed.78 However, although 
temporarily defeated as practice, Autonomism would eventually 
triumph as theory. By the time that the 21st century arrived, the 
writings of Negri and his comrades had become essential reading for 
the opponents of neoliberal globalisation across the world. Crucially, 
they’d predicted that rioters, hackers, queers, squatters and ravers 
would replace the co-opted industrial proletariat as the revolutionary 
subject of history.79 Empowered by the Net, this new iteration of the 
New Left would instigate the spontaneous uprising of the multi-
faceted multitude against the monolithic hegemony of the neoliberal 
Empire.80 Autonomism was the hipster intellectuals’ theory of DIY 
politics.
76 For the successful implementation of these ameliorative policies at a local level, see 
Max Jäggi, Roger Müller and Sil Schmid, Red Bologna.
77 See Red Notes, Italy 1977–8: Living With an Earthquake; and Steve Wright, 
Storming Heaven.
78 For eyewitness accounts of this brutal state repression against the Autonomists, see 
Red Notes, Italy 1980–81 After Marx, Jail!
79 See the prophetic analyses of the post-Fordist recomposition of the working class in 
Sergio Bologna, ‘The Tribe of Moles’; and Toni Negri, ‘Archaeology and Project’.
80 See Michael Hardt and Toni Negri, Empire, pages 393–413; and Maurizio Lazzarato, 
‘General Intellect’.
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In The Coming Insurrection, the Invisible Committee argued that a 
dedicated officer corps was now required to lead the nomadic army 
of the 21st century anti-capitalist revolution. Echoing Lenin, these 
Autonomists believed that the masses were too stupefied by bourgeois 
ideology to determine their own destiny without the guidance of this 
illuminated elite.81 Until the world-historical moment of collective 
emancipation arrived, self-management was inevitably a minority 
affair. Fortunately, by embracing a bohemian lifestyle, the alter-
globalisation activists were already anticipating the communist future 
in the neoliberal present.82 From amongst the best and brightest of 
them, the Invisible Committee would recruit the members of its 
new vanguard party. Like the Bolsheviks who’d recuperated the 
Soviets, these Autonomists desired the spectacular annexation of 
participatory politics. Telling, in its earlier incarnation as Tiqqun, the 
Invisible Committee had condemned Debord while enthusing about 
Negri, Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari.83 Derived from Stalin’s socio-
linguistics, the theoretical musings of these New Left philosophers 
justified the authoritarian assumptions of The Coming Insurrection. The 
chosen few must liberate the befuddled many. Military discipline was 
the precursor of direct democracy.84 
By hosting the participatory performance of Reds versus Reds at the 
Winter Palace, Class Wargames provided the Situationist retort to 
both the academic and the Autonomist revivals of vanguard politics. 
In this key manoeuvre for the second phase of our campaign of ludic 
subversion, the two armies of toy soldiers were sent into combat against 
the self-appointed generals of the popular uprising against neoliberal 
81 ‘An assembly [of workers] is not a place for decision, but for ... free speech exercised 
without a goal.’ The Invisible Committee, The Coming Insurrection, page 81. Also 
see pages 22–27 for their sociological apologia for this anti-proletarian prejudice.
82 See The Invisible Committee, The Coming Insurrection, pages 65–68, 80–82.
83 Reversing the historical flow of influences between Situationism and Autonomism, 
they even claimed that ‘... Debord was an execrable middleman for all that was 
explosive in the [1970s] Italian situation ...’ Tiqqun, This is Not a Program, page 
21. For a Situationist dismissal of this sect’s militarist obsession with revolutionary 
violence, see Jules Bonnot de la Bande, ‘Advisory Concerning Spectacular Terrorism’.
84 ‘There is no such thing as a peaceful insurrection. Weapons are necessary; it’s a 
question of doing everything possible to make using them unnecessary.’ The 
Invisible Committee, The Coming Insurrection, pages 84.
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capitalism. In his concluding remarks, Fabian emphasised that – 
although they could no longer exercise power in such a brutal fashion 
as the 28mm figurines of Trotsky and the two Bolshevik commissars 
had done during our recreation of the Kazan operation – too many of 
today’s Left intellectuals and activists still fantasised about acting as 
decisively as these metal miniatures. It was their firm leadership that 
would decide between victory and defeat on the social battlefield. For 
this retro-garde tendency, the supersession of the integrated spectacle 
was the resurrection of the concentrated spectacle. In both tactics and 
strategy, the proponents of the totalitarian Communist hypothesis 
and the militants of the Invisible Committee had learnt well from 
the Situationists. Provocation and détournement were guided missiles 
against bourgeois complacency. With the demise of Fordism, the 
best class warriors were to be found amongst the quasi-criminal and 
over-educated elements of the proletariat. However, as revealed by 
their penchant for semiotic structuralism, these latter-day admirers of 
Bolshevism continued to hold the masses in contempt. Brainwashed 
by the media and repressed by the patriarchal family, the majority of 
the inhabitants of the consumer society were inherently conservative. 
Illuminated by the totalitarian Communist hypothesis, the Bolshevik 
intellectuals must give the orders to those who were destined to take 
orders. Countering this patronising attitude, the aim of our Reds 
versus Reds détournement of figurine wargaming was to shrink these 
would-be despots of the insurrectionary multitude down to 28mm 
scale. Transformed into toy soldiers, the Autonomist commissars of the 
networked vanguard were sent back to the tragic times that had given 
birth to them. As Fabian now revealed, this re-enactment of Russian 
revolutionary history was our Situationist remedy for the Bolshevik 
recuperation of Situationism.85 It was better to play at being Trotsky 
than to make politics like Trotsky.
By refighting the conflict between the rival Red factions inside the 
Winter Palace, Class Wargames had returned to the birthplace of the 
militarised version of socialism that was newly fashionable amongst the 
21st century Left. In 1917, as the Tsarist system collapsed in ignominy, 
the Bolsheviks had taken command of the key institution which would 
85 See Class Wargames, ‘Communiqué #5’; and Mark Copplestone, ‘Not Just A Game 
of Toy Soldiers’.
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enable them to rebuild a more powerful and ambitious Russian state: 
the professional army.86 During that momentous year, the competing 
Red parties had ostensibly fallen out over whether their new republic 
should be ruled by the Congress of Soviets or the Constituent 
Assembly. Yet, neither of these forms of democratic legitimation was 
capable of creating long-term political stability within Russia. Out in 
the countryside, the peasant majority of the population were instinctive 
anarchists. For them, the demise of the autocratic state meant the 
dispossession of the landowning aristocracy. Each village commune 
could now run its own local affairs without any outside interference.87 
Crucially, it was this peasant ethic of self-reliance that had inspired 
the audacious experiments in direct democracy within the cities. By 
holding mass meetings, workers could manage their factories and 
soldiers run their regiments. Joining this self-management movement, 
artists and intellectuals declared that they too wanted to control their 
own cultural and educational institutions.88 In the Bolshevik mythology 
of the 1917 Russian Revolution, this flowering of participatory politics 
had culminated in the storming of the Winter Palace. Thanks to Lenin 
and Trotsky’s skilful generalship, everyone could now take part in 
deciding the destiny of the nation: ‘The Soviet system represents the 
maximum of democracy for the workers and peasants.’89 
When he went to Russia in 1920, H.G. Wells – the English socialist 
author and wargames pioneer – had no difficulty in recognising 
the fallacy of this claim. Despite the language barrier, his visit to 
the Petrograd Soviet quickly revealed its deficiencies compared to 
the Westminster parliament. Above all, this talking shop lacked the 
legislative powers which could determine who formed the government 
of the country. Ironically, in practice, Russian proletarian democracy 
was less accountable than British bourgeois democracy. The Bolshevik 
leadership may have participated in the debates of the Petrograd Soviet, 
86 See Harold Nelson, Leon Trotsky and the Art of Insurrection, pages 93–124; and Mark 
von Hagen, Soldiers in the Proletarian Dictatorship, pages 13–21.
87 See Jacques Camatte, Community and Communism in Russia, pages 16–25, 33–48; 
and Charles Bettelheim, Class Struggles in the USSR, pages 210–249.
88 See Oskar Anweiler, The Soviets, pages 97–207; and Maurice Brinton, The Bolsheviks 
and Workers’ Control, pages i–xv.
89 V.I. Lenin, ‘Fourth Anniversary of the October Revolution’, page 503.
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but their executive authority was derived from elsewhere.90 In October 
1917, it’d been the military that had decided which Red faction would 
control Russia. The weaponry of the Petrograd garrison was much more 
important than the votes of the city’s population. Fighting for survival 
against internal and external enemies, Lenin’s regime over the next few 
years rebuilt the regular army which had almost disintegrated during 
the revolutionary turmoil. Amongst the European Left, it had long 
been argued that only volunteers could be trusted with the defence of 
the nation. From bitter experience, they knew that professional soldiers 
led by career officers would obey orders to crush internal dissent with 
extreme violence. By democratising the army, Social Democrats 
believed that the threat posed by this repressive institution could be 
neutralised. When every worker was a part-time soldier, the men in 
uniform would be loyal to the Left.91  
In 1917, like other revolutionary groups, the Bolsheviks had recruited 
its own militia forces in Petrograd and Moscow: the Red Guards. 
During that tumultuous year, these armed workers played a key role in 
ensuring that Lenin’s party came out on top in the factional competition 
for state power. For a brief moment, the Bolsheviks were able to 
congratulate themselves for putting the European Left’s proletarian 
military policy into practice.92 Unfortunately, this commitment to 
a volunteer army proved to be as short-lived as their enthusiasm for 
universal suffrage. After some disastrous encounters with its German 
and White opponents, Lenin’s regime soon relegated the Red Guards 
to policing duties. Despite their ardour, workers’ militias from the 
cities lacked not only the numbers, but also, more importantly, the 
mindset to win the Russian Civil War. Even on the battlefield, these 
amateur soldiers still wanted to discuss with each other whether or 
90 See H.G. Wells, ‘Russia in the Shadows’, pages 391–395. In contrast, Marx 
emphasised that: ‘The [1871 Paris] Commune was ... executive and legislative at the 
same time.’  Karl Marx, Civil War in France, page 40.
91 ‘The first decree of the [1871 Paris] Commune … was the suppression of the 
standing army and the substitution for it of the armed people.’ Karl Marx, Civil War 
in France, page 40. For the practical implications of this Social Democratic policy, 
see Friedrich Engels, ‘The Prussian Military Question and the German Workers’ 
Party’; and Jean Jaurès, L’Armée Nouvelle. 
92 See Harold Nelson, Leon Trotsky and the Art of Insurrection, pages 108–124; and 
Mark von Hagen, Soldiers in the Proletarian Dictatorship, pages 13–24.
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not they agreed with their commander’s decisions before going into 
action.93 Requiring more reliable troops, Trotsky – as the Bolsheviks’ 
defence minister – instead conscripted the sons of the peasantry in 
their millions to serve under officers who’d learnt their trade in the 
Tsar’s regiments. The Red Guards had been replaced by the Red Army. 
Military discipline was restored by using tried-and-trusted methods: 
a rigid hierarchy of ranks, smart uniforms, saluting superiors, medals 
for bravery and harsh punishments for trouble-makers including the 
death penalty for deserters. Substituting Bolshevik ideology for radical 
democracy, political commissars now enforced allegiance to the new 
Russian government amongst the rank-and-file soldiery.94 Under 
Trotsky’s leadership, orders were to be obeyed without any debates in 
the Red Army. The victory of the revolution had been bought at a 
terrible price: the defeat of the revolution.95 
When the Tsar’s regime had collapsed in February 1917, tight press 
censorship  suddenly gave way to almost unrestricted media freedom. 
From the outset, the competing parties’ newspapers were at the forefront 
of their struggle for political power. Not surprisingly, as instability 
increased, toleration for opposing viewpoints quickly diminished. 
Printing presses were now the arsenals of civil strife.96 In October 1917, 
the Bolsheviks had launched their coup d’état in response to a bungled 
attempt by their Red rivals to close down one of their newspapers. As 
well as taking over the utilities, railway stations, telephone exchange 
and telegraph offices, Trotsky’s troops also seized control of the Right’s 
printing works. Within a few days, the new Bolshevik government 
had reintroduced press censorship and banned various conservative 
newspapers.97 Over the next few years, media freedom soon disappeared 
93 See Evan Mawdsley, The Russian Civil War, pages 46–51; and Mark von Hagen, 
Soldiers in the Proletarian Dictatorship, pages 24–5.
94 See Leon Trotsky, Military Writings, page 148–158; Isaac Deutscher, The Prophet 
Armed, pages 405–485; and Mark von Hagen, Soldiers in the Proletarian Dictatorship, 
pages 25–66.
95 See Ante Ciliga, The Russian Enigma, pages 283–291, 489–491; and Evan Mawdsley, 
The Russian Civil War, pages 377–403.
96 See Peter Kenez, The Birth of the Propaganda State, pages 29–35.
97 See Leon Trotsky, History of the Russian Revolution, pages 194–195, 210–211; and 
John Reed, Ten Days That Shook the World, page 166.
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amidst the chaos and bloodshed of the Russian Civil War. Under 
military discipline, there could be no open expression of dissent. Even 
the critical voices on the Left had to be silenced.98 What the Bolsheviks 
required instead was rousing propaganda which mobilised the masses 
to fight for the Soviet republic: the concentrated spectacle. Like the 
artistic avant-garde, the political vanguard was convinced that changing 
popular consciousness would inevitably transform the whole of society. 
In an influential interpretation of this fundamental human right, the 
Bolsheviks now claimed that their monopoly over intellectual and 
cultural life was the most advanced form of media freedom.99 Armed 
with the correct political ideology, the ‘firmly knit and monolithic’ 
vanguard party was leading the peoples of the world into the utopian 
future.100 
During the Russian Civil War, the intervention of avant-garde artists 
helped to decide which side would emerge victorious on the battlefield. 
By backing Lenin’s party against its Red rivals, they’d identified the 
Bolsheviks’ political monopolisation of the 1917 Revolution with 
the cutting-edge of aesthetic creativity. Through their posters, plays, 
paintings, films and publications, these Modernist propagandists 
motivated the conscripted peasantry to fight with fervour for the Soviet 
cause. Thanks to their hard work and commitment, radical artworks 
were transformed into deadly weapons against not only the Whites, 
but also other Red factions.101 In the ferocious struggles of the Russian 
Civil War, Trotsky’s armoured train covered with Constructivist designs 
became the icon of the Bolshevik synthesis of ideological and military 
shock tactics. Rushing from front to front, this mobile factory of the 
concentrated spectacle combined the persuasive power of the printing 
press, radio broadcasting and theatrical performances with the coercive 
98 See Peter Kenez, The Birth of the Propaganda State, pages 35–44; and Arthur 
Ransome, The Crisis in Russia, pages 35–43.
99 See Peter Kenez, The Birth of the Propaganda State, pages 44–118; and Richard 
Barbrook, Media Freedom, pages 38–54. 
100 Commission of the CC of the CPSU(B), History of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union, page 140. Also see Susan Buck-Morss, Dreamworld and Catastrophe, pages 
40–96.
101 See Peter Kenez, The Birth of the Propaganda State, pages 95–118; and Mark von 
Hagen, Soldiers in the Proletarian Dictatorship, pages 89–114.
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might of motorised infantry, guard cavalry and heavy artillery. Like 
the small teams of specialists who’d carried out the Bolshevik coup 
d’état, this elite detachment of the Red Army was living proof of the 
collective power of industrial production with its complex hierarchy 
of intellectual and practical skills. No enemy unit had been able to 
withstand its devastating fusion of ideological passion and military 
firepower for long. Within the agrarian society of early-20th century 
Russia, Trotsky’s armoured train was a wondrous Constructivist 
premonition of the possibilities of the hi-tech future in the present.102 
102 See Leon Trotsky, My Life, pages 427–439; Arthur Ransome, The Crisis in Russia, 
pages 67–72; and David Elliot, New Worlds, pages 72–73.
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2.4: The Temptations of Bolshevism
In 1921, the Red Army finally achieved its hard-won victory in the 
Russian Civil War. By purging their erstwhile comrades on the Left, 
the Bolsheviks had first taken exclusive ownership of the popular 
revolution which then – after great sacrifices – led to the annihilation 
of the aristocratic counter-revolution. Violence not voting had decided 
who would rule over the new republic.103 Not surprisingly, the Red 
Army was now the most admired institution of this reborn Russian 
state. Under the Tsars, the military profession had been widely despised, 
especially amongst the Left. However, in 1917, these prejudices quickly 
disappeared when mutinous soldiers and sailors became the strongest 
supporters of the revolution. It was their commitment that enabled the 
Reds to overthrow the absolute monarchy which had brutally oppressed 
the Russian people for centuries. It was their bravery that would thwart 
the Whites’ efforts over the next four years to restore the old order by 
force. In their life-and-death fight for survival, the Bolsheviks soon 
became devotees of ‘… the military virtues of honour, self-sacrifice and 
obedience’.104 Direct democracy was now condemned for threatening 
the fragile unity of the nation against its domestic and foreign enemies. 
As on the battlefields of the Russian Civil War, an undisputed chain of 
command was needed for the efficient running of all political, cultural 
and economic institutions.105 Intoxicated by victory, Trotsky in 1921 
advocated mobilising the entire civilian population in labour armies to 
carry out the rebuilding of the devastated country. In this militarised 
recuperation of socialism, obeying orders issued by state planners 
became the Leninist substitute for trading commodities within the 
103 As the leader of the Bolshevik regime emphasised: ‘… the solution of the problems 
[in Russia] is effected not by means of the ballot, but by the class struggle in all its 
forms, including civil war.’ V.I. Lenin, ‘The Elections to the Constituent Assembly’, 
page 481. Also see Leon Trotsky, Terrorism and Communism, pages 51–68, 119–
125.
104 Mark von Hagen, Soldiers in the Proletarian Dictatorship, page 279.
105 See the unabashed enthusiasm for authoritarian ‘one-man management’ in V.I. 
Lenin, The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government; and Nikolai Bukharin, 
Economics of the Transition Period.
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marketplace.106 Reflecting this new wisdom, Bolshevik propaganda 
was saturated with the terminology of armed conflict. Workers and 
peasants were soldiers in the economic struggle to increase industrial 
and agricultural production. Avant-garde artists became fighters on 
the cultural front against ideological reaction. In revolutionary Russia, 
every citizen was a conscript in the Red Army: ‘War Communism’.107 
For the Bolsheviks, the defeat of the Whites in 1921 was their greatest 
moment of existential doubt. During the Russian Civil War, the 
advocates of Soviet democracy within the party had accepted that 
drastic measures were temporarily required to defend the revolution 
against its domestic and foreign opponents. Only too aware of the 
tragic fate of the 1871 Paris Commune, they knew that it was shoot 
first or be shot.108 However, once the emergency was over, many on 
the Left believed that state repression against dissenters had lost its 
rationale. In a wave of strikes, workers in Petrograd demanded that the 
Bolsheviks should loosen their monopoly over political and economic 
power in Russia. Inspired by their example, the Kronstadt sailors 
who’d provided the elite troops for the October 1917 coup d’état and 
the 1918 Kazan campaign also rose in revolt against Lenin’s regime. 
Drafting a manifesto for this new split within the Red cause, these 
rebels had one key demand that would enthuse the Situationists many 
decades later: ‘Soviets without Bolsheviks.’ In revolutionary Russia, 
direct democracy must now replace military discipline. Outraged by 
this proletarian insurrection, Lenin’s regime first ruthlessly crushed 
the strikes in Petrograd and then massacred the defenders of the 
Kronstadt Soviet. Like the Paris Commune, this local experiment in 
self-management had been no match for a disciplined national army of 
peasant conscripts led by professional officers.109 Having blocked any 
106 See Leon Trotsky, Terrorism and Communism, pages 140–182; and Isaac Deutscher, 
The Prophet Armed, pages 486–503
107 See Roger Pethybridge, The Social Prelude to Stalinism, pages 73–131; and E.H. 
Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution Volume 2, pages 151–268.
108 Writing on his armoured train in 1920, Trotsky claimed that: ‘We are taking 
vengeance for the [1871] Commune and shall avenge it.’ Leon Trotsky, ‘The Paris 
Commune and Soviet Russia’, page 46.
109 See Ida Mett, The Kronstadt Uprising; Oskar Anweiler, The Soviets, pages 244–253; 
and Victor Serge, Memoirs of a Revolutionary, pages 115–156.
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opening towards political pluralism, the Bolsheviks instead relaxed their 
controls over the Russian economy, especially within the countryside. 
Letting peasants trade in the marketplace was much less threatening to 
the privileges of this new ruling elite than allowing workers to vote in 
the Soviets.110 
During the 1920s, the veterans of the Russian Civil War deplored 
the moral laxity encouraged by the increasing toleration of private 
enterprise.111 According to Trotsky, his opponents within the Bolshevik 
party were guilty of preparing the way for the restoration of liberal 
capitalism. What he advocated instead was a return to the military 
virtues of the wartime Red Army. When state planning displaced 
market competition, discipline and commitment would supplant 
consumerism and selfishness.112 In the bitter contest for the Bolshevik 
leadership that followed Lenin’s death in 1924, Stalin eventually 
emerged as the new boss of bosses. Yet, despite this political setback, 
it was Trotsky who would win the ideological argument over the most 
effective development strategy for the Soviet republic.113 In 1928, 
Russia was the first country to succumb to the traumatic economic 
crisis which would engulf the whole world over the next decade. 
When the markets were no longer able to provide enough food from 
the countryside to feed the cities, the Bolshevik government quickly 
rediscovered the military solutions which had secured its grip on power 
during the Russian Civil War. Appropriating Trotsky’s programme as 
his own, Stalin now ordered the mobilisation of the whole population 
in a nationwide campaign to modernise agriculture and industrialise 
the economy. Compulsory military service provided the prototype for 
110 See Roger Pethybridge, The Social Prelude to Stalinism, pages 196–251; and E.H. 
Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution Volume 2, pages 269–357.
111 See Mark von Hagen, Soldiers in the Proletarian Dictatorship, pages 166–168, 185–
195.
112 For the political and economic programme of the Left Opposition within Russia’s 
governing party, see Leon Trotsky, The New Course; and Eugeny Preobrazhenksy, The 
New Economics.
113 In 1931, one of his imprisoned followers eventually realised that: ‘Trotsky... is … 
the theorist of the regime which Stalin is carrying out in practice.’ Ante Ciliga, The 
Russian Enigma, page 283.
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this ruthless drive to proletarianise the Russian peasantry.114 Like Red 
Army soldiers, the exploited and fearful servants of the Stalinist state 
were all equal in their subordination to the maximum leader. In this 
stern empire of the concentrated spectacle, they worked under strict 
discipline, received the same rations and were subjected to incessant 
ideological indoctrination. As Marx and Engels had foreseen in the 
late-19th century, the fatal flaw of the Russian Left was its obsession 
with ‘barrack-room communism.’115 
On that November 2008 evening at the Winter Palace, Class Wargames’ 
performance was our Situationist exorcism of the vanguard party’s 
counter-revolution within the proletarian revolution. For this second 
phase of our campaign of ludic subversion, the International’s avant-
garde art tactic of participatory creativity would be implemented to 
propagandise for the communist political strategy of direct democracy. 
With Trotsky having once again triumphed in our Reds versus Reds 
re-enactment, I now took over the commentator’s role to introduce 
Debord’s ludic antidote to the Bolshevik militarised recuperation of 
socialism: The Game of War. For the next contest at the Hermitage, 
Fabian and Ilze would play the South against Mark and Stefan as the 
North.116 While the two sides were making their opening moves, I 
began to elucidate the political reasoning which had inspired this game. 
Born in 1931, Debord’s childhood and adolescence had coincided 
with the apogee of Stalinist hegemony over the French Left. Before 
the Second World War, the Social Democrats had been the dominant 
force within working class politics.117 But, when France was defeated in 
1940, this mass party focused on winning elections, cultural agitation 
and trade union activism had suddenly become an irrelevance. Under 
Nazi occupation, any overt opposition was ruthlessly repressed. In 
such dangerous circumstances, the armed struggle against the fascist 
enemy had to be led by a disciplined revolutionary organisation: the 
114 See Mark von Hagen, Soldiers in the Proletarian Dictatorship, pages 295–343; and 
David Stone, Hammer and Rifle, pages 85–183. 
115 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, ‘The Alliance of Social Democracy and the 
International Working Men’s Association’, page 120.
116 The photographs of this game are in the Events 2008 section of the Class Wargames 
website.
117 See Jean Lacouture, Léon Blum; and Julian Jackson, The Popular Front in France.
154 155
French Communist Party. Thanks to the courage and dedication of its 
members, the Germans and their collaborators paid an increasingly 
high price to keep control over the country until the arrival of the 
Allied armies in 1944 put an end to the conflict. By providing these 
elite troops of the French Resistance, the Stalinists had eclipsed their 
Social Democratic, Trotskyist and Anarchist rivals on the Left. In the 
elections held immediately after the Second World War, they were 
able to win almost a third of the popular vote. If women hadn’t just 
been enfranchised, the French totalitarian Communists would have 
come close to securing a working majority of deputies in the National 
Assembly.118 
When these ballots were cast in 1945–7, the prestige of the Soviet 
Union had never been higher. For four years, people across the world 
had been thrilled by the Russians’ stubborn refusal to succumb to Nazi 
aggression. Under Stalin’s leadership, the Red Army had fought back 
and – at a massive cost in lives and material – won the Second World 
War. His regime’s brutal policy of forced industrialisation had built 
the factories that produced the tanks, planes, rifles and artillery which 
destroyed Adolf Hitler’s empire. The fate of humanity had been decided 
on the Eastern Front.119 Most appropriately, Yevgeny Khaldei’s 1945 
photograph of the hoisting of the red hammer-and-sickle flag of the 
Soviet Union on the Reichstag building in Berlin came to symbolise 
the final victory over fascism in Europe.120 As I now explained to the 
audience of Cyberfest 2008, Debord and his comrades had grown up 
under the shadow of this triumph of militarised socialism. When 
the continent was partitioned between Russia and America at the 
1945 Yalta conference, Stalin had consigned the French totalitarian 
Communists to permanent opposition. Prevented from taking state 
power, this vanguard party had instead concentrated its efforts on 
imposing the rule of the concentrated spectacle over the political, 
economic and cultural institutions of the Left. By the time that Debord 
became an activist in the late-1950s, the Cold War division of Europe 
118 See Serge Halimi, Sisyphe est Fatigué, pages 241–350; and R.W. Johnson, The Long 
March of the French Left, pages 23–51.
119 See Richard Overy, Russia’s War; and Evan Mawdsley, Thunder in the East.
120 Like Eisenstein’s October, this famous image was also doctored to conform to the 
requirements of Stalinist ideology, see Dean Lucas, ‘Flag on the Reichstag’. 
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had ensured that: ‘… French Marxism … [was] identified completely 
with the Soviet Union and the “thought” of Joseph Stalin.’121 
The dissidents of Debord’s generation who’d founded the New Left had 
never completely escaped from the military glamour of Bolshevism. 
Like their Stalinist elders, many of these young French anti-Stalinists 
also saw themselves as the skilful generals of the proletarian vanguard. 
Having repudiated the Soviet despot, they’d then transferred their 
loyalties to another charismatic warrior intellectual of the concentrated 
spectacle: Trotsky, Mao, Castro or Pol Pot. The French Communist 
Party might have become compromised by its reformist policies in the 
postwar decades, but its wartime resistance against fascism still provided 
the best model for revolutionary militancy. Amongst the ranks of the 
New Left, many dreamt of returning to the hardline intransigence of 
the Bolshevik Left in its prime.122 As in our Reds versus Reds game, 
these militants of May ‘68 continually re-fought the sectarian quarrels 
of the 1917 Russian Revolution and its aftermath amongst themselves. 
Instead of uniting against the common enemy, the French New Left 
during the 1970s became obsessed with its own sectarian divisions.123 
Defeat and disillusionment were the inevitable consequences of this 
ideological confusion. By the time that the 20th anniversary of May 
‘68 arrived, most of these once youthful radicals had long since made 
their peace with bourgeois society. With the revolutionary overthrow 
of capitalism no longer on the agenda, the Post-Modernist celebration 
of cultural diversity was now the limit of their ambitions: ‘… [the] 
loss of the ability immediately to perceive what is significant and 
what is … irrelevant; what is incompatible and what could well be 
complementary; all that a particular consequence implies and at the 
same time all that it excludes ...’124
121 Arthur Hirsh, The French Left, page 11.
122 See Christophe Bourseiller, Les Maoistes, pages 105–297; and A. Belden Fields, 
Trotskyism and Maoism, pages 41–130.
123 For an exhaustive list from 1978 of these competing groups, see Roland Biard, 
Dictionnaire de l’Extrême-Gauche.
124 Guy Debord, Comments of the Society of the Spectacle, page 30. For the intellectual 
targets of his scorn, see Jean-François Lyotard, The Post-Modern Condition; Jean 
Baudrillard, Simulations; and Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand 
Plateaus.
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By playing The Game of War along with Reds versus Reds in the Winter 
Palace as the opening manoeuvre of the second stage of our campaign 
of ludic subversion, we were honouring the Situationists’ discovery of a 
more subversive escape route from the dead end of Bolshevism. During 
the first decade of its existence, the International had mimicked the 
New Left’s reborn vanguard parties in its ideological intensity with fierce 
debates over the correct political and cultural strategy decided through 
bitter splits and expulsions. Like Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin, Debord 
had also insisted upon ideological purity as the test of communist 
virtue.125 Then, in May 1968, a revolution had taken place for real in 
France. During this momentous month, Debord became convinced 
that the Winter Palace of consumer capitalism was on the brink of 
falling to the insurgent proletariat. In a resurgence of direct democracy, 
the masses were creating their own institutions of social power: the 
workers’ councils. For a brief moment, the Kronstadt rebels’ demand 
for Soviets without Bolsheviks had become a practical possibility. 
Debord now understood that the Situationist International must 
finally free itself from all ideological taints of vanguard politics. Victory 
could no longer be won with an elitist military strategy on the new 
spectacular battlefield. Everyone must be involved in the revolutionary 
transformation of modern society. On the streets of Paris in May 
‘68, the Situationists had the exhilaration of briefly experiencing the 
libertarian communist future in the present: ‘Capitalised time stopped 
… People strolled, dreamed, learned how to live. Desires began to 
become … reality.’126
During our performance at the Hermitage, as Fabian and Ilze 
launched a devastating cavalry attack against their opponents, I took 
this opportunity to discuss how Debord had laid down these lessons 
of May ’68 within The Game of War. In the immediate aftermath 
of this almost revolution, he’d had the moral strength to resist the 
temptations of Bolshevism. One of Debord’s greatest achievements was 
his announcement of the dissolution of the Situationist International 
in 1972. By this daring move, he succeeded in preventing its admirers 
125 See Len Bracken, Guy Debord, pages 72–157; and Andrew Hussey, A Game of War, 
pages 156–230.
126 René Viénet, Enragés and Situationist in the Occupation Movement, page 77.
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from turning themselves into yet another New Left vanguard party. 
The strategy and tactics of the International were practical responses to 
the specific historical circumstances in which Debord and his comrades 
had found themselves. Asserting that their revolutionary adventures 
provided an infallible solution for all subsequent generations would 
transform Situationism from a subversive practice into a dogmatic 
ideology.127 Intellectuals must be trained to resist their instinctive 
desire for recuperation by the concentrated spectacle. Debord was 
well aware that the working class movement was strengthened when 
dissident thinkers put their learning in the service of the revolution. 
But, as the attendees at Cyberfest 2008 knew only too well, the tragic 
history of 20th century Russia was a dreadful warning to the Left across 
the world. The Bolsheviks – the leaders of the exploited – had all too 
easily become a new class of exploiters. By inventing The Game of War, 
Debord had provided his answer to how radicals after May ‘68 could 
stop themselves from also turning into a little Lenin, Trotsky or Stalin. 
This ludic battlefield was the Situationist antidote to the snares of 
Bolshevism. 
Pointing to the board, I directed the Cyberfest 2008 audience’s attention 
to the South’s audacious outflanking attack against the North’s army. 
Laid out according to the Rio de Janeiro scenario shown in Diagram 
2 on page 224, the two sides had begun with their forces divided into 
three almost equal brigades. In a series of clever manoeuvres, Fabian 
and Ilze had utilised their cavalry pieces on their left flank to break 
through the North’s defences. At a key moment in the game, they’d 
happily sacrificed one of these elite units to open the way to taking 
their opponent’s western arsenal. As I now explained, Fabian and Ilze 
were in the ascendency because they clearly understood the political 
meaning of this Situationist simulation. For Debord, the four cavalry 
pieces symbolised the artists and intellectuals who’d committed 
themselves to the cybernetic communist cause. In The Game of War, 
the task of both North and South was to learn how to make the best 
use of these guard troops of the social battlefield without becoming 
Bolsheviks themselves. During the May ‘68 Revolution, the Situationist 
127 See the impassioned diatribe against these would-be synthesisers of Situationism 
and Bolshevism in Guy Debord and Gianfranco Sanguinetti, The Veritable Split in 
the International. 
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International had gladly sacrificed itself to prepare the ground for the 
final assault of the proletarian army: ‘… I believe I can say that our 
formation as a whole never swerved from its line until it plunged into 
the very core of destruction.’128 Like cavalry units in The Game of War, 
the members of the revolutionary vanguard were expendable pieces 
in the struggle to build a truly human civilisation. Inside the Winter 
Palace, the players of North and South were learning that there could 
be no leadership which placed itself above the working class as a whole. 
In this tabletop combat, the whole army had to work as one to achieve 
victory against the common enemy. By inventing The Game of War, 
Debord had supplied his ludic response to the totalitarian temptations 
of Bolshevism. When every proletarian could play at being Lenin, 
Trotsky and Stalin on its game board, then no intellectual would be 
tempted to become a little Lenin, Trotsky or Stalin in real life. 
128 Guy Debord, In Girum Imus Nocte et Consumimur Igni, page 179. In this film, 
the International’s role in May ‘68 was visually identified with the Light Brigade’s 
suicidal charge against the Russian artillery which led to the British-French victory 
at the 1854 battle of Balaclava. For an account of this infamous moment in military 
history, see Mark Adkin, The Charge.
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2.5: The Chosen Few 
After the contest in the Hermitage was over, the members of Class 
Wargames were invited to a local restaurant by Dmitry Golynko and 
his friends to celebrate our decisive intervention at Cyberfest 2008. 
Over vodka and blinis, the conversation soon turned to the political 
meaning of The Game of War. Despite their recent arrival in the 
country, Situationist ideas were already finding local devotees. Drawn 
from the same bohemian milieu as Chto Delat?, the activists of Voina 
had just begun a daring campaign of public provocations against the 
mendacity and hypocrisy of the Putin regime. In this early-21st century 
Russian version, Situationism meant avant-garde performance art in 
the service of libertarian Left politics.129 Not surprisingly, our Russian 
comrades were puzzled by Debord’s decision to devote so much of his 
time to inventing a simulation of Horse-and-Musket warfare. Surely 
the chief theorist of the International should have spent his energies 
on something much more obviously political? If he did want to make a 
ludic critique of Bolshevism, why didn’t he instead create a Situationist 
variant of Chris Peers’ Reds versus Reds game? There were plenty of 
precedents for this approach. In 1933, A.S. Yurgelevich had produced 
a Soviet Battle-Chess which updated the original version by not only 
extending the board to 128 squares, but also replacing its monarchical 
pieces with new ones representing machine guns, tanks and aircraft.130 
Since the publication of SPI’s Russian Civil War in 1976, there’d been a 
succession of board games which had modelled this key turning point 
in world history.131 However, Debord hadn’t imitated these more-or-
less successful attempts to re-enact the Bolsheviks’ rise to power. For 
some bizarre reason, his simulation was focused upon the military 
campaigns of over a century earlier. If Debord’s goal really was to 
prevent leftists from becoming a little Lenin, Trotsky or Stalin, then 
why did The Game of War encourage its players to transform themselves 
into a little Bonaparte?
129 For an account of their early actions, see Danila Rozanov, ‘Voina: artists at war’.
130 See Hans Bodlaender, ‘Battle-Chess’.
131 See Jim Dunnigan, Russian Civil War; Andy Lewis, Ted Raicer and Volko Runkhe, 
Reds!; David Dockter, The Triumph of Chaos; Brian Train, Konarmiya; and William 
Sariego, Red Russia.
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As the vodka flowed, the questioning intensified. In the early-1960s, 
the  Situationists’ ludic manifesto had envisaged a co-operative playtime 
where everyone was a winner.132 Yet, when we’d staged The Game of 
War that evening in the Hermitage, there could be only one victor – 
and there had to be a loser. For some people around the table in the 
restaurant, this miniature head-to-head combat reeked of the masculine 
competitiveness of bourgeois society. Inside the Winter Palace, its 
players had embraced the same aggressive militarist emotions that 
fuelled the recent US-led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Debord’s 
abandonment of the Situationist vision of non-competitive gaming 
might have been more understandable if his aim had been to recreate 
the iconic revolutionary uprisings of his own times. But, as we’d already 
realised back in 2007, his ludic masterpiece wasn’t an abstraction of 
workers and students fighting against the cops on the streets of Paris 
in May ’68.133 The Game of War also didn’t reproduce the struggles of 
the Algerian guerrillas against French colonialism or the Vietnamese 
partisans against American imperialism.134 On the contrary, its pieces 
were divided into the famous 18th and 19th century military trinity: 
infantry, cavalry and artillery. As Debord had emphasised, his game 
was founded upon very specific ‘voluntary historical limits’.135 Within 
the confines of this miniature battlefield, its participants had to play at 
being Bonaparte. For both North and South, the prize of conquest was 
an emperor’s crown. 
When this discussion took place in St. Petersburg, Class Wargames 
still hadn’t fully worked out our analysis of The Game of War. We could 
parry the harder questions from our Russian comrades, but weren’t able 
to provide them with  definitive answers. Luckily, on that November 
night, the copious flow of vodka had hidden these serious gaps in our 
knowledge. However, on our return to England, we knew that this 
problem would have to be rectified as soon as possible. Class Wargames 
must be able to give a convincing explanation of why Debord had 
132 See the Situationist International, ‘Contribution à une Definition Situationniste du 
Jeu’.
133 For a game of this revolution, see François Nedelec and Duccio Vitale, Mai ‘68.
134 For examples of games inspired by these conflicts, see Brian Train, Algeria; and Nick 
Karp, Vietnam.
135 Alice Becker-Ho and Guy Debord, A Game of War, page 24.
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devised a Horse-and-Musket simulation. By the time that the second 
phase of our campaign of ludic subversion had commenced at Cyberfest 
2008, we’d already understood that this avant-garde artwork was 
promoting libertarian communist politics. While moving its pieces 
across the board, the players of The Game of War were learning how 
to avoid the temptations of the 21st century revival of the Bolshevik 
vanguard. The promoters of the totalitarian Communist hypothesis 
and the militants of the Invisible Committee were both mythologists 
and amnesiacs of the tragic history of the 1917 Russian Revolution. 
Fortunately, Class Wargames’ participatory performances could enable 
the inhabitants of the present to experience this formative moment 
of the past in person. Proletarian memory was the death knell of the 
integrated spectacle.
Prodded by the questioning of our Leningrad comrades, Class 
Wargames realised that we would now have to delve deeper into the 
Situationist politics of revolutionary history. Having successfully made 
the link between 2008 and 1917 with our performances at the Winter 
Palace, our next task would be to go further back in time to the much 
earlier epoch of Horse-and-Musket warfare replicated by The Game of 
War. From our research, we knew that Debord hadn’t been alone in his 
deep fascination with the military career of Bonaparte. The Napoleonic 
era had been the most popular historical period amongst the wargaming 
subculture in the 1960s and 1970s. The collectors of toy soldiers loved 
the bright and colourful uniforms which had aided recognition of who 
was who on these smoke-filled battlefields.136 The fans of Avalon Hill 
games had ensured that Waterloo was one of its best-selling releases 
during this period.137 For these hobbyists, this almost modern moment 
in military history had the attraction of being neither too distant nor 
too recent in time. Re-staging the battles of the Greeks and Romans 
required an understanding of a socio-economic system which was very 
different from that of late-20th century capitalism. Re-fighting the 
campaigns of the First or Second World Wars evoked painful family 
memories for many people. Fortunately, the era of Horse-and-Musket 
136 See Barrie Quarrie, PSL Guide to Wargaming, pages 86–87.
137 See Lindsley Schutz and Thomas Shaw, Waterloo; and Jim Dunnigan, The Complete 
Wargames Handbook, page 147. 
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warfare was both close enough to be familiar and far enough away 
to be enchanting. Above all, these Napoleonic wargames offered the 
opportunity for hobbyists to play the most romantic warrior hero of 
them all: Napoléon Bonaparte. Whether with toy soldiers or cardboard 
counters, they too could be victorious at Marengo, Austerlitz and 
Wagram. This time around, they would annihilate the enemy’s army at 
Borodino, Leipzig and Waterloo. For Debord’s generation, pretending 
to be Bonaparte was their ultimate wargaming experience: ‘There are 
amateur tacticians who want to prove that they could have bettered 
Napoleon in some battle or campaign (there may even be some who 
believe that they are Napoleon!) ...’138
In 1960s and 1970s France, this ludic obsession had been an identifier 
of reactionary politics. The connoisseurs of toy soldiers revered the 
upstart emperor as the forerunner of the two uniformed saviours 
who’d defined the bitter split within the authoritarian Right during 
the mid-20th century: Phillipe Pétain and Charles de Gaulle. Among 
the followers of both factions, manoeuvring beautifully painted 
figurines in historically correct uniforms across a miniature Napoleonic 
battlefield became their aesthetic rejection of the equalitarian ethos 
of the modern world.139 By publishing The Game of War, Debord 
deployed the Situationist tactic of provocation against these guardians 
of the established order. The abstract design of its pieces made no 
attempt to reproduce the splendid finery of the imperial army. The 
board wasn’t an accurate simulation of the terrain from one of the 
emperor’s famous battles. Above all, in his recreation of Horse-and-
Musket warfare, the military supremacy of Bonaparte was firmly 
reconnected to the political energy of the 1789 French Revolution. For 
the Right, the rule of the emperor was commemorated as a high point 
in the nation’s history: civil order at home and absolute hegemony over 
the European continent.140 But, on the Left, the legacy of Bonaparte’s 
regime had always been much more contentious. On the one hand, 
this charismatic general had consolidated the social gains of the 1789 
138 John Sanders, An Introduction to Wargaming, page 10.
139 See Harry Pearson, Achtung Schweinehund!, pages 161–3.
140 See Michel Franceschi and Ben Weider, The Wars against Napoleon; and Alistair 
Horne, The Age of Napoleon.
164 165
French Revolution: the abolition of feudal privileges, the redistribution 
of land to the peasantry and the codification of legal equality. Yet, 
on the other hand, his seizure of power had also marked the end of 
the republican experiment in political democracy: the restoration of 
the monarchy, the curtailment of civil liberties and the restriction of 
the electoral franchise. The people’s emperor was the enforcer of the 
dictatorship of the bourgeoisie.141
Most worryingly of all, like Stalin, Bonaparte had first risen to 
prominence as a fervent supporter of the Left before reinventing himself 
as the supreme leader of the Right. By synthesising these two opposites 
in his regime, he’d succeeded in embodying both the realisation and 
the negation of the 1789 French Revolution.142 Not surprisingly, this 
Napoleonic myth was the instigator of political confusion long after 
his death. Even the fiercest opponents of monarchy have been able to 
find something to admire in the career of this crowned autocrat.143 By 
publishing The Game of War, Debord provided his ludic response to 
the Left’s confusion over whether Bonaparte should be admired as an 
enlightened despot or castigated as a corrupt tyrant. Embedded within 
the ebb-and-flow of its play was a Situationist lesson in European 
history. Through Debord’s ludic invention, every proletarian could 
learn that there was no doubt about the emperor’s guilt. Tellingly, 
echoing Marx’s famous quip, the pieces of The Game of War were 
reminders of Bonaparte’s hijacking of the 1789 French Revolution: 
‘… the republic’s motto, … [Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, had been] 
replaced by the unambiguous words: Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery!’144
During the discussions with our Russian comrades after Cyberfest 
2008, we still hadn’t fully realised the theoretical implications of 
141 See Pieter Geyl, Napoleon For and Against, pages 25–33, 125–126, 232–277, 319–
323, 376–400.
142 Anticipating the Post-Modernist mixing of opposites, Bonaparte boasted that his 
regime combined the best elements of monarchy and republic, see Emmanuel de 
Las Cases, Mémorial de Sainte-Hélène, pages 367–368, 558–561. Also see Georges 
Lefebvre, Napoleon, pages 71–94; and Isser Woloch, Napoleon and his Collaborators, 
pages 36–65.
143 For the early-19th century origins of the Bonapartist cult, see Sudir Hazareesingh, 
The Legend of Napoleon. 
144 Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, page 67.
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this design decision. The Game of War and Reds versus Reds might 
have been simulating different periods in military history, but they 
were teaching the same political lesson to their players: the leaders of 
the oppressed can all too easily become their new oppressors. From 
our performances of both games, we’d understood how Debord’s 
masterpiece was a ludic meditation on the Bolsheviks’ recuperation of 
the 1917 Russian Revolution. On that night in Leningrad, what we 
hadn’t yet comprehended was why this game was also a fierce critique 
of Bonaparte’s hijacking of the 1789 French Revolution. Nearly two 
decades after the end of the Cold War, it was easy for the people sitting 
around the table inside that St. Petersburg restaurant to forget the 
enthusiasm with which the Left in France had once identified these 
two world-historical turning points with each other. When Debord 
first became politically active in the 1950s, the competing Bolshevik 
sects had taken pride in tracing their lineage back to the radical 
republicans of 1792–4: the Jacobins. For them, far from being a foreign 
import, the vanguard party was the contemporary manifestation of 
a long and admirable French revolutionary tradition. After their fall 
from power, the Jacobins had been forced to organise themselves as 
secretive conspiracies to survive under the authoritarian regimes that 
controlled 19th century France. What had begun as a tactical necessity 
for the republican Left was soon transformed into a political virtue. 
The members of the revolutionary conspiracy were a select band of 
activists, artists and agitators who’d succeeded in freeing themselves 
from the shackles of bourgeois ideology.145 Regrettably, the rest of the 
French population still remained befuddled by the false ideas promoted 
by the media, the church and the academy. The political implications 
of this elitist analysis were clear. Before they could rule themselves, 
the French people must first be re-educated in republican principles 
under the tutelage of the Left’s concentrated spectacle.146 During the 
1789 Revolution, religious devotion had deluded the inhabitants 
of the Vendée region into fighting for their aristocratic exploiters. 
After the 1848 Revolution, the Napoleonic myth had convinced the 
majority of the peasantry to support his nephew’s grab for the imperial 
145 See Phillipe Buonarroti, Babeuf ’s Conspiracy for Equality; and Alain Maillard, ‘De 
Babeuf au Babouvisme’.
146 See Louis-Auguste Blanqui, ‘Defence Speech’, pages 33–35; and Richard Barbrook, 
Media Freedom, pages 28–37.
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crown. Conspiratorial politics was the French Left’s response to these 
reverses. For the Jacobins, imposing a revolutionary dictatorship in the 
short-term was the necessary precondition for creating a democratic 
republic in the long-term. The vanguard party was the prophecy of 
the libertarian future in the monarchical present. Only the few could 
emancipate the many.147
At the 1920 Congress of Tours, the French Socialist Party had split 
over whether it should emulate the new Russian manifestation of 
Jacobinism: the Bolsheviks. Having been temporarily eclipsed by 
the parliamentary strategy of Social Democracy and the syndicalist 
struggles of Anarchism in the decades before the First World War, the 
conspiratorial politics of the inheritors of the 1789 Revolution were 
once again in the ascendency.148 Over the next three decades, the rise of 
fascism, the Nazi occupation of France and the Cold War would confirm 
the historical necessity of this Jacobin revival. By the 1950s, being 
a revolutionary meant being a Bolshevik.149 Despite their contempt 
for Stalinism, Debord and his comrades had found it very difficult to 
extricate themselves completely from this seductive political identity. 
This fascination with vanguard politics wasn’t entirely irrational. As 
demonstrated by their contemporaries on the Left who in middle 
age would become revisionist historians, the outright repudiation of 
the Jacobin legacy could all too easily lead to political retrogression. 
Frightened by May ‘68, these repentant Stalinists would rehabilitate 
the conservative chroniclers of 1789 French Revolution to justify their 
accommodation with late-20th century neoliberalism. For the Right, 
the bloodletting of the Jacobin and Bolshevik regimes had always been 
their best argument against any attempts to abolish social inequality 
and implement direct democracy. By tracing the vanguard party back 
to its original version, these revisionist historians identified the 1789 
French Revolution with the 1917 Russian Revolution to condemn 
the Left as the avowed enemy of liberty. Reversing the Bolsheviks’ 
147 See Louis-Auguste Blanqui, ‘Organisation of the Society of Families’; and Samuel 
Bernstein, Auguste Blanqui and the Art of Insurrection, pages 56–84, 134–208.
148 See Jean Lacouture, Léon Blum, pages 146–168; and Serge Halimi, Sisyphe est 
Fatigué, pages 52–68.
149 See Serge Halimi, Sisyphe est Fatigué, pages 241–350; and R.W. Johnson, The Long 
March of the French Left, pages 23–51.
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argument, all socialists were tainted by their Jacobin heritage. What 
had once been a positive had now become a negative.150 
Ironically, these revisionist historians of the 1789 French Revolution 
were obsessed with a conspiratorial style of politics that was their own 
country’s most influential ideological export. In 19th century Russia, 
the Left had modelled itself on the Jacobins who’d succeeded in 
overthrowing an absolute monarchy and founding a democratic republic. 
Small groups of intellectuals had tried to replicate this insurrectionary 
strategy by experimenting with every tactical option: military coups, 
avant-garde art, terrorist outrages, bohemian communes, peasant 
revolts and proletarian strikes. As Mikhail Bakunin – the founding 
father of Anarchism – had emphasised, their task was to create the 
‘invisible dictatorship’ that would guide the spontaneous insurgency of 
the impoverished Russian masses to total victory over their aristocratic 
oppressors.151 When the Tsarist autocracy finally collapsed during 
the First World War, the Bolsheviks were ready to fulfil this role of 
the Jacobins of the revolutionary crisis. Under Lenin’s leadership, the 
illuminated few would open the way towards the hi-tech future for the 
ignorant masses. Not surprisingly, when the utopian promises of the 
October 1917 Revolution were disappointed, the Russian Left looked 
back to the history of the 1789 French Revolution to understand 
its predicament. In a re-enactment of the past, the radicalism of the 
Bolsheviks had been sabotaged by opportunists within their own ranks: 
a new iteration of the Thermidor faction who’d taken over the Jacobin 
republic in 1794. Once again, securing the abolition of aristocratic 
privilege had been achieved by sacrificing political democracy. Almost 
inevitably, this counter-revolution within the revolution culminated in 
the emergence of a new Bonaparte. The militarised version of socialism 
required an undisputed hierarchy of command under a maximum 
leader. After the death of Lenin in 1924, Trotsky and Stalin had vied 
150 In a revealing confession, the leading proponent of this Right rewriting of history 
admitted that: ‘... the inventory of the Jacobin legacy was overlaid with an implicit 
discourse for or against Bolshevism, a development that hardly made for intellectual 
flexibility.’ François Furet, Interpreting the French Revolution, page 7. For a critique of 
this liberal historiography, see George Comninel, Rethinking the French Revolution.
151 See Mikhail Bakunin, ‘Letter to Albert Richard’; and Sergei Nechaev, Catechism of 
the Revolutionist. Also see Franco Venturi, Roots of Revolution, pages 36–62, 232–
468.
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with each other over who would become the next emperor of Soviet 
Russia. The defeated generalissimo would denounce his rival as the 
embodiment of his own thwarted ambition: the new Bonaparte of the 
Thermidor reaction. The rise and fall of the 1917 Russian Revolution 
was a recapitulation of the 1789 French Revolution.152    
By making October, Eisenstein created the cinematic spectacle which 
drew upon this elision in time and space. In a series of evocative 
montages, he caricatured Alexander Kerensky – the leader of the 
Red faction whose government was overthrown by the Bolsheviks’ 
coup d’état – as a vainglorious popinjay by cross-cutting the actor 
playing him with a white porcelain statue of Bonaparte. Above all, 
this film transformed the Petrograd garrison occupying the almost 
undefended Winter Palace into the Russian equivalent of the popular 
uprising which – on 14th July each year – is still commemorated as 
the defining moment of the 1789 French Revolution: the seizure of 
the Bastille prison in Paris which shattered the absolute rule of the 
Bourbon kings. For the domestic audience, October confirmed the 
Soviet regime’s replacement of lived experience with its artistic re-
enactment. The Bolshevik spectacle of the 1917 Russian Revolution 
had become the documentary coverage of authentic history. When 
October was shown in French cinemas, this Jacobin fantasy was then 
exported back to its country of origin. The ideological imperative had 
come full circle. On the screen, the French Left witnessed its own 1789 
Revolution re-imagined as the 1917 Russian Revolution. The fall of 
the Bastille had been updated into the storming of the Winter Palace. 
The political message of Eisenstein’s film was emphatic. Jacobinism 
was the 18th century anticipation of Bolshevism – and Bolshevism was 
the 20th century incarnation of Jacobinism. By watching October, two 
generations of the French Left were able to discover their own destiny 
within the forward movement of world history. The vanguard party 
was leading the workers and peasants into the communist future. Their 
task as officers of the revolution was to make the inevitable come true. 
In the mid-1970s, New Left activists started sorrowfully recanting  their 
Bolshevik sins. Most wickedly, they’d succumbed to the totalitarian 
152 See Leon Trotsky, Revolution Betrayed, pages 86–114. Also see Tamara Kondratieva, 
Bolcheviks et Jacobins; and Mark Hoskisson, ‘The Red Jacobins’.
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temptations of the vanguard party. Like Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin, they 
too had dreamt of imposing their will upon the grand narrative of history. 
In their confessions, these penitents blamed their political errors on 
the Left’s profound misunderstanding of contemporary French society. 
Under Fordism, its old ideology which emphasised the class struggle 
between the impoverished masses and the greedy bourgeoisie was no 
longer relevant. With their basic material needs now being satisfied 
by consumer capitalism, people were instead devoting their energies 
to the multivalent politics of identity: age, gender, sexuality, culture, 
ethnicity and lifestyles.153 In their meditations, the Post-Modernist 
recuperators of the New Left tried to make sense of their generation’s 
experience of the traumatic transformation of France from a rural into 
an urban society. When they’d been born in the mid-20th century, the 
majority of the population were still living in the countryside. During 
their formative years, the double reflection between the 1789 French 
Revolution and the 1917 Russian Revolution had made sociological 
sense. The New Left’s fascination with the vanguard party was inspired 
by the treasured historical memory of how the peasantry had been the 
decisive force in the overthrow of the absolute monarchy. By rebelling 
against their masters at the key moment, they’d deprived the aristocracy 
of the troops that had crushed previous urban insurrections. There was 
no repeat of the 1572 St. Bartholomew’s Massacre in the rebellious 
Paris of 1789. Yet, despite this critical intervention, the French 
peasantry had never been able itself to take control of the revolutionary 
process. Divided into village communities, the rural population only 
aspired to liberty at a local level. Led by the inhabitants of Paris, the 
creation of the democratic republic had been a predominantly urban 
phenomenon.154
Paradoxically, in both the 1789 French Revolution and the 1917 
Russian Revolution, the social pre-eminence of the peasantry had 
concentrated political power in the capital city. The fate of the 
nation was decided by whichever Left faction could seize control of 
Paris or Petrograd. Whether as Jacobins or Bolsheviks, a small group 
153 See Jean-François Lyotard, The Post-Modern Condition; Jean Baudrillard, The Mirror 
of Production; and Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus.
154 See Daniel Guérin, Bourgeois et Bras Nus; and Albert Soboul, The Sans-Culottes.
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of activists, artists and agitators had been able to assert its right to 
rule in the interests of the disorganised and uneducated majority in 
the countryside. Under their enlightened guidance, the backward 
peasantry would be turned into civilised citizens. In this interpretation 
of the grand narrative of history, revolutionary dictatorship became 
the fast route to direct democracy.155 When the New Left militants 
were children, this Bolshevik programme of rapid modernisation 
still hadn’t lost its radical edge within a largely agrarian society. But, 
by the 1960s, it was de Gaulle’s conservative government that was 
enthusiastically carrying out the urbanisation and industrialisation of 
France.156 On reaching adulthood, the New Left was confronted by 
the political consequences of this social transformation: what had once 
been subversive was fast becoming reactionary. The early-19th century 
strategy of the vanguard party was an anachronism on the battlefields 
of late-20th century Fordism. 
As Debord understood, there was much to regret in the disappearance 
of the old France, including its revolutionary traditions. However, his 
questioning of the Jacobin inheritance took a very different form from 
that of Lyotard, Foucault, Baudrillard, Deleuze and Guattari. Crucially, 
by promoting the Post-Modernist remix of Stalin’s socio-linguistic 
theory, their recantation of Bolshevism had carefully preserved the 
leading role of the intellectuals in the struggle for human emancipation 
under the integrated spectacle. Like their Jacobin forebears, they still 
believed that only the chosen few could liberate themselves from the 
ideological domination of corporate capitalism. These activists, artists 
and agitators were the officer corps of the confused multitudes who 
provided the foot soldiers of the autonomous social movements. 
Once again, direct democracy had been recuperated as a dogmatic 
ideology. In 1977, by publishing The Game of War, Debord issued his 
ludic refutation of this New Left remix of vanguard politics. From 
then onwards, there was a Situationist alternative to the perpetual 
hegemony of the revolutionary conspiracy. The pernicious remnants of 
155 For the original version of this prophecy, see Louis-Auguste Blanqui, ‘To the 
Mountain of 1793! To the Pure Socialists, its True Heirs!’; and Samuel Bernstein, 
Auguste Blanqui and the Art of Insurrection, pages 67–83.
156 See André Gauron, Histoire Économique et Sociale de la Cinquième République; and 
Henri Mendras, Social Change in Modern France. 
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the concentrated spectacle within the integrated spectacle could now 
be outflanked and routed. When every proletarian knew how to play 
at being Bonaparte and Trotsky, the historical epoch of Jacobinism and 
Bolshevism would finally be over.
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2.6: The Crossing of the Alps     
By the time that Class Wargames was invited to participate in the 
2010 Chto Delat? season at the ICA, we were fully engaged in the 
second phase of our campaign of ludic subversion. Our participatory 
performances of The Game of War were Situationist political pedagogy 
carried out through avant-garde art. By re-enacting the past, the players 
of North and South were learning about the spectacular stratagems 
of the vanguard party. We’d embarked on this stage of our campaign 
at the Hermitage by emphasising the close historical connections 
between its contemporary Autonomist manifestation with the earlier 
Bolshevik version. As we played contest after contest, our expositions 
on The Game of War went further back in time to the original version of 
the 1917 Russian Revolution. The Napoleonic theme of this military 
simulation was no whim. Debord’s choice of infantry, cavalry and 
artillery units for its pieces had a serious political purpose. Before 
the Autonomists were the Bolsheviks – and, before them, there were 
the Jacobins. Tracing the spectacular recuperation of the Left back 
two centuries was the Situationist retort to the perpetual present of 
neoliberal globalisation. Playing with the past was understanding the 
historical origins of our contemporary predicament with ludic means. 
Above all, by re-enacting the turbulent events which shaped the 
modern world, rebellious proletarians could gain confidence in their 
collective ability to guide the course of time towards a better future.  
At the ICA in 2010, for the next push in the second phase of our 
campaign of ludic subversion, Class Wargames played the Marengo 
scenario as a punk provocation against the newly fashionable revival 
of Bolshevik ideology. Like our Russian comrades from Chto Delat?, 
the European Left was still mesmerised by Lenin’s vision of vanguard 
leadership. Revolutionary elitism was its only alternative to the shabby 
compromises of electoral politics. By adopting this opening deployment 
for The Game of War shown in Diagram 3 on page 226, we wanted 
to return to the historical moment when the reactionary implications 
of this Jacobin strategy were fully exposed for the first time. During 
the most radical phase of the 1789 French Revolution, Bonaparte had 
risen to prominence as a political soldier devoted to defending the new 
republic against both its internal and external enemies. In 1793, he’d 
172 173
not only devised the strategy that crushed the anti-Jacobin uprising 
in Toulon which had given control of this important Mediterranean 
seaport to the British navy, but also published a widely-read pamphlet 
that had passionately argued the cause of democratic patriotism. At 
this early point in his career, Bonaparte had unequivocally identified 
himself with the austere leader of the Jacobin dictatorship: Maximilien 
Robespierre. Like its Ancient Greek and Roman predecessors, the 
French republic was the political expression of an egalitarian community 
of citizen-soldiers.157 Not surprisingly, when the Thermidor faction 
overthrew the Jacobin government in 1794, Bonaparte suffered for his 
Left opinions. After a brief imprisonment, this unreliable officer was 
then demoted to a minor position within the army. However, Bonaparte 
quickly adapted himself to the new dispensation. By 1795, he was in 
charge of the Paris garrison when it ruthlessly put down a monarchist 
revolt against the Thermidor regime. As his reward, Bonaparte was 
next given command of the French forces in Italy. During 1796–7, 
he became a national hero by inflicting defeat after defeat on the 
numerically superior and better equipped Austrian army. As de facto 
ruler of Northern Italy, Bonaparte demonstrated his growing political 
skills by adopting a liberal policy of conciliating the aristocracy and 
clergy which successfully neutralised local opposition to French rule.158 
Leading an expedition to Egypt in 1798, his victories in this exotic 
location further enhanced his celebrity status back home.159 For the 
French public, this combination of political commitment and military 
genius became very seductive. Compared to the venal and squabbling 
leaders of the Thermidor faction, Bonaparte was the incarnation of 
republican virtue: ‘Robespierre on horseback’.160   
In 1799, France faced the imminent threat of foreign invasion. Due 
157 See Emmanuel de Las Cases, Mémorial de Sainte-Hélène, pages 55–57, 101–102, 
194. Also see Steven Englund, Napoleon, pages 36–80; and David Chandler, The 
Campaigns of Napoleon,  pages 3–29.
158 See Emmanuel de Las Cases, Mémorial de Sainte-Hélène, pages 69, 295–297, 531.
159 See Steven Englund, Napoleon, pages 83–160; and David Chandler, The Campaigns 
of Napoleon, pages 29–130, 205–249.
160 Ironically, in his St Helena exile, Bonaparte vehemently repudiated Germaine de 
Staël’s characterisation of this public image which had helped to elevate him to 
absolute power. See Emmanuel de Las Cases, Mémorial de Sainte-Hélène, pages 
183–185, 575–576.
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to the incompetence of the Thermidor government, the armies of the 
Second Coalition were rolling back the territorial gains that had created 
a protective cordon of ‘sister-republics’ around the mother country.161 
Returning from Egypt, Bonaparte offered himself as the saviour of 
the nation at this moment of deep crisis. Recruiting supporters from 
the rival Thermidor and Jacobin factions, this military hero promised 
to provide firm leadership both at home and on the battlefield.162 By 
securing the loyalty of the Paris garrison, Bonaparte was soon able to 
seize control of the French republic in a coup d’état. Anointing himself 
as First Consul, he systematically concentrated all executive authority 
into his own hands.163 But, like the Bolsheviks after their coup over a 
century later, Bonaparte’s new regime had initially lacked democratic 
legitimacy. Thanks to his victories in Italy and Egypt, there was genuine 
admiration for the First Consul’s great abilities. Having served loyally 
under both Jacobin and Thermidor governments, he could appeal to 
a large constituency amongst the French population who were tired 
of the bitter sectarian squabbles within the republican movement. 
Although its results were massaged, Bonaparte did obtain a large 
majority in the 1800 referendum that ratified the new constitution 
which gave dictatorial powers to the First Consul.164 However, he was 
well aware that his hold on state power was still insecure. There were 
other enterprising generals and a Bourbon pretender to the throne 
waiting to take his place if he ever lost the confidence of the French 
people. Bonaparte knew that the most effective method of dealing 
with these rivals was to win a decisive victory against the armies of the 
Second Coalition. When he’d assembled his forces for the Marengo 
campaign in 1800, the First Consul was preparing to fight against a 
 
161 See Carl von Clausewitz, Campagne de 1799 en Suisse et en Italie, pages 13–359; and 
Owen Connelly, The Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon, pages 107–110.
162 After Thermidor, Bonaparte had quickly become ‘... a classic “political general” ... 
who unapologetically put his own interests ahead of ideology and campaigned for 
political influence in Paris as vigorously as he did for enemy territory.’ David Bell, 
The First Total War, page 189. Also see Philip Dwyer, ‘Napoleon Bonaparte as Hero 
and Saviour’, pages 398–402.
163 See Stendhal, A Life of Napoleon, pages 44–57; and Georges Lefebvre, Napoleon, 
pages 60–94.
164 See Isser Woloch, Napoleon and his Collaborators, pages 3–89; and Georges Lefebvre, 
Napoleon, pages 71–77.
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foreign enemy so he could thwart his opponents at home. The destiny 
of France would be decided on the fields of Italy.165 
Two decades later, when the coffin of the exiled emperor was being 
lowered into his grave at St. Helena, the body of Bonaparte was 
wrapped in the grey cloak that he’d worn at the Battle of Marengo.166 
For devotees of the Napoleonic myth, this town in Piedmont has always 
been the sacred site of the key turning-point in their idol’s life story. 
Before 14th June 1800, Bonaparte was an ambitious general who’d 
temporarily struck lucky when – by being in the right place at the right 
time – he’d become the military dictator of the French republic. It was 
winning a decisive victory at Marengo that had changed everything 
for this renegade Jacobin soldier. After that fateful day, Bonaparte’s 
absolute control over the French state was unassailable. Within a year, 
he’d extended the term in office of the First Consul from 10 years to his 
own lifetime. By 1804, Bonaparte had succeeded in crowning himself 
as the emperor of the French. With his ascendency to the imperial 
throne confirmed in a popular referendum and blessed by the Pope, 
this bourgeois despot was convinced that he’d successfully fused the 
new democratic and old aristocratic forms of political legitimacy 
within his own person.167 Having neutralised his opponents at home, 
Bonaparte then devoted the next decade to trying to achieve mastery 
over Europe. By uniting the continent under a single currency, one 
legal code and the metric system, his liberal autocracy would bestow 
the fruits of peace and prosperity on all of its different peoples.168 
When reviewing the troops of the imperial army on these campaigns 
of European conquest, Bonaparte was almost always mounted on 
 
165 The First Consul’s personal secretary recollected that: ‘It was Bonaparte’s policy [in 
1800] .. to buy security at home by battle and victory abroad. ... something must be 
done in Europe, worthy of [his 1796–7 Italian military successes before] ... he could 
hope to be seated firmly on his throne.’ Louis de Bourrienne, Memoirs of Napoleon, 
page 153. Emphasis in the original.
166 See James Arnold, Marengo & Hohenlinden, page 268.
167 See Emmanuel de Las Cases, Mémorial de Sainte-Hélène, pages 470–471.
168 See Emmanuel de Las Cases, Mémorial de Sainte-Hélène, pages 433–434, 559–560. 
Also see Steven Englund, Napoleon, pages 209–355; and Geoffrey Ellis, ‘The Nature 
of Napoleonic Imperialism’.
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his favourite white stallion which he’d proudly named Marengo.169 
According to the Napoleonic legend, he had founded his dynasty on 
this Italian battlefield. Fulfilling the destiny revealed by this martial 
triumph, the task of the house of Bonaparte was to impose its political 
authority over the whole of Europe. Discarding its earlier incarnation 
as the Jacobin republic, the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie had now 
become the venal rule of one family.170 
The acolytes of the Napoleonic cult were correct to celebrate the 
Marengo campaign. In 1800, Bonaparte had won a decisive victory 
through his almost uncanny ability to combine daring, intelligence and 
good fortune that would make him into the dominant personality of 
his generation. At the beginning of that year, the First Consul had 
been confronted by a very difficult political and military conundrum. 
During 1799, despite losing control of most of Italy, the French republic 
had managed to repulse the invasion of its Dutch and Swiss allies by 
the armies of the Second Coalition. After these embarrassing reverses, 
the Russian Tsar had decided to withdraw his troops from Western 
Europe.171 However, as Bonaparte knew only too well, the outcome 
of this bloody conflict was still not yet decided. With the Royal Navy 
controlling the seas and the 1798 Irish Revolution having failed, the 
British isles were invulnerable to attack. If the French wanted to defeat 
the Second Coalition, the First Consul’s only option was to knock the 
Austrians out of the war. As we replicated in our Marengo scenario for 
The Game of War, their forces had begun the 1800 campaigning season 
with a double-pronged offensive in Southern Germany and Northern 
Italy. While the French troops defending these two fronts slowly fell 
back, Bonaparte took command of the powerful reserve army which 
his administration had been secretly training and equipping over the 
winter. His first and most important decision was where to launch 
the counter-attack against the Austrian empire. In 1805 and 1809, 
Bonaparte was able to choose the most direct and easiest route towards 
the enemy’s heartland: Southern Germany. But, in 1800, adopting 
169 For the biography of this famous horse and its owner, see Jill Hamilton, Marengo. 
170 See Stendhal, A Life of Napoleon, pages 135–147; and Steven Englund, Napoleon, 
pages 298–384.
171 See Carl von Clausewitz, Campagne de 1799 en Suisse et en Italie, pages 363–618.
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the best military strategy was politically difficult. The French army 
defending the Rhine border was led by a popular general who was 
Bonaparte’s most serious rival for the job of First Consul: Jean Victor 
Moreau. Committing the reserve to this front might weaken rather 
than strengthen his regime. Being a skilled politician, Bonaparte 
without hesitation picked the riskier military strategy: an invasion 
of Northern Italy. If the French army could win a stunning victory 
over the Austrians on the plains of Piedmont, the glory would be his 
alone.172 
During a meeting in Paris to plan the offensive, Bonaparte had predicted 
that the decisive battle of the war would take place at the key crossroads 
of Marengo.173 Under Michael von Melas, the Austrian forces were 
already making rapid progress in spring 1800 as they’d advanced across 
Northern Italy. By April, only the stubborn resistance of Masséna’s 
garrison in Genoa was preventing the enemy from crossing into 
France itself. Faced with this crisis, a cautious commander might have 
committed his reserves to relieving this last line of defence before the 
republic’s southern bastion in Marseille. But, instead of coming to his 
colleague’s rescue, Bonaparte devised a much more audacious strategy. 
Seizing the initiative, the French army would move into Switzerland, 
cross the Alps and, once in Northern Italy, cut the Austrians’ lines of 
communications to their supply bases in Trieste and Vienna.174 In the 
classrooms of 19th century military academies, the Marengo campaign 
was taught as the essence of Bonaparte’s genius as a general: ‘the 
manoeuvre onto the enemy’s rear’. Yet, few of these pupils would ever 
have the courage to put this theory into practice when they became 
commanders in the field. Unlike their role model, these soldiers hadn’t 
learnt their trade by fighting revolutionary warfare.175 
In 1800, Bonaparte had repeatedly risked everything to achieve a 
172 See Georges Lefebvre, Napoleon, pages 96–99; and Reginald Burton, Napoleon’s 
Campaigns in Italy, pages 104–106.
173 See Louis de Bourrienne, Memoirs of Napoleon, page 154.
174 The success of this daring strategy exemplified how ‘... rashness in war becomes a 
veritable proof of genius.’ Louis de Bourrienne, Memoirs of Napoleon, page 163.
175 See Antoine-Henri de Jomini, The Art of War, pages 62–125; and David Chandler, 
The Campaigns of Napoleon, pages 161–170.
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decisive victory. Advancing into Switzerland meant exposing his lines 
of communications to an attack by the Austrian forces in Southern 
Germany. The crossing of the Alps was almost prevented by a hostile 
fort that had blocked the path over the St. Bernard pass. Masséna had 
to hold out long enough in Genoa to keep the Austrians distracted 
while the French army was able to complete its deployment in the Po 
valley. On 14th June, Bonaparte’s repeated gambling for high stakes 
nearly did end in disaster. Having at last taken Genoa, von Melas had 
quickly turned his forces around to confront the threat to his lines 
of communications. Underestimating his opponent, Bonaparte had 
scattered his troops across the Piedmont countryside to close off the 
Austrians’ remaining supply routes. When von Melas launched an 
assault on that morning against the French forces around Marengo, the 
First Consul had initially found himself at a serious tactical disadvantage. 
Taken by surprise, the French army was almost overwhelmed by its 
more numerous opponent. Despite fighting tenaciously, its soldiers 
couldn’t prevent the Austrians breaking through their line. Then, at the 
very moment when the conflict seemed lost, Louis Desaix arrived with 
his division to reinforce Bonaparte’s faltering regiments. Fortunately, 
the superior strategic position of the French army in Northern Italy 
had compensated for its tactical weakness in the environs of Marengo. 
Without waiting for orders, this general had rushed his troops towards 
the battlefield on hearing the sound of fighting in the distance. 
Organising a counter-attack with fresh troops, Desaix – at the cost 
of his own life – soon pushed back the Austrian army whose troops 
were too exhausted after hours of hard fighting to resist.176 As the 
battle of Marengo came to its conclusion, François Kellerman led the 
cavalry charge which finally routed the enemy. In a letter to a friend, 
this brave warrior recollected with pride what Bonaparte’s soldiers had 
accomplished on that summer day in 1800: ‘[the French army had] 
placed the crown on his head.’177 
Six months later, the war of the Second Coalition was concluded when 
Moreau defeated the Austrian forces in Southern Germany at the battle 
176 See James Arnold, Marengo & Hohenlinden, pages 100–186; and David Chandler, 
The Campaigns of Napoleon, pages 286–298.
177 François Kellerman in James Arnold, Marengo & Hohenlinden, page 284.
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of Hohenlinden. By 1801, France was at peace for the first time in 
almost a decade with all of the great powers of Europe, including Britain. 
As one of its many displays of gratitude to Bonaparte’s impressive 
achievement, the republic’s parliament commissioned an official history 
of the Marengo campaign.178 But, by the time that this book was ready 
for publication, an accurate account of what had happened in 1800 on 
the plains of Piedmont was no longer required. Having transformed 
the French republic into the empire of the French, Bonaparte was 
now determined to project an image of unimpeachable infallibility. 
As Debord pointed out, his project of ‘monarchically directing the 
energies of memories’ would anticipate the ubiquitous manipulation 
of the past under late-20th century spectacular capitalism.179 Bonaparte 
was the original version of not only Stalin, but also de Gaulle. While 
commanding the army in Italy in 1796–7 and the expeditionary 
force to Egypt in 1798, this political soldier had learnt how to be a 
superb propagandist in his own cause.180 He’d published newspapers 
both to motivate his own troops while they were on campaign and 
to publicise their accomplishments to the public back home. He’d 
seduced the leading intellectuals of republican France by joining their 
salons, appropriating artworks in Italy for the new Louvre museum 
and inviting a team of researchers to accompany his expedition to 
Egypt. During these early days of his career, Bonaparte had revelled in 
the cut-and-thrust of intellectual debate. As a former Jacobin serving 
the Thermidor regime, he was able successfully to promote himself as a 
warrior intellectual who could work with all factions of the republican 
movement.181 
Not surprisingly, once he’d seized absolute power, Bonaparte quickly 
acquired a distaste for anyone who questioned the moral and political 
deficiencies of the established order: the ‘ideologists’. Under his 
prototype of the concentrated spectacle, censorship was steadily 
tightened over all forms of art and media. Whether in print, on the 
178 See James Arnold, Marengo & Hohenlinden, pages 197–264.
179 Guy Debord, The Society of the Spectacle, page 76.
180 See Philip Dwyer, ‘Napoleon Bonaparte as Hero and Saviour’, pages 384–389.
181 See David Bell, The First Total War, pages 198–201; and Timothy Wilson-Smith, 
Napoleon and his Artists, pages 64–84.
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stage or in the gallery, the glorification of the emperor became the 
highest duty of the creators of culture.182 Inadvertently, the writers of 
the official history of the 1800 Marengo campaign now found that 
they’d become dangerous opponents of the French state. Any truthful 
chronicler of the battle would recount that Bonaparte had made a near 
disastrous mistake when he’d divided his army into a widely dispersed 
line to cut off von Melas’ supply lines. It is this tactical blunder which 
has made the battle of Marengo into a favourite subject for board game 
designers over the past few decades. In these simulations, the Austrians 
always have an excellent chance of prevailing over the First Consul.183 
However, Bonaparte had no desire to admit that another outcome to 
this confrontation on the Piedmont plains might have been possible. 
Determined to prevent any criticism of his military genius, the emperor 
not only banned the publication of the French parliament’s study into 
the Marengo campaign, but also ordered the destruction of its proof 
copies. In the new official history, Bonaparte had led the Austrians 
into a clever trap by splitting his forces. Even when he was in error, the 
emperor was always correct.184   
In 1801, Jacques-Louis David exhibited a painting that would become 
the icon of this rewriting of the Marengo campaign to serve the 
Napoleonic cult: The First Consul Crossing the Alps by the St. Bernard 
Pass on 30th Floréal Year VIII. Astride a rearing white horse, Bonaparte 
in a glamorous blue-and-gold uniform with a cloak flowing out behind 
him raised his arm to point the way forward into Italy to the French 
troops pushing an artillery piece up the mountain in the background. 
Inscribed in the rocks beneath him alongside his own name were those 
of two illustrious warriors from the past: Hannibal and Charlemagne. 
Reproduced as a print, David’s painting quickly became the most 
famous visual image of Bonaparte across the whole of Europe. Two 
182 Bonaparte in 1799 confessed that: ‘If I gave the press free rein, I would not stay in 
power for three months.’ Michael Sibalis, ‘The Napoleonic Police State’, page 82. 
Also see Emmanuel de Las Cases, Mémorial de Sainte-Hélène, pages 124; and Isser 
Woloch, Napoleon and his Collaborators, pages 205–213.
183 See David Naquin, Battles of the First Empire: Marengo; Dean Essig and David 
Powell, Marengo; Bowen Simmons, Bonaparte at Marengo; and Eric Harvey, 
Marengo.
184 See James Arnold, Marengo & Hohenlinden, pages 264–265.
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centuries later, The First Consul Crossing the Alps is still the authorised 
version of the Napoleonic myth in the mass media. Made just before 
photography was invented, this exhilarating painting has become our 
faithful record of the appearance of the greatest celebrity of those 
revolutionary times. Yet, like Eisenstein’s October, David’s The First 
Consul Crossing the Alps was an artistic fantasy that has succeeded in 
supplanting historical reality. Far from riding a white horse, Bonaparte 
had been seated on a mule when he’d led his troops across the St. 
Bernard Pass.185 Tellingly, this painting wasn’t a documentary record 
of what a war artist had observed at the time. Instead, working in 
his Paris studio, David had created the rearing horse from drawings 
of the equestrian statues of Marcus Aurelius in Rome and Peter the 
Great in St. Petersburg. When this artist had asked Bonaparte to sit 
for the painting, the First Consul had dismissed his request with a 
revealing reply: ‘Alexander [the Great] never posed for [the Ancient 
Greeks’ leading artist] Apelles.’ Although he’d provided his general’s 
uniform to give authenticity to the project, he expected David to 
portray his flawed features in an idealised form. The painter’s skill was 
to give a simulacrum of realism to the transformation of this political 
soldier into the saviour of the nation.186 In The First Consul Crossing the 
Alps, Bonaparte became the spectacular embodiment of the bourgeois 
recuperation of the 1789 French Revolution. After a decade of turmoil 
and war, a charismatic hero had come to restore order at home and 
impose peace upon Europe. The absolute power of one man was now 
necessary to ensure that everyone else could enjoy liberal freedoms.187 
Five years after David’s painting was first exhibited, Georg Hegel 
witnessed the emperor’s triumphal entry into Jena after he’d destroyed 
the Prussian army outside this town. Convinced that this portrait had 
come to life before his eyes, the great philosopher proclaimed with 
enthusiasm that Bonaparte was now the guiding force of historical 
progress: ‘I saw the emperor, this World Soul ... on horseback ... [who] 
185 This prosaic scene is portrayed in Hyppolite Delaroche’s 1850 painting: Bonaparte 
Crossing the Alps. Also see James Arnold, Marengo & Hohenlinden, pages 90–91.
186 See Warren Roberts, Jacques-Louis David, Revolutionary Artist, pages 143–146; and 
Timothy Wilson-Smith, Napoleon and his Artists, pages 87–90.
187 See Thomas Carlyle, Heroes and Hero Worship, pages 258–262, 303–311; and 
Domenico Losurdo, Liberalism, pages 323–325.
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reaches out over the entire world and masters it.’188 The spectacle had 
been made flesh.
188 Georg Hegel in Terry Pinkard, Hegel, page 228. Embracing this role, Bonaparte 
believed that the Alexander, Julius Caesar and other warrior heroes of the past had 
shaped human destiny through the strength of their own minds, see Emmanuel de 
Las Cases, Mémorial de Sainte-Hélène, pages 572–573.
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2.7: The General’s Will  
In its October 1955 issue, Potlatch reported back on a lively meeting of 
the Lettrist International which had discussed ideas for improving the 
urban environment in Paris. Everyone was in agreement that the metro 
should be kept running all night to facilitate their nonconformist 
lifestyles. Debord and Gil Wolman had argued over whether the group 
should demand the demolition or secularisation of the city’s churches. 
Echoing the 1909 Futurist manifesto, the Lettrists proclaimed their 
avant-garde contempt for the cultural establishment by advocating the 
‘abolition of museums and the distribution of their artistic masterpieces 
to the bars’ of Paris.189 Enthused by cheap wine and good company, they 
picked out one iconic painting which should be immediately moved 
from its prominent position in the Louvre gallery to their bohemian 
haunt at the Tonneau de la Montagne-Geneviéve: David’s 1807 The 
Coronation of Napoléon and Joséphine.190 Five years before this meeting 
took place, the Lettrists had outraged the French Right by preaching 
atheism from the pulpit of Notre Dame cathedral. Now they dreamt of 
detourning the visual commemoration of the crowning of Bonaparte’s 
bourgeois dictatorship inside this holy Catholic shrine. When placed 
on the wall of their favourite Left Bank café, David’s massive 621 x 
979cm canvas would be transformed into a dreadful warning to the 
political and artistic dissidents who looked up from their tables at it. 
Surrounding the parvenu emperor in this famous painting were the 
members of the new elite who’d done well out of the 1789 French 
Revolution. Their splendid outfits at Bonaparte’s coronation in 1804 
were hiding the shameful abandonment of their republican beliefs. 
Seduced by wealth and power, these once fervent revolutionaries had 
become sleazy guardians of law and order. If the young radicals of the 
1950s wanted to avoid the horrors of recuperation, they must learn 
the lessons of the historical defeat on vivid display in David’s The 
Coronation of Napoléon and Joséphine. Unlike the Bonapartists or their 
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latter-day Stalinist imitators, the Lettrists wouldn’t trade their political 
integrity for the trinkets of worldly success.  
In his painting of the investiture at Notre Dame, David had included 
himself among the 140 portraits of the key personalities of the new 
French empire. Throughout Bonaparte’s reign, he would remain the 
pre-eminent  artist of the imperial court. By the 1800s, David had 
become a superstar whose work was admired even by those who 
loathed his politics. He was the first artist in France who could 
make money by holding exhibitions of his latest paintings. David’s 
studios at the Louvre were filled with the best-and-brightest students 
from across Europe.191 Revealingly, it was a coterie of his pupils that 
would found the primordial avant-garde art movement in human 
history: the Barbus. Creating the template for generations to come, 
these students of David dedicated themselves to fermenting cultural 
rebellion against bourgeois conformity. In an abandoned monastery 
on the outskirts of Paris, the Barbus pioneered the leitmotifs of the 
bohemian artist: outrageous fashions, debauched parties, sexual 
promiscuity, chemical experimentation and communal living. Like the 
Surrealists, Constructivists and Situationists in the 20th century, one 
of their greatest creations was their own personalities.192 Responding 
to this overt disdain for conventional morality, Bonaparte’s police 
made clumsy attempts to clamp down on these aesthetic dissidents. 
In 1806, the male students of David unfortunate enough to be busted 
at an avant-garde gathering in the Bois de Boulogne had their long 
hair forcibly shaved off and their female companions were threatened 
with being prosecuted as prostitutes. For the enforcers of Bonaparte’s 
regime, there was no doubt that these dissolute pupils of its most 
celebrated propagandist were guilty of undermining the social stability 
of the French empire.193 
Not surprisingly, the Barbus took their teacher as the role model of 
artistic subversion. When David began his career before the 1789 
191 See Warren Roberts, Jacques-Louis David, Revolutionary Artist, pages 118–119, 123–
125, 146–147; and Thomas Crow, ‘Patriotism and Virtue’, pages 38–48. 
192 See George Levitine, The Dawn of Bohemianism, pages 1–5, 55–72, 130–134; and 
Malcolm Easton, Artists and Writers in Paris, pages 8–18.   
193 See Malcolm Easton, Artists and Writers in Paris, pages 18–19.
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French Revolution, the Classical motifs of the rococo style had been 
used to celebrate the decadent pleasures of aristocratic rule. Fortunately, 
given the chance to study in Rome, their hero had been able to break 
with this corrupt cultural orthodoxy. In his 1784 The Oath of the 
Horatii and 1789 The Lictors Bringing the Bodies of his Sons to Brutus 
paintings, David had won fame by presenting an austere vision of 
male citizen-soldiers stoically doing their duty while the women of 
the household mourned the tragic consequences of their actions. By 
returning to the original version of rococo in Ancient Rome, he’d been 
able to invent a politicised form of art: Neo-Classicism.194 Crucially, for 
his contemporaries, these paintings of David were seen as prophecies of 
the 1789 French Revolution. Admiring The Oath of the Horatii at the 
1791 Salon exhibition in Paris, a peasant infantryman had exclaimed 
with awe: “It made one think!” The republican virtues of the Classical 
past lived again in contemporary France.195 
The popularity of his new style of painting led to David being 
commissioned to make a tableau of the rebirth of the nation: the 
representatives of the French people publicly dedicating themselves in 
1789 to institute a liberal constitution at the Jeu de Paume in Versailles. 
Life had imitated his art – and his task was to commemorate this re-
enactment of The Oath of the Horatii as an artwork. Unfortunately, 
David’s determination to make an accurate depiction of this world-
historic event couldn’t keep pace with the tumult of the revolutionary 
process. By the time that he’d completed the initial drawings for his 
canvas in 1791, too many of the politicians who were to be depicted 
in The Tennis Court Oath had betrayed their ideals and were no longer 
worthy of official recognition.196 Forced to abandon this project, 
David instead dedicated his brushwork over the next few years to 
honouring the martyrs of the new French republic. In 1793, he cleverly 
detourned the familiar images of the crucified Christ for a stunning 
194 See Warren Roberts, Jacques-Louis David, Revolutionary Artist, pages 11–38; and 
David Dowd, Pageant-Master of the Republic, pages 2–23.
195 ‘In these heroic Romans, he saw himself ... taking the oath to be faithful to the 
nation. He felt, like them, a fanatical zeal to defend the Fatherland.’ David Dowd, 
Pageant-Master of the Republic, page 1.
196 See Warren Roberts, Jacques-Louis David, Revolutionary Artist, pages 51–59; and 
David Dowd, Pageant-Master of the Republic, pages 36–41.
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portrayal of the brutal murder of one of his closest friends: The Death 
of Marat.197 Distributed as a cheap print, David’s painting quickly 
became the secular icon of revolutionaries across Europe. Instinctively, 
they understood that this masterpiece of Neo-Classical art heralded 
the inevitable victory of the democratic republic over its aristocratic 
enemies.198 
  
In the immediate aftermath of the fall of the Bastille in 1789, David had 
thrown himself into the political struggle by organising an impassioned 
campaign against the monarchical monopoly over high culture. Under 
the old order, only the select few who’d been accepted as members of 
the Royal Academy of the Arts were allowed to exhibit and sell their 
works to the public. Excoriating this bastion of privilege, David and his 
allies argued that the liberal principles of free trade should be applied 
to the making of paintings and sculptures as elsewhere in the economy. 
To turn this demand into reality, these cultural revolutionaries 
championed the democratisation of the education system. Forming 
themselves into the Commune des Arts, they welcomed both fine artists 
and plebeian artisans into their ranks. Having finally persuaded the 
French government to abolish the Royal Academy in 1792, this group 
based in David’s  studio at the Louvre became the laboratory for a new 
republican approach to the teaching of painting and sculpture which 
laid down the template for progressive art education for generations 
to come.199 Inspired by Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Émile, the Commune 
des Arts envisioned a mutual and egalitarian collaboration of masters 
and pupils that would overcome the old snobbish divisions between 
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aesthetic appreciation and craft skills. Every French citizen must have 
the opportunity to become an artist if they so desired.200 
Through this cultural agitation, David metamorphosed himself into a 
prominent politician. His contribution to the cause went far beyond 
creating memorial paintings of republican martyrs and designing the 
costumes of public officials. In 1791, David was elected as a Jacobin 
deputy of the French parliament for a Paris constituency. A year later, 
he was invited to become a member of the revolutionary government: 
the Committee of Public Safety. Outraged by their collaboration with 
the Austrian enemy, David enthusiastically voted for the execution of 
the traitorous king and queen. In defence of the French republic, he’d 
gladly signed the death warrants of its aristocratic and liberal opponents. 
As the most celebrated victims of the Terror were transported to the 
guillotine, David was there to make evocative drawings of their final 
public appearance. Shorn of her finery, Marie Antoinette Bourbon 
was caught with a few pencil lines on 16th October 1793 just before 
she met the violent end that she’d once wished upon the insurgent 
population of Paris. During these tumultuous years, David lived the 
fusion of radical art and revolutionary politics in its most intense form. 
For the Constructivists, Surrealists and Situationists over a century 
later, having the chance to share this wondrous experience would be 
their greatest ambition.201 
As a member of the Committee of Public Safety, David was given 
responsibility for resolving the severe cultural crisis facing the new 
French republic. Three years earlier, in its conflict with the Royal 
Academy, the Commune des Arts had advocated the liberalisation 
of the creative economy. Free trade was the precondition of artistic 
autonomy. But, by the time that David took up his post, this faith 
in the magic of the markets had waned. Across France, the demise of 
aristocratic and clerical patronage had deprived artists and artisans of 
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their primary source of income. Traumatised by civil war and foreign 
invasions, the new bourgeois elite wasn’t yet ready to take over this 
crucial role. As an emergency measure, the French government decided 
to provide assistance for its destitute supporters amongst the artistic 
community. Under David’s direction, they were employed to make 
costumes, floats, banners and props in the Neo-Classical style for a series 
of revolutionary festivals. Over a century before the Bolsheviks’ avant-
garde re-enactments of the seizure of the Winter Palace took place, 
the Jacobin government was lavishly sponsoring public celebrations 
of important events in the brief history of the French republic: the 
storming of the Bastille, the abolition of the monarchy and its military 
victories over internal or external enemies. The artists and artisans who 
had once gratified the aristocracy with luxury goods were now devoting 
their imaginative skills to staging multi-media celebrations where the 
people could glorify the revolution.202 
In his 1758 Letter to Monsieur D’Alembert on the Theatre, Rousseau had 
contrasted the passive contemplation of an audience of a play with the 
active involvement of the crowd at a carnival. Anticipating Debord’s 
critique of the spectacle two centuries later, the sage of Geneva 
castigated the increasing division of labour in 18th century Europe 
between the producers and consumers of art. For this forefather of the 
Situationists, a flourishing republican democracy required the cultural 
underpinning of participatory creativity.203 Enthused by Rousseau’s 
text, David and his colleagues from the Commune des Arts dedicated 
themselves to turning theory into practice. Their revolutionary festivals 
were much more than a job creation scheme for unemployed artists 
and artisans. For the first time, the masses were also invited to join 
the party. On 20th September 1793, one third of the entire population 
of Paris was involved in making a collective artwork to celebrate the 
anniversary of the founding of the French republic. Specialist skills 
202 See David Dowd, Pageant-Master of the Republic, pages 45–97; and Mona Ozouf, 
Festivals and the French Revolution, pages 33–125.
203 ‘... let the spectators become an entertainment to themselves; make them actors 
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had been required to manufacture the stunning Neo-Classical floats, 
statues and costumes for this carnival. But, what made this day so 
memorable was the active involvement of large numbers of ordinary 
people on the day of the festival itself. Under the old order, the public 
had been confined to admiring from a distance extravagant displays of 
monarchical and clerical power. Now, with the triumph of the republic, 
it was the inhabitants of Paris themselves who were taking centre stage 
in this popular carnival. With David as their mentor, they’d dressed 
up, marched in the parade, carried banners, played music, appeared on 
floats and carried out ceremonial rituals. If only for a brief moment, the 
spectacle was superseded on the streets of Paris. Fulfilling Rousseau’s 
prophecy, the 1789 French Revolution had turned every citizen into an 
artist.204 Most wonderfully, the Situationist memory of this collective 
achievement is still an affront to the ideological apologists of the 
integrated spectacle.  
On 10th November 1793, one and a half centuries before the Lettrists’ 
infamous provocation, an exuberant crowd of radical artisans led 
by Jacques-René Hébert invaded Notre Dame cathedral and – as a 
deliberate act of sacrilege – took over this sacred space for a wild party: 
the Festival of Reason. As they drank, sang and danced to celebrate the 
official abolition of slavery in the French colonies, these fervent atheists 
tore down the high altar and replaced it with a shrine dedicated to 
the secular ideal of Liberty. Emphasising their rejection of Christian 
mysticism, they concluded this blasphemous ceremony by crowning 
one of their more beautiful activists as the Goddess of Reason.205 
The supporters of Hébert who organised this unauthorised carnival 
inside Notre Dame were drawn from the Left faction of the Jacobin 
movement. In the early phases of the 1789 French Revolution, liberal 
grandees had tried to create a new political settlement founded upon 
an English-style constitutional monarchy. Discredited by the king’s 
treachery, they’d lost power in 1792 to the more radical representatives 
of the bourgeoisie who understood that there could be no compromise 
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with the aristocracy. Instead, this new Jacobin government forged an 
alliance with the plebeian activists of the towns and countryside. Like 
the Bolsheviks during the Russian Civil War, their regime could only 
prevail against its internal and external enemies by mobilising the 
masses to fight on its behalf. Under the auspices of the Committee 
of Public Safety, the Jacobins adopted a series of measures designed 
to win popular support for the republican cause: punishing counter-
revolutionaries, redistributing land, controlling prices and, last but 
not least, sponsoring public festivals. Best of all, this intransigent 
party of the French bourgeoisie had discovered a charismatic leader in 
Robespierre who was trusted by rebellious artisans and peasants across 
the nation.206
Facing a common danger, the social contradictions of the Jacobin 
movement weren’t immediately apparent to its members. Like in 
Russia over a century later, the vicious political faction-fighting within 
the Left obscured the more fundamental divide between those who 
were profiting from the new regime and those who were still suffering 
from poverty and powerlessness. In 1792, the struggle between liberals 
and republicans for control of the French state had been finally 
decided by the direct intervention of the Paris mob. Emerging from 
their ghettos, the artisans, shopkeepers and labourers of the capital 
city had forcibly occupied the parliament building and expelled the 
advocates of compromise from the assembly. As a consequence, the 
new Jacobin regime derived its political legitimacy from two rival 
sources: representative democracy and direct democracy. On the one 
hand, the Committee of Public Safety was an executive chosen by the 
majority of deputies within the national legislature. On the other hand, 
Robespierre’s administration was the collective expression of decisions 
made by citizens at local meetings in Paris and other republican 
strongholds.207 In 1762, Rousseau had published a book that elucidated 
the stark difference between these two forms of democracy: The Social 
Contract. Contradicting the liberal admirers of the English parliamentary 
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system, he argued that elected representatives were only interested in 
representing their own selfish interests.208 As the son of a watchmaker 
from Geneva, he believed that the artisan trade community provided a 
far superior model of political organisation. With their wives looking 
after the household, male citizens would assemble in public to decide 
together how the state should be run. Through intense discussions, 
they could eventually come to a consensus which was agreed by all: 
the General Will. Above all, it was through this participatory process 
of taking decisions together that the citizenry became united in the 
implementation of these public policies. For Rousseau, the democratic 
republic was an interactive creation: ‘... the ... collective being cannot 
be represented by anyone but itself ...’209  
When the monarchy was abolished in 1792, the plebeian Jacobins were 
convinced that they were now masters of the French state. Like the 
workers and soldiers attending the Russian Soviets over a century later, 
artisans and shopkeepers in the capital held daily meetings through 
which they administered their own neighbourhoods: the Paris Sections. 
Across the country, revolutionaries used popular assemblies to deprive 
the liberal notables of their local power bases. Improving on Rousseau’s 
patriarchal concept of direct democracy, these Left Jacobins warmly 
welcomed female activists into their ranks.210 Anticipating the 20th 
century’s workers’ councils, these experiments in popular participation 
sought to coordinate both the political and economic life of the nation. 
It was this  flourishing of self-management that ensured the French 
people were directly involved in supporting the war effort. Campaigns 
were launched to collect provisions for the republic’s armies: horses, 
food, saltpetre, shoes and clothing. Punishing the clergy for its royalist 
sympathies, militants stripped the churches of their bells and other 
metal ornaments to provide the raw materials for making muskets and 
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other weaponry. For the Jacobins, Rousseau’s writings had become a 
self-help manual for securing the survival of the revolution.211 
More than anything else, this mass mobilisation enabled the French 
republic to create a new type of army that was able to defeat the forces 
of reaction at home and abroad. During the wars conducted under 
the absolute monarchy, the aristocratic officer corps had imposed rigid 
discipline upon a rank-and-file recruited from the outcasts of society. 
In 1789 as in 1917, it was the insubordination of these despised 
soldiers that had tipped the balance in favour of the revolution. Over 
the next few years, this politicisation of the French army became ever 
more intense. When the liberals established a National Guard, they’d 
allowed its bourgeois members to elect their own officers and discipline 
themselves. Under the impact of civil war and foreign invasion, the 
social exclusivity of this militia soon had to be discarded.212 As Rousseau 
had emphasised, those who enjoyed the benefits of citizenship also had 
to share the risks of military service.213 Like Red Guards in 1917, these 
plebeian soldiers saw themselves as first and foremost fighters for a 
political cause. In 1792, the Jacobin government raised a revolutionary 
army composed of loyal artisans from Paris and the other major cities to 
enforce price controls, requisition food and intimidate malcontents at 
home.214 With Austrian, British, Russian and Prussian troops massing 
on the French borders, Robespierre’s regime called upon all patriotic 
young men to join the army defending the integrity of the nation: the 
levée en masse. As in the Russian Civil War over a century later, the 
survival of the revolution now depended upon the martial prowess of 
its civilian supporters. Much to the surprise of the military experts, 
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this influx of volunteers not only saved the Jacobin republic, but also 
transformed the nature of European warfare.215 
Ironically, the defection of its aristocratic officers benefited the French 
army. Instead of obeying orders without question, its citizen-soldiers 
were now fighting for a political cause under leaders who they’d chosen 
themselves. Unlike the brutalised conscripts of the absolute monarchy, 
they would break and run during an engagement rather than stand in 
formation accepting heavy casualties. However, once they’d reached a 
place of safety, these volunteers would – to the amazement of their 
enemies – quickly rally and return to the attack. Slowly but surely, 
the French republican army developed the tactics which delivered 
victory over its aristocratic enemies. On the battlefield, swarms of 
skirmishers would cover the advance of massed columns of infantry 
backed up by artillery barrages and cavalry charges. On campaign, 
this new republican army was led by a group of elite troops whose 
moniker would soon be adopted by both the artistic avant-garde and 
the political vanguard: the advanced guard. Tellingly, these politicised 
warriors didn’t have to wait for detailed orders from a commander-in-
chief before they seized any opportunity to exploit the weaknesses of 
their royalist opponents. Again and again, the conscious self-discipline 
of citizen-soldiers triumphed over the blind obedience of professional 
troops. In warfare as in art and politics, participatory creativity had 
empowered isolated individuals with the collective strength of the 
General Will.216
In 1806, while the French and Prussian armies were manoeuvring 
outside Jena in preparation for battle, Hegel had been hurriedly making 
corrections to the manuscript of the book that would make his name 
amongst the German intelligentsia: The Phenomenology of the Spirit. 
By the time that the final version was ready to be dispatched to the 
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publishers, the fate of central Europe had been decided. As he joined 
the joyful crowds cheering Bonaparte leading the victorious French 
army into this university town, the serendipity of the moment was 
perfect.217 In his just completed text, Hegel claimed that the origins of 
human civilisation could be traced back to a primeval moment when 
class divisions had emerged for the first time. In the distant past, the 
members of barbarian tribes had been united by the equality of poverty 
and ignorance. Then, in the founding moment of history, an outburst 
of extreme violence had split human society into two irreconcilable 
groups: the masters and the slaves. People had fought bitterly against 
each other to determine who would be in which class. Those who were 
brave enough to risk death became the masters. Those who were not 
became the slaves. One class would do the fighting while the other 
did the work. From then onwards, the evolution of human civilisation 
had been driven by the repeated reiteration of this all-encompassing 
conflict between the masters and the slaves.218 
In The Phenomenology of the Spirit, Hegel traced how this social dialectic 
had manifested itself across the centuries. Like David, he admired the 
political and cultural achievements of Ancient Greece and Rome. As a 
scholar, he was fascinated by the wonders of the medieval kingdoms of 
Europe and Asia. Yet, each of these great civilisations had been unable 
to overcome the primordial class conflict that had given them life. Even 
the one true religion of Christianity had only been able to reconcile 
these social divisions in a spiritual form. However, immersed in the 
crowds lining the streets of Jena, Hegel knew that he was a member 
of the lucky generation that were alive at the transformative moment 
when the slaves had successfully risen in revolt against their masters: 
the fall of the Bastille. Like many Germans in 1806, he enthusiastically 
celebrated the arrival of the genius general who now personified the 
ideals of the 1789 French Revolution. They were convinced that 
Bonaparte’s decisive victory at the battle of Jena-Auerstädt had swept 
away the old order in central Europe. When both masters and slaves 
become citizen-soldiers of the crowned republic, the class divisions 
217 See Terry Pinkard, Hegel, pages 227–230.
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which had shaped human civilisation had been superseded: the end 
of history.219  
Hegel would remain a fervent admirer of Bonaparte for the rest of 
his life. During the brief French ascendency over Germany, he and 
his family were active collaborators with the imperial regime. Between 
1808 and 1810, Hegel was the editor of a Bonapartist newspaper in 
Bavaria. Both his brother and his brother-in-law would lose their lives 
in the emperor’s disastrous invasion of Russia in 1812.220 Even after 
the final defeat and exile of Bonaparte, Hegel had remained true to his 
hero’s cause. Inside his writings’ esoteric terminology was hidden an 
intellectual vindication of the achievements of the French empire.221 
Anticipating the Post-Modernist philosophers of the late-20th century, 
he compensated for the disappointment of his political hopes by 
transforming them into literary abstractions. What couldn’t be put 
into practice could be enjoyed as theory. In The Phenomenology of the 
Spirit, Hegel had already constructed a lofty philosophical apology 
for Bonaparte’s venal dictatorship. Like other liberals in the 1800s, 
he’d been convinced that the key mistake of the Jacobin regime was 
its decision to make an alliance with the plebeian masses. Inspired by 
Rousseau, these artisan and peasant radicals had dreamt of a democratic 
republic that would impose political and social equality: Absolute 
Liberty. According to Hegel, by rejecting all forms of authority, the 
Left Jacobins had instead plunged the nation into anarchic chaos. For 
liberals, the 1793 Festival of Reason in Notre Dame was the epitome of 
this mob irrationality. Deprived of the moral disciplines of religious 
belief, civilised society in France had collapsed into brutal barbarism as 
everyone pursued their own selfish interests.222 
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As Hegel explained, the Left Jacobins’ desire for Absolute Liberty 
had inevitably culminated in its opposite when Robespierre’s regime 
was forced to restore order through the Absolute Tyranny of the 
Terror. As Hébert’s faction was dispatched to the guillotine, these 
bourgeois revolutionaries marked the conclusion of the destructive 
phase of the 1789 French Revolution by anathematising all forms of 
atheism. On 8th June 1794, in a final flourish, David had organised a 
cast of thousands for a massive festival in Paris which celebrated the 
inauguration of a new republican religion: the Cult of the Supreme 
Being.223 The plebeian experiments in participatory democracy were 
over. The concentrated spectacle had now been sanctified as eternal and 
immutable. Unfortunately for Robespierre and his intimates, the Right 
Jacobins had condemned themselves by this irrevocable break with 
their artisan and petit-bourgeois allies. Deprived of the legitimacy of 
direct democracy, executive authority was now solely derived from the 
representative democracy of the legislature. Seizing this opportunity, 
liberal and republican members of parliament had banded together and 
overthrown the Committee of Public Safety. Over the next five years, 
the Thermidor regime tried and failed to create a stable constitutional 
settlement for post-revolutionary France. Besieged by Jacobins on their 
Left and monarchists on their Right, most of these bourgeois politicians 
had welcomed Bonaparte’s seizure of state power in 1799. Under 
his charismatic leadership, liberalism could now rule unimpeded by 
forging a third way to modernity out of the most enlightened elements 
of its two deadly rivals: democracy and aristocracy.224  
On 14th July 1824, while visiting Dresden with his students from 
Berlin university, Hegel ordered the most expensive champagne from 
their hotelier to toast the anniversary of the fall of the Bastille. Even 
though a Bourbon king was once again on the throne of France, the 
author of The Phenomenology of the Spirit was still confident that this 
marvellous day in 1789 had marked the beginning of the end of 
223 See David Dowd, Pageant-Master of the Republic, pages 120–124; and Mona Ozouf, 
Festivals and the French Revolution, pages 106–115.
224 Bonaparte was convinced that: ‘When I became emperor, I never ceased to be a 
citizen.’ See Emmanuel de Las Cases, Mémorial de Sainte-Hélène, page 88. Also see 
Isser Woloch, Napoleon and his Collaborators, pages 3–65; and Howard Brown, ‘The 
Search for Stability’.
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history. During the intervening decades, the slaves – by learning how 
to face death without flinching – had prevailed over their masters on 
the battlefields of Europe.225 Under  Bonaparte, the liberal ideals of the 
1789 French Revolution had been given their definitive institutional 
expression: the codification of laws, civil equality, religious toleration, 
expert administration and promotion by merit. As Hegel took pleasure 
in pointing out, even the bitterest opponents of the deposed emperor 
had now embraced his constitutional settlement. In early-19th century 
Europe, the Bourbon monarchy could be restored, but not the old 
feudal order. As a liberal intellectual living in 1820s Berlin, Hegel 
moved within a circle of friends that included the patriotic reformers 
who’d catalysed the 1813 German uprising against the French empire. 
Most notably, he regularly played games of Whist with a military 
theorist who’d left the Prussian army to fight on the opposite side to 
his doomed brother and brother-in-law in the 1812 Russian campaign: 
Carl von Clausewitz.226 Like these Berlin colleagues, Hegel now 
understood that Bonaparte had destroyed himself through reckless 
ambition. Intoxicated by power, the emperor had tried to micro-
manage the whole of Europe. When commanding an army at the gates 
of Moscow, Bonaparte was also running another war in Spain and 
dealing with the day-to-day administration of France.227 At this point in 
his reign, any independent initiatives by his subordinates had become 
suspect. Fatally, by monopolising all decision-making, Bonaparte had 
deprived the French army of its organisational edge over its aristocratic 
rivals. In 1800, Desaix had saved the day at the battle of Marengo by 
marching his troops towards the sound of the guns before he’d received 
the First Consul’s urgent summons for help. In contrast, Emmanuel 
de Grouchy’s division failed to arrive in time to turn the tide at the 
battle of Waterloo in 1815 because he knew that his primary duty was 
225 See Terry Pinkard, Hegel, pages 450–453. Also see Keith Sanborn, ‘Postcards from 
the Berezina’, pages 84–85.
226 See Peter Paret, Clausewitz and the State, page 316; and Terry Pinkard, Hegel, pages 
502–503. For Clausewitz’s account of Bonaparte’s humiliating defeat, see Carl von 
Clausewitz, The Campaign of 1812 in Russia.
227 For an insider’s account of the over-centralisation of the imperial bureaucracy, 
see Stendhal, A Life of Napoleon, pages 118–147. This was the fatal weakness of 
Bonaparte’s empire: ‘Unable to learn, it will, eventually, fall.’ Ricardo Blaug, How 
Power Corrupts, page 13.
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to follow the emperor’s orders to the letter without any questioning.228 
As in an Ancient Greek tragedy, Bonaparte had been undone by the 
deadly vice of hubris. Even the most brilliant man of his age was 
incapable of deciding everything for everyone at all times everywhere. 
Like a modern Prometheus who’d challenged the gods and lost, the 
emperor would end his days as a lonely figure imprisoned on the 
barren Atlantic island of St. Helena. Yet, by enduring this humiliation, 
Bonaparte would purge himself of his multiple mistakes and bloody 
crimes in many people’s eyes. What would survive was a pernicious 
legacy which would enthral generations to come: the romantic allure 
of the Napoleonic myth.229   
In 1820, Hegel published a book which codified his own idealised 
vision of Bonaparte’s empire: The Philosophy of Right. Living in the 
capital city of Prussia, he carefully disguised his devotion to this 
nation’s greatest enemy. As at the emperor’s coronation in Notre Dame 
in 1804, he dressed up the novelty of bourgeois rule in feudal clothing. 
His reactionary readers could take comfort that – in this intellectual 
reverie – the king was still on his throne and the landowners had kept 
their domination over the upper house of parliament. However, in its 
introduction, Hegel emphasised that these ancient institutions were 
now serving a modern purpose: ‘the rational is real’.230 Alongside 
them were the self-appointed bodies that represented the bourgeois 
elites who now dominated Europe. At the helm of Hegel’s state was 
the select group of cultivated and efficient bureaucrats whose task was 
to guide the destiny of the nation: the civil service.231 The aristocratic 
society of masters and slaves had become a technocratic civilisation 
of order-givers and order-takers. For its author, this manifesto of 
authoritarian liberalism was a Bonapartist reflection on the tumultuous 
228 Ungraciously, Bonaparte blamed Grouchy rather than himself for his defeat at 
Waterloo, see Emmanuel de Las Cases, Mémorial de Sainte-Hélène, pages 110–111, 
578–579. Also see David Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon, pages 1057–1093; 
and Owen Connelly, The Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon, pages 207–
213.
229 See Sudhir Hazareesingh, The Cult of Napoleon; and Barbara Ann Day-Hickman, 
Napoleonic Art.
230 See Georg Hegel, Philosophy of Right, pages 14–36.
231 See Georg Hegel, Philosophy of Right, pages 155–223. Also see Bernard Cullen, 
Hegel’s Social and Political Thought, pages 73–96.
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events that had just shaken Europe. In the early-1790s, the democratic 
zeal of the Jacobins had inadvertently unleashed the anarchy lurking 
within the egoism of liberal economics. Fortunately, during his early 
years in power, Bonaparte had been able to restore social order by 
creating political structures that mediated between the interests of 
the individual and the collective: the Senate, the Tribunate and the 
Council of State. Under his new empire, its notables were recruited 
on merit not birth: ‘Every soldier ... carried a marshal’s baton in his 
knapsack.’232 But, by the end of his reign, Bonaparte’s ambition had 
eviscerated the autonomy of these crucial intermediary institutions 
which he himself had brought into being. Unwilling to listen to those 
who’d known better, this demiurge had invaded Russia and ruined 
everything that he’d worked so hard to achieve.233 Yet, as the final act 
of his illustrious career, Bonaparte had rescued his reputation by his 
return from exile in 1815. Welcomed by cheering crowds and defecting 
soldiers, the emperor’s political legitimacy was confirmed by an almost 
bloodless seizure of power. Issuing the Additional Act for the imperial 
constitution, he dedicated his new regime to nurturing the political 
and civil rights of French citizens. His dictatorship after the 1799 
coup had been an unfortunate and temporary necessity to defend the 
country against its internal and external enemies. The long-term goal 
of the Bonapartist cause was always to build a free and meritocratic 
society where enterprising individuals would be able to achieve their 
full potential. Exiled after the disaster of Waterloo, the fallen emperor 
won his final victory by popularising this seductive Napoleonic 
myth.234 Enrolling in this cause, Hegel’s goal in The Philosophy of Right 
was to rescue what was best from the wreckage of Bonaparte’s empire 
for the elucidation of the next generation of European liberals. He was 
convinced that the restoration of the Bourbons was only a temporary 
block on the inevitable realisation of the end of history. Befuddled by 
his obscure language, German conservatives might deceive themselves 
232 Jean-Baptiste Vachée, Napoleon at Work, page 132. Also see Emmanuel de Las Cases, 
Mémorial de Sainte-Hélène, pages 470–471, 496–497, 553–554; and Isser Woloch, 
Napoleon and his Collaborators, pages 158–185.
233 ‘[Bonaparte] ... let himself be defeated not by men, but his own pride and the 
climate ...’ Stendhal, A Life of Napoleon, page 158.
234 See Napoléon Bonaparte, ‘Act Additional 22nd April 1815’; and Emmanuel de Las 
Cases, Mémorial de Sainte-Hélène, pages 208, 253–257, 583–584.
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that his tome was an apology for the aristocratic regime of the King of 
Prussia. Little did they realise that The Philosophy of Right was Hegel’s 
exposition of what might have been if Europe in the 1820s was instead 
living under the enlightened rule of a liberal oligarchy headed by 
Bonaparte’s son and heir: the King of Rome.235
Exiled in nearby Brussels, David also mourned the disappointment 
of his Napoleonic dreams. Like Hegel, he too had believed that 
Bonaparte embodied the third way between the two extremes of 
aristocratic privilege and democratic levelling.236 Under the liberal 
empire, this repentant Jacobin had devoted his artistic skills to 
promoting the emperor’s authoritarian constitutional settlement. 
As his contemporaries knew only too well, David in The Oath of the 
Horatii had anticipated the egalitarian impulses of the 1789 French 
Revolution. Placed on the same horizontal plane on the left of this 
Neo-Classical painting, three sons were depicted pledging their lives to 
fight in defence of the Roman republic against its monarchical enemies 
in front of their proud father. Echoing Rousseau’s patriarchal attitudes, 
the female members of this family on the right of the tableau were 
shown mourning the bloody cost of this imminent confrontation. Not 
surprisingly, like his sponsors, David also conceived The Tennis Court 
Oath as a modern celebration of male political bonding. In the centre 
of this unfinished painting, the leaders of the three old feudal estates – 
the aristocracy, the clergy and the bourgeoisie – grasped hands to affirm 
their new common identity as French citizens. Around them, the 
deputies of the National Assembly were depicted swearing allegiance 
to this liberal version of Rousseau’s social contract. Tellingly, the only 
women in David’s drawings for this painting were to be found amongst 
the audience looking down from the balconies of the Jeu de Paume. As 
would become evident over the next few years, only the extreme Left 
of the revolutionary movement had understood that everyone – not 
only rich and poor, but also male and female – was entitled to the full 
rights of citizenship. 
235 For the political settlement promised by the 1810 birth of Bonaparte’s child by 
his new Austrian wife, see Steven Englund, Napoleon, pages 359–364; and Adam 
Zamoyski, 1812, pages 1–11.
236 See Warren Roberts, Jacques-Louis David, Revolutionary Artist, pages 131–207.
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Two decades after he was given the commission for the The Tennis 
Court Oath,  David exhibited the Bonapartist recuperation of his 
own republican past: The Distribution of the Eagle Standards. In this 
1810 masterpiece, the self-crowned emperor was portrayed in his 
coronation robes receiving the acclamation of his loyal troops. Unlike 
the protagonists in The Oath of the Horatii, Bonaparte and his notables 
were elevated on a dais above the faithful warriors in peacock uniforms 
brandishing their regimental flags who were promising to fight for 
imperial hegemony over the whole of Europe.237 Back in the early-
1790s, the politicised citizen-soldiers of the French republic had risked 
their lives to liberate the continent from aristocratic oppression. But, 
as would happen with the Red Army a century later, they and their 
successors had by 1810 been corrupted by the plunder and baubles 
which rewarded victory on the battlefield. The political mission of the 
early-1790s Jacobin fighters for freedom was now long forgotten. Under 
Bonaparte’s charismatic leadership, the French military had become a 
privileged caste dedicated to advancing its own self-interest: the army 
of honour.238 After the victory at Marengo, they had championed the 
First Consul’s elevation to the imperial throne as a confirmation of their 
own bravery. In The Distribution of the Eagle Standards, David used 
his paint to flatter this patriotic enthusiasm and martial pride. Once 
again, he carefully placed women in the background whose symbolic 
role was to admire a florid display of male prowess. The artistic prophet 
of republican virtue had become the visual propagandist of bourgeois 
vanity.239
When they’d demanded that The Coronation of Napoléon and Joséphine 
should be immediately moved from the Louvre to the Tonneau de 
la Montagne-Geneviéve, the Lettrist International had chosen well. 
 
237 ‘[Bonaparte] ... perfected the Terror by substituting permanent war for permanent 
revolution.’ Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Holy Family, page 166. Italics in 
original.
238 ‘Napoléon’s military genius blossomed on the terrain fertilised by the French 
Revolution. It began to decline when his political goals became antagonistic to 
its revolutionary heritage.’ Albert Soboul, Les Soldats de l’An II, page 278. For the 
ideological and combat degeneration of the French soldiery, see Stendhal, A Life of 
Napoleon, pages 148–152; and John Lynn, ‘Toward an Army of Honour’.
239 See Warren Roberts, Jacques-Louis David, Revolutionary Artist, pages 164–167.
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In contrast with David’s other famous political paintings, women 
were now at the centre of its action. As an artistic prototype of the 
concentrated spectacle, this canvas captured the iconic moment 
when Bonaparte had crowned his wife as empress. Surrounding her 
were the female members of the new imperial family. However, these 
pampered princesses bore no resemblance to the militant republicans 
who’d partied inside Notre Dame only a decade earlier. The empress 
Josephine was not the Goddess of Reason. Unlike the Paris festivals of 
the early-1790s, Bonaparte’s coronation in 1804 had been an exclusive 
event staged for the select few with the city’s inhabitants confined to 
being passive observers of the spectacular procession to and from Notre 
Dame.240 Led by David himself, the austere look of Neo-Classicism was 
already well on the way to being recuperated as the luxurious aesthetics 
of Empire Style.241 Crucially, with liberal order imposed upon France, 
the next generation of radical artists had been denied the chance to 
experience the intoxicating synthesis of political revolution and cultural 
rebellion. Instead, David’s pupils would have to preserve the memory of 
participatory creativity within their own bohemian milieu: the avant-
garde movement. From the Romantics to the Surrealists, generation 
after generation of leftfield artists kept faith with this subversive legacy. 
One day, the people’s carnival would return to the streets of Paris. By 
dreaming of detourning The Coronation of Napoléon and Joséphine, the 
Lettrists in 1955 had affirmed their adherence to this hallowed avant-
garde prophecy. Yet, like the Barbus, they’d also mistaken their own 
marginalisation for political rectitude. Their vision of mass creativity 
still had to be transformed from intellectual dogma into proletarian 
practice. When compared to the Hébertists’ 1793 Festival of Reason 
with its thousands of participants, the 1950 provocation by a handful 
of Lettrists at Notre Dame was an insignificant gesture. It would take 
the morphing of this group into the Situationist International to begin 
their escape from the avant-garde ghetto. The insurgency against 
spectacular capitalism would require not just the détournement of 
David’s paintings, but also the critique of Hegel’s writings. Only by 
deposing the emperor who still haunted its imagination could the Left 
240 See Warren Roberts, Jacques-Louis David, Revolutionary Artist, pages 152–164; and 
Steven Englund, Napoleon, pages 238–251.
241 See Odile Nouvel-Kammerer, Symbols of Power; and Thomas Crow, ‘Patriotism and 
Virtue’, pages 48–54.
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rediscover its emancipatory world-historical mission: the ascendency of 
direct democracy over all social institutions.    
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2.8: The Passion for Victory 
On 2nd December 2011, a select group of people gathered at Raylab for 
the English launch of the Russian language version of Class Wargames 
Presents Guy Debord’s The Game of War. Thanks to the hard work of 
Elena and Ilze, our audiovisual meditation on this Situationist ludic 
masterpiece was now accessible to audiences in the wild East.242 Over the 
summer, Stefan had already hosted special screenings of the Russian cut 
of the Class Wargames movie to bohemian audiences in St. Petersburg, 
Moscow and Irkutsk.243 Most appropriately, this promotional tour 
was concluding in a renowned London meeting point for artists and 
hackers from the opposite ends of Europe.244 As our film emphasised, 
the Situationists’ searing critique of spectacular capitalism had emerged 
from their lucid analysis of the defeat of the 1917 Russian Revolution. 
Two decades after the implosion of the Soviet Union, the once distinct 
systems of East and West were now fused into a single integrated form 
of domination which combined the ideological rigidity of Stalinism 
with the commodity conformism of Fordism. During the second phase 
of our campaign of ludic subversion, Class Wargames had become 
focused upon making our own distinctive contribution to the political 
analysis of this historical trajectory of spectacular domination. Through 
our performances and publicity, we’d aimed to provide a compelling – 
and entertaining – alternative to the Left’s stultified debates over the 
tragic fate of the 1917 Russian Revolution. For far too long, Eisenstein’s 
October had been accepted as an eyewitness documentary. Countering 
this Bolshevik myth-making, we’d sampled war films, costume dramas, 
political documentaries and sci-fi thrillers to provide evocative imagery 
for the voice-over elucidating the Situationist reasoning about these 
momentous events. Like the cavalry pieces in The Game of War, the 
vanguard intellectuals were only one section of the Red forces on the 
social battlefield. If everyone could play at being a little Lenin, Trotsky 
or Stalin, then nobody on the Left would be able to recuperate the next 
upsurge of participatory democracy – and become a new Lenin, Trotsky 
242 See Ilze Black, Class Wargames ʠʡʖʕʢʣʑʓʜʰʖʣɹʔʡʑʓʓʟʚʞʤɴʙɵʖʒʟʡʑ.
243 See the photographs of these matches in the Events 2011 section of the Class 
Wargames website. 
244 See the Raylab website for more details of this art and technology project.
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or Stalin who oppressed the people in the name of the revolution. The 
lessons of proletarian history were there to be learnt on the game board.
After the first screening of the Russian version of our film in London 
was over, Class Wargames invited the audience at Raylab to participate 
in a collective performance of The Game of War. Earlier in the year, 
Stefan had themed our promotional events in St. Petersburg and 
Irkutsk around a famous Red Army hero of the 1917–1921 Russian 
Civil War: Vasily Chapayev. Imitating this Bolshevik cavalryman’s 
eponymous updating of Draughts, either potatoes or onions were 
transformed into the pieces and terrain features of Debord’s game. As 
in Victor Pelevin’s 1996 satirical novel, Stefan had channelled the spirit 
of Chapayev to commemorate the disappointed hopes of the 1917 
Russian Revolution.245 For the film launch at Raylab, Class Wargames 
opted for another remix of Debord’s game which had been played on 
2nd July 2011 at Moscow’s State Polytechnical Museum. In an avant-
garde homage to Takako Saito’s Liquid Chess, its infantry, cavalry and 
artillery pieces were represented by glasses filled with red or white 
vodka. Honouring Debord’s devotion to alcoholic intoxication, the 
unfolding of this game was guaranteed to result in the players of North 
and South becoming very drunk. Each time that they took an enemy 
piece, they’d have to down the large shot of vodka in its symbolic glass. 
Like Chapayev in the 1934 biographical film, the players of The Game 
of War must revel in the emotional intensity of combat.246     
For this contest, Elena and Fabian decided to command the army of 
the North. On the other side of the board, Marc Garrett, Lara Blazic 
and Alexei Blinov became the commanders of the South. As in the 
ICA bar a year earlier, the opposing sides’ pieces were laid out in the 
opening positions for the 1800 Marengo campaign shown in Diagram 
3 on page 226. Like the Austrians in the original campaign, Elena and 
Fabian’s pieces were split into two strong forces advancing on each flank. 
Recreating the French army’s deployment, the bulk of Marc, Lara and 
Alexei’s troops were held in reserve behind a defensive screen. Once 
245 See Victor Pelevin, Chapeyev and Void. 
246 See Georgi and Sergei Vasiliev, Chapayev. Debord heavily sampled the Russian Civil 
War battle scenes in this 1934 film for his 1973 movie version of The Society of the 
Spectacle. 
206 207
again, a difficult problem in military strategy had been posed. How 
could the rival generals transform their very different opening positions 
on the battlefield into a decisive victory over the enemy? Despite 
first appearances, as shown by the ICA game, the French definitely 
had the strategic advantage. In 1800, Bonaparte had triumphed by 
concentrating his military might against a divided opponent. When 
playing South in our Marengo deployment, the task was to replicate 
this winning manoeuvre. Taking the offensive, Marc, Lara and Alexei 
began by moving their reserve forward towards the Austrian formation 
on the east of the board. As the First Consul had proved, the South’s 
best plan was to overwhelm one of the North’s exposed flanks as quickly 
as possible and then demolish the other at its leisure. A year before at 
the ICA, Elena and Fabian had won the game by faithfully imitating 
the master. This time, playing the North at Raylab, their conundrum 
was working out how to thwart Bonaparte’s winning strategy. If they 
fumbled like von Melas had done in 1800, it would be Marc, Lara and 
Alexei who’d be claiming victory in The Game of War.
On 24th August 2011, I’d played the Austrians against Ken Wark as 
the French in the basement of the Housmans bookshop just before 
a promotional event for the first volume of his marvellous history 
of Situationism: The Beach Beneath the Street. In this contest, as I 
withdrew my right flank through the pass into the centre of the board, 
he’d advanced his reserve to seize my western arsenal. But, by taking 
Vienna, Ken had fallen into a trap. Moving my now united forces 
through the gap between the two mountain ranges, I’d launched an 
attack which eventually cut his army’s line of communications to its 
own western arsenal. I’d proved that the more experienced player could 
win as the Austrians in the 1800 Marengo campaign. Learning from 
this encounter at Housmans, Elena and Fabian in the Raylab game 
responded to the South’s offensive by conducting a fighting retreat 
on their right flank. Showing their tactical superiority, they inflicted 
significant casualties as they were forced to concede ground. By the 
time that the French reserve broke through into the centre of the 
board, Elena and Fabian had succeeded in concentrating their forces 
together. In a dramatic series of moves, both sides now took piece after 
piece from each other. Fortunately, before the vodka prevented any 
more play, the game was decided. Commanded by the more skilful 
generals, the Austrians had demolished the French in this Marengo 
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rematch at Raylab. As Debord had intended, beating Bonaparte meant 
knowing how to fight better than Bonaparte.247
By the time that this key event in the second stage of our campaign 
of ludic mischief was held, Class Wargames had become adept at 
promoting The Game of War as Situationist political propaganda. 
Taking our inspiration from Bernstein’s toy soldier tableaus, we were re-
enacting revolutionary history to denounce the ideological eternities of 
the integrated spectacle. At our 2011 Raylab event, its combination of 
film screening and game playing emphasised the close political parallels 
between the two world-historical revolutions which had shaped 
Debord’s political imagination: the 1789 French original and its 1917 
Russian remix. The Bolsheviks had copied their Jacobin predecessors 
– and the Bolshevik sects in France as elsewhere had inherited this 
hallowed tradition of conspiratorial politics. David and his pupils had 
pioneered the heady fusion of avant-garde art and vanguard politics 
which the Constructivists and the Surrealists had later implemented 
with such expertise. Above all, it was obvious that Stalin had been the 
Bonaparte of the 1917 Russian Revolution. Like the upstart emperor, 
he’d also forged a third way to modernity which dispensed with both 
the Left’s direct democracy and the Right’s hereditary aristocracy. As 
Alexandre Kojève had explained to his French audiences at the time, 
Stalin was the mid-20th century manifestation of Hegel’s vision of 
Bonaparte as the pitiless champion of human progress: the World 
Spirit on a T34 tank.248
In our performances and propaganda for this stage of the campaign, 
Class Wargames always highlighted how the New Left critics of 
Bolshevism were also fascinated by the historical parallels between the 
two revolutions in France and Russia. During May ‘68, the Situationists 
were convinced that their generation was on the verge of realising the 
most utopian demands of the plebeian militants of the early-1790s. 
Within the workers’ councils, the direct democracy of the Paris Sections 
had reemerged in a more modern iteration. Like David’s popular 
247 For photographs of both games, see the Events 2011 section of the Class Wargames 
website.
248 For his influential late-1930s lectures on Hegel, see Alexandre Kojève, Introduction 
to the Reading of Hegel. Also see Michael Kelly, Hegel in France, pages 37–39.
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festivals, the mass demonstrations taking place across France were 
joyful carnivals of participatory creativity. When they’d launched their 
campaign of agitation which would culminate in that general strike that 
momentarily threatened the survival of the Gaullist regime in France, 
the Situationists at Nanterre university adopted a moniker evoking the 
radical Left of the Paris Sections: the Enragés.249 In his influential 1946 
history of the 1789 French Revolution, Daniel Guérin had identified 
this plebeian movement as the precursor of the libertarian communist 
groups of his own times. Like workers’ councils, the Paris Sections 
had been the institutional expressions of direct democracy in practice. 
Crucially, by studying the Enragés’ pioneering attempts to implement 
this radical programme, the French Left would be able to inoculate 
itself against the temptations of both Jacobinism and Bolshevism.250 In 
their eulogy to the 1871 Paris Commune, the Situationists emphasised 
that these daring moments of political rebellion in French history were 
also mass celebrations of creativity and sociability.251 Symbolising the 
late-19th century’s avant-garde art commitment to the insurrectionary 
cause, Gustave Courbet – the charismatic Realist painter – had been 
given responsibility for co-ordinating the Paris Commune’s cultural 
policies. Like David in the early-1790s, his task was mobilising the 
population to defend the republic against its reactionary enemies. On 
8th May 1871, Courbet had watched with pride as a large crowd held a 
boisterous party which culminated in the demolition of the militarist 
monument commemorating Bonaparte’s 1805 victory over the 
Austrians at Austerlitz: the Vendôme Column. As its pieces were taken 
away to be displayed as a detourned artwork in the Invalides museum, 
the avant-garde humiliation of the skilful general who’d hijacked the 
General Will was complete. The dictatorship of the proletariat had 
toppled the bourgeois dictator.252    
249 See Situationist International, ‘The Beginning of a New Era’; and René Viénet, 
Enragés and Situationists in the Occupation Movement. 
250 See Daniel Guerin, Bourgeois et Bras Nus, pages 13–39. Raoul Vaneigem included 
the Enragés alongside the 1871 Paris Commune and the 1921 Kronstadt Soviet 
in his timeline of libertarian communist struggles, see Raoul Vaneigem, ‘Basic 
Banalities’, page 93.
251 See Guy Debord, Attila Kotányi and Raoul Vaneigem, ‘Theses on the Paris 
Commune’.
252 See Prosper-Olivier Lissagaray, History of the Paris Commune, pages 231–232; and 
Alistair Horne, The Fall of Paris, pages 349–352.
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During the second stage of our campaign of ludic subversion, Class 
Wargames played The Game of War and Reds versus Reds in homage 
to this celebrated avant-garde performance. Bonaparte was shrunk 
down to a mounted general in Debord’s game. Trotsky was now one 
of Copplestone Casting’s 28mm toy soldiers. The celebrity academics 
of the Autonomist vanguards were only cavalry pieces or commissar 
figurines which would happily be sacrificed for victory. In both the 
French and Russian revolutions, the increasing militarisation of politics 
had brought about the demise of participatory democracy. However, at 
our events, this temporal process was reversed in ludic form. Playing at 
being Bonaparte and Trotsky was understanding that the order-givers 
must be prevented from dominating the social battlefield. By this point 
in the second stage of our campaign, we’d worked out the answer to the 
intriguing question which we’d dodged during the discussions in the 
St. Petersburg restaurant after our 2008 intervention at the Hermitage: 
why had Debord devoted so much time and energy to inventing a 
simulation of Horse-and-Musket warfare? As our Leningrad comrades 
had pointed out at the time, unlike Reds versus Reds, the theme of 
his ludic creation appeared to have no connection with the dramatic 
events which had taken place in their country in the early-20th century. 
The Game of War might be nothing more than a hobbyist exercise in 
military nostalgia. Two years on, we now understood the fallacy of 
this widely-held interpretation of Debord’s masterpiece. The political 
and social struggles of the 1789 French Revolution had laid out the 
battle lines which would later reappear in a more intense manifestation 
during the 1917 Russian Revolution. By going back to this formative 
moment in the rise of spectacular domination, Class Wargames was 
mapping the historical growth of the alienated terrain over which 
today’s class forces must fight. The skilful general should know how to 
master time as well as space.
Having tracked the emergence of revolutionary resistance to 
spectacular domination back from Russia in 1917 to France in 1789, 
the Situationists were able to identify the modern expression of this 
collective desire for self-emancipation: the workers’ councils. As the 
heirs of David, Courbet and the Constructivists, the practitioners of 
avant-garde art had been given the vital task of proselytising for this 
revolutionary ideal. At its 1962 Fifth Conference in Stockholm, this 
new imperative had split the International into two irreconcilable 
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factions. On one side, there were the politicised artists – the Nashists 
– who’d kept faith with the avant-garde revolt into style. On the other 
side, there were the artistic politicos – the Debordists – who were now 
focused on instigating the proletarian revolution.253 Taking exclusive 
control of the brand, the Paris headquarters defined the primary 
mission of the Situationist International as making smart propaganda 
for the late-20th century’s most advanced expression of participatory 
democracy: the absolute rule of the workers’ councils.254 Through their 
links with Socialisme ou Barbarie, Debord and his allies had already 
joined the growing number of 1960s New Left militants who were 
rediscovering the almost forgotten theoretical and historical writings 
of the 1920s Council Communists. Despite strongly disagreeing over 
the necessity of the Bolshevik dictatorship, these heterodox writers had 
all been united in their admiration for Soviet democracy. Updating 
Rousseau for the industrial age, they’d argued that the ordinary people 
of Russia had – if only briefly – successfully instituted participatory 
democracy in the state, schools, factories, farms, media and army. The 
Paris Sections had been revived as the Workers’ and Soldiers’ Soviets. 
David’s festivals were restaged as Constructivist artworks. The order-
takers had become the order-givers.255
Having been anathematised for decades after the Council Communists’ 
defeat by the Bolsheviks in the early-1920s, this inspiring vision of 
human emancipation was reborn on 23rd October 1956 when the 
Hungarians rose in revolt against their Stalinist oppressors. Although 
subsequently recuperated by both sides in the Cold War as a purely 
nationalist uprising, what would give global significance to this 
rebellion were the insurgent proletarians who’d risked their lives for 
a new social revolution. For the Situationists, like the 1921 Kronstadt 
Soviet, the 1956 Budapest Workers’ Council proved that there was a 
253 See Situationist International, ‘The Fifth S.I. Conference in Göteborg’; ‘Ideologies, 
Classes and the Domination of Nature’; and Stewart Home, The Assault on 
Culture, pages 31–44. Jörgen Nash was the celebrated painter who’d founded the 
International’s Scandinavian Section.
254 See René Riesel, ‘Preliminaries on the Councils and Councilist Organisations’; and 
Mustapha Khayati, ‘On the Poverty of Student Life’, pages 331–337.
255 See Anton Pannekoek, Workers’ Councils; Paul Mattick, Anti-Bolshevik Communism; 
and  International Communist Current, The Dutch and German Communist Left.
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libertarian communist – and eminently practical – alternative to both 
state autocracy and market alienation.256 During the heated arguments 
at the International’s Stockholm Conference, Debord’s most vocal ally 
was a veteran of the barricades from the 1956 Hungarian Revolution: 
Attila Kotányi. Unlike the other attendees of the meeting in 
Stockholm, this militant had experienced direct democracy in action at 
first hand. Learning the lessons from the Budapest Workers’ Council, 
the Situationists must now become the catalyst of the spontaneous 
proletarian insurrections that would soon overthrow not only the 
Fordist capitalists of the West, but also the Stalinist bureaucrats of 
the East. At long last, Bolshevism had lost its ideological grip over the 
European Left. As Kotányi later emphasised, the Budapest Workers’ 
Council had swept away any remaining illusions in these malefactors of 
the concentrated spectacle: ‘We fought the Communists because they 
weren’t communist.’257
As the May ‘68 uprising reached its peak, the Paris Situationists had 
called for the rebellious masses to take immediate control of all public 
and private institutions: the Committee for the Maintenance of the 
Occupations. When people began collectively managing the factories, 
offices, media, universities and neighbourhoods, spectacular capitalism 
in all of its multiple manifestations was on the brink of dissolution.258 
The Gaullist government’s promises of wage rises and welfare 
improvements would change nothing fundamental. In 1960s France, 
the living conditions of the masses might have improved markedly 
compared to those of their grandparents, but they were now more 
dependent than ever on the capitalist system. For the Situationists, 
the one-way flow of television broadcasting was the exemplar of this 
relentless expansion of bureaucratic authority from the workplace into 
256 See René Riesel, ‘Preliminaries on the Councils and Councilist Organisation’. 
Tellingly, one of Bernstein’s 1963 toy soldier tableaus was entitled Victory of the 
Workers’ Councils of Budapest.
257 Attila Kotányi made this quip at the after-party for nettime’s 1996 conference in 
Budapest. Also see Balazs Nagy, How the Budapest Workers’ Council Was Set Up; and 
Andy Anderson, Hungary ‘56.
258 ‘The critique of everyday life successfully began to modify the landscape of alienation 
... Everyone, in his own way, made his own critique of [capitalist] urbanism.’ René 
Viénet, Enragés and Situationists in the Occupation Movement, page 82. Also see the 
Situationist International, ‘The Beginning of a New Era’.
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everyday life under Fordism. As Rousseau had warned, the passive 
consumption of culture was the bulwark of authoritarian politics. 
Fortunately, by learning from the long history of popular resistance to 
the imposition of spectacular domination, it was possible to devise the 
winning strategy and tactics for this final decisive battle in the class war. 
Like their illustrious ancestors in the Paris Sections, the Situationists 
were convinced that the revolutionary synthesis of direct democracy 
and participatory creativity could create a truly human civilisation: 
‘The power of workers’ councils can be effective only if it transforms 
the totality of existing conditions and ... to be recognised – and to 
recognise itself – in a world of its own design.’259
Through the performances and publicity for the second stage of our 
campaign of ludic subversion, Class Wargames explained how Debord’s 
fervent commitment to libertarian communism was deeply embedded 
within the rules of The Game of War. Because the pieces could only 
move and fight as long as their supply lines to the arsenals were 
unimpeded, each side had been set the difficult task of maintaining the 
stability of its own communication network while striving to disrupt 
that of its opponent. By going back in time from May ‘68 through the 
tempestuous events of 1917 to the founding moment of modernity in 
1789, Debord’s game wasn’t just critiquing the Bonapartist pretensions 
of today’s Bolshevik and Autonomist commissars. Above all, his 
ludic invention celebrated the unbroken revolutionary lineage from 
the early-1790s Paris Sections through the 1921 Kronstadt Soviet to 
the workers’ councils of his own times. With the 20th century left far 
behind, these historical teachings found within Debord’s game have 
never been more topical. What was once only briefly implemented in 
one city with the printing press could now be permanently realised in 
a much more sophisticated form on a global scale with the Net. By 
participating in our performances, the players of The Game of War were 
not only re-enacting the heroic revolutionary past, but also practicing 
at fighting for the emancipated future.
Paradoxically, as this second phase of our campaign of ludic subversion 
went from success to success, Class Wargames became increasingly 
259 Guy Debord, The Society of the Spectacle, page 127.
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aware of the limitations of promoting The Game of War and other 
military simulations as Situationist political propaganda. Since our 
founding in 2007, we’d faithfully retraced the trajectory of Debord’s 
seditious career from avant-garde artist to revolutionary theorist. In 
the first stage of our campaign, we’d perfected the playing of The 
Game of War as the ludic realisation of the most dangerous tactic 
of Pop Situationism: participatory creativity. Well aware of both 
the antecedents of the International and the impact of its English 
interpretors, Class Wargames had adopted the strategy of avant-garde 
art to mock the recuperation of Debord and his comrades by the prissy 
mandarins of the academy and the gallery system. Moving into the 
second phase of our campaign, we’d then switched targets to a more 
serious opponent: the Left nostalgists for vanguard politics. Countering 
the simultaneous forgetting and mythologising of the past under the 
integrated spectacle, Class Wargames had played The Game of War and 
Reds versus Reds to pay respect to the hard-won accomplishments of our 
mutinous ancestors. By going back two centuries, we’d not only traced 
the origins of our avant-garde art interventions through Deller, the 
Sex Pistols, Fluxus, the Surrealists and the Constructivists to Courbet’s 
toppling of the Vendôme Column and David’s popular festivals of 
republican virtue. More importantly, we were now also able to explain 
how the early-1790s Paris Sections were reiterated in the 1871 Paris 
Commune, the 1921 Kronstadt Soviet, the 1956 Budapest Workers’ 
Council, the May ‘68 occupations and the anti-capitalist rebellions of 
our own times. The Situationist lessons of revolutionary history were 
there to be learnt on the game board.   
In the immediate aftermath of May ‘68, Debord and his colleagues 
could have easily turned themselves into leaders of a New Left version 
of the vanguard party. By then, the Situationists possessed enough 
notoriety to have found a receptive audience amongst the radicalised 
hippie generation in Western Europe. Not surprisingly, there were 
those who had less inhibitions about institutionalising May ‘68’s 
fleeting moment of direct democracy. Like the Jacobins establishing 
the Cult of Supreme Being, these New Left vanguards offered a 
mystical solution to the forcible reassertion of social alienation. 
Prevented from running their own lives in practice, the masses would 
instead find solace in its spectacular facsimile: the Bolsheviks’ cultural 
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revolution.260 By the early-1970s, Gauche Proletarienne – a ‘Mao-
spontex’ group – was selling 150,00 copies of its weekly newspaper 
in France that promoted an almost coherent melding of these two 
incompatible positions.261 Yet, despite having developed a far superior 
analysis of modern capitalism, the Situationists were never tempted 
to imitate this impressive feat of New Left proselytising. On the 
contrary, Debord retreated into the countryside and – after expelling 
its few remaining members – dissolved the International in 1972.262 
According to the Pop Situationist canon, this refusal to lead the New 
Left vanguard marked his rejection of proletarian politics. From then 
onwards, staying true to his libertarian communist ideals became 
a signifier of his avant-garde authenticity. Ironically, although they 
fiercely denounced this recuperative misrepresentation, the admirers 
of Debord’s insurrectionary politics have over the last four decades 
also romanticised his unwavering commitment to the absolute rule 
of the workers’ councils. While almost all of the other gurus of May 
‘68 would sooner or later make their accomodation with spectacular 
capitalism, this Situationist stood firm in his unambiguous rejection 
of the rewards of money and fame until the end of his life. Even if 
they could not fully live up to this exacting example, Left intellectuals 
now had a stirring role model in Debord. Like their Situationist idol, 
they too would be the special individual who exclusively possessed 
the esoteric revolutionary knowledge that could irrevocably change 
the world. Whether lauded as an avant-garde artist or a libertarian 
communist theorist, Debord had become the intransigent prophet 
howling in the wilderness. 
When Class Wargames had performed The Game of War and Reds 
versus Reds at the 1968 & All That conference in London’s Conway 
Hall, it was heartening that the biggest audiences at this 40th 
anniversary commemoration of May ‘68 were for the sessions praising 
the Situationists as the cutting-edge theoreticians of this New Left 
 
260 See Patrick Kessel, Le Mouvement Maoïste en France; and Christophe Bourseiller, Les 
Maoïstes.
261 See Roland Biard, Dictionnaire de l’Extrême-Gauche, pages 162–168.
262 See Len Bracken, Guy Debord, pages 86–97; and Anselm Jappe, Guy Debord, pages 
101–117.
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rebellion. Unlike its Trotskyist and Maoist rivals during that iconic year, 
the International had understood that the modern proletariat lived 
within a media-saturated consumer society. Most wonderfully, their 
advocacy of the ascendency of the workers’ councils during the May 
‘68 uprising had anticipated the network politics of the 21st century’s 
anti-capitalist movements. In contrast with the Post-Modernists and 
the Autonomists, Debord had never taken the ‘linguistic turn’ which 
now provided the philosophical justification for intellectual snobbery 
within the Left. Tellingly, instead of studying Lenin and Lacan with 
Althusser and Foucault like so many of his New Left peers, he’d 
discussed Hegel with Jean Hyppolite and debated Marx with Henri 
Lefebvre.263 Four decades after May ‘68, dissident activists, artists and 
academics still had much to learn from the exciting adventures of the 
Situationist International. 
Unfortunately, Debord had also left a legacy of fierce sectarianism 
to his heirs. The impressive political and theoretical advances of the 
Situationists had been gained – in part – by sharply distinguishing 
themselves from all other currents within the New Left. Devising the 
winning strategy and tactics to overthrow the society of the spectacle 
required the unrelenting denunciation of those in the 1960s who were 
determined to repeat the recuperative errors of the Social Democrats, 
Anarchists and Bolsheviks.264 By carefully studying the Left’s history, 
revolutionary proletarians could gain important insights from their 
illustrious predecessors’ successes and mistakes. However, there 
were no eternal wisdoms to be found in the past. Each generation 
must appropriate the achievements of its predecessors to devise its 
own historically specific programme. When he’d closed down the 
International in 1972, Debord was convinced that he’d successfully 
thwarted any attempt to transform Situationism into an eternal 
ideology like Social Democracy, Anarchism and Bolshevism. The next 
 
263 For Lefebvre’s rueful reminiscences of their brief collaboration, see Kristen Ross, 
‘Lefebvre on the Situationists’. Also see Len Bracken, Guy Debord, pages 86–97; and 
Anselm Jappe, Guy Debord, pages 73–81.
264 ‘Caught in the vortex of desacralisation and resacrilisation, we stand essentially for 
the negation of ... the [Left] organisation ... as a spectacle in which everyone denies 
himself.’ Raoul Vaneigem, ‘Basic Banalities (II)’, page 121. Emphasis in the original.
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generation must formulate a new strategy and tactics for combating a 
more advanced manifestation of spectacular domination.265 
Despite his best efforts, Debord failed completely in this vital mission. 
Prevented from becoming card-carrying members of the International, 
radical intellectuals instead took sustenance from his romantic image 
as the intransigent solitary prophet.266 Over the decades that followed 
its dissolution as a formal organisation, Situationism would be reborn 
as a New Left historical re-enactment society. By engaging in this live 
action role-playing of May ‘68, the imitators of Debord were able to 
savagely denounce the electoral compromises of Social Democracy, the 
bureaucratic manipulations of Bolshevism, the moralistic lifestyles of 
Anarchism and the intellectual pretensions of Autonomism. Like the 
citizen-soldiers of the early-1790s French republic, these Situationist 
revivalists hailed revolutionary violence as the sole authentic expression 
of revolutionary politics. As had been proved by the 1965 Watts 
uprising, urban riots were the most effective method for breaking the 
hegemony of the state and the commodity over everyday life.267 All 
other forms of political activity were inevitably doomed to co-option 
by the devious masters of the integrated spectacle. Not surprisingly, 
Class Wargames’ campaign of ludic subversion was no exception to 
this inflexible rule. At the 1968 & All That conference, the editors 
of Dialectica Principia distributed a leaflet publicising their fringe 
meeting which sternly denounced our shameful recuperative failings: 
‘... Barbrook ... and Tompsett want to remain frozen in time, because 
265 ‘It is necessary to go beyond this partial defeat [of May ‘68]. ... All conclusions 
remain to be drawn; everything has to be recalculated.’ Guy Debord, Critique of 
Separation, pages 38–39.
266 These disciples ‘... see in the ... [Situationist International] .... simply extremist ideas; 
and not so much extremist ideas as the idea of extremism; and in the last analysis ... 
the image of extremist heroes gathered together in a triumphant community.’ Guy 
Debord and Gianfranco Sanguinetti, The Veritable Split in the International, page 42. 
Emphasis added.
267 ‘The spontaneous and uncontrolled character of the rebellion [in the streets of 2008 
Athens] was proved precisely by the lack of any political or economic demands 
whatsoever, by a complete negation of politics and trade unionism.’ TPTG, 
‘The Rebellious Passage’, page 118. Nearly three decades earlier, Fabian had also 
contributed to this influential interpretation of Situationism: Riot Not to Work 
Collective, We Want to Riot not to Work!.
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they hope to make a few bucks ...’268 When we’d played The Game 
of War and Reds versus Reds inside the Conway Hall, Class Wargames 
had owed more to McLaren’s marketing techniques than to Debord’s 
insurrectionary politics. 
Of course, it was Dialectica Principia that was truly frozen in time. As 
with other Situationist re-enactors, this magazine’s greatest contribution 
to the 21st century Left was its ideological inflexibility. By staying stuck 
in the revolutionary moment of May ‘68, these disciples of Debord 
could immediately recognise the reformist errors of their own times. 
Anything less than the immediate abolition of wage labour and the 
bourgeois state was a disgusting sell-out.269 Ironically, this voluntarist 
concept of New Left politics led inexorably to a fatalistic interpretation 
of socio-economic determinism. While waiting for the glorious 
workers’ uprising which would overthrow spectacular domination, all 
the fans of Situationism could do in the meantime was propagandise 
for their libertarian communist beliefs. Any attempts to ameliorate 
the capitalist present were inevitably doomed to failure. Like medieval 
Christian millenarians, they must patiently suffer the hardships of this 
sinful world while living in hope of the imminent arrival of a better 
one.270 As Debord had feared, these Situationist re-enactors preferred 
the certainties of the past to the possibilities of the future. Ideology was 
in command.
As the second stage of our campaign of ludic subversion progressed, 
Class Wargames became increasingly aware that our performances 
and publicity might also be succumbing to this nostalgic adoration 
of Situationism. By playing The Game of War and Reds versus Reds, we 
were concentrating the attention of the audiences at our events on 
the fascinating historical narrative which led from the 1789 French 
268 Dialectica Principia, ‘The Battle for Ideas’. At the 2011 Anarchist Book Fair in 
London, Michel Prigent from Dialectica Principia confidently told me that: ‘The 
Game of War is an irrelevance amongst Debord’s works.’
269 ‘For the Left, the solution is always ... to rally uncritically to slogans such as ‘the 
right to work is a human right.’ ... people are increasingly waking up to the fact that 
such perspectives are ... regressive.’  Principia Dialectica, ‘A World on Fire’, page 5. 
270 For this quietist interpretation of the apocalyptic tradition, see Bernard McGinn, 
Visions of the End, pages 28–36.
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Revolution through the 1917 Russian Revolution to the May ‘68 
Revolution. In successive reiterations, each of these spontaneous 
outbursts of participatory democracy had been recuperated by 
the cynical managers of spectacular domination. Every time, the 
charismatic leader who’d personified this reassertion of hierarchical rule 
was a skilful general: Bonaparte, Trotsky and de Gaulle. As evidenced 
by the Bolsheviks’ brutal massacre of the 1921 Kronstadt Soviet, 
these uniformed guardians of bourgeois order were quite capable of 
employing the most extreme violence to achieve their nefarious goals. 
In May ‘68, de Gaulle had also made sure that the French army was – 
if necessary – willing to crush the insurrectionary movement by force. 
However, it was his adoption of a more sophisticated strategy for the 
Fordist epoch of spectacular warfare that would deliver victory for 
Right. Instead of intimidating the French population into submission, 
de Gaulle decided to hold fresh parliamentary elections. Crucially, 
the ballot papers didn’t include the absolute rule of the workers’ 
councils. Given the stark choice between Gaullism and Stalinism, an 
overwhelming majority of those who’d voted opted for the devil that 
they knew. The Right had succeeded in maintaining its grip on state 
power. Representational democracy had trumped direct democracy. 
Distraught like the Austrians after the 1800 Marengo campaign, the 
New Left now realised that de Gaulle had cunningly outmanoeuvred 
them on the social battlefield. The May ‘68 French Revolution was 
over.271
Having personally witnessed this debacle, Debord’s The Game of War 
was a ludic warning that a new skilful general would almost inevitably 
emerge to threaten the next outbreak of proletarian insurrection. As 
we stressed at our performances, the players of his military simulation 
were teaching themselves the Situationist history of 1789, 1917 and 
1968 so that they could avoid making the same political mistakes as 
the courageous fighters for these failed revolutions had done. Next 
time, the Left must win. In the second stage of our campaign, Class 
Wargames enthusiastically propagandised for this political utilisation of 
The Game of War. Through our performances and publicity, Debord’s 
seditious interpretation of the past was sent into ludic combat against 
271 See Allan Priaulx, and Sanford Ungar, The Almost Revolution, pages 154–159; and 
Patrick Seale, and Maureen McConville, French Revolution 1968
218 219
the amnesiacs and fabricators of the integrated spectacle. But, in our 
enthusiasm to engage the enemy, we were now also in danger of turning 
into Situationist re-enactors ourselves. Like Dialectica Principia, Class 
Wargames had become a bunch of May ‘68 geeks.
By the time that the 2011 Raylab launch took place, the political 
weaknesses of this second phase of our campaign of ludic subversion 
were no longer in doubt. Over the summer of that momentous year, a 
spontaneous wave of mass protests had ousted the despicable dictators 
of Tunisia, Egypt and Libya – and badly shaken all of the other corrupt 
regimes in the Middle East: the Arab Spring. Across Europe, huge 
numbers of people were now taking part in strikes, occupations and 
demonstrations against the disastrous austerity policies imposed in the 
wake of the global financial crisis. From Tunis and Cairo to Athens and 
Madrid, the youthful activists who’d spearheaded these new improvised 
movements of popular resistance were united in their scepticism about 
the traditional structures of the Left.272 In the 2010s, the Situationist 
revivalists of May ‘68 weren’t an anomaly. Like hobbyist wargamers 
deciding to concentrate on refighting one particular historical period 
of warfare, each of the rival factions of the Left was obsessed by its 
own chosen moment of revolutionary valour from the last century. 
Bolsheviks wanted to relive the storming of the Winter Palace in 1917 
Petrograd. Anarchists dreamt of fighting fascism on the streets of 
1936 Barcelona. Social Democrats took inspiration from the crowds 
celebrating the election victory which would create the British welfare 
state in 1945 London. Autonomists imagined themselves in the front 
row of a rowdy demonstration of students and workers in 1977 Milan. 
Trapped in the past, these political ideologues didn’t get the present 
let alone the future. The Left was nothing more than a historical re-
enactment society. 
For many young revolutionaries in 2011, the interactive capabilities of 
the Net showed how politics should be conducted in the modern hi-tech 
world. Everyone with a computer, tablet or mobile was now able to make 
their own media. Empowered by these network technologies, people no 
longer needed professional politicians to represent their views for them. 
272 See TPTG, ‘The Rebellious Passage’; and Blaumachen and Friends, ‘The Rise of the 
(Non-)Subject’.
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Instead, they could collectively solve their mutual problems through 
open meetings and on-line forums. The horizontal communities of 
Net politics were now replacing the hierarchical bureaucracies of the 
traditional Left. There were no leaders when the whole population had 
an email address, a Facebook account and a Twitter handle.273 Ironically, 
in their enthusiasm for the democratic possibilities of these digital 
technologies, the youthful rebels of 2011 were inadvertently engaging in 
their own form of historical revivalism. Back in the 1960s and 1970s, the 
boosters of McLuhanism had predicted that the inexorable convergence 
of computing, telecommunications and media into the Net would 
culminate in the advent of a new human civilisation: the information 
society. The national hatreds, class divisions and social isolation of the 
industrial epoch would soon be no more. In the global village of their 
imaginary future, everyone was going to have creative, fulfilled and 
prosperous lives.274    
By the time that the Net became a mass phenomenon in the late-
1990s, this McLuhanist prophecy had been annexed by the apologists 
for neoliberal globalisation. According to their Californian ideology, 
the rapid spread of the Net was creating a worldwide unregulated 
virtual marketplace where every entrepreneur with a good idea had 
the chance to become fabulously wealthy by founding their own 
dotcom company. As relics of the industrial age, the Left’s parties and 
trade unions with their statist welfare policies were now obsolete.275 
Challenging this neoliberal version of the McLuhanist revelation, the 
Autonomists claimed that the decline of the industrial proletariat had led 
to the emergence of the new digital rebels of the information society: the 
‘immaterial labourers’ of the creative, technical and educational sectors. 
In their mailing lists, clubs, websites, squats and shows, these leftfield 
activists, hackers and artists were prefiguring the libertarian future in 
the corporate present. Equipped with increasingly powerful network 
 
 
273 See Paul Mason, Why It’s Kicking Off Everywhere; and Joss Hands, @ is for Activism. 
274 See Richard Barbrook, Imaginary Futures; and Frank Webster, Theories of the 
Information Society.
275 See Richard Barbrook and Andy Cameron, ‘The Californian Ideology’; and Paulina 
Borsook, Cyberselfish.
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technologies, this revolutionary multitude would soon bring about the 
fall of the neoliberal Empire. Milan in 1977 was the anticipation of the 
whole world in the new millennium.276
When we’d assembled at Raylab in December 2011, Class Wargames 
was facing an interesting dilemma. Like the Autonomists in the 
late-1990s, it would have been easy to update our Situationist ludic 
propaganda for the 2010s generation of network revolutionaries. As 
in May ‘68, general strikes, mass demonstrations and occupations 
of key points in the city had proved during that dramatic year to be 
effective tactics for combating the autocrats of the integrated spectacle. 
Organising their protests through social media, many of these young 
activists had already embraced the Situationists’ strategic wisdom that 
the greatest threat to any popular revolution was the recuperative 
tendencies of the Left’s own leaders. With a little tweaking, we would 
have had no difficulty in arguing that everyone who played The Game 
of War was celebrating the profound influence of the Situationist 
International upon the audacious practitioners of today’s digital 
politics. But, what had prevented us taking this attractive option was 
our growing awareness that the second stage of our campaign of ludic 
subversion had reached the limits of its advance. Proselytising with 
ludic methods for the ascendency of the workers’ councils was no 
longer sufficient. As emphasised by the more perceptive analysts of the 
Arab Spring and the European occupation movements, these leaderless 
revolutions had produced their own crop of skilful generals: the self-
selected ‘choreographers’ of social media protests.277 The absence of 
the formal structures of parties and trade unions had disguised the 
directing role within spontaneous uprisings of the on-line stars who 
were liked on Facebook, followed on Twitter and admired in blogs. As 
with the New Left before them, the 2011 insurgents had also discovered 
that direct democracy could quickly morph into vanguard politics: ‘the 
276 See Maurizio Lazzarato, ‘General Intellect’; and Michael Hardt and Toni Negri, 
Empire, pages 385–389, 409–411.
277 See Paulo Gerbaudo, Tweets and the Streets, pages 134–157; and ‘The Roots of the 
Coup’, pages 110–112.
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tyranny of structurelessness’.278 Confounding the Autonomist remix of 
the McLuhanist prophecy, the new information society was just the latest 
upgrade of the old capitalist system. 
By hosting participatory performances of The Game of War and Reds versus 
Reds, Class Wargames could remind the 21st century Left of the triumphs 
and traumas of its own glorious revolutionary history. David’s popular 
festivals and the Constructivists’ avant-garde artworks were preferred 
to the Empire Style and Socialist Realism. The 1790s Paris Sections 
were counterposed to Bonaparte – and the 1921 Kronstadt Soviet was 
the antithesis of Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin. By reliving this past, today’s 
dissidents were able to recognise what was new and what was familiar 
about their own political situation. Instead of being mesmerised by the 
imaginary future of the information society, they should build upon 
the practical accomplishments of their heroic ancestors to devise their 
own vision of the shape of things to come. At this juncture of our 
campaign of ludic subversion, Class Wargames was now ready to move 
from its second phase of Situationist propaganda into the next stage of 
disseminating the skills of generalship to these anti-capitalist militants. 
The order-takers must learn how to become order-givers. Instead of the 
leaderless revolution, everyone should be a leader in the next iteration 
of the proletarian revolution. Four years after our opening engagement, 
Class Wargames now fully understood why Debord had designed The 
Game of War as a Clausewitz simulator. If the Left wanted to prevail 
over spectacular capitalism on the social battlefield, its activists had to 
be capable of fighting and winning as the collective skilful general. Our 
world-historic mission would be to teach this specialist knowledge to 
these dear comrades with the interactive pedagogical tools of military 
simulations. When the next May ‘68 took place, a new de Gaulle mustn’t 
be able to outsmart the proletarian insurrectionaries. The third phase 
of Class Wargames’ campaign of ludic subversion was about to get 
 
 
 
278 See Jo Freeman, The Tyranny of Structurelessness. Freeman’s prophetic expose of the 
authoritarian tendencies within anti-authoritarian organisations was a reflection on 
her painful time within the late-1960s American feminist movement, see Jennifer 
Scanlon, ‘Jo Freeman’. 
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underway: ‘Our aim is ... to teach ourselves the knowledge that will 
secure the victory of cybernetic communism.’279
279 Richard Barbrook and Fabian Tompsett, Class Wargames Presents Guy Debord’s The 
Game of War, page 39.
224 225
224 225
Diagram 2
Rio de Janeiro opening positions for Guy Debord’s The Game of 
War
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Diagram 3
1800 Marengo campaign scenario for Guy Debord’s The Game of 
War
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Diagram 4
1918 battle of Kazan scenario for Chris Peers’ Reds versus Reds.

Carl von Clausewitz, On War, page 698.
3.0: the Workers’ militia
‘Theory cannot equip the mind 
with formulas for solving prob-
lems, nor can it mark the narrow 
path on which the sole solution 
is supposed to lie by planting a 
hedge of principles on either side. 
But it can give the mind insight 
into the great mass phenomena 
and their relationships, then leave 
it free to rise into the higher realms 
of action.’
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3.1: La Force Fait L’Union
On 23rd and 30th June 2012, Class Wargames hosted two events for the 
Invisible Forces exhibition at Furtherfield’s new space inside London’s 
Finsbury Park. In this show dedicated to ‘spontaneity, experimentation 
and [a] sense of adventure’, Edward Picot, YoHa, Laura Oldfield Ford 
and other avant-garde artists tackled such pressing social issues as 
managerial mendacity, corporate surveillance and the gentrification 
of inner city neighbourhoods.1 Alongside their installations, digital 
works and psychogeographic drawings, Furtherfield was – for the 
first time in its 15 year history – displaying a figurative oil painting 
in the gallery: Kimathi Donkor’s Toussaint L’Ouverture at Bedourete.2 
Filling almost one entire wall of their space, this 136 x 183cm canvas 
depicted the charismatic general who’d led the revolutionary slaves of 
Haiti to victory over both the French and British imperialists. Created 
in the Neo-Classical style, Donkor’s painting was conceived as a 21st 
century détournement of David’s The First Consul Crossing the Alps. 
In the original version, the heroic figure of Bonaparte on a white 
stallion dominated the foreground while the rest of the French army 
was reduced to tiny figures in the background. However, in Donkor’s 
remix, François-Dominique Toussaint L’Ouverture was depicted 
riding on horseback amongst his troops as they faced the dangers of 
the battlefield together. By rearranging the perspective of the tableau, 
this English artist had composed a visual meditation on the role of 
leadership in the revolutionary struggle. While David’s painting of 
Bonaparte mythologised the ‘genocidal maniac’ who’d betrayed the 
republican cause by elevating himself into an emperor, Donkor’s 
canvas celebrated Toussaint as the first among equals in a common 
fight for freedom.3 When they’d defeated the European superpowers, 
the Haitian revolutionaries had demonstrated not only their military 
prowess, but also their political superiority over the enemies of human 
emancipation.
1 Furtherfield, Invisible Forces, page 2.
2 This painting is on the front cover of this book.
3 Kimathi Donkor in Ilze Black, Class Wargames Interviews Kimathi Donkor; and 
Pablo Robertson de Unamuno, Invisible Forces at Furtherfield Gallery.
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As our contribution to the Invisible Forces exhibition, Class Wargames 
decided to make two ludic artworks which would take their inspiration 
from Donkor’s impressive painting. For the first of these events on 23rd 
June, we put on a participatory performance of Stefan’s newly devised 
scenario for The Game of War  shown in Diagram 5 on page 336: 
the 1805 battle of Austerlitz. Having successfully adapted Debord’s 
game to re-enact the 1800 Marengo campaign, its abstract engine 
was now manipulated to mimic Bonaparte’s famous victory over the 
Austrian and Russian armies outside this Moravian village.4 For many 
admirers of the French emperor, the battle of Austerlitz was his tactical 
masterpiece. Having lured the Austro-Russian forces into assaulting 
his right flank, Bonaparte waited until the crucial moment – and 
then launched his reserve in a devastating counter-attack against their 
weakened centre. Outmanoeuvred and outfought, the opposition was 
soon put to flight. Another astounding feat of military genius had been 
added to the Napoleonic legend.5
As the North and South teams were fighting our simulation of the 
battle of Austerlitz inside the Furtherfield gallery, Stefan elucidated 
the historical significance of this turning point in the 1803–1806 War 
of the Third Coalition. Like our commentaries for The Game of War 
and Reds versus Reds earlier in the second phase of our campaign of 
ludic subversion, his analysis of Command & Colors: Napoleonics was a 
Situationist lesson in political history. Pointing to Donkor’s painting, 
Stefan explained that Bonaparte had been striving to build an empire 
in the East during this conflict because his empire in the West was no 
more. Three years before the French and Austro-Russian armies met in 
the Czech countryside, the First Consul had dispatched his brother-
in-law Charles Leclerc with a large expeditionary force to retake the 
rebellious colony of Saint-Domingue in the Caribbean. Under the 
Bourbon monarchy, this island had been by far the most profitable 
4 There have been numerous more-or-less successful attempts over the years to turn 
this decisive battle into a board game: John Young, Austerlitz; Dean Essig and David 
Powell, Austerlitz; Robert Markham, Napoleonic Battles: Austerlitz 1805; Kevin 
Zucker, The Sun of Austerlitz; and Bowen Simmons, Napoleon’s Triumph.
5 See F.G. Hourtoulle, Austerlitz; and David Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon, 
pages 381–489.
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outpost of the French empire.6 Bonaparte was convinced that his well-
equipped professional soldiers would easily be able to restore order and 
put its inhabitants back to work in the slave plantations. However, 
this nefarious scheme had been thwarted by the fierce resistance of 
the newly-born nation-people of Haiti. In 1804, the defeated and 
decimated French army of occupation was humiliatingly forced to 
evacuate the Caribbean island.7 Tellingly, it was only a year later that 
the rest of Bonaparte’s troops found themselves fighting against their 
Austro-Russian opponents at Austerlitz. The empire that had been 
lost in the West would now be conquered in the East. Yet, even the 
triumphant outcome of this famous battle proved to be ephemeral. 
As Stefan emphasised, Bonaparte would fight war after war over the 
next decade in the elusive search for final victory until he himself went 
down in defeat. The failed 1802 expedition to Haiti was a premonition 
of his disastrous 1812 invasion of Russia.8 Crucially, by abandoning 
the democratic ideals of the Jacobins, Bonaparte had deprived his 
soldiers of their most potent weapon against the defenders of privilege: 
the support of the local population.9  
For our next intervention at the Invisible Forces exhibition on 30th 
June, Class Wargames staged a ludic re-enactment of the confrontation 
depicted in Donkor’s evocative painting: the 1802 battle of Fort 
Bedourete. Shockingly, despite its world-historical significance, we’d 
been unable to find any commercially available figurine rules or board 
games which simulated the 1791 Haitian Revolution. Rather than 
adapting Debord’s ludic experiment again, we decided instead to 
make good this deficiency by hacking Richard Borg’s Commands & 
Colors: Napoleonics. First published in 2010, this popular synthesis of 
figurine and board gaming already had a thriving on-line community 
6 ‘[In] ... 1783, Saint-Dominique ... comprised one-third of the foreign trade of 
France.’ Thomas Ott, The Haitian Revolution, page 6. Also see Robin Blackburn, 
The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery, pages 163–166.
7 For the history of this military catastrophe, see Thomas Ott, The Haitian Revolution, 
pages 139–187; and Martin Ros, Night of Fire, pages 151–201.
8 See C.L.R. James, The Black Jacobins, pages 356–357.
9 ‘One of Napoleon’s gravest miscalculations ... was to underestimate the extent to 
which liberty and equality had become the religion of the formerly enslaved [in 
Haiti] ...’ Robin Blackburn, The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery, page 259.
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of fans who were inventing their own battlefield scenarios.10 In Alfred 
Auguste Nemours’ Histoire Militaire de la Guerre d’Independance 
de Saint-Domingue, we’d found a detailed description of the day’s 
fighting at Bedourete which allowed us to work out the terrain of this 
engagement, invent some special rules to add historical flavour and 
concoct the rival armies’ opening positions shown in Diagram 6 on 
page 338. On the southern side of the board, three columns of Haitian 
infantry were advancing in parallel while Toussaint and his Jacobin 
cavalry brought up the reserve. In the middle of the board, a lone 
French regiment was defending Fort Bedourete with the rest of the 
Bonapartist invasion force lined up across its northern side.11 As in our 
Marengo and Austerlitz scenarios for The Game of War, the two sides 
had been set the challenge of optimising the military potential of both 
their very different starting dispositions and the geographical features 
of the battlefield. The winner would be the team that could master 
time and space under the emotional pressures of ludic combat. 
For this game of Commands & Colors: Napoleonics at the Furtherfield 
gallery, the Haitians were commanded by Christian Nold and Tuesday 
Greenidge while Marc Garrett and David Bovill took charge of the 
French. In the first few moves, Toussaint’s forces were in the ascendency 
as the Jacobins’ centre column stormed into Fort Bedourete and their 
left flank moved forward to take the village on the western side of the 
board. However, learning from their experiences of playing The Game 
of War, Marc and David’s team didn’t lose their nerve. Ordering their 
troops to defend the woods on the north-west of the board, the French 
were able to halt the Haitian offensive with deadly firepower. Seizing 
the initiative, the Bonapartists next launched a vigorous counter-attack 
against their Jacobin opponent’s right flank. Christian and Tuesday’s 
team now committed the cavalry reserve to reinforce their exposed 
eastern position, but this gamble ended in disaster as they too were cut 
to pieces by the enemy’s musket volleys. Eventually, as the casualties 
mounted on both sides, the Haitian losses became heavy enough to 
fulfil the French victory conditions. This time, the Bonapartists had 
10 See GMT Games, Commands & Colors: Napoleonics.
11 See Alfred Auguste Nemours, Histoire Militaire de la Guerre d’Independance de Saint-
Domingue, pages 348–358.
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won the battle of Fort Bedourete against the Jacobins. As Richard Borg 
promised in the Scenarios booklet of Command & Colors: Napoleonics, 
history could be changed.12 
A week earlier, immediately before our first performance for the 
Invisible Forces exhibition on 23rd June, Donkor had given a talk 
about the making of his illustrious painting. Back in 2004, he’d 
been outraged at the paucity of public celebrations of the 200th 
anniversary of the 1804 Haitian declaration of independence.13 At 
the beginning of that year, an American-organised coup d’état had 
ousted Jean-Bertrand Aristide – the country’s elected president – 
whose redistributive policies threatened the power and privileges of 
both the local oligarchs and overseas investors. Soon afterwards, using 
the United Nations as cover, the USA and its allies sent their troops to 
the island and recruited fascist paramilitaries to suppress any attempts 
by the locals to resist the destruction of democracy in Haiti.14 Not 
surprisingly, in the Western media, the supporters of Aristide’s Lavalas 
movement were castigated for their audacity in resisting neoliberal 
domination. Countering this racist condescension, Donkor set out to 
make a painting which would educate its viewers about Haiti’s glorious 
revolutionary past. Two centuries earlier, this Caribbean island had 
been at the forefront of the global struggle for human liberation. Led 
by Toussaint, its rebellious slaves had not only freed themselves from 
servitude, but also advanced the cause of democracy in Europe. No 
wonder the 21st century adepts of the integrated spectacle wanted 
to erase the 1791 Haitian Revolution from popular memory. If the 
oppressed of South and North had successfully fought together against 
tyranny and exploitation long ago, their modern descendants might 
be tempted to imitate this courageous example today.15 By painting 
Toussaint L’Ouverture at Bedourete, Donkor extolled this emancipatory 
12 For photographs of this game, see the Events 2012 section of the Class Wargames 
website.
13 Kimathi Donkor in Ilze Black, Class Wargames Interviews Kimathi Donkor; and 
Pablo Robertson de Unamuno, Invisible Forces at Furtherfield Gallery.
14 See Peter Hallward, Damming the Flood; and Jeb Sprague, ‘Paramilitaries in Haiti’.
15 According to the deposed Haitian president, ‘Toussaint’s fierce opposition to slavery, 
his leadership skills, his freedom-inspired writings ... bequeath to us [in 2008] a 
strategy for opposing injustice.’ Jean-Bertrand Aristide, ‘Introduction’, page xxviii.
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alternative to the established order. As the Haitian revolutionaries had 
proved, the insurgent masses were capable of overthrowing the most 
vicious of social systems. Countering the amnesia of the integrated 
spectacle, remembering the accomplishments of the past emboldens 
our ambitions in the present.16
When researching for his painting, Donkor had turned to his well-read 
copy of what is still the definitive historical account of the Haitian 
War of Independence: C.L.R. James’ The Black Jacobins: Toussaint 
L’Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution. It was within its covers 
that he’d found the stirring account of the battle of Fort Bedourete 
which would become the inspirational subject of his canvas.17 Nearly 
a decade later, needing to work out the rival armies’ positions at this 
engagement for our re-enactment at the Furtherfield gallery, Class 
Wargames tracked down Nemours’ 1928 military history of the 1791 
Haitian Revolution which James had used as his main source for 
this clash of arms.18 Much to our surprise, we realised from its pages 
that the author of The Black Jacobins had subtly altered the original 
version to accentuate the heroic role of Toussaint at the battle of Fort 
Bedourete. In this influential book, history had been mythologised 
in the service of an admirable political cause. As Donkor’s painting 
eulogised, Toussaint was ‘... the black Spartacus, the Negro ... who 
would avenge the outrages done to his race.’19
Growing up in the British colony of Trinidad in the early-20th century, 
16 In 1962, the Martiniquean co-founder of the Negritude movement ended his 
biography of this Haitian revolutionary hero with these rousing words: ‘[Toussaint] 
... well deserves the name given him by his compatriots of today: the Precursor.’ 
Aimé Césaire, Toussaint Louverture, page 310.
17 See C.L.R. James, The Black Jacobins, pages 319–321. For the commander-in-chief ’s 
own account of this battle, see François-Dominique Toussaint L’Ouverture, The 
Haitian Revolution, pages 92–94.
18 For his intellectual debt to Nemours, see C.L.R. James, The Black Jacobins, pages 
v–vi, 382; and Toussaint Louverture, page 45.
19 C.L.R. James, The Black Jacobins, page 171. Spartacus was the leader of a 1st century 
BCE slave revolt against the Roman aristocracy which the early-20th century Left saw 
as the forerunner of their own socialist revolutions, see Frank Ridley, Spartacus; and 
Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Liebknecht, Clara Zetkin and Franz Mehring, ‘Manifesto of 
the German Spartacists’.
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James was fascinated as a child by the 1791 Haitian Revolution 
whose victory had helped to free his own ancestors from the horrors 
of slavery.20 Moving to England in 1933, he’d become not only a 
prominent Trotskyist militant, but also the intellectual sage of the Pan-
Africanist movement.21 For James, it was the 1935 Italian invasion 
of Ethiopia that would give topical urgency to his historian’s interest 
in the Haitian Revolution. Outraged by this Fascist atrocity, he 
hastily wrote an agitprop play about Toussaint’s life which was given 
a short run at an avant-garde London theatre. With Paul Robeson 
taking the lead role, this drama of the Haitian independence struggle 
became his artistic cry of protest against the barbarism of Italian 
imperialism.22 Turning his play into a book, James also endowed the 
historical narrative of The Black Jacobins with the emotional power of 
a Shakespeare play. According to Nemours’ report of the battle of Fort 
Bedourete, the Haitian militiamen who were fighting for the French 
imperialists deserted in the aftermath of their side’s defeat by the 
revolutionary army. However, in James’ account, Toussaint rides up to 
these renegade soldiers at the key point in the engagement and – by the 
sheer force of his political arguments – persuades them to defect there 
and then to the cause of national liberation. By visualising this Pan-
Africanist romanticisation of history, Donkor’s painting was able to 
carry out a ruthless détournement of David’s Bonapartist hagiography. 
Most wonderfully, Toussaint L’Ouverture at Bedourete became the 
Neo-Classical portrayal of a better past when the First Consul was 
an Afro-Caribbean Marat on horseback.23 The artist imagined that 
– on receiving a commission at the presidential palace of the newly 
20 See Christian Høgsbjerg, ‘Introduction’, pages 6–7. For James’ early years in 
Trinidad, see Kent Worcester, C.L.R. James, pages 3–26; and Richard Small, ‘The 
Training of an Intellectual, the Making of a Marxist’.
21 See Kent Worcester, C.L.R. James, pages 27–51; and Robert Hill, ‘In England’. 
For an account of the pioneers of English Trotskyism, see Sam Bornstein and Al 
Richardson, Against the Stream.
22 See C.L.R. James, Toussaint Louverture. For the story of this play, see Christian 
Høgsbjerg, ‘Introduction’, pages 10–28; and Nicole King, ‘C.L.R. James, Genre 
and Cultural Politics’. Paul Robeson was a much loved left-wing African-American 
movie and music star of the 1930s, see Edwin Hoyt, Paul Robeson.
23 In 1791, Marat was the first of the Jacobin leaders in Paris to call for the immediate 
abolition of slavery and the granting of independence to all French colonies, see 
Aimé Césaire, Toussaint Louverture, pages 175–176.
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independent Haiti in 1804 – he’d been told how to paint the official 
portrait of the republic’s martyred founding father: ‘Do it in the French 
style!’24
During the 1950s, The Black Jacobins provided an instruction manual 
of anti-colonial rebellion for the charismatic leaders of the nationalist 
movements which would evict the bankrupt British empire from 
Africa: Kwame Nkrumah, Jomo Kenyatta and Julius Nyerere. In 
its portrayal of Toussaint, they’d found a stirring role model of an 
unimpeachable hero who’d sacrificed himself for the freedom of his 
people.25 Returning the compliment, in the 1963 appendix to his 
book, James enthusiastically praised the emancipatory achievements 
of this new generation of revolutionary luminaries.26 But, by the 
time that a new edition of The Black Jacobins appeared in 1980, this 
ardour for his Pan-Africanist admirers had long been disappointed.27 
Far from resembling Toussaint, they’d become modern equivalents of 
the military despots who’d ruled over the newly independent Haiti: 
Jean-Jacques Dessalines and Henry Christophe. During the next two 
centuries, the successors of these self-proclaimed monarchs failed not 
only to deliver prosperity for the majority of the population, but also to 
preserve the nation’s sovereignty.28 Most notoriously, during François 
‘Papa Doc’ Duvalier’s 1957–71 dictatorship, political stability in Haiti 
had been achieved through the enforced social and economic regression 
24 Kimathi Donkor in Ilze Black, Class Wargames Interviews Kimathi Donkor. Very 
appropriately for this task, his parents had named him in honour of Dedan Kimathi 
– the executed leader of the Mau-Mau guerrillas who’d fought against the British 
imperialists in 1950s Kenya, see Maina Wa Kinyatti, Kenya’s Freedom Struggle.
25 James had worked with both Kenyatta and Nkrumah before they returned home to 
lead their countries’ independence struggles, see Robin Kelly, ‘Introduction’, pages 
10–14; and Kent Worcester, C.L.R. James, pages 30–34. 
26 See C.L.R. James, The Black Jacobins, pages 396–399; and Kwame Nkrumah and the 
Ghana Revolution, pages 159–175.
27 See C.L.R. James, A History of Pan-African Revolt, pages 109–136; Kwame Nkrumah 
and the Ghana Revolution, pages 10–17, 179–186. For a Trotskyist critique of James’ 
infatuation with these anti-imperialist regimes, see Baruch Hirson, ‘Communalism 
and Socialism in Africa’.
28 See David Nicholls, From Dessalines to Duvalier, pages 33–164; and Peter Hallward, 
Damming the Flood, pages 9–16.
240 241
of the whole country.29 In the late-20th century, the calamitous fate of 
this Caribbean island had provided a stark warning to the newly freed 
nations of the Third World. Expelling the colonial master was only 
the beginning of the liberation struggle. Without political democracy, 
economic modernisation and social justice, the people would never be 
able to control their own destiny. The revolution must be permanent.30 
By recreating the battle of Fort Bedourete at the Invisible Forces 
exhibition, Class Wargames was not only challenging the deliberate 
forgetting of the heroic achievements of the Haitian Jacobins, but 
also interrogating this troubled heritage of insurgent leadership in 
the South. From the participatory performances of The Game of War 
and Reds versus Reds during the second stage of our campaign of ludic 
subversion, we’d understood that playing the past offered new insights 
into the difficult decisions forced upon the protagonists of key historical 
moments. Now, at our 30th June performance, the two sides were able 
to experience this 1802 clash of arms between the Haitian Jacobins and 
the French Bonapartists for themselves. Like Donkor’s painting, our 
game was leftfield art in the service of political sedition. This hacked 
version of Commands & Colors: Napoleonics was an immersive tool for 
teaching the libertarian communist understanding of the 1791 Haitian 
Revolution. While the rival teams moved their pieces across the board, 
we’d kept up a continuous commentary which explained not only the 
tumultuous events which had led up to the battle of Fort Bedourete, 
but also the world-historical significance of the destruction of slavery 
in this Caribbean island. As James had stressed in The Black Jacobins, 
the democratic revolutions in France and Haiti were inextricably 
intertwined. In the 1790s, the radical movements on either side of the 
29 See David Nicholls, From Dessalines to Duvalier, pages 191–238; and Edward 
Luttwak, Coup d’État, pages 180–1.
30 ‘One can only be for the time being for a socialist pattern [of society in Africa]. 
... socialism ... demands a highly developed technological and industrial society. 
... Now none of the underdeveloped countries have [yet] got that.’ C.L.R. James, 
Kwame Nkrumah and the Ghana Revolution, page 169. Also see C.L.R. James, ‘Black 
Power’.
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Atlantic had risen and fallen together.31 By the time that the Jacobins 
and Bonapartists met at Fort Bedourete in 1802, popular sovereignty 
had succumbed to military autocracy in both countries. Yet, there 
was still much at stake in this deadly combat. Bonaparte’s troops were 
fighting for the restoration of human bondage within the French 
colonies. In contrast, Toussaint’s soldiers were risking their lives for 
the equal rights of every citizen regardless of their skin colour.32 As we 
explained to the audience at Furtherfield, the apostate emperor was the 
prototype of the nationalist revolutionaries who’d turned themselves 
into corrupt dictators in more recent times. But, as James’ book and 
Donkor’s painting celebrated, his Haitian adversary symbolised the 
better political option which was not taken. Even as Governor-General 
for Life, Toussaint had always been the servant of the people.33 
31 See C.L.R. James, The Black Jacobins, pages 85–144, 269–288. As a Trotskyist in 
the 1930s, he’d conceived of this 1790s alliance between the French and Haitian 
Jacobins as the anticipation of the Bolsheviks’ 1920s call for proletarian insurrections 
in the North to be combined with anti-colonial rebellions in the South, see C.L.R. 
James, World Revolution, pages 62–68, 118–140.
32 Title 2 of the 1801 Haitian Constitution guaranteed that: ‘... servitude is ... forever 
abolished. All men are born, live and die free ...’ François-Dominique Toussaint 
L’Ouverture, The Haitian Revolution, page 46. Also see C.L.R. James, The Black 
Jacobins, pages 289–377; and Thomas Ott, The Haitian Revolution, pages 127–138.
33 ‘Since the revolution, I’ve done all that depended upon me to return happiness 
to my country and ensure liberty for my fellow citizens.’ François-Dominique 
Toussaint L’Ouverture, The Haitian Revolution, page 65. Also see C.L.R. James, The 
Black Jacobins, pages 241–268.
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3.2: Guiding the Masses 
As well as teaching the history of the 1791 Haitian Revolution, our 
participatory performance of the battle of Fort Bedourete scenario 
for Commands & Colors: Napoleonics was also a critique of Hegel’s 
philosophy. During the second stage of our campaign of ludic 
subversion, we’d become proficient at combining factual exposition 
and theoretical analysis in the commentaries for our events. At the 
Furtherfield gallery, we were now ready to tackle the ambivalent legacy 
of this German speculative philosopher. When Hegel had cheered 
Bonaparte’s entrance into Jena in 1806, he’d believed that this liberal 
dictator embodied the triumph of modern bourgeois society which 
had swept away the rigid class divisions between masters and slaves. 
However, only a few years earlier, the emperor of the French had sent 
an expeditionary force to subjugate Haiti’s abolitionist republic.34 For 
Bonaparte’s regime, liberal rights were to be restricted to white people 
within the French colonies. As in the USA at that time, freedom for 
few was founded upon servitude for the many.35 Far from representing 
the end of history, Hegel’s Bonapartist politics contradicted his 
own philosophy of social evolution. As the Haitian Jacobins had 
proved in the 1800s, the practical realisation of the equality of all 
citizens would require more radical solutions.36 Reflecting upon this 
conclusion, the next generation of dissident German intellectuals 
realised that bourgeois liberalism was only a temporary stage in the 
turbulent progress of humanity towards the truly emancipatory future: 
 
 
34 Hegel tried to justify the unjustifiable by claiming that the Africans’ lack of bourgeois 
rationality condemned them to a life of chattel slavery, see Georg Hegel, Lectures on 
the Philosophy of World History, pages 173–190. For the elucidation of his confused 
politics, see Susan Buck-Morss, Hegel, Haiti and Universal History, pages 3–75; and 
Paul Gilroy, The Black Atlantic, pages 41–71.
35 See Domenico Losurdo, Liberalism, pages 1–65; and Eugene Genovese, The World 
the Slaveholders Made, pages 118–244.
36 ‘Although the abolition of slavery [in Haiti] was the only logical outcome of ... 
[Hegel’s] ideal of universal freedom, it did not come about through the revolutionary 
ideas ... of the French; it came about through the actions of the slaves themselves.’ 
Susan Buck-Morss, Hegel, Haiti and Universal History, page 36. Emphasis added.
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proletarian communism. Philosophical abstractions were no substitute 
for the material emancipation of the masses.37 
Ironically, a century later, the left of the Left would find itself re-
discovering what their illustrious predecessors had discarded. During his 
1940s American sojourn, James had run a study circle for his comrades 
who were working in Detroit’s car factories. Having split from the main 
Trotskyist party in the USA, they together embarked upon a careful 
reading of Hegel’s writings to enable them to rethink their political 
strategy.38 By the beginning of the 20th century, this philosopher’s 
idealist abstractions had lost favour on the Left to more positivist 
interpretations of socialist theory.39 But, when the old certainties in 
Europe collapsed under the impact of war and revolutions after 1914, 
there’d been a revival of interest in Hegel’s theoretical concepts. As 
Marx had emphasised, dialectical reasoning was ‘... an abomination 
to the bourgeoisie and its doctrinaire spokesmen ... because it regards 
every historically developed [social] form as being in a fluid state ... 
and therefore grasps its transient aspect as well ...’40 In his Geneva exile, 
Lenin had immersed himself in Hegel’s Logic alongside Clausewitz’s On 
War to understand the bewildering times of imperialist butchery within 
which he was then living.41 Following the Bolsheviks’ 1917 seizure of 
power, this esoteric philosophical position soon became the identifier 
of a distinct political identity. By downplaying the dialectic, the Social 
Democratic parties had abandoned their revolutionary heritage and 
prepared the way for their shameful collaboration with the slaughter 
of the trenches. Only by revitalising Marx with Hegel could the Left 
rediscover its emancipatory mission.42
37 See Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology; and David McLellan, The 
Young Hegelians.
38 See Kent Worcester, C.L.R. James, pages 55–115; and Paul Buhle, ‘Marxism in the 
USA’.
39 See Karl Kautsky, The Class Struggle; and Eduard Bernstein, Evolutionary Socialism.
40 Karl Marx, Capital Volume 1, page 103.
41 See V.I. Lenin, ‘Conspectus of Hegel’s book The Science of Logic’; ‘The Collapse of 
the Second International’.
42 ‘The scientific theory of Marxism must become again what is was for the authors of 
the Communist Manifesto ... a theory of social revolution that comprises all areas of 
society as a totality.’ Karl Korsch, Marxism and Philosophy, page 63.
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During the 1920s, this theoretical synthesis became the leitmotif 
of the most iconoclastic intellectuals in Europe: György Lukács, 
Karl Korsch and Antonio Gramsci.43 Even when Stalin temporarily 
recuperated dialectical materialism as the official ideology of Russian 
totalitarianism in 1938, Hegelian-Marxism had still retained its 
subversive potency.44 Tellingly, for James and his Detroit comrades, 
it was their collective study of this philosophy of history during the 
1940s that would enable them to escape from dogmatic Bolshevism.45 
As The Black Jacobins elucidated, the struggle for human emancipation 
hadn’t begun with the 1917 storming of the Winter Palace in Petrograd. 
Although they continued to admire Lenin and Trotsky as revolutionary 
leaders, James’ group now abandoned their former obsession with 
building the vanguard party. In its place, they focused their energies 
on preparing for the next explosive outbreak of popular sovereignty. 
From the Ancient Athenian agora through the Paris Sections to the 
Petrograd Soviet, the urban poor had repeatedly created socio-political 
institutions which allowed them collectively to run their own lives.46 
When the masses rose in revolt again, they would intuitively set up the 
modern expression of this instinctive desire for direct democracy: the 
workers’ councils. In the past, the Left had formed vanguard parties 
because anti-capitalist activists were only a minority of the population. 
However, in the coming wave of social rebellion, it would be the 
overwhelming majority in their many millions who would carry out 
the radical transformation of society.47 In 1940s Europe, the deadly 
43 See György Lukács, History and Class Consciousness; Karl Korsch, Marxism and 
Philosophy; and Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks. 
44 For this philosophical legerdemain, see Joseph Stalin, ‘Dialectical and Historical 
Materialism’; and Loren Grahem, Science, Philosophy and Human Behaviour in the 
Soviet Union, pages 24–67.
45 James and his comrades were searching for a smart theoretical analysis which 
could explain why the ‘bureaucratic stranglers of the proletariat’ now dominated 
the American Left’s political parties and trade unions, see C.L.R. James, Notes on 
Dialectics, pages 181–184; and John McClendon, C.L.R. James’ Notes on Dialectics, 
pages 181–238, 339–391.
46 See C.L.R. James, ‘Every Cook Can Govern’; Notes on Dialectics, pages 184–210.
47 In 1950, he predicted that: ‘... from the beginning of the [imminent] social 
revolution, the proletariat as a whole will be organised to become the state and to 
manage production.’ C.L.R. James, State Capitalism and World Revolution, page 56. 
Emphasis in original.
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necessity to defeat Nazi Germany had almost banished such libertarian 
dreams from the political imagination. Fortunately, in their safe haven 
in faraway Detroit, James and his comrades were able to keep alive the 
theory of Hegelian-Marxism and the practice of Council Communism 
to pass on to the post-war generation of young subversives: the New 
Left. Most gratifyingly, within two decades, the hard work of this 
small study circle would be vindicated by the burgeoning tide of 
insurrectionary struggles that threatened the stability of the heartlands 
of the imperialist system. In May ‘68, the Bolshevik vanguard was finally 
made obsolete by the spontaneous eruption of popular sovereignty. 
The Hegelian dialectic of history had reasserted itself.48
At its 1962 Fifth Conference in Stockholm, the Situationist 
International decided to abandon avant-garde art for this modern 
expression of revolutionary politics. When they formulated their 
new position, Debord’s faction was heavily influenced by their close 
association with the militants of Socialisme ou Barbarie. Like James 
and his Detroit comrades, these French socialists had also started 
out as Trotskyists who’d then begun to question the precepts of this 
Bolshevik heresy. Linking up with James and his comrades, they 
soon rediscovered the almost forgotten classics of 1920s libertarian 
communism.49 Enthused by the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, this 
collaboration resulted in the publication of a prescient pamphlet: 
Facing Reality. Rejecting both Social Democracy and Bolshevism, 
its authors utilised Hegelian-Marxist theory to update the practice 
of Council Communism for the new Fordist dispensation. Political 
parties and trade unions had been recuperated into the bureaucratic 
hierarchies of consumer capitalism. The next upsurge of proletarian 
rebellion would reject these representative bodies in favour of the 
48 ‘I know that [vanguard] parties are not necessary in [contemporary Europe] 
... there are millions of people highly educated with fifty or a hundred years of 
practical experience behind them, so a party isn’t necessary there [to lead them to 
communism].’ C.L.R. James, ‘Interviews’, page 8.
49 See Kent Worcester, C.L.R. James, pages 122–125, 139–140. For the story of 
Socialisme ou Barbarie, see Richard Gombin, Les Origines du Gauchisme, pages 127–
151; and Arthur Hirsh, The French Left, pages 108–135.
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self-management of all social institutions.50 Taking their cue from 
James’ Detroit experience, Socialisme ou Barbarie now primarily saw 
itself as a study circle and magazine publisher. The rule of the workers’ 
councils could only be constituted once the revolutionary process 
was already underway. While waiting for this great day to arrive, the 
New Left had to resist the temptation to form vanguard parties which 
tried to impose their authority upon the class as a whole. As James 
had emphasised, the victory of the proletarian revolution required the 
participation of millions of people. Everyone must be involved in the 
building of the new society.51
Following the 1962 Stockholm scission, the Situationist International 
became enthusiastic propagandists for this heady combination of 
Hegelian-Marxist theory and Council Communist practice. In The 
Society of the Spectacle, Debord surpassed his mentors not only in his 
historical overview of the Left’s squabbling political tendencies, but also 
in his denunciation of the solipsistic tedium of Fordist abundance. Best 
of all, after the May ‘68 French Revolution, his Situationist manifesto 
was widely praised for its intelligent anticipation of this unexpected 
outburst of participatory democracy. Yet, despite the blandishments of 
its newly acquired admirers, the Paris Section never expanded beyond 
a handful of members. Like James, Debord believed that the vanguard 
party was an anachronism in the late-20th century. Instead, the vital 
task of libertarian communists was to prepare the proletariat for its next 
spontaneous insurrection against spectacular capitalism.52 By writing 
books, making films and designing games, Debord in his Auvergne 
exile demonstrated how James’ politics could be put into practice even 
during the harder times of neoliberal ascendency in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Unlike many of his New Left peers, he never abandoned the subversive 
theory of Hegelian-Marxism for the elitist presumptions of semiotic 
50 See Grace Lee, Pierre Chalieu and J.R. Johnson, Facing Reality, pages 7–19. Also 
see Paul Cardan, Modern Capitalism and Revolution. Chalieu and Cardan were both 
pseudonyms of Cornelius Castoriadis who was the chief theoretician of Socialisme 
ou Barbarie. Johnson was James’ political alias.
51 See Paul Cardan, Modern Capitalism and Revolution, pages 91–95.
52 See Guy Debord and Gianfranco Sanguinetti, The Veritable Split in the International, 
pages 67–71.
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structuralism.53 Above all, Debord argued that the recomposition of 
the working class under the integrated spectacle proved that there now 
was no credible alternative to the the absolute rule of the workers’ 
councils.54 By unapologetically proclaiming this revolutionary analysis 
of modern society, the Situationists were providing their class with 
the theoretical and historical knowledge which would soon be used 
to carry out the radical transformation of everyday life: ‘The repressed 
of the proletarian critique has come to light; it has acquired a memory 
and a language.’55
When we made our two ludic interventions at the Invisible Forces 
exhibition, Class Wargames was implementing Debord’s politicisation 
of the historical imperative. Under the integrated spectacle, the 
enforced inability to imagine a better future was predicated upon the 
deliberate forgetting of the freedom struggles of the past. By playing 
the Austerlitz scenario of The Game of War and the battle of Fort 
Bedourete opening positions for Commands & Colors: Napoleonics 
at the Furtherfield gallery, Class Wargames was putting avant-garde 
art in the service of Situationist political propaganda. Fulfilling the 
aims of the second stage of our campaign of ludic subversion, the 
aesthetic pleasure of participating in these performances had become 
our interactive teaching tool. By re-enacting the revolutionary past 
on a game board, the competing teams were learning together about 
the hidden history which was depicted in Donkor’s iconic painting. 
Emphasising Debord’s intellectual debts to James and his Detroit 
comrades, our two ludic artworks challenged the neoliberal revisionists’ 
erasure of the Haitian Jacobins from the academic chronicles.56 As the 
1793 Festival of Reason at Notre Dame celebrated, the oppressed of 
the South and the North had united, fought and won against their 
53 Back in the 1940s, James had also argued that Stalin’s suspicion of Hegelian-
Marxism exposed the Stalinist bureaucracy’s fear of revolutionary social changes, see 
C.L.R. James, Notes on Dialectics, pages 98–106.
54 See Guy Debord and Gianfranco Sanguinetti, The Veritable Split in the International, 
pages 13–34.
55 Guy Debord and Gianfranco Sanguinetti, The Veritable Split in the International, 
page 14. Emphasis in original.
56 Shamefully, there were no entries for Toussaint, Dessalines or Christophe in François 
Furet and Mona Ozouf, A Critical Dictionary of the French Revolution.
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mutual enemy: the liberal bourgeoisie. Over two centuries later, the 
world outside the Furtherfield gallery in 2012 was being convulsed 
by a modern iteration of this global uprising against coercion and 
exploitation. By understanding what had happened in Toussaint’s 
times through playing games, this new generation of dissidents could 
equip themselves with the accumulated combat experiences of their 
admirable forebears. Skilful generals must know how their opponents 
were once outsmarted.57
In The Black Jacobins, James had also drawn a parallel between the 
1791 Haitian Revolution and the tumultuous events of his own 
lifetime. Like Bonaparte, Benito Mussolini – the Fascist dictator who 
instigated the Italian invasion of Ethiopia – was a renegade of the 
intransigent Left who’d traded his principles for power.58 In his cruelty 
and crudeness, Dessalines was the prototype for Stalin’s tyrannical rule 
over the Russian empire.59 More than anything else, James identified 
the dramatic story of Toussaint with that of Trotsky. Most laudably, 
these two soldier politicians had successfully commanded the masses 
in their violent insurrection against the old social order. Unfortunately, 
they’d both also been Shakespearean tragic heroes who’d been brought 
down by their own personal flaws. Committing the same mistake 
as Trotsky, Toussaint had embraced the militarisation of politics. As 
the Governor-General for Life of Haiti, he’d centralised all decision-
making into his own hands. Determined to rebuild the island’s export 
economy, he’d ordered the former slaves back to work in the plantations 
as wage labourers. By the time that the French imperialists had invaded 
the island, Toussaint was facing widespread dissent amongst his own 
followers. Taking advantage of these internal divisions, the Bonapartists 
were able to depose, imprison and murder him. Like Trotsky in 
the 1920s, Toussaint had fallen from power because he didn’t trust 
 
57 See Class Wargames, ‘Communiqué #9’; ‘Communiqué #10’.
58 ‘We explain endlessly: fascism is Bonapartism. ...’ C.L.R. James, Notes on Dialectics, 
page 177. For the Italian dictator’s almost inevitable trajectory from one extreme of 
the political spectrum to the other, see Denis Mack Smith, Mussolini, pages 11–79; 
and Ernst Nolte, Three Faces of Fascism, pages 193–290.
59 See the close parallels in James’ descriptions of these two dictators in World 
Revolution, pages 143–5; and The Black Jacobins, pages 289–377.
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the masses. In Haiti as in Russia, the uniformed despots who then 
took control over the new state would build upon this authoritarian 
presumption to establish a vicious form of social domination.60 By 
staging the 1802 battle of Fort Bedourete at the Furtherfield gallery, 
Class Wargames provided its ludic response to this sad tale of martyred 
heroes and lost opportunities. When everyone could play at being 
Toussaint, then no revolutionary leader would be irreplaceable.61   
In his 1961 diatribe against French colonialism in Algeria, Frantz Fanon 
had championed an existentialist interpretation of Hegelian-Marxism 
for the anti-imperialist fighters of the South. The armed struggle was 
much more than a political strategy for overthrowing foreign rule. 
For Fanon, the oppressed must engage in revolutionary violence to 
rid themselves of their psychological submission to the oppressor. As 
Hegel had argued, the slaves could only live in a society without masters 
if they themselves were willing to risk death in combat.62 Yet, two 
decades earlier, James in The Black Jacobins had already warned against 
the dangers of this fascination with militarised politics. Toussaint – 
like Trotsky – might have had the mental strength to hold fast to his 
revolutionary principles. However, Dessalines and Christophe – like 
Stalin – had succumbed to the bloodthirsty desire for absolute power. 
In Haiti as in Russia, the unquestioning loyalty required of soldiers on 
the battlefield was imposed upon every civilian of the new republic. 
The skilful generals had transformed themselves into revolutionary 
despots. Crucially, in The Black Jacobins, James argued that this military 
usurpation of the national liberation struggle wasn’t inevitable. The 
impressive discipline of the Haitian citizen-soldiers had been learnt in 
the collective labour of the slave plantations. In contrast with their pre-
industrial artisan, shopkeeper and peasant allies in France, they were 
modern proletarians who’d laboured in agricultural factories. Like the 
 
 
 
60 See C.L.R. James, The Black Jacobins, pages 224–288; and Kent Worcester, C.L.R. 
James, pages 36–42.
61 See Class Wargames, ‘Communiqué #9’; ‘Communiqué #10’.
62 See Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, pages 27–84; Towards the African 
Revolution, pages 99–105, 144–149, 170–173.
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workers of 1917 Petrograd, these Haitian rebels had also aspired to 
run their own lives collectively.63 But, when they were prevented from 
democratically organising themselves by the post-independence ruling 
elite, their only alternative had been to become self-sufficient peasants. 
Although economically and ecologically disastrous in the long-run, the 
Haitian masses did temporarily succeed in winning a limited form of 
personal autonomy. The former slaves were now masters of their own 
small plots of land.64
By making parallels between the 1791 Haitian Revolution and the 1917 
Russian Revolution, James was seeking a resolution of the conundrum 
of political leadership within participatory democracy. Back in 1872, 
Marx and his supporters had rejected Bakunin’s vision of a conspiratorial 
elite directing the spontaneous rebellion of the masses against the 
established order. Instead, the Social Democrats dedicated themselves 
to building up the public institutions of the labour movement: the 
political party, trade unions and co-operatives. By pressing for social 
reforms in the short-term, these faithful Marxists believed that they 
were preparing for the communist revolution in the long-term. Workers 
were learning how to manage their own lives as party members, trade 
unionists and co-operative producers.65 Yet, even before the disastrous 
collapse of this Social Democratic strategy in 1914, radical leftists had 
clearly identified its fatal flaws. Better organised than its constituents, 
the labour bureaucracy was much more interested in advancing its 
own interests within the existing system than risking everything to 
overthrow capitalism. For these salaried officials, reformism was an end 
in itself.66 According to these questioners of orthodox Marxism, this 
63 See C.L.R. James, The Black Jacobins, pages 85–86, 392. Also see Aimé Césaire, 
Toussaint Louverture, page 34; and Robin Blackburn, The Overthrow of Colonial 
Slavery, pages 236–237.
64 See David Nicholls, From Dessalines to Duvalier, pages 33–164; and Peter Hallward, 
Damming the Flood, pages 9–16.
65 See Paul Thomas, Karl Marx and the Anarchists, pages 249–353; and Karl Kautsky, 
The Class Struggle.
66 ‘We now have a finely conservative [Social Democratic] party which ... continues 
to employ revolutionary terminology, but which in actual practice fulfils no other 
function than that of a constitutional opposition [to bourgeois rule].’ Robert 
Michels, Political Parties, page 339. Also see Max Weber, Essays in Sociology, pages 
196–244; and Eduard Bernstein, Evolutionary Socialism.
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recuperation of socialist subversion was underpinned by the hegemony 
of bourgeois ideology over the proletariat. Trapped within capitalist 
social relations, ordinary people couldn’t conceive of radically different 
ways of conducting politics or creating wealth. Their pragmatic vision 
of collective emancipation went no further than universal suffrage, 
higher wages and increased welfare spending. For them, the communist 
future was nothing more than a pious hope.67 
In the immediate aftermath of the First World War, the charismatic 
leader and the vanguard party were both proclaimed as the modern 
antidotes to the passivity of the masses within industrial society. In 
1920s Italy, defectors from Social Democracy and Anarchism hailed 
Mussolini as the longings of the people incarnated in a single person. 
Sweeping away the sordid comprises of parliamentary politics, this 
Fascist dictator was imposing his unflinching will upon the public 
and private bureaucracies which determined the nation’s existence.68 
Similarly, in 1920s Russia, the Bolsheviks declared that the vanguard 
party was the anticipation of the imaginary future in the present. 
Enlightened by Lenin’s doctrine, the totalitarian state would free the 
masses from the mystifications of bourgeois ideology and then lead 
them in the construction of the communist cornucopia.69 But, by the 
time that James wrote The Black Jacobins in the late-1930s, both of 
these alternatives to Social Democracy had been discredited. Far from 
breaking with bureaucratic rule, the totalitarian regimes of Fascist 
Italy and Stalinist Russia were implementing the latest manifestation 
of bourgeois society: state capitalism. Following the implosion of the 
world market in 1914, all nations in the mid-20th century had been 
67 See V.I. Lenin, What Is To Be Done?; and Lars Lih, Lenin, pages 52–83.
68 ‘... when Mussolini speaks, he translates into a naked and brilliant form the aims 
of the multitude. The multitude itself frantically acclaims [the charismatic leader], 
answering from the profundity of its own moral beliefs ...’ Robert Michels, First 
Lectures in Political Sociology, page 126. Also see A. James Gregor, Mussolini’s 
Intellectuals, pages 120–122, 148–155; and Max Weber, Essays in Sociology, pages 
245–252.
69 See Leon Trotsky, ‘Theses on the Conditions of Admission to the Communist 
International’; and György Lukács, History and Class Consciousness, pages 295–342.
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forced to adopt some variant of this autarchic system.70 Ironically, 
as Debord later emphasised in The Society of the Spectacle, it was the 
Social Democrats who would prove to be the most sophisticated 
practitioners of this Fordist stage of capitalism. As advocates of one 
party dictatorship, both Fascists and Bolsheviks epitomised the less 
developed form of this new dispensation: the concentrated spectacle. In 
contrast, by combining political democracy with the mixed economy, 
their Social Democratic rivals were able to create a more progressive 
form of capitalist domination: the diffuse spectacle. In 1950s Europe, 
when forced to choose between West and East in the Cold War, 
the survivors of 1920s Council Communism had no hesitation in 
siding with the Social Democrats against the Stalinists. As Marx had 
prophecised, the proletarian revolution would take place first in the 
most advanced capitalist nations. In Cold War Europe, the West was 
undoubtedly the lesser evil.71 
Like these 1920s veterans, by embracing the revolutionary zeal of 
Council Communism, the Situationist International at its 1962 
Stockholm Conference had also tacitly accepted the reformist 
compromises of Social Democracy. Paradoxically, the deep political 
differences between these parliamentary and anti-parliamentary 
currents within the Left masked their common theoretical assumptions. 
For the acolytes of Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin, the overthrow of 
capitalism was a subjective act of political will that was carried out by 
the vanguard party. If the proletarian revolution hadn’t yet taken place 
in a country, what was missing was the hardened nucleus of warrior 
intellectuals which could accomplish this world-historical task.72 
Rejecting this Bolshevik concept of voluntarist politics, Karl Kautsky 
– the intellectual champion of orthodox Marxism – had reaffirmed 
the programmatic outcome of the 1872 split between the Social 
 
70 See C.L.R. James, State Capitalism and World Revolution, pages 1–54; ‘Russia – 
a Fascist State’; and C.L.R. James, F.Forest and Ria Stone, The Invading Socialist 
Society, pages 23–32. 
71 See Anton Pannekoek, Workers’ Councils, pages 205–231; and International 
Communist Current, The Dutch and German Communist Left, pages 355–356.
72 See Grigory Zinoviev, ‘The Role of the Communist Party in Proletarian Revolution’; 
and Leon Trotsky, The Transitional Programme, pages 11–14.
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Democrats and the Anarchists within the European labour movement. 
While agitating for the liberation of humanity from oppression, the 
Left must always be acutely aware that its ambitions were limited by 
the objective circumstances within which it found itself.73 As Marx 
had argued, capitalism could not be superseded until its progressive 
possibilities had been completely exhausted.74 By campaigning for 
reforms in the present, Social Democrats were hastening the arrival of 
communist future. However, even with the most fervent ideological 
commitment, it was impossible to escape from capitalist exploitation 
until the time was right. If they understood Marx’s grand narrative 
of history correctly, all Marxists must be socio-economic determinists. 
Their subjective desire for libertarian communism required the 
objective preconditions for proletarian emancipation. The Russian 
tragedy was a terrible warning to those who thought otherwise. By 
trying to leap over the objective historical circumstances by an act of 
subjective will in 1917, the Bolsheviks had created a monstrous state 
capitalist tyranny. The victory of the premature socialist revolution was 
a disastrous defeat.75 
Opting to collaborate with the American empire at the outbreak of 
the Cold War, Social Democrats in 1950s Western Europe quickly 
shed their formal adherence to orthodox Marxism. In theory as well as 
practice, reforming capitalism had now become their only ambition.76 
Ironically, after the May ‘68 uprising, it was the left of the New Left 
that would revive the strategic wisdom of Marx’s followers in the 
1872 split. Through single issue campaigns, social movements and 
community media, the libertarian future could now be prefigured in 
73 See Karl Kautsky, The Dictatorship of the Proletariat, pages 1–58; The Materialist 
Conception of History, pages 450–464.
74 ‘No social order is ever destroyed before all the productive forces for which it is 
sufficient have been developed, and new superior relations of production never 
replace older ones before the material conditions for their existence have matured 
within the framework of the old society.’ Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique 
of Political Economy, page 21.
75 See Karl Kautsky, The Dictatorship of the Proletariat, pages 135–149; ‘The Lessons of 
the October Experiment’.
76 See Social Democratic Party, ‘Basic Programme of the Social Democratic Party of 
Germany’; and Anthony Crosland, The Future of Socialism. 
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the capitalist present.77 By the 1980s, these New Left activists were 
being recuperated within the institutions of the old parliamentary 
Left. As the years passed, they too would lose faith in the imminent 
arrival of the communist utopia. Slowly but surely, their adherence to 
Marxist fatalism transformed their interpretation of the Hegelian end 
of history into a more enlightened and pluralist version of neoliberal 
globalisation.78 In contrast, exiled in the French countryside, Debord 
stubbornly refused to capitulate to the new orthodoxy. Like James in 
the 1940s, this Situationist veteran ruthlessly criticised the delusions 
of the competing factions of the European Left. Confirming his 
deterministic version of Hegelian-Marxism, their attempts to prefigure 
the self-managed future in the present had been inevitably recuperated. 
The proletarian institutions which would sweep away the integrated 
spectacle could only be built once the cataclysmic transformation 
of human society was already taking place for real. Until this world-
historical moment arrived, the stoical duty of libertarian communists 
was to prepare for the spontaneous uprising which would bring the 
workers’ councils to undisputed power: ‘When the revolution is still far 
off, the difficult task of the revolutionary organisation is above all [the] 
practice of theory. [Only] when the revolution begins, its difficult task, 
more and more, is [the] theory of practice.’79 Patience was a Situationist 
virtue.
Enthused by this insight, with our two interventions for the Invisible 
Forces exhibition at the Furtherfield gallery, Class Wargames embarked 
on a new phase of our campaign of ludic subversion against spectacular 
capitalism. Back in 2007, in the first stage of this assault, we’d started 
out performing The Game of War as the Situationist retort to the elitist 
pretensions of avant-garde art. By moving its pieces across the board, 
everyone was able to engage in participatory creativity. Inspired by our 
visit to Cyberfest 2008 in St Petersburg, we soon became more interested 
77 See George Katsiaficas, The Imagination of the New Left, pages 177–256; and Félix 
Guattari, The Molecular Revolution, pages 175–287.
78 See Michel Rocard, À l’Épreuve des Faits; and Stuart Hall and Martin Jacques, New 
Times.
79 Guy Debord and Gianfranco Sanguinetti, The Veritable Split in the International, 
page 68. Emphasis in the original. For the 21st century update of this Situationist 
analysis, see R.S., ‘The Present Moment.’
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in The Game of War as the Situationist antidote to the authoritarian 
assumptions of vanguard politics. In this second phase of our campaign 
of ludic subversion, we proclaimed that – when everyone was playing 
at being a little Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin – then nobody could become 
the Bolshevik dictator who oppressed the proletariat. By 2012, our 
understanding of The Game of War had deepened even further. After 
five years of hosting events on three continents, we were now ready 
to answer the key conundrum of why Debord firmly believed that 
this ludic invention was his greatest achievement. According to his 
hagiographers, the maximum leader of Situationism was just being 
facetious. For them, Debord’s legacy must be his leftfield artworks, 
writings and films. At the very most, The Game of War was an eccentric 
homage to Duchamp’s Chess obsession or a frivolous distraction 
made for his rural retirement. Playing military simulations might be 
an entertaining leisure activity, but it had no political importance 
for grown-up revolutionaries. Under spectacular capitalism, ludic 
subversion was a contradiction in terms.   
At the Furtherfield gallery, Class Wargames took pleasure in refuting 
this snobbish assumption. After five years of active service in the field, 
Class Wargames could now explain why Debord’s The Game of War 
was designed as a Clausewitz simulator. This mock battle was much 
more than an avant-garde artwork promoting Situationist ideas. For 
Debord, his ludic invention was a political solution for the dangerous 
problem of charismatic leadership within the proletarian revolution. 
During that summer of 2012, mass spontaneous uprisings against 
neoliberal austerity were taking place across the world. From Athens 
and Madrid to New York and Cairo, the boosters of these Occupy 
movements argued that a horizontal form of networked politics was 
now emerging to replace the corrupt hierarchical structures of the 
Social Democratic and Bolshevik parties. But, like the militants of May 
‘68 before them, they too would soon discover that their leaderless 
revolution had produced its own unaccountable leaders. Within this 
new iteration of the New Left, Anarchists stubbornly denied the 
existence of the reborn invisible dictatorship while Autonomists loudly 
advocated their own hi-tech version of the Bolshevik vanguard. As the 
political and economic crisis worsened, growing popular support for a 
radical break with neoliberalism also encouraged other anti-capitalist 
activists to enter the electoral arena. With their elders’ timid reformism 
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discredited, this new generation of Social Democrats had rediscovered 
the more hardline parliamentary strategy of orthodox Marxism.80 
Ironically, the early-21st century’s explosion of participatory politics had 
quickly turned into the Left’s renewed commitment to representative 
politics in its multiple manifestations. Libertarian communism was 
still an imaginary future within the perpetual present.
For Debord, the rapid recuperation of the 2010s Occupy movements 
would have come as no surprise. Four decades earlier, he had observed 
the domestication of the New Left after the May ‘68 uprising with 
disdain. In non-revolutionary times, politics always remained the 
specialist activity of the privileged few. Spontaneous acts of rebellion 
were only brief premonitions of the coming hegemony of the workers’ 
councils. Until this world-historical moment arrived, the hard duty of 
the Situationists was to provide the proletariat as a whole with both 
the practical skills and the theoretical understanding which would 
be required for successfully smashing the integrated spectacle.81 In 
contrast, whether overtly or covertly, the Social Democratic, Anarchist, 
Bolshevik and Autonomist sects all assumed that only a self-selected 
minority was capable of fulfilling the vital task of guiding this 
fundamental transformation of modern society. As James had argued, 
the insurgent masses would inevitably elevate from their midst the 
revolutionary tribunes who could express their own emancipatory 
desires.82 But, as Donkor’s stunning painting reminded visitors to the 
Furtherfield gallery, the people’s trust in these skilful generals had been 
disappointed again and again. Fortunately, Debord had an inspired 
solution to this intractable obstacle to human progress. By playing 
Situationist games, the millions of rank-and-file workers could now 
learn how to lead themselves in the collective struggle for libertarian 
communism. Ludic artworks were now dedicated to the service of the 
80 See Eric Olin Wright , ‘Class Struggle and Class Compromise in an Era of Stagnation 
and Crisis’; and Christosforos Vernardakis, ‘The Greek Left in the 2012 Elections’.
81 ‘The theory of revolution is judged by this sole criterion that its knowledge must 
become a power.’ Guy Debord and Gianfranco Sanguinetti, The Veritable Split in the 
International, page 69. Emphasis in the original.
82 ‘[The] ... people ... produced from themselves and their own resources the great 
body of leaders.’ C.L.R. James, Kwame Nkrumah and the Ghana Revolution, page 
61.
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proletarian revolution. Like the 2008 performance of Reds versus Reds at 
the Winter Palace, we’d devised our 2012 détournement of Commands 
& Colors: Napoleonics as an interactive lesson in insurrectionary 
history. More importantly, having commenced the third phase of our 
campaign of ludic subversion, we also presented this simulation as an 
immersive exercise in military theory. By re-enacting the 1802 battle 
of Fort Bedourete, the Haitian and French teams were acquiring the 
virtuoso attributes of the skilful general in a simplified form. On that 
summer’s day in the Furtherfield gallery, the Bonapartists had prevailed 
because they were better at maximising the destructive capabilities of 
their forces than their Jacobin opponents. Crucially, Class Wargames 
had discovered this practical application of ludic subversion through 
repeatedly playing The Game of War. By fighting the Marengo and 
Austerlitz scenarios, the participants at our performances were 
now able to learn the strategic and tactical insights derived from 
Clausewitz’s writings built into Debord’s simulation. After five years 
of frenetic activities, we’d finally understood why The Game of War was 
his greatest achievement: it was the Situationist cure for the oligarchical 
recuperation of participatory democracy. When every proletarian knew 
how to be a military captain, then revolutionary leadership could be 
exercised by the entire class.83  In this third stage of our campaign 
of ludic subversion, Debord’s Clausewitz simulator was teaching its 
leftist players to become like ‘… the … adventurous … general who 
understands and decides as much with instinct as with the available 
information ... [whose] genius and inspiration ... indicates a higher 
level of intellectual activity.’84
83 See Class Wargames, ‘Communiqué #9’; ‘Communiqué #10’.
84 Carl von Clausewitz, Campagne de 1799 en Suisse et en Italie, page 42.
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3.3: The Craft of Wargaming
During his Auvergne exile in the 1970s, Debord had pursued the 
two parallel and intertwined projects of book publishing and game 
development which were both inspired by the Napoleonic era. For the 
first part of this plan, he’d begun by persuading Lebovici to commission 
a new and improved French translation of Clausewitz’s masterpiece: 
On War. He also arranged for their company to reprint this Prussian 
soldier’s campaign chronologies as well as Bonaparte’s maxims and 
Charles Napier’s account of the 1809 Corunna operation. In contrast 
with the other left-wing publishers in 1970s France, Champ Libre 
stood out because its catalogue prominently featured classic texts 
of military theory and military history.85 For the second half of this 
mission, Debord devoted his energies to completing The Game of War. 
In collaboration with Lebovici, he carefully planned the promotional 
campaign for his ludic masterpiece. Champ Libre published the 
players’ manual which he’d written in collaboration with Becker-Ho. 
The gold-and-silver metal board and pieces provided iconic images for 
his In Girum Imus Nocte film. Just before Lebovici’s murder ruined 
everything, Debord had been preparing the release of a cardboard 
version of his game for the mass market. Every Situationist admirer 
must be able to learn Clausewitz’s military theory by playing The Game 
of War at their local bohemian cafés and workers’ bars.  
Revealingly, Debord described his new creation as a modern stripped-
down version of Kriegspiel.  By using this misspelt German term, 
he was endowing The Game of War with an illustrious historical 
pedigree.86 According to the authoritative accounts, the ancestor of 
both professional and hobbyist wargaming was an  early-19th century 
Prussian military simulation: Kriegsspiel.87 First invented by Georg 
von Reisswitz in 1812 and then perfected by his son and namesake 
85 For Champ Libre’s publications, see Éditions Ivrea, ‘Catalogue’. Also see Len 
Bracken, Guy Debord, pages 215–217; and Anselm Jappe, Guy Debord, page 114.
86 See Guy Debord, ‘À Gérard Lebovici 24 Mai 1976’; and Panegyric, pages 63–7. 
Anticipating Debord, H.G. Wells had the same misspelling of Kriegsspiel in the 
subtitle of his Little Wars book.
87 See Peter Perla, The Art of Wargaming, pages 23–30; and Charles Grant, The War 
Game, page 15. 
258 259
during the 1820s, this miniature version of Horse-and-Musket warfare 
was designed to teach and perfect the skills of ordering troops on the 
battlefield without the necessity of holding expensive field manoeuvres. 
When the younger von Reisswitz put on a demonstration of Kriegsspiel 
for the Prussian high command in 1824, the initially sceptical Chief of 
the General Staff exclaimed with enthusiasm at the end of the session: 
‘This is not a game, this is a war exercise! I must recommend it to the 
whole army!’88 
What had made Kriegsspiel so distinctive on that Berlin evening was 
its  abandonment of the mechanics of Chess. Long ago in 6th century 
South Asia, this board game had also started out as a military training 
exercise. The squared grid symbolised the open field where the two 
opposing feudal hosts had agreed to do battle with each other. The 
pieces represented the different types of troops who’d fought in the 
South Asian despots’ armies: infantry, marines, cavalry and elephants.89 
However, gradually over time, the practical purposes of Chess were 
eclipsed by its intellectual pleasures. Inside the Arab and European 
courts of the medieval period, this military simulation was domesticated 
and feminised. For warrior aristocrats and their paramours, Chess now 
became ‘... the [poetic] metaphor of choice for the etiquette of lovers.’90 
With the queen as its most powerful piece, this ancient game had long 
ceased to be a teacher of the skills of generalship. In his 16th century 
Italian handbook for ambitious courtiers, Baldesar Castiglione warned 
against playing Chess too well in case it betrayed an unhealthy interest 
in frivolous matters. Serious people knew that board games were for 
relaxation not elucidation.91  
Since medieval times, there’d been successive attempts to return Chess 
to its military origins. New pieces were added and different boards 
were devised, but these variants always retained the original’s basic 
mechanics: perfect information about the opponent’s deployment, 
88 Karl von Müffling in Bill Leeson, ‘Origins of the Kriegsspiel’.
89 See Richard Eales, Chess, pages 19–38.
90 Marilyn Yalom, Birth of the Chess Queen, page 123. Also see Richard Eales, Chess, 
pages 38–70; and Class Wargames, ‘Communiqué #6.
91 See Baldesar Castiglione, The Book of the Courtier, pages 140–141.
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moving only one piece at a time and combat as instant elimination.92 
The elder von Reisswitz’s brilliant idea was to break completely with 
the Chess engine. Instead, he took his inspiration from the wartime 
experience of staff officers in their headquarters directing troops on 
the battlefield. Famously, Bonaparte had coordinated his army corps 
in devastating onslaughts against the enemy’s forces by moving pins 
symbolising each unit across campaign maps.93 But, by the time that 
the younger von Reisswitz demonstrated Kriegsspiel to the Prussian 
General Staff, Europe was more or less at peace. It was now very 
difficult for its officers to receive the exhilarating on-the-job training 
that had transformed Bonaparte into the military master of the 
continent. Unable to fight real wars, von Reisswitz proposed that they 
instead should play his wargame. By training hard with Kriegsspiel, the 
Prussian General Staff would be at the peak of combat readiness when 
hostilities next recommenced in Europe.94 
In its conception, von Reisswitz’s game was an indoor version of 
tactical exercises without troops. Rather than officers riding across the 
countryside imagining where their regiments might attack or defend, 
Kriegsspiel simulated the look and feel of a staff headquarters at war. 
The two sides were placed in different rooms with maps which initially 
only showed the deployment of their own troops. Their pieces were 
divided into the infantry, cavalry and artillery units of a typical early-
19th century army. Under the supervision of umpires, the rival teams 
ordered these forces forward until contact was made with the enemy. 
The complex rules of Kriegsspiel simulated the full-range of military 
activities: moving in column and line, crossing rivers, skirmishing, 
musket fire, artillery bombardments, hand-to-hand combat, fighting 
in towns, taking prisoners, retreating in panic and following up a 
victory. Special dice were thrown to calculate the casualties inflicted 
by different types of weaponry.95 Within the safe environment of 
Kriegsspiel, the Prussian General Staff was now able by proxy to 
92 See Alfred Hausrath, Venture Simulations in War, Business and Politics, pages 3–5; 
Peter Perla, The Art of Wargaming, pages 16–19; and Andrew Wilson, The Bomb and 
the Computer, pages 2–3.
93 See Jean-Baptiste Vachée, Napoleon at Work, pages 67–73.
94 See Peter Perla, The Art of Wargaming, pages 25–30.
95 See Georg von Reisswitz, Kriegsspiel.
260 261
experience the discord and unpredictability of war. As their miniature 
units moved across its maps, its officers were transforming themselves 
into the new Bonapartes of Europe. 
In 1866, the potency of Kriegsspiel for the planning of military operations 
was dramatically confirmed by the crushing Prussian victory over the 
Austrians at the battle of Königgrätz. The skills acquired on map 
manoeuvres had given the edge to the players of von Reisswitz’s game 
in this deadly confrontation. Not surprisingly, following the Prussian 
triumph at Königgrätz, armies across the world quickly introduced 
Kriegsspiel into their own military training programmes.96 Crucially, 
for the new generation of professional officers, these simulations 
also became predictions of a future European conflagration as the 
long peace of the 19th century drew to a close. Echoing the popular 
invasion fantasy books of the period, their games speculated about the 
major powers engaging in a ferocious Napoleonic struggle for absolute 
hegemony over the continent.97 It was by repeatedly playing simulations 
of a two-front war against both France and Russia that the German 
General Staff decided to concentrate their forces first in the West and 
– with this opponent defeated – then turn them on their adversary 
in the East: the Schlieffen Plan. After gaming its own version of this 
scenario, the British General Staff persuaded its political paymasters to 
make a formal alliance with France to prevent the military power of 
Berlin threatening London from the other side of the English Channel. 
Kriegsspiel was playing the future in the present.98
When the First World War broke out in 1914, what had first been 
simulated in military training exercises was now implemented for real 
with disastrous results. Far from delivering a quick victory in the West, 
the Schlieffen Plan resulted in the long stalemate of trench warfare 
which culminated in a humiliating defeat for Germany. Instead of 
96 See Peter Perla, The Art of Wargaming, pages 30–34; and Andrew Wilson, The Bomb 
and the Computer, pages 6–14.
97 See I.F. Clarke, ‘Dorking Revisited’. In The War of the Worlds, H.G. Wells added 
a science fiction twist to this fashionable theme by replacing the Germans with 
Martians as the invaders of England.
98 See Andrew Wilson, The Bomb and the Computer, pages 17–26; and Peter Perla, The 
Art of Wargaming, page 41 .
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securing its global empire, Britain’s military intervention into this 
continental conflict drained so much of the country’s wealth and power 
that the USA emerged as the top nation on the planet by the end of the 
fighting. The seductive predictions of Kriegsspiel had proved to be false 
prophecies.99 Despite these disappointments, admirals and generals 
still retained their enthusiasm for military planning with wargames. 
During the 1920s and 1930s, the US navy played detailed simulations 
to test out its plans for fighting against the British or Japanese fleets. 
Over in the East, the leaders of the Red Army devised the defence-
in-depth strategy which would deliver victory in the next war by 
conducting exercises which experimented with different responses 
to an invasion of Bolshevik Russia from the West.100 Above all, the 
German military kept faith with the predictive powers of Kriegsspiel. 
In 1940, its generals were able to discover the route through the 
Ardennes which led to victory over France through repeatedly playing 
wargames of this forthcoming confrontation.101 Four years later, when 
the tables had been turned, the German General Staff was participating 
in a simulation of the expected Anglo-American crossing of the Rhine 
when suddenly news arrived that the Allies were making a probing 
attack nearby.102 Switching from fantasy to reality, these officers now 
returned to playing the wargame which they couldn’t possibly win. 
Before another year was out, Germany had gone down to an even more 
disastrous defeat as its battered forces were overwhelmed by double-
pincer attacks from both the West and the East. Clever gaming tactics 
couldn’t compensate for Hitler’s self-destructive geopolitical strategy.
By the end of the Second World War, the peoples of Europe knew 
from bitter experience that German militarism was the most viciously 
reactionary political ideology on the continent. Yet, only a century 
and a half earlier, patriotic Prussian officers like Clausewitz were in 
the vanguard of their country’s reform movement. The old fighting 
99 For the horrific human and material costs of the First World War, see Eric 
Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes, pages 21–35.
100 See Peter Perla, The Art of Wargaming, pages 70–76; and Jacob Kipp, ‘Soviet Military 
Doctrine and the Origins of Operational Art’, pages 110–114.
101 See Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader, pages 90–92. 
102 See Peter Perla, The Art of Wargaming, page 44; and Thomas Allen, War Games, page 
129.
262 263
methods of the absolute monarchy had been discredited by defeat after 
defeat on the battlefield. If French domination was to be thwarted, 
the Prussian army would have to be modernised along French lines. 
Motivated citizens made better soldiers than brutalised mercenaries. 
Talent not birth should decide who became an officer. Above all, the 
commander-in-chief of the army must be its most skilful general rather 
than a royal flunky. In 1806, the immigrant artillery corporal who’d been 
elevated into the emperor of the French starkly exposed the military 
deficiencies of a political system based upon inherited privilege and 
smug ignorance. At the battle of Jena-Auerstädt, squabbling generals, 
obsolete tactics and meddling courtiers had doomed the Prussian 
cause. Like other nationalistic officers, Clausewitz understood that 
political reform was now the precondition for reversing this military 
debacle. The Prussian state could only beat Bonaparte by becoming 
Bonapartist itself.103  
In the aftermath of Jena-Auerstädt, Clausewitz and his allies argued for 
two key innovations: the detailed education of officers and the mass 
mobilisation of  citizen-soldiers. Not surprisingly, reactionaries at court 
denounced these liberal supporters of army modernisation as closet 
Jacobins. The professionalisation of the officer corps would weaken the 
aristocracy’s preeminence over state institutions. The universalisation 
of military service could presage the democratisation of political 
power. Throughout his career, Clausewitz stayed a dissident within the 
Prussian military establishment.104 Most notably, in 1812, he’d opted 
to fight with the Russians against Bonaparte whose invading army 
included a large contingent of troops supplied by his own king. Being 
a liberal, Clausewitz’s sense of patriotism was defined by loyalty to the 
nation before the monarchy.105 Over the next three years, his scandalous 
defection was vindicated as the Prussian army first switched sides and 
then took a leading role in the military annihilation of Bonaparte’s 
empire. However, Clausewitz would always remain politically suspect 
for being prematurely correct. Fortunately, when peace was restored, 
103 See Carl von Clausewitz, Notes sur la Prusse dans sa Grande Catastrophe 1806, pages 
3–47. Also see Peter Paret, Clausewitz and the State, pages 98–136; and Beatrice 
Heuser, Reading Clausewitz, pages 26–27, 50–52.
104 See Peter Paret, Clausewitz and the State, pages 123–146, 288–292.
105 See Peter Paret, Clausewitz and the State, pages 166–168, 209–228.
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he was able to focus his energies on improving the education of young 
officers. Like his Whist partner Hegel, Clausewitz also wanted the 
Prussia state to be administered by an enlightened oligarchy of public 
servants. Both the fervent admirer and the bitter enemy of Bonaparte 
were agreed that bourgeois meritocracy provided the third way between 
the two political extremes of the 1789 French Revolution: levelling 
democracy and aristocratic privilege.106 
As a military instructor, Clausewitz emphasised that leadership within 
the army was a skill that had to be learnt not only in the field, but also in 
the classroom. The popularity of Kriegsspiel within the Prussian officer 
corps exemplified the success of Clausewitz’s progressive pedagogy. 
In contrast with their peers elsewhere, these peacetime soldiers were 
playing wargames as a training exercise for fighting wars. Using the 
insights of Kriegsspiel, they were carrying out strategic analyses which 
would enable them to defeat their nation’s rivals. Although none of 
them had the individual brilliance of Bonaparte, these educated and 
meritocratic officers had created their own collective version of this 
genius general: the Prussian General Staff. In 1820s Berlin, Clausewitz 
became the intellectual mentor of this modernising state institution.107 
He wrote a series of fascinating campaign histories which elucidated the 
political imperatives and military options of the Napoleonic wars. By 
placing themselves in the commander-in-chief ’s position, his readers 
could study the successes and reverses of past conflicts to understand 
how to put these lessons into practice themselves. As in Kriegsspiel, 
re-enacting these historical engagements was making preparations for 
future conflicts.108   
During his time at the Berlin academy, Clausewitz worked hard on 
his famous philosophical and practical meditation upon the 1789 
French Revolution’s radical transformation of military violence: On 
War. Like many German liberal intellectuals, he looked to dialectical 
 
106 See Peter Paret, Clausewitz and the State, pages 286–306.
107 See Peter Paret, Clausewitz and the State, pages 270–285; and Beatrice Heuser, 
Reading Clausewitz, pages 12–13.
108 See Carl von Clausewitz, On War, pages 162–163, 181–204. Also see Peter Paret, 
Clausewitz and the State, pages 307–355.
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theory to unlock the secrets of the turbulent events of his times. For 
Clausewitz, the abstract concept of Absolute War provided his way into 
understanding the confusing practicalities of Limited War. Back in the 
mid-18th century, the European powers had ruthlessly struggled against 
each other for territory and prestige. However, possessing only small 
professional armies, they’d always been forced to curb their imperial 
ambitions. In this exemplar, Limited War was an aristocratic game with 
fixed rules and rigid conventions.109 As the ideologue of the Prussian 
General Staff, Clausewitz’s task was to explain why the storming of the 
Bastille brought this brief civilised interlude to a sudden end. In 1792, 
by mobilising the masses to defend the nation, the French republic had 
unleashed the martial energy of Absolute War upon the continent.110 
Fulfilling Rousseau’s predictions, its citizen-soldiers quickly learnt 
how to overcome the mercenary troops of the old order. Composed of 
politicised volunteers, the French republic’s army dreamt of liberating 
the whole of Europe from monarchical tyranny. Intoxicated with 
ideological fervour, these Jacobin warriors were endowed with the 
essential weapon for winning the opening round of this Absolute War: 
high morale.111 
In his canonical text, Clausewitz argued that the strength of the modern 
nation-state was now measured by a new secular trinity: the army, the 
government and the people. When combined together effectively, 
political leaders were able to utilise military violence to realise their 
territorial and ideological ambitions.112 As the armed prophet of the 
1789 French Revolution, Bonaparte had perfected the cutting-edge 
strategy for Absolute War: the concentration of forces to win the 
decisive battle which utterly destroyed his opponent’s main army. Once 
he’d achieved military superiority, this skilful general then occupied 
the enemy’s capital city and dictated the terms of a humiliating peace 
109 See Carl von Clausewitz, On War, pages 738–745. Also see Peter Paret, Clausewitz 
and the State, pages 24–29.
110 See Carl von Clausewitz, On War, pages 700–725. Also see Beatrice Heuser, Reading 
Clausewitz, pages 24–29.
111 See Carl von Clausewitz, On War, pages 216–227.
112 See Carl von Clausewitz, On War, page 101. Also see Beatrice Heuser, Reading 
Clausewitz, pages 52–56.
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treaty.113 During the 1806 Jena-Auerstädt campaign, Clausewitz had 
witnessed the effectiveness of this revolutionary method of fighting 
wars at first hand. Being a leading military reformer, he argued that 
the Prussian state must imitate the meritocratic and equalitarian ethos 
of Bonaparte’s army: promotion by talent and mass conscription. 
Above all, he stressed that this rejuvenation of military power must 
also be accompanied by the renewal of the nation’s political culture. 
The destruction of French hegemony over Europe required what the 
Prussian state had so obviously lacked in 1806: determined leadership 
from above and popular support from below. The fate of soldiers on 
the battlefield was determined by the attitudes of civilians in their 
homeland.114
When he wrote On War, Clausewitz was reflecting on his own 
dramatic experiences during the Napoleonic wars. In 1812, he’d been 
there when the deadly of combination of the Tsar’s obstinacy and the 
peasantry’s hostility had doomed the French invasion of Russia.115 
During 1813–4, he’d fought alongside the volunteer militias who had 
sparked off the national uprising against the French occupation of 
Germany.116 In his masterpiece, Clausewitz explained why destroying 
Bonaparte had meant becoming like Bonaparte. In both 1814 and 
1815, the methods of Absolute War were turned against their greatest 
practitioner. Uniting against the common enemy, the European 
powers had relentlessly pursued the upstart emperor until his army 
was destroyed and his capital city was occupied. After two decades 
of bloody conflict, a political peace was finally imposed upon France 
through overwhelming military force.117 For Clausewitz, the downfall 
of Bonaparte had been a historical moment that provided theoretical 
illumination. The cruelty and chaos of armed combat had resulted in 
113 See Carl von Clausewitz, On War, pages 265–321, 700–703. Also see Jean-Baptiste 
Vachée, Napoleon at Work, page 128, 160–178.
114 See Charles Esdaile, The Wars of Napoleon, pages 182–216.
115 See Carl von Clausewitz, The Campaign of 1812 in Russia. Also see Peter Paret, 
Clausewitz and the State, pages 222–254.
116 These citizen-soldiers were more of a political than military threat to the Napoleonic 
imperial system, see Daniel Moran, ‘Arms and the Concert’.
117 For his account of the destruction of Bonaparte’s empire, see Carl von Clausewitz, 
Campagne de 1814; and Campagne de 1815 en France.
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the establishment of a stable constitutional settlement in Europe. In 
what would become his most famous phrase, Clausewitz revealed the 
rationality of power within the irrationality of violence: ‘ ... war ... is a 
continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means.’118 
On 26th November 1812, the two greatest military theorists of the 
Napoleonic era had faced each other in battle on opposite banks of 
the Berezina river in Belarus. Amongst the pursuing Russian army, 
Clausewitz was serving as a staff officer in the Tsar’s crusade against 
the heathen invaders. On the far side of river with the bedraggled 
remnants of the retreating French army was a Swiss soldier who was 
an aide-de-camp to one of Bonaparte’s marshals: Antoine-Henri 
Jomini.119 Although they’d never meet in person, these two intellectuals 
in uniform would over the next few decades become the gurus of 
rival pedagogies within the army academies. In On War, Clausewitz 
emphasised that military theory was a conceptual toolbox to analyse 
the social and political implications of military history.120 Absolute War 
was an abstract formula which could never be fully realisable in practice. 
Even the skilful general with enthusiastic troops could find his most 
brilliant plans going awry due to circumstances beyond his control. 
Political ambitions were always being frustrated by the ‘friction’ of 
war.121 According to Clausewitz, the purpose of dialectical theory was 
pragmatic. In military history, all wars were more or less Limited Wars. 
Yet, only the abstract concept of Absolute War allowed the warrior 
intellectual to understand the rational strategy and tactics which had 
enabled one side to triumph in these eruptions of armed violence. 
From this theoretical insight, Clausewitz was able to draw practical 
conclusions for his pupils at the Berlin academy. Whether playing 
Kriegsspiel or fighting on campaign, these Prussian officers could use 
his dialectical philosophy to discover the best solutions for resolving 
118 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, page 99. Also see Beatrice Heuser, Reading Clausewitz, 
pages 33–41.
119 See Christopher Bassford, ‘Jomini and Clausewitz’, page 5. Clausewitz gave his own 
account of this battle in The Campaign of 1812 in Russia, pages 206–212. Also see 
Adam Zamoyski, 1812, pages 458–480.
120 See Carl von Clausewitz, On War, pages 153–171, 181–198.
121 ‘War ... is movement through a thick medium.’ Carl von Clausewitz, The Campaign 
of 1812 in Russia, page 185. Also see Carl von Clausewitz, On War, pages 138–140.
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practical military problems: establishing lines of communications, 
positioning arsenals, defending mountain passes and, last but not least, 
crossing rivers. As Clausewitz’s On War explained, these geographical 
obstacles weakened the defender more than the attacker because its 
forces were dispersed to cover multiple bridges and fords.122 At that 
1812 engagement on the Berezina, Clausewitz watched his theory 
become reality as Jomini and the rest of the French army had escaped 
from the encircling Russian forces. Much to the chagrin of this Prussian 
patriot, Bonaparte had survived to fight another day.123 
When peace eventually came, Jomini was able to write his best-selling 
instruction manual which systematised the strategical and tactical 
innovations of the Napoleonic period: The Art of War. In contrast with 
Clausewitz, he wasn’t much interested in the political and social reasons 
why the nations of Europe had been involved in such destructive 
armed conflicts with each other.124 Instead, he saw warfare primarily 
as a set of technical skills that defined the professional officer corps. In 
the field and in the classroom, cadets learnt how to imitate Bonaparte’s 
favourite manoeuvres of outflanking the enemy or breaking through 
the centre of his line.125 Within the military academy, Jomini became 
the geometrician of Horse-and-Musket warfare. His textbook was 
intensely practical with no unnecessary political or philosophical 
reflections to disturb its more conservative readers. Wars between 
nations were decided by the size of their armies, the firepower of their 
weaponry, the morale of the soldiers and, above all else, the capabilities 
of their commanders. By studying Jomini, the diligent student 
122 For his analysis of the pitfalls of river defences, see Carl von Clausewitz, On War, 
pages 522–540. Also see Napoléon Bonaparte, Military Maxims, pages 41–46.
123 Not surprisingly, his rival praised the ‘truly wonderful’ crossing of the Berezina 
river by the French army, see Antoine-Henri Jomini, The Art of War, page 228. We 
were delighted that the 2013 Russian Army Expansion set of Commands & Colors: 
Napoleonics contained a scenario for refighting this fascinating engagement.
124 Jomini quickly rushed through the different causes and types of warfare in the 
opening section of The Art of War, pages 1–26.  
125 See Antoine-Henri Jomini, The Art of War, pages 56–254.
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could become a little Bonaparte without any taint of Jacobinism.126 
Victory was secured through mathematical formulas which were only 
understood by professional officers. The players of Kriegsspiel were the 
experts of the military trade and politicians shouldn’t interfere in their 
business. Within bourgeois society, war was an end in itself. 
126 ‘Jomini ... saw the revolutionary warfare which he himself had participated as 
merely the technical perfection of a fundamentally unchanging phenomenon, to 
be modified only by superficial matters like the list of dramatis personae, technology 
and transient political motivations.’  Christopher Bassford, ‘Jomini and Clausewitz’, 
page 4.
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3.4: Gaming the Future
In 1876, Julius von Verdy du Vernois published a new type of Kriegsspiel 
which dispensed with the rules and dice of von Reisswitz’s 1824 version. 
In their place, this German staff officer relied upon the game’s umpires 
to decide the progress of the action. From their military experience 
in Prussia’s recent wars against Denmark, Austria and France, his 
colleagues were able to determine the speed of movement of the rival 
armies and the likely outcome of any combat between them.127 For von 
Verdy, this ‘free’ form of Kriegsspiel solved the problem of its players 
gaming the game. Instead of concentrating on simulating warfare, far 
too many of them were using quirks in von Reisswitz’s rules to gain 
an advantage over their opponents. But, by transforming this ‘rigid’ 
military simulation into a role-playing exercise, von Verdy’s umpires 
were able to prevent any unrealistic outcomes thrown up by these ludic 
anomalies.128 Just as importantly, participating in Kriegsspiel was now 
much easier for busy officers who already had too many commitments 
on their time. With no rules to master, they instead played the game by 
simply telling the umpires where they wanted their forces to move and 
fight. If organised correctly, this version of Kriegsspiel was a facsimile of 
working at army headquarters under battlefield conditions.129
Impressed by Prussia’s victories in Europe, the Japanese military also 
became ardent wargamers as this country’s rulers embarked upon the 
conquest of East Asia. Both the winning strategy in the 1905 war 
against Russia and the 1941 airborne assault on the US fleet in Hawaii 
were devised with the help of detailed simulations. However, the 
Japanese General Staff’s enthusiasm for the free version of Kriegsspiel 
would eventually lead to disaster at the 1942 battle of Midway. Seeking 
to please their superior officers, the umpires of the game held to plan 
this operation decided that its side’s aircraft carriers were invulnerable 
127 ‘... what the [War] Game especially requires is a knowledge of the capabilities and 
fighting power of all arms, as well as their principal accepted formations.’  Julius von 
Verdy du Vernois in John Curry, Verdy’s Free Kriegspiel, page 14.
128 See Peter Perla, The Art of Wargaming, pages 31–34; and Andrew Wilson, The Bomb 
and the Computer, pages 6–7.
129 See von Verdy’s blow-by-blow account of his Connewitz game in John Curry, Verdy’s 
Free Kriegspiel, pages 23–100.
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to torpedo attacks by American fighter planes. Unfortunately for the 
Japanese navy, when the battle was fought for real four weeks later, their 
opponents quickly exposed the fallacy of this subjective judgement. 
After a series of devastating raids by the US airforce, two-thirds of 
its carrier fleet had been sunk – and the war in the Pacific was lost. 
Contrary to von Verdy’s expectations, abolishing the rules and dice of 
Kriegsspiel didn’t stop its players gaming the game. The desire to win an 
imaginary victory had resulted in the worst defeat in Japanese military 
history.130    
During the Second World War, the US navy benefited from its many 
peacetime simulations of potential conflicts in the Atlantic and 
Pacific. Like their German and Japanese rivals, its commanders also 
extensively used wargames to work out the best strategy and tactics for 
forthcoming operations against the enemy. However, the Americans 
much preferred the rigid versions of Kriegsspiel over its free variants.131 
This positivist bias was confirmed when the US navy’s wargamers 
discovered their British ally’s cutting-edge weapon in the battle of 
the Atlantic: operational research. In this pioneering form of systems 
analysis, scientists constructed mathematical models to discover the 
optimal routes for supply convoys and the most effective deployment 
of anti-submarine patrols. By incorporating this empirical data into 
their military simulations, American sailors were now able to formulate 
much more realistic rules for their manoeuvres with maps. Rather than 
rely on the subjective judgement of umpires, the US navy’s wargames 
were based upon the cold logic of mathematical equations.132   
In its bitter struggle against Germany and Japan, the American 
government mobilised patriotic scientists to develop the advanced 
weaponry that would win the anti-fascist struggle: tanks, airplanes, 
radar, code-breaking and the atomic bomb. By the time that the 
130 See Peter Perla, The Art of Wargaming, pages 45–48; Alfred Hausrath, Venture 
Simulations in War, Business and Politics, pages 30–32; and Andrew Wilson, The 
Bomb and the Computer, pages 32–35.
131 See Alfred Hausrath, Venture Simulations in War, Business and Politics, pages 32–35, 
61–71; and Peter Perla, The Art of Wargaming, pages 63–76.
132 See Alfred Hausrath, Venture Simulations in War, Business and Politics, pages 39–44; 
and Andrew Wilson, The Bomb and the Computer, pages 36–43.
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Cold War broke out in 1948, these once marginalised academics had 
become honoured members of the ruling elite. Crucially, it had been in 
their laboratories where the formulas of physics were transformed into 
a military technology which was capable of wiping out entire cities in 
one blow. Not surprisingly, the US state now looked to these warrior 
intellectuals to maintain its preeminence over the new Russian enemy.133 
Alongside the natural scientists who were involved in armaments 
research, social scientists were also recruited for the American team in 
this geopolitical confrontation. Generously funded by the US airforce, 
the RAND think-tank was set to work on solving what was the most 
important challenge facing the nation’s leadership: devising a credible 
strategy for fighting the Cold War.134 Both superpowers now possessed 
atomic bombs which could inflict massive damage on its rival. By 
the early-1950s, Clausewitz’s Absolute War was no longer an abstract 
theoretical concept. Instead, it had become a terrifying premonition of 
the genocidal logic of nuclear conflict. If the two superpowers did start 
fighting each other, the US military’s primary task was to carry out the 
total annihilation of Russia’s cities and their unfortunate inhabitants. 
But, because their Eastern opponent could also retaliate in kind, 
any attempt to use these atomic bombs would be suicidal. The most 
powerful weapon in the world was also its most impractical.135    
During the early-1950s, RAND’s intellectuals tried to make sense of this 
military conundrum. From Clausewitz, they understood that fighting 
wars was carrying out politics with violent methods.136 Their biggest 
problem was how to apply this brilliant theoretical insight to the genesis 
of US nuclear strategy when there were no historical precedents for two 
sides fighting each other with atomic weapons. While Clausewitz had 
theorised war by studying the past, his admirers at RAND had instead 
to analyse the superpowers’ nuclear confrontation by simulating the 
133 See Stuart Leslie, The Cold War and American Science; and André Schiffrin, The Cold 
War and the University. 
134 See Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon, pages 51–84; and Irving Louis 
Horowitz, The War Game, pages 13–16.
135 In 1960, RAND predicted that up to 90 million Americans could be killed in a full-
scale nuclear war with Russia, see Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, page 113. 
136 See Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon, pages 79; and Beatrice Heuser, 
Reading Clausewitz, pages 152–168.
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future. As the mentor of this think-tank, Johnny von Neumann – the 
Hungarian émigré who’d helped to invent both the computer and 
the atomic bomb – championed the mathematical modelling of the 
USA’s geopolitical strategic choices: game theory. Back in the 1920s, 
he’d argued that smart Poker players epitomised the rational egoism of 
bourgeois society. As in the neo-classical economists’ musings about the 
free market, each of them competed for their own gain by observing 
a common set of rules.137 The RAND academics already knew that 
Clausewitz had compared fighting battles with both playing at cards 
and making business deals.138 Now, in its early-1950s updating, game 
theory became their favoured scientific method of analysing the Cold 
War. With its dispassionate calculations, the irrationality of risking the 
nuclear apocalypse could now be rationalised as a series of excellent 
Poker moves. Both superpowers would gain if they mutually disarmed, 
but neither could trust the other to keep any deal because the rewards 
of trickery were too great in the atomic age. When expressed as a 
mathematical formula, games theory revealed that the USA’s most 
rational strategy was to keep on building more and more nuclear 
weapons: the Prisoners’ Dilemma.139 Simulating the future had told 
RAND’s paymasters what they wanted to hear. It was now scientifically 
proven that the US airforce required a much bigger bomber fleet.140  
Named in homage to Clausewitz’s masterpiece, Herman Kahn’s 1960 
book – On Thermonuclear War – imagined a military technology that 
would come to define the kamikaze logic of the arms race between the 
two superpowers: the ‘Doomsday Machine’. In this RAND-sponsored 
thought experiment, the Americans would construct a massive nuclear 
bomb which could wipe out all life on earth with radioactive fallout. If 
the Russians ever broke the rules of acceptable geopolitical behaviour, 
they’d run the risk of its computer program deciding to detonate the 
137 See John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic 
Behaviour; and Steve Heims, John von Neumann and Norbert Wiener, pages 43–46, 
79–95, 193–194, 292–293.
138 See Carl von Clausewitz, On War, pages 97, 111.
139 See Anatol Rapoport, Fights, Games and Debates, pages 15–46; and Irving Louis 
Horowitz, The War Game, pages 16–28.
140 See Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon, pages 85–110.
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weapon which would bring about the extinction of humanity.141 In this 
RAND remix, Clausewitz’s theoretical concept of Absolute War had 
inspired the practical strategy of atomic armageddon: ‘mutually assured 
destruction’. Acting as rational players, both America and Russia 
continually increased their nuclear stockpiles to ensure that neither 
side could deprive the other of its instruments of human genocide. 
Global stability was now founded upon a suicide pact between the two 
superpowers.142 
In parallel to this research, Kahn and his RAND colleagues also 
investigated how Clausewitz’s Limited War could be fought with 
atomic bombs. Adopting the terminology of game theory, they 
speculated that a single nuclear strike against Leningrad might be 
the most effective method of ‘signalling’ disapproval of any Russian 
attack on US-controlled West Berlin. In this ‘tit-for-tat’ strategy, the 
Americans would continue wreaking atomic destruction on their 
enemy until the geopolitical stalemate in Europe was restored.143 For 
the RAND academics, nuclear weapons were welcome as the most 
powerful pieces on the board of the Cold War game. By the mid-
1960s, Kahn was appearing at public meetings in towns and cities 
across America to explain the 44 rungs of his ‘escalation ladder’ which 
began with an ‘Ostensible Crisis’ and ended with a devastating ‘Spasm 
or Insensate War’.144 Thanks to game theory, the unthinkable had 
become thinkable. As a consequence, RAND’s intellectuals became 
convinced that America could fight and win this nuclear version of 
Limited War. As long as enough fallout shelters were constructed, 
US civilian casualties might be limited to only two million dead. As 
Kahn kept emphasising, American know-how and entrepreneurship 
would ensure that the nation recovered quickly from the traumas of 
atomic warfare.145 According to RAND’s calculations, the USA’s most 
141 See Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, pages 144–160. Stanley Kubrick 
satirised this RAND dystopian fantasy in his 1964 Dr Strangelove movie. 
142 See Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, page 28; and Jeremy Isaacs and Taylor 
Dowling, Cold War, pages 230–243.
143 See Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, pages 126–144.
144 See Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon, pages 222–224. For the book of this 
lecture tour, see Herman Kahn, On Escalation.
145 See Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, pages 74–100.
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powerful military technology was now a functioning weapons system. 
Nuclear war was the late-20th century’s iteration of Limited War.146       
From the early-1950s onwards, RAND was a pioneer of complex 
computer games which simulated the global political and military 
confrontation between America and Russia. With Kahn’s help, its 
researchers incorporated different nuclear manifestations of Limited 
War into these role-playing exercises.147 The leaders of the USA must 
learn how to risk the atomic apocalypse if they wanted to prevail over 
their Russian enemy.148 Yet, when they hosted their ludic predictions of 
this future, RAND’s researchers soon discovered that the players always 
tried as hard as possible to avoid being the first side to use nuclear 
weapons. In this think-tank’s 1961 game of a Russian attempt to take 
over West Berlin, the American team was dominated by hawkish 
intellectuals like Henry Kissinger. But, however disadvantageous the 
umpires made the US position in this crisis simulation, they too had 
refused to escalate beyond conventional warfare. Even as a fantasy, 
crossing the nuclear threshold was obviously a disastrous move.149 
Contradicting Kahn’s prophecies, RAND’s wargames had exposed that 
neither of the superpowers was going to take the potentially disastrous 
gamble of fighting a Limited War with atomic weapons. As its acronym 
confirmed, risking mutually assured destruction was madness.
The threat of a global nuclear genocide guaranteed the partition of 
Europe into hostile blocs. Unable to seize any more territory in the 
rich North, America and Russia increasingly shifted their rivalry to 
the poor South. As the European colonies gained their independence, 
the two superpowers fiercely competed for hegemony over these 
newly independent countries. Each side energetically promoted its 
146 See Adrian Lewis, The American Culture of War, pages 201–204; and Fred Kaplan, 
The Wizards of Armageddon, pages 197–219.
147 See Thomas Allen, War Games, pages 148–150, 161–166; and Alfred Hausrath, 
Venture Simulations in War, Business and Politics, pages 226–229.
148 These elite politicians, bureaucrats and academics saw themselves as: ‘... the warrior 
caste ... endowed with the temperament of a Chess player ...’ Irving Louis Horowitz, 
The War Game, page 24.
149 See Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon, pages 301–2. Also see Thomas Allen, 
War Games, pages 43–57.
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own path to industrial modernity within the agrarian South: Fordism 
or Stalinism. Crucially, by claiming to embody the imaginary future 
of humanity in the present, America and Russia were asserting their 
territorial control over the developing nations.150 In this struggle 
for world domination, the US government once again turned to its 
warrior intellectuals for strategic advice. In the same way that RAND 
took the leading role in analysing the nuclear standoff, the Political 
Science department at MIT became the centre of research into how 
American power could be most effectively exercised within the South. 
Generously funded by the US military, its academics carried out 
detailed empirical studies of the major flashpoints in the superpower 
confrontation within the developing world: Latin America, Africa and 
East Asia.151 Providing a theoretical framework for their endeavours, 
Walt Rostow wrote the MIT Political Science department’s ‘non-
communist manifesto’ which argued that poor countries could only 
reach prosperity by strictly observing the rules of the capitalist game: 
The Stages of Economic Growth. Unfortunately, as he admitted, there 
was a disgruntled minority of marginalised intellectuals, exploited 
workers and impoverished peasants who had been seduced by the rival 
Stalinist vision of modernity. By resisting American hegemony over 
the South, these psychologically disturbed subversives were sabotaging 
their fellow citizens’ efforts to join the global consumer society.152 
Rostow and his MIT colleagues’ mission was to stymie this growing 
Red menace within the developing nations. At the Political Science 
department, they had to devise the techniques which could bring 
victory to the American side on this new front of the Cold War. The 
future of humanity now depended upon their knowledge and skills.153 
Inspired by their peers at RAND, MIT intellectuals created political-
military games to test out different strategies and tactics for imposing 
US dominance over the South. Combining role-playing exercises with 
150 For how owning prophetic time enabled the control of political space in the South, 
see Richard Barbrook, Imaginary Futures, pages 200–218.
151 See Max Millikan and Donald Blackmer, The Emerging Nations; and  Myron Weiner, 
Modernisation.
152 See Walt Rostow, View from the Seventh Floor, pages 113–114; Essays on a Half-
Century, pages 99–103.
153 See Walt Rostow, Concept and Controversy, pages 245–253.
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computer simulations, these ludic models were endowed with the 
positivist aura of the quantitative social sciences. As in von Reisswitz’s 
Kriegsspiel, their players experienced a believable facsimile of taking 
vital decisions under the intense pressure of crisis conditions.154 By 
participating in these MIT games, members of the US elite could now 
learn the skills required to direct American foreign policy in the South. 
Long before they were appointed as National Security Advisors to the 
US President, both Rostow and Kissinger had proved their mettle in 
the struggle against the Russians by becoming excellent players of these 
political-military simulations.155 Being obsessive gamers, MIT-trained 
intellectuals envisaged the superpower confrontation in the developing 
world as a two-player ‘zero-sum’ matrix. America and Russia were 
competing to take over the South whose nations were the pieces on 
the global board. One empire’s gain was the other’s loss. There was 
no neutral option in this Cold War game. Above all, both sides were 
rational players who always acted in their own self-interest.156 Echoing 
the RAND appropriation of Clausewitz, these MIT simulations 
encouraged the militarisation of politics. As a superpower, the USA 
always had the option of using extreme violence if insistent persuasion 
didn’t achieve its objectives in the South. Unlike with the nuclear 
confrontation, Clausewitz’s concept of Limited War could be credibly 
applied to localised conflicts within the developing world.157 America 
and Russia were able to fight each other over an impoverished territory 
in the South without risking the destruction of the North’s industrial 
heartlands in an atomic holocaust.158 Whatever their unfortunate 
inhabitants might think, these peasant nations were just pieces on the 
board to be won and lost in the never-ending Cold War game.   
During the 1950s, the leaders of the American empire discovered a 
154 See Thomas Allen, War Games, pages 150–160; and Alfred Hausrath, Venture 
Simulations in War, Business and Politics, pages 230–234.
155 See Thomas Allen, War Games, pages 164–165.
156 See Anatol Rapoport, Fights, Games and Debates, pages 105–242. 
157 See Alfred Hausrath, Venture Simulations in War, Business and Politics, pages 165–
187, 244–274; and Andrew Wilson, The Bomb and the Computer, pages 66–76.
158 ‘In theory, ... limited war ... provide[d] a safety valve for preventing explosions of 
any “doomsday” proportions.’ Irving Louis Horowitz, The War Game, page 143. 
Also see Adrian Lewis, The American Culture of War, pages 224–227.
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strategically marginal and economically irrelevant country which 
provided an excellent location for waging Limited War between the 
two superpowers: Vietnam. Most gratifyingly, the Red team was 
a serious opponent whose defeat would greatly enhance the Blue 
team’s reputation. Across most of the developing world, the USA had 
successfully replaced the departing European colonialists with its own 
neo-colonial rule. However, having finally thrown out the French 
at great cost in 1954, the Vietnamese partisans were determined to 
resist the American attempts to take over the southern half of their 
country. With the support of the liberated north, revolutionary 
nationalists launched a rural guerrilla war against the USA’s local 
allies: the corrupt and brutal oligarchy that had collaborated with 
the hated French imperialists.159 By the time that John Kennedy won 
the 1960 US presidential elections, American advisors were already 
fighting against Maoist insurgents in southern Vietnam. Joining the 
new administration, Rostow applied MIT theory to improve his 
side’s militarised political intervention within this backward country. 
Under American supervision, all nations must progress through 
the pre-ordained stages of growth towards the apotheosis of US-
style modernity: representative democracy and consumer plenty. By 
winning a decisive victory over the Vietnamese peasant revolution, the 
Kennedy government could ensure that the Maoists’ alternative path to 
the future had been blocked off across the whole South.160 
At MIT, the Political Science department organised role-playing 
computer simulations to devise the optimal strategy and tactics for 
this key battleground in the Cold War game. The French had lost in 
Vietnam because they’d fought like 19th century European colonialists. 
Fortunately, the Americans now possessed 20th century technology to 
even the odds.161 As both Clausewitz and Jomini had emphasised, the 
159 See Robert Taber, The War of the Flea, pages 59–72; and Neil Sheehan, A Bright 
Shining Lie, pages 145–172.
160 See Walt Rostow, The Diffusion of Power, pages 451–459; and David Halberstam, 
The Best and the Brightest, pages 121–129. For how the American ownership of time 
depended upon keeping control over this particular piece of territory in the South, 
see Richard Barbrook, Imaginary Futures, pages 220–251.
161 See W.W. Rostow, The Diffusion of Power, page 450; and David Halberstam, The Best 
and the Brightest, pages 122–124, 542–543.
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outcome of most campaigns was decided by an arithmetic calculation 
of troop numbers and intensity of firepower. When incorporated into 
computer simulations, this formula happily predicted that a US victory 
in Vietnam was inevitable. By repeatedly playing TACSPIEL and other 
counter-insurgency games, MIT-trained researchers devised the best 
strategy and tactics for securing American control over this South-East 
Asian nation.162 In ‘search-and-destroy’ missions, the US army would 
first eliminate the Maoist guerrillas in the countryside and then switch 
to winning the ‘hearts-and-minds’ of the peasantry with civil assistance 
programmes. By steadily intensifying its bombing campaign against 
the liberated north, the American empire was signalling disapproval of 
continued Vietnamese resistance to its occupation of their country.163 
In a gruesome calculation, the US military compiled monthly ‘body 
counts’ to measure its inexorable eradication of the Maoist forces.164 
Given its superior resources and technology, the American empire could 
keep on ratcheting up the pain until – sooner or later – the Vietnamese 
enemy would be forced to admit defeat in this Limited War. According 
to the US military’s calculations, the peasant insurgency was on the 
verge of being crushed.165
In early-1968, Rostow spent many hours in the White House 
basement huddled with US President Lyndon Johnson over a sand 
table which had been modelled into a facsimile of the American 
airbase at Khe Sanh in Vietnam. Like two hobbyist wargamers, they 
were re-fighting the 1954 siege of ÒLӔQ%L¬Q3KӴ in a new scenario 
which added the greater destructive power of modern weaponry. In the 
original encounter, the French regular army had been humiliatingly 
defeated by the Vietnamese guerrillas. But, this time around, the US 
airforce would drop so many bombs on the Maoist opposition that the 
outcome would be very different. American technology would prevail 
162 See Thomas Allen, War Games, pages 181–208; and Alfred Hausrath, Venture 
Simulations in War, Business and Politics, pages 253–264.
163 See Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon, pages 328–342; and Andrew Wilson, 
The Bomb and the Computer, pages 118–130.
164 See Robert McNamara, In Retrospect, pages 48, 237–238; and Michael Maclear, 
Vietnam, pages 224–227.
165 ‘The other side is near collapse. … The charts are very good ... Victory is very near.’ 
Walt Rostow speaking in 1967 in Daniel Ellsberg, Secrets, page 184.
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over the peasant revolution.166 Ironically, while the attention of the 
US President and his National Security Advisor was distracted by the 
siege of Khe Sanh, the Vietnamese resistance launched a devastating 
surprise attack on the cities of the American-occupied zone of the 
country: the Tet Offensive. As the fighting intensified, Rostow told his 
boss that the statistics from the battlefield proved that the final victory 
over the peasant insurgency was now in sight. By coming out of their 
jungle hideouts, the Vietnamese guerrillas had exposed themselves to 
the superior firepower of the US army. According to the body counts 
which scored each sides’ gains and losses, the American team had won 
this key round of the Cold War game in the South.167 
When playing von Reisswitz’s Kriegsspiel, Prussian officers had soon 
learnt how to game the game in their favour. In his 1876 free version, 
von Verdy dispensed with the rules to make this military simulation 
more closely resemble the chaotic experience of directing troops on 
campaign. But, by the 1950s, the rigid form of Kriegsspiel had been 
reinvigorated by the advent of computing. At RAND and MIT,  the 
complicated rules of the game were hidden inside the program code. 
Through running these computer simulations, American academics 
now believed that it was possible to obtain scientifically proven 
predictions of the geopolitical future.168 Unfortunately for them, 
Rostow and his colleagues didn’t realise that the Vietnamese guerrillas 
weren’t playing by the same rules as them. These MIT academics had 
simulated fighting a Limited War against the peasant revolution in the 
South. However, for the inhabitants of Vietnam, their military and 
political struggle for national independence was an Absolute War. 
Whatever their losses, they would continue fighting until victory was 
achieved. For the Red player, there was only one choice in their game 
theory matrix. 
Inside the basement of the White House in 1968, the ludic spectacle of 
166 See Thomas Allen, War Games, pages 209–211.
167 See Walt Rostow, The Diffusion of Power, pages 459–470; and Neil Sheehan, Hedrick 
Smith, E.W. Kenworthy and Fox Butterfield, The Pentagon Papers, pages 615–621.
168 In 1969, the players of a US military computer game of the Vietnam war were told 
that: ‘You won in 1964!’  Thomas Allen, War Games, page 140. Emphasis in the 
original.
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ÒLӔQ%L¬Q3KӴ had obscured the disastrous reality of the Tet Offensive. 
By the time that the Vietnamese attacks were finally repulsed, the 
Maoist guerrillas had discredited the American population’s naive 
belief in a quick victory. As public support for the war collapsed at 
home, US troops became increasingly mutinous until they had to be 
withdrawn from South-East Asia.169 Refusing to concede the game, 
the American military embarked upon the indiscriminate bombing of 
the Vietnamese countryside to drive its inhabitants into the cities. In 
this genocidal strategy, the peasant insurgency would be defeated by 
exterminating the rebellious peasantry.170 As the casualties mounted, 
the US military kept on playing for a stalemate result. Then, after 
three decades of bloody conflict, the outcome never predicted in 
the MIT computer simulations finally took place. On 30th April 
1975, Vietnamese troops liberated the capital city of the Americans’ 
puppet state and the guns fell silent at last.171 The champions of two 
rival interpretations of Clausewitz had met on this South-East Asian 
battlefield – and the revolutionary practitioners of Absolute War had 
triumphed over the counter-revolutionary theorists of Limited War.172 
  
169 See Gabriel Kolko, Anatomy of a War, pages 359–367; and Jonathan Neale, The 
American War, pages 117–146.
170 See Samuel Huntington, ‘The Bases of Accommodation’; and Gabriel Kolko, 
Anatomy of a War, pages 465–469, 489–491.
171 See Gabriel Kolko, Anatomy of a War, pages 538–544; and Michael Maclear, 
Vietnam, pages 452–468.
172 See Beatrice Heuser, Reading Clausewitz, pages 168–178.
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3.5: Comrade Clausewitz
During our first event for the Invisible Forces exhibition, the conversation 
amongst the players of The Game of War turned at one point to a 
question that had been also posed four years earlier in the St Petersburg 
restaurant. Looking at Donkor’s painting of the 1791 Haitian 
Revolution on the wall of the Furtherfield gallery, they were curious why 
Debord’s ludic experiment didn’t model the anti-imperialist struggles 
of his own times. In both Europe and America, New Left activists had 
identified their own battles at home with those being waged in the 
developing world. Crucially, many of them were radicalised by what 
became the defining cause of the May ‘68 generation: opposition to the 
murderous American invasion of Vietnam. These young radicals had to 
show solidarity with the guerrilla fighters of this small peasant nation 
who were heroically resisting the richest and most technologically 
advanced military power on the planet. As the New Left’s leaders 
kept emphasising, its Maoist partisans were just one contingent of a 
global insurrection against US imperialism. From Cuba and Bolivia to 
Palestine and South Africa, revolutionary movements were fighting to 
liberate their nations from brutal American-backed regimes.173 
Most notoriously, New Left militants inspired by Mao and Che created 
armed detachments of the insurgent South inside the metropolitan 
North: the Black Panther Party, Weather Underground, Rote Armee 
Fraktion and Brigate Rosse.174 Ironically, as was observed both in the 
St Petersburg restaurant and at the Furtherfield gallery, the early-1970s 
peak of this campaign of urban terrorism had coincided with the 
development phase of Debord’s The Game of War. If this Situationist 
had wanted to expose the follies of these New Left Maoists, making 
a tabletop version of Horse-and-Musket combat was not an obvious 
choice. Debord should instead have carried out the détournement of 
the binary Cold War logic of American hobbyist military simulations. 
Like its MIT predecessors, Nick Karp’s 1984 Vietnam game was 
173 For an overview of this emancipatory interconnection between North and South, 
see George Katsiaficas, The Imagination of the New Left, pages 29–82.
174 See Philip Foner, The Black Panthers Speak; Dan Berger, Outlaws of America; Stefan 
Aust, The Baader-Meinhof Complex; and Red Brigades, ‘Strategic Resolution’.
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a two player contest between Blue and Red – and the Reds had to 
be Maoists.175 As suggested by Bernstein’s toy soldier dioramas, the 
appropriate ludic response might have been to imagine the victory of 
the libertarian communist alternative to vanguard politics in South-
East Asia: the 1945 Saigon Commune.176 In this Situationist version of 
the Vietnam wargame, the anti-Maoist Reds should be able to win this 
time around. History can be changed in our favour.  
However, in The Game of War, Debord had eschewed the faux-realism 
of Karp’s Vietnam with its detailed hex map, myriad cardboard pieces 
and bewilderingly complex rules. Instead of detourning this American 
obsession with historically accurate military simulations, he’d 
invented a ludic abstraction of Clausewitz’s theoretical and historical 
writings on warfare. When we’d debated the meaning of Debord’s 
masterpiece in the St Petersburg restaurant, Class Wargames still hadn’t 
fully understood the political implications of this design decision. 
Fortunately, by the time that our 2012 event in the Furtherfield gallery 
took place, we could reveal that The Game of War  was – despite its 
outward appearance – a Vietnam war game. In this bloody conflict, 
the military intellectuals who’d led both sides had studied Clausewitz’s 
On War. However, the Blue and Red teams championed very different 
methods for putting his ideas into practice. Tellingly, in TACSPIEL 
and other MIT simulations, the US player’s political goal could only be 
achieved by the military destruction of the enemy’s forces. In contrast, 
the Vietnamese partisans conceived of Clausewitz’s famous dictum in 
a much more dialectical sense. For them, politics always took primacy 
over violence. When the US military invaded Vietnam in 1965, the 
two nations were not just fighting over territory. Crucially, the warrior 
intellectuals of Blue and Red also knew that: ‘... the stage was set 
for the test of the differing American and Maoist interpretations of 
Clausewitzian doctrine’.177
175 The American player could win this simulation’s ‘The Battle for South Vietnam’ 
scenario by holding out for more turns than the historical ending of the war in 
spring 1975, see the rules book of Nick Karp, Vietnam, page 45.
176 See Ngo Van Xuyet, ‘1945: the Saigon Commune’; and Lu Sanh Hanh, ‘An Account 
of the 1945 August Revolution’.
177 William Staudenmaier, ‘Vietnam, Mao and Clausewitz’, page 79.
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By the time that The Game of War was published in 1977, the US side 
had been decisively defeated in this trial by combat. With the American 
team temporarily out of the game, the Maoists had ensured that the Left 
was now the proud owner of Clausewitz’s theoretical legacy. Yet, before 
the First World War, Social Democrats had little time for the thoughts 
of the German General Staff’s favourite philosopher. As advocates of 
the citizen-soldier army, labour activists were highly suspicious of these 
professional officers with their bellicose imperialist politics. In place 
of Clausewitz, they’d turned to Engels’ historical materialist analysis 
of military affairs. Paralleling the productive economy, the techniques 
and technologies of destruction had kept on increasing in efficiency 
over time. As a result, each social system had fought wars in its own 
distinctive ways.178 Informed by this Marxist historical overview, 
Engels argued that the Left must now update its own defence policy. 
Having personally experienced defeat on the battlefields of the 1848 
German Revolution, he didn’t share the republican enthusiasm for 
civilian volunteer armies. Echoing Jomini, Engels stressed the vital 
importance of the craft skills of the military profession. At the outbreak 
of the American Civil War, most of the US army’s officer corps had 
defected to the slaveholders’ rebellion. Despite their greater numbers, 
the North’s citizen-soldiers were only able to prevail over the better 
led South when they too had learnt how to fight like professionals.179 
Engels’ analysis was confirmed by the tragic fate of the 1871 Paris 
Commune whose civilian militia had been no match for the French 
regular army. Since it would inevitably lose when fighting the military 
on the barricades, the Left should instead win over the rank-and-file 
soldiers to its cause: the ‘workers in uniform’. Universal conscription 
was now the best guarantor of universal suffrage. By the time that the 
Social Democrats had achieved enough popular support to take state 
power, the skilled professionals of the regular army would already be on 
the side of the proletarian revolution.180   
Unfortunately, this prognosis was not ready to be realised when 
178 See Friedrich Engels, Anti-Dühring, pages 190–220.
179 For their collaborative analysis of this 1861–65 military conflict, see Karl Marx and 
Friedrich Engels, The Civil War in the United States. Also see Martin Berger, Engels, 
Armies and Revolution, pages 74–86, 109–113.
180 See Martin Berger, Engels, Armies and Revolution, pages 154–170. 
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the First World War broke out in 1914. Instead of the military 
professionals joining the Left’s peace campaign, the workers’ 
movement rallied to the Right’s nationalist crusade. Disorientated by 
this humiliating capitulation of European Social Democracy, Lenin 
studied Clausewitz’s On War to discover a dialectical analysis of the 
decisive role of military violence within political struggles.181 State 
power meant forcing your enemy to submit to your will.182 Armed 
with this knowledge, Lenin set to work on updating the Bolsheviks’ 
credo. In his 1916 Imperialism pamphlet, he claimed that the German 
war economy was the premonition of the socialist future in the present: 
state capitalism.183 On his return to Russia in 1917, he insisted that 
the fate of the revolution would be decided by bullets not ballots. By 
1921, like Clausewitz and Hegel, Lenin had also become convinced 
that the enlightened rule of the authoritarian bureaucracy was the 
most efficient form of government.184 Stripped of their liberal politics, 
the writings of these two Berlin Whist players now vindicated the 
Bolsheviks’ militarised version of socialist politics: Marxism-Leninism. 
In 1858, while reading On War, Engels was amused to discover 
Clausewitz’s observation that ‘war resembles commerce’. Writing 
to Marx, he commented that this book also had ‘an odd way of 
philosophising, but [was] per se very good.’185 After the 1917 Russian 
Revolution, these throwaway remarks became the textual authority 
for the Bolsheviks’ cult of Clausewitz. Ironically, they now quoted 
from Engels’ letter to justify their abandonment of his proletarian 
military policy. As leader of the Red Army, Trotsky had rebuilt the 
181 See Jacob Kipp, ‘Lenin and Clausewitz’, pages 185–186. In 1915, Lenin updated 
Clausewitz’s famous phrase: ‘... every war ... [is] a continuation of the politics of 
given interested nations – and various classes inside of them – at a given time.’ 
V.I. Lenin, ‘The Collapse of the Second International’, page 284. Emphasis in the 
original.
182 See V.I. Lenin, ‘Socialism and War’, pages 223–225. Also see the opening of Carl 
von Clausewitz, On War, pages  83–86.
183 See V.I. Lenin, Imperialism, pages 102–105, 145–152. Also see Nikolai Bukharin, 
Imperialism and World Economy, pages 116–129, 144–167.
184 See V.I. Lenin, ‘Preliminary Draft Resolution Of The Tenth Congress Of The R.C.P. 
On Party Unity’. Also see E.H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution Volume 2, pages 269–
380.
185 Friedrich Engels, ‘Engels to Marx in London: 7th January 1858’.
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professional officer corps with the training and discipline needed to 
win the Russian Civil War. But, unlike Engels, he was fiercely opposed 
to any democratic selection of this military cadre.186 Instead, quoting 
Clausewitz, Trotsky championed the Bolsheviks’ elitist politics of armed 
violence. In Soviet Russia, the vanguard party had become the general 
staff of the workers and peasants’ revolution.187 In the aftermath of 
their decisive victory over the Whites, Mikhail Frunze argued that the 
Bolsheviks had now developed their own distinctive military policy. 
With its unique combination of hi-tech weaponry and ideological 
fervour, the Red Army would soon be capable of breaking the capitalist 
encirclement of Russia by force.188 As well as being more sceptical about 
exporting revolution into Europe, Trotsky also criticised this aggressive 
foreign policy for serving the self-interest of the military profession. 
Modernising the Russian economy should take precedence over 
increasing the defence budget. In Trotsky’s reading of Clausewitz, the 
politicians must always give the orders to the generals. While soldiering 
was a craft skill that could be learnt by both Reds and Whites, directing 
the Bolshevik regime required an ideological education which was only 
available on the Left. It was the political vanguard that must decide 
whether to stay on the defensive or go over to the offensive. There 
were no inherently revolutionary strategies or tactics in warfare. As 
pragmatists, the Bolsheviks should adopt any military methods that 
helped to defeat their enemies on the battlefield.189 
During the First World War, Clausewitz’s trinity of the army, 
government and people had disintegrated within Tsarist Russia. 
By 1917, mutinous soldiers and sailors were at the forefront of the 
revolutionary overthrow of the old order. After their successful coup 
d’état, the Bolsheviks had quickly set to work on constructing their 
own version of the Prussian staff officer’s secular trinity: the vanguard 
party mobilising the masses to fight for the Red Army. By winning 
186 See Leon Trotsky, Military Writings, pages 144–145. Also see Jacob Kipp, ‘Lenin and 
Clausewitz’, pages 187–189.
187 See Leon Trotsky, Military Writings, page 36.
188 See Mikhail Frunze, ‘Unified Military Doctrine and the Red Army’. Also see 
Makhmut Gareev, M.V. Frunze, pages 79–142; and Jacob Kipp, ‘Lenin and 
Clausewitz’, page 189.
189 See Leon Trotsky, Military Writings, pages 19–69, 109–133.
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its war against the Whites, Lenin’s regime popularised this new 
interpretation of Clausewitz amongst the radical Left across the globe. 
During the 1930s, Antonio Gramsci – the imprisoned leader of the 
Italian Communist Party – made his own illuminating contribution 
to the theoretical precepts of Bolshevism. Synthesising Clausewitz 
and Lenin, he argued that political power was exercised through both 
force and persuasion: hegemony.190 Learning the lessons of 1917, the 
vanguard party must become the premonition of the Bolshevik trinity 
of army, state and people inside modern bourgeois society. Adopting 
Clausewitz’s terminology, Gramsci contrasted two different strategies 
for fighting the class enemy: the ‘war of manoeuvre’ in Russia and the 
‘war of position’ in Europe. While Bolsheviks in the developing world 
prioritised the armed struggle, their comrades in the metropolitan 
heartlands had to concentrate on the ideological contest.191 By 
choosing the optimal combination of force and persuasion for each 
social terrain, the skilful generals of the vanguard party would be able 
to impose their hegemony upon the inhabitants of the modern world. 
As his armies terrorised the nations of Europe, Hitler boasted that 
the Nazis were successfully implementing Clausewitz’s teachings on 
political warfare.192 However, by failing to study this Prussian soldier’s 
history of Bonaparte’s 1812 campaign, the German dictator also 
made the fatal mistake of invading Russia. Once again, the emperor 
of the West was utterly destroyed by his rival in the East. During the 
Second World War, Stalin’s promotion of Russian nationalism led 
to Clausewitz being temporarily condemned as the chief ideologist 
of German militarism.193 But, following the death of the Bolshevik 
despot, this Prussian soldier’s deep influence on vanguard politics 
quickly reemerged into the open. Lenin’s appropriation of Clausewitz 
was once again taught as orthodoxy in the Red Army’s academies. 
Above all, his insights into the political goals of military violence now 
190 See Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, pages 5–14, 57–58, 257–
265.  Also see Perry Anderson, ‘The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci’, pages 12–26. 
191 See Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, pages 229–239. Also 
see Carl von Clausewitz, On War, pages 606–629; and Perry Anderson, ‘The 
Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci’, pages 7–12, 55–78.
192 See Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader, page 378.
193 See Beatrice Heuser, Reading Clausewitz, pages 143–144.
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justified the Russian empire wasting huge resources on the Cold War 
arms race. Coercion was the deadliest weapon in the struggle for global 
hegemony.194 
The Clausewitz revival in Russia was boosted by Mao’s admiration for 
his teachings. Back in the late-1930s, the maximum leader of Chinese 
Bolshevism had carefully studied On War while codifying the most 
effective strategy and tactics for his rural guerrilla forces.195 Like Lenin, 
Trotsky and Gramsci, Mao was convinced that the vanguard party 
prefigured the new socialist trinity of army, government and people. 
As the general staff of the peasant revolution, these Chinese warrior 
intellectuals fought with both political and military weapons against 
the oppressors of the masses: brutal landowners, greedy merchants, 
corrupt officials and foreign imperialists.196 Building upon Clausewitz’s 
analysis of Spanish and Russian resistance to French occupation, Mao 
described a three stage strategy of rural guerrilla warfare. At first, the 
revolutionary forces defended in depth by embedding themselves 
amongst the peasantry. As their strength increased, these partisans 
continually harassed the enemy’s army. Finally, when the opposition 
was significantly weakened, the Chinese Bolsheviks went over to the 
offensive to take the urban centres that brought total victory. At each 
stage of this strategy, political mobilisation and military violence were 
combined to achieve victory over the better equipped and resourced 
Japanese and Nationalist armies.197 As both Clausewitz and Mao 
celebrated, patriotic citizen-soldiers could prevail against mercenary 
professionals. Revolutionary warfare required revolutionary politics.    
When he updated Clausewitz’s great book, Mao dispensed with one 
of its key strategic and tactical principles: the concentration of forces. 
194 See Harriet Fast Scott, ‘Soviet Doctrine in the Nuclear Age’; and B. Byely et al, 
Marxism-Leninism on War and Army. Also see Beatrice Heuser, Reading Clausewitz, 
pages 145–150.
195 See Mao Zedong, ‘On Protracted War’, pages 266–268; and Philip Short, Mao, 
pages 363–365.
196 See Mao Zedong, ‘Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society’. Also see Philip Short, 
Mao, pages 117–178; and Beatrice Heuser, Reading Clausewitz, pages 53–54.
197 See Mao Zedong, ‘On Protracted War’, pages 232–253, 275–311; and Philip Short, 
Mao, pages 221–223, 363–365. Also see Carl von Clausewitz, On War, pages 453–
466, 566–584; and Beatrice Heuser, Reading Clausewitz, pages 138–140.
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Instead, this Bolshevik commander insisted that his troops must 
remain dispersed in the countryside until they were ready to launch 
the third offensive stage of rural guerrilla insurgency.198 As a keen Go 
player, Mao already knew how to surround his opponent’s army by 
placing pieces around the edges of the board and then building into 
its centre. When this ludic metaphor was applied to mid-20th century 
China, the game’s grid symbolised the class geography of the peasant 
insurrection.199 In the late-1920s, the vanguard party had opened its 
campaign amongst isolated rural communities on the corners of the 
board. After two decades of fierce struggles to control its four sides, 
the Chinese Bolsheviks concluded the game by attacking the rich and 
powerful cities in the middle of the grid. Despite their nine stone 
opening advantage, the Nationalists had been so thoroughly defeated 
by 1949 that they were left with only one surviving eye in Taiwan.200 
By translating his ideas into Chinese, Mao had promoted Clausewitz 
into a 1st dan Go player.
In 1965, the American elite was convinced of its theoretical and 
ludic superiority over the Vietnamese Bolsheviks. RAND and MIT 
intellectuals had developed the most modern understanding of 
Clausewitz’s ideas. TACSPIEL was much better at modelling rural 
guerrilla warfare than Go. Unfortunately for these champions of the 
American empire, their self-confidence was totally misplaced. Leading 
the Vietnamese resistance was a very skilled practitioner of Mao’s three 
stage strategy of rural insurrection: Võ Nguyên Giáp. Fighting against 
the US invaders, his partisans combined political mobilisation and 
military violence to wear down the foreign army of occupation.201 In 
1968, Giáp fulfilled Clausewitz’s dictum that the skilful general ‘rises 
above all rules [of war]’.202 While the American leadership’s attention 
198 See Mao Zedong, ‘On Protracted War’, pages 298–305. Also see Beatrice Heuser, 
Reading Clausewitz, pages 140–142; and Scott Boorman, The Protracted Game, 
pages 170–172.
199 See Mao Zedong, ‘On Protracted War’, pages 253–258; and Scott Boorman, The 
Protracted Game, pages 38–51.
200 See Scott Boorman, The Protracted Game, pages 52–153.
201 See Võ Nguyên Giáp, ‘The South Vietnamese People Will Win’; ‘Great Victory, 
Great Task’. Also see Peter MacDonald, Giap, pages 78–83.
202 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, page 157.
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was focused upon the siege of Khe Sanh, the Vietnamese resistance 
suddenly attacked the major urban centres of the US-controlled 
south of the country. According to Mao’s three stage strategy, the Tet 
Offensive was a premature move that foolishly risked the exposing the 
guerrilla army to the overwhelming firepower of the enemy. All good 
Go players knew to avoid playing too many pieces in the centre of the 
board before they’d secured its corners and sides.203 Yet, despite their 
heavy casulties, the Vietnamese partisans still emerged triumphant 
on the South-East Asian battlefield. Unlike the RAND and MIT 
intellectuals, Giáp and his comrades understood that vanguard 
politics was in command of the armed struggle. By disappointing the 
American people’s hopes of imminent victory, they’d succeeded in 
shattering the morale of the US conscripts who were fighting the war 
in Vietnam. As Clausewitz had emphasised, citizen-soldiers had to be 
motivated by their commitment to the nation’s cause. However, his 
American acolytes’ enthusiasm for hi-tech weaponry blinded them to 
this political imperative. When the US military’s rank-and-file troops 
refused to fight anymore, the Vietnamese had won the American war 
on the battlefield.204 The Maoists had passed the test – and proved the 
superiority of their interpretation of Clausewitz’s doctrine.
By inventing The Game of War, Debord proclaimed his heretical 
status amongst the New Left generation. Inspired by the heroic rural 
guerrillas of the South, youthful revolutionaries had become seduced 
by the Bolshevik appropriation of Clausewitz’s ideas. They too would 
take up arms to achieve their political goals in the metropolitan centres 
of the North. Like his comrade Sanguinetti, Debord presciently warned 
that these Maoist insurrectionists were being manipulated by the state’s 
intelligence services. In late-1970s Italy, indiscriminate bomb attacks 
frightened the population into supporting repressive measures against 
203 See Scott Boorman, The Protracted Game, pages 87–89.
204 ‘The United States has a strategy based on arithmetic. They question the computers 
... and then go into action. ... They can’t get it into their heads that the Vietnam war 
has to be understood in terms of the [Maoist] strategy of people’s war ...’ Võ Nguyên 
Giáp, ‘Their Dien Bien Phu Will Come’, pages 329–330. Also see Võ Nguyên Giáp 
and Van Tien Dung, How We Won The War; and Adrian Lewis, The American Culture 
of War, pages 274–294.
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all forms of political dissent: the ‘strategy of tension’.205 Dismayed by 
this disastrous infatuation with urban terrorism, Debord argued that the 
New Left must renounce its obsession with the Maoist interpretation 
of Clausewitz’s ideas. Far from pioneering the socialist future, the 
rural guerrillas of the South were fighting to establish the first stage 
of capitalist modernity: the concentrated spectacle. As the Vietnamese 
Maoists’ destruction of the Saigon Commune in 1945 had proved, 
the vanguard party was a bureaucratic obstacle to the ascendency 
of the workers’ councils. Fortunately, by playing The Game of War, 
libertarian communists could now break the Bolshevik monopoly over 
Clausewitz’s On War. Within this military simulation were materialised 
the key strategic and tactical principles of this Prussian staff officer’s 
writings. Above all, The Game of War provided a safe environment 
for Situationist rebels to learn how to turn Clausewitz’s theoretical 
insights into practice. Moving its pieces across the board was excellent 
training for the social upheavals to come. Every proletarian must 
acquire the craft techniques of skilful generalship. On those 2012 
summer afternoons at the Furtherfield gallery, Class Wargames took 
inspiration from Debord’s masterpiece for its two ludic contributions 
to the Invisible Forces exhibition. In this third phase of our campaign 
of ludic subversion, our task was to teach military theory to those who 
participated in our performances. Unlike the Japanese admirals or MIT 
intellectuals who’d deluded themselves with the superficial realism of 
their own simulations, Class Wargames was engaged in realising a much 
more dialectical ambition. While engaged in mock combat under the 
auspices of Donkor’s Toussaint L’Ouverture, the players of The Game of 
War and Command & Colors: Napoleonics were learning how to be not 
only Situationists, but also Clausewitzians. 
205 See Guy Debord, Comments on the Society of the Spectacle, pages 52–56 and 
Gianfranco Sanguinetti, On Terrorism and the State. Also see Stuart Christie, Stefano 
Delle Chiaie.
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3.6: The Romance of Combat
On Friday 17th August 2012, four members of Class Wargames set 
out from London on an expedition to Haldon Forest Park on the edge 
of Dartmoor in Devon. Within this unlikely setting, our copies of 
Debord’s The Game of War and H.G. Wells’ Little Wars were starring 
in the first part of the Games People Play exhibition which was running 
over that summer at CCANW: the Centre for Contemporary Art and 
the Natural World. As well our contributions, this show also featured a 
fascinating selection of other historical ludic curiosities, including the 
precursors of contemporary family favourites like Snakes & Ladders and 
Monopoly. In the CCANW’s programme, Clive Adams – the director 
of this venue – revealed his inspiration for the exhibition: ‘Games hold 
a mirror to civilisation; they build bonds, trust and strengthen social 
relationships.’206 Fulfilling this mandate, Class Wargames arrived at 
this gallery in a wood ready to host two participatory performances 
of our leftist military simulations over the weekend of 18th–19th 
August. After nearly five years of touring, we’d become veterans in the 
remixing of hobbyist games into avant-garde art installations. As we’d 
discovered throughout the first stage of our campaign of ludic mischief, 
the everyday could become extraordinary when placed inside a gallery 
setting.207 Having moved onto the second phase of this campaign, we’d 
also become adept at explicating the seditious reasoning which could 
be found within these martial make-believes. Class Wargames was by 
now very experienced at both the aestheticisation and politicisation of 
wargaming. 
On that Saturday evening, we began our intervention by playing The 
Game of War with the audience gathered inside the CCANW space. 
Taking charge of the rival teams were a brother and sister who were 
eager to try out Debord’s Clausewitz simulator: Ben and Lisa Vanovitch. 
Much to Clive Adams’ bemusement, this performance of The Game of 
War would be dedicated to strengthening their social bond of sibling 
206 Centre for Contemporary Art and the Natural World, Games People Play, page 1.
207 ‘... artists are often just fortunate people who get acknowledged or rewarded for 
what a lot of other people are doing outside the context of art.’ Jeremy Deller in 
Matthew Higgs and Jeremy Deller, ‘In Conversation’, page 185.
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rivalry. When the pieces were laid out for the Marengo scenario as in 
Diagram 3 on page 226 and the basics of the rules had been explained, 
the miniature battle was ready to begin. On one side of the board, Ben 
–  assisted by Tara Woodyer – took on the role of commander of the 
South. Across from them, Lisa became the general of the South with 
Fabian as her aide de camp. The other members of Class Wargames 
and the audience were ready to join in the lively discussions which 
would take place around the board. From the outset of the game, Ben’s 
team ensured that the South kept the initiative by aggressively moving 
their main reserve army from the back of the board into the central 
plain. But, despite losing some important units in the retreat, Lisa’s 
side eventually did manage to concentrate the North’s pieces in front 
of its eastern arsenal. With the immediate crisis over, the result of the 
game was now open with either side capable of emerging the victor. As 
the event was by now drawing to close, the two siblings agreed upon 
a draw. After an evening of friendly rivalry, family honour on both 
sides had been satisfied. At the CCANW, everyone was a winner of The 
Game of War. 
On Sunday afternoon, hostilities recommenced with a public 
performance of H.G. Wells’ Little Wars on the covered stage outside 
the gallery. In both its appearance and mechanics, this celebrated 
novelist’s ludic invention was very different from Debord’s minimalist 
artwork. While on family holidays at the Kent seaside in South-East 
England, Wells – helped by Jerome K. Jerome and other literary types 
– had devised a set of rules to fight imaginary battles with toy soldiers 
borrowed from his children’s collection. In 1913, Wells published the 
results of their efforts along with an amusing account of one of their 
contests in a best-selling book: Little Wars. Since the late-19th century, 
Britains and other manufacturers had been mass producing 54mm 
military figurines for small boys who wanted to play at war – and those 
who had to buy presents for them.208 Now, thanks to the rules provided 
in Wells’ book, grown-ups could also join in the fun. Infantry, cavalry 
and artillery were all given fixed moves in imperial measures. Hand-
to-hand fighting was resolved by numerical superiority. Best of all, 
both sides were required to fire metal pellets from model cannon at 
208 See James Opie, Collecting Toy Soldiers, pages 20–21.
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their opponent’s soldiers which were removed from the game when 
hit.209 In the photographs inside Little Wars, Wells and his famous 
friends were shown happily aiming miniature Britains’ artillery pieces 
while kneeling in the garden of his Sandgate house. Enthused by their 
example, lots of other adults soon also started fighting mock battles 
with toy soldiers. Most wonderfully, the publication of Little Wars had 
launched the modern hobby of figurine wargaming.
In the eponymous book of his game, Wells emphasised that his ludic 
creation was more than just an amusing pastime. For over a decade 
before Little Wars appeared, he’d been a prominent – and maverick – 
member of the Fabian Society which lobbied for the gradual socialist 
reform of British society.210 During his lifetime, Wells’ sci-fi novels and 
futurological texts would popularise their vision of the enlightened 
elite who would replace the poverty and ignorance of liberal capitalism 
with a new collectivist commonwealth constructed along rational and 
scientific lines.211 Most admirably, in contrast with many of his Fabian 
colleagues, he was also openly contemptuous of the racial hierarchies of 
the British empire and its American imitator.212 Although no Marxist, 
Wells’ socialism was always internationalist. Like all of his writings, 
Little Wars was designed to promote these Left political beliefs. By 
following its rules, the players of this figurine wargame would soon 
understand that any conflict between the major powers fought with 
modern weapons would result in massive casualties on the battlefield. 
Devastated by cannon fire and hand-to-hand combat, there were very 
few toy soldiers left in either side’s miniature army at the end of this 
ludic contest.213 In his explanatory remarks in Little Wars, Wells even 
dreamt of luring the generals, politicians and industrialists who were 
209 See H.G. Wells, Little Wars, pages 39–66. In our performances of his game, we’ve 
replaced these metal pellets with matchsticks for health and safety reasons.
210 See Michael Sherborne, H.G. Wells, pages 152–175; and George Bernard Shaw, 
Sidney Webb, Graham Wallas, Oliver Clarke, Annie Besant and Hubert Bland, 
Fabian Essays.
211 See H.G. Wells, A Modern Utopia; and The Shape of Things to Come.
212 See Michael Sherborne, H.G. Wells, pages 155, 164–5, 175–179.
213 ‘You only have to play at Little Wars three or four times to realise what a blundering 
great thing Great War must be.’ H.G. Wells, Little Wars, page 106. Also see Harry 
Pearson, Achtung Schweinehund!, page 173.
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then driving Europe towards a disastrous imperialist bloodbath into 
his Sandgate garden. Once there, he would divert their competitive 
instincts with his socialist alternative to the impending Great War: 
playing with Britains’ figurines. Knocking over toy soldiers with metal 
pellets was much preferable to killing human beings with artillery 
shells.214 
During the second phase of our campaign of ludic subversion, Class 
Wargames began putting on participatory performances of Little Wars. 
By emphasising its pacifist message, we were able to remind apolitical 
figurine gamers of the political ambitions of their hobby’s founding 
father. Tragically, Wells’ toy soldier simulation had failed to prevent 
the outbreak of the horrendous military conflagration in 1914. Now, 
as the centenary of this catastrophe approached, playing Little Wars 
became our ludic protest against the forgetting and mythologising of 
this imperialist Great War. On that Sunday afternoon at CCANW’s 
Games People Play exhibition, Class Wargames was making Left 
propaganda with toy soldiers. For our match of this original version 
of Reds versus Reds, Ben and Lisa decided to join together to command 
the French forces. Facing them under the red canvas in control of the 
British army was Tara with Stefan acting as her military advisor. As 
Wells had intended, casualties rose very quickly as matchsticks from 
the six Britains’ model cannons rained down on the toy soldiers of both 
sides. At the climax of this ludic prophecy of the First World War, Ben 
and Lisa had the brilliant idea of sheltering their troops behind two 
artillery pieces while moving them into an enfilading position. Facing 
fire from their front and outflanked on their right, the British were 
soon reduced to only one 54mm figurine. Even the opposing armies 
in the trench warfare of 1914–8 hadn’t suffered such heavy casualties. 
Incapable of further resistance, Tara and Stefan ruefully conceded the 
match. On this summer’s day at CCANW, sibling cooperation had 
delivered a memorable victory.
In the appendix to Little Wars, Wells provided an advanced set of rules 
which could be used in army training. Despite his pacifist principles, 
he’d been unable to resist the invitation to adapt his civilian diversion 
214 See H.G. Wells, Little Wars, pages 103–105; and Class Wargames, ‘Communiqué 
#8’.
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for the deadlier purposes indicated by the misspelt name of the 
pioneering military simulation in the book’s subtitle: Kriegsspiel.215 
Although professional wargaming would become increasingly 
sophisticated over the decades, this close link with the hobbyist 
subculture was never completely broken. As Peter Young and his 
colleague from Royal Military Academy Sandhurst explained in their 
classic 1967 Charge! book, players of toy soldier simulations were able 
to learn the ‘... basic principles of war – surprise, the concentration of 
effort at the right place and the right time, an understanding of the 
capabilities of the enemy’s forces and his intentions ...’216 With our two 
performances of The Game of War and Little Wars for the CCANW’s 
summer exhibition, Class Wargames was now ready to build upon this 
all-important insight. Commencing the third phase of our campaign 
of ludic subversion, our primary goal became the dissemination of 
these basic principles of military theory amongst Left activists. In 
the preceding two stages of this offensive, we’d followed Debord’s 
personal trajectory from avant-garde artist to libertarian communist 
proselytiser. Now, in the third stage of our campaign, Class Wargames 
would realise the full seditious potential of The Game of War in our 
performances and publicity. Unlike the US inventors of hobbyist and 
professional simulations, Debord hadn’t been obsessed with modelling 
past or future conflicts as realistically as possible. Instead, The Game of 
War was a ludic abstraction of the strategic and tactical insights of On 
War. Crucially, through its Napoleonic theme, Debord had challenged 
the then dominant Cold War orthodoxies about Clausewitz’s ideas. 
By refuting both the American and Maoist interpretations, his game 
championed its own Situationist détournement of this Prussian 
soldier’s philosophy. Debord believed that Clausewitz’s writings didn’t 
just provide smart theoretical and historical insights into the violent 
transformation of Europe carried out by the modernising forces 
unleashed by the 1789 French Revolution. When studied carefully, 
these texts also illuminated the social turmoil shaking the world in 
the wake of the May ‘68 Revolution. Like conflicts between nations, 
class struggles were also conducted with a combination of force and 
persuasion. In his introduction to Champ Libre’s 1976 reissue of 
215 See H.G. Wells, Little Wars, pages 107–116.
216 Peter Young and J.P. Lawford, Charge!, page 9.
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Clausewitz’s analysis of the 1806 Jena-Auerstädt campaign, Debord 
declared that: ‘... we live in an epoch in which the study of all forms 
of war, all forms of historical action, are of the greatest political 
and theoretical interest.’217 By playing wargames, Situationists were 
learning the military principles which would be required to conquer 
the emancipated future. 
When The Game of War was published in the late-1970s, Pong and 
other first-generation video games were already familiar items not only 
in bars and arcades, but also in living rooms and bedrooms.218 However, 
Debord’s invention didn’t have any need of this technological advance. 
Made from card or metal, its analogue board and pieces were still able 
to fulfil his main aim: creating a competitive social relationship between 
the players.219 In On War, Clausewitz had compared a battle between 
rival armies to a duel between two aristocrats. In both cases, one side 
imposed its will upon the other with extreme violence.220 Despite 
playing Whist with Hegel, this Prussian soldier was entranced by a 
very stark version of dialectical reasoning. According to his concept of 
Absolute War, victory was secured by totally destroying their enemy’s 
military might. For both his American and Bolshevik admirers, 
Clausewitz’s martial theory had justified their ambition to monopolise 
political power through armed force. There could only be one winner 
– and the defeated had to leave the stage of history. However, in Hegel’s 
Phenomenology of the Spirit, this duel to the death between two wills 
resulted in the division of humanity into two opposing classes: the 
masters and the slaves. According to his grand narrative of history, 
this game of social power had been played again and again until it 
culminated in the 1789 French Revolution. For a brief moment, the 
Jacobins had tried and failed to resolve the dialectic of human evolution 
217 Guy Debord in Carl von Clausewitz, Notes sur la Prusse dans sa Grande Catastrophe 
1806, page ix.
218 Pong was released as an arcade game in the USA in 1972 and the console version had 
been available in Europe since 1974. See David Winter, ‘Welcome to Pong-Story’.
219 Echoing Clausewitz’s comparison between Whist and war, Debord explained that: ‘I 
wanted to imitate Poker [in the design of The Game of War] – not the chance factor 
in Poker, but the combat that is so characteristic of it.’ Alice Becker-Ho and Guy 
Debord, A Game of War, page 156.
220 See Carl von Clausewitz, On War, page 83.
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by elevating one of the two rival classes to undisputed dominance. 
Fortunately, under Bonaparte’s enlightened rule, the masters and the 
slaves were now being melded into one people: bourgeois citizens. The 
end of history was authoritarian liberalism.  
Within the rules of The Game of War, Debord detourned both of these 
variants of dialectical reasoning. As the audiences at Class Wargames’ 
events soon discovered, there might be only one victor, but everyone 
who participated in these collective performances was a winner. True to 
the Situationists’ avant-garde origins, The Game of War was politicised 
art in the service of aestheticised politics. The two teams of players 
were re-enacting Hegel’s concept of the world-historical struggle for 
recognition between masters and slaves.221 Above all, by teaching 
the strategic and tactical principles of Clausewitz and other military 
theorists, The Game of War democratised the esoteric knowledge of 
the Bolshevik elite. When everyone could play at being Bonaparte, 
then no one could become a little Lenin, Trotsky or Mao. Back in 
1861, Engels had joked that French soldiers came from ‘... the nation 
of ... generals’.222 With The Game of War, Debord created the ludic 
manifestation of this democratic dream. By moving its pieces across the 
board, the slaves could now acquire the military and political skills of 
the masters. Thanks to this Situationist training exercise, they were able 
to possess the knowledge required to seize control of grand narrative 
of modernity. The Limited War strategy of the Social Democrats and 
Stalinists had been discredited by these parties’ pusillanimous behaviour 
during the May ‘68 Revolution. If the workers’ councils were to prevail 
over spectacular capitalism, Left activists must now become experts in 
the Absolute War strategy of proletarian revolution.223 
In the performances and publicity for the third phase of our campaign 
of ludic subversion, Class Wargames stressed that Debord’s The Game 
of War was his practical critique of the Bolshevik interpretation of 
221 ‘I know that Clausewitz was not directly Hegelian, [and] no doubt had not read 
Hegel. ... [but] simply by dominating the very reality of the strategic sphere, 
[Clausewitz came] to be something truly close to a Hegelian dialectician.’ Guy 
Debord, ‘To Jean-Pierre Baudet’.
222 Friedrich Engels, ‘Waldersee on the French Army’, page 510.
223 See Guy Debord, Comments on the Society of the Spectacle, pages 85–88.
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Clausewitz’s writings. When everyone was a player, direct democracy 
was no longer mythologised into the exclusive ideology of the vanguard 
party. Participatory creativity was realisable in the here and now. While 
training with The Game of War, revolutionary militants were already 
experiencing this imaginary future in the tangible present. Like Chess in 
medieval times, the socialisation taking place around the board was as 
important as the two players moving their pieces in attack or defence. 
Horrifying military violence had become an entertaining metaphor 
for mental duelling. When, in the game of their eponymous book, 
Becker-Ho had finally defeated her husband, this victory was a cause 
for mutual celebration. In their Situationist wargame, competitive play 
had stimulated psychological intimacy between these close comrades. 
Similarly, at our two CCANW performances in 2012, winning or losing 
were also equally pleasurable experiences.224 By inventing The Game 
of War, Debord had made his sociable contribution to the collective 
striving for emancipatory understanding. Libertarian communism was 
directly embedded within its board and pieces. When North and South 
fought each other, the rules of the game temporarily took precedence 
over the disciplines of capitalism. For these brief moments in time, its 
players were living the most utopian demand of modern humanity: 
‘The abolition of the proletarian condition is the self-transformation of 
proletarians into immediately social individuals ...’225
224 See Class Wargames, ‘Communiqué #6’. 
225 Théorie Communiste, ‘Much Ado About Nothing’, page 203. Emphasis in original.
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3.7: The Ludic Lessons of Military History
By inviting the audiences at our events to play The Game of War, 
Reds versus Reds, Commands & Colors: Napoleonics and Little Wars, 
Class Wargames was teaching the smart Situationist appropriation 
of Clausewitz’s writings. In this third stage of our campaign of ludic 
subversion, our vital task was to disseminate the basic principles of 
military theory amongst our Left comrades. When we presented 
Debord’s ludic creation, we stressed that – unlike Kriegsspiel and 
TACSPIEL – The Game of War hadn’t been designed as a role-playing 
exercise which modelled the Prussian General Staff’s headquarters or 
the US President’s National Security Council meetings. Instead, the 
abstract style of its game engine was much closer to Chess or Go: two 
sides taking alternate turns, perfect information about each other’s 
positions and only one attack allowed in each move. As Debord 
confessed, this minimalist imperative had forced his simulation to omit 
two important factors that often determined the outcome of military 
confrontations: the soldiers’ morale and the weather conditions. 
In recompense, the ability to move five pieces on each turn ensured 
that The Game of War was much more fluid and unpredictable in its 
outcomes than Chess.226 By imitating Bonaparte, its best players would 
learn how to manoeuvre their infantry, cavalry and artillery units to 
maximise their combined offensive and defensive power. With mobility 
restricted to one third of their army, they’d also have to become adept 
at prioritising their ambitions. There were never enough troops to be 
strong everywhere on the board. By seizing one opportunity, others 
must be missed. Debord wanted every libertarian communist to learn 
the essential skill of making difficult choices: ‘This war game – like war 
itself and all forms of strategic thought and action – tends to demand 
the simultaneous consideration of contradictory requirements.’227 
As one of his maxims, Bonaparte laid down that aspirant generals 
should carefully study the feats of the great commanders of the past.228 
Following his advice, whether played with toy soldiers or cardboard 
226 See Alice Becker-Ho and Guy Debord, A Game of War, pages 24–26, 155.
227 Alice Becker-Ho and Guy Debord, A Game of War, page 21.
228 See Napoléon Bonaparte, Military Maxims, page 79.
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counters, the designers of hobbyist simulations have dedicated 
themselves to producing historically accurate recreations of specific 
battles or campaigns. As our Marengo and Fort Bedourete scenarios 
revealed, both The Game of War and Command & Colors: Napoleonics 
could be adapted to re-enact politically resonant military conflicts 
from the past. But, this antiquarian chrome disguised the primary 
purpose of our participatory performances during the third stage of 
our campaign of ludic subversion: training Left activists in the abstract 
principles of On War. Back in late-1930s Vietnam, Giap had taught 
a course on this classic book and Bonaparte’s campaigns to the elite 
leadership of the underground Bolshevik party.229 Four decades later, 
Debord had published The Game of War to disseminate Clausewitz’s 
theoretical analysis of these tumultuous historical events amongst 
the entire revolutionary movement. By playing his ludic invention 
and other military simulations, the third phase of Class Wargames’ 
campaign was now dedicated to fulfilling this Situationist’s greatest 
ambition. Breaking the vanguard party’s monopoly over political 
subversion, rank-and-file proletarians must now become the collective 
skilful general whose mental agility could overcome the friction of 
war. Like Bonaparte, they too should know how to recognise the 
enemy’s weaknesses and to correct their own mistakes. Within the 
spatial and temporal confines of these military simulations, the passive 
contemplation of Clausewitzian theory was transformed into the ludic 
celebration of Situationist practice. Deciding where to move the pieces 
on the board – or toy soldiers across a miniature terrain – was learning 
by doing.230 Through the brief experience of being a little Bonaparte, 
the players of wargames were acquiring the intellectual stamina and 
calculated courage required to fight the modern iteration of Absolute 
War: the class struggle.231 
When discussing his academic rival’s methodology, Clausewitz 
229 See Peter MacDonald, Giap, page 23.
230 ‘Wargames have ... educational advantages for the study of war because students 
must grapple with real strategic and tactical dilemmas as they struggle to beat their 
colleagues, and games show that the historical outcome of a conflict was not bound 
to occur.’ Philip Sabin, Simulating War, page 37. 
231 ‘Daring has the value of gold amongst the warrior virtues.’ Carl von Clausewitz, 
Campagne de 1799 en Suisse et en Italie, page 475. Also see On War, pages 700–703.
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criticised the ‘false elegance’ of Jomini’s geometrical theories of military 
strategy and tactics. For this Prussian soldier, there was only one brutal 
necessity underpinning Absolute War: breaking the enemy’s will to resist 
with murderous violence.232 From this fundamental abstract principle, 
Clausewitz had developed his dialectical exposition of the chaotic 
practicalities of armies fighting against one another. By studying the 
unfolding of the analysis within his classic text, generations of bourgeois 
officers have learnt the skills of commanding troops in the field. Now, 
thanks to Debord’s ludic invention, proletarian revolutionaries could 
also become experts in this esoteric doctrine. Within the workings of 
The Game of War, this Situationist veteran had carefully incorporated 
the most important insights of On War. By playing his ludic invention 
and other military simulations, Class Wargames was now dedicated to 
teaching Clausewitz’s five key strategic and tactical principles to today’s 
Left activists: 
• Coup d’oeil;
• Psyching the opponent;
• Concentration of forces;
• Outflanking the enemy;
• Hot pursuit.
In warfare, skilful generals know instinctively how to deploy their forces 
to maximise their effectiveness in a particular terrain of combat: coup 
d’oeil. For those fortunate enough to possess this ability, the outcome 
of an engagement can be decided even before the fighting commences. 
Taking advantage of the local geography, the different types of troops 
are positioned to provide mutual support for each other in both attack 
and defence. The army’s lines of communications to its supply bases 
are well protected against outflanking attacks by the opposing side. 
The reserve is placed in a secure location until the time is ready for its 
decisive intervention into the combat.233 Like Bonaparte, these military 
232 See Carl von Clausewitz, Campagne de 1799 en Suisse et en Italie, pages 288–289; 
On War, pages 85–86, 102–105.
233 ‘... the relationship between warfare and terrain determines the peculiar character of 
military action ... To master it a special gift is needed ... It is the faculty of quickly 
and accurately grasping the topography of any area which enables a man to find his 
way about at any time.’ Carl von Clausewitz, On War, page 127. Emphasis in the 
original. 
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commanders can instantly recognise the strengths and weaknesses of 
the enemy’s deployment on the battlefield – and will ruthlessly take 
advantage of any mistake to beat them. Equipped with coup d’oeil, 
skilful generals always begin the battle with a distinct edge over their 
less sophisticated opponents.234 
While planning the 1800 Marengo campaign, Bonaparte spotted 
immediately that the Austrians had foolishly launched a double-
pronged offensive in both North Italy and South Germany. By dividing 
its military might into two equal parts, the enemy was now vulnerable 
to a concentrated counter-attack by the French reserve army. Long 
before the two sides met at this Piedmont town, Bonaparte’s coup d’oeil 
had decided the result of the battle of Marengo. Despite his initial 
tactical errors, the First Consul’s superior strategic position ensured 
that Desaix’s reinforcements were able to arrive in time to save the 
day for the French cause.235 At the culmination of the 1805 Austerlitz 
campaign, Bonaparte demonstrated a similar expertise in exploiting 
the psychogeography of a particular location. By hiding his reserves 
in the morning mist of the rolling Czech countryside, the newly 
crowned emperor accentuated the numerical inferiority of his own 
army. Tempted by this display of weakness, the Russians and Austrians 
were lured into leaving the security of their hilltop position and 
launching an attack against the French right. Then, as the sun burnt 
off the mist, Bonaparte’s reserves suddenly emerged to make a surprise 
counter-attack against the exposed flank of the enemy’s offensive strike. 
Celebrated in the Napoleonic legend ever since, the 1805 battle of 
Austerlitz was a triumph of coup d’oeil. By positioning his troops to 
take maximum advantage of the quirks of the terrain, Bonaparte had 
enabled the smaller French army to win a decisive victory against the 
larger Russian and Austrian opposition.236 
234 For Bonaparte’s mastery of coup d’oeil, see Jean-Baptiste Vachée, Napoleon at Work, 
pages 162–163. Also see Friedrich Hohenzollern, The King of Prussia’s Instructions to 
his Generals, page 13; and Rory Muir, Tactics and the Experience of Battle in the Age 
of Napoleon, pages 141–143.
235 See James Arnold, Marengo & Hohenlinden, pages 100–186; and David Chandler, 
The Campaigns of Napoleon, pages 274–275.
236 See F.G. Hourtoulle, Austerlitz; and David Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon, 
pages 409–439.
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The Game of War is a ludic tool for practising coup d’oeil. Unlike 
Chess or Go, its board doesn’t consist of a uniform grid of squares or 
intersections. Instead, when they sit down to play, North and South are 
faced by different spatial arrangements of forts, mountains, passes and 
arsenals. In contrast with the realist aesthetic of hobbyist and professional 
wargames, these two territories aren’t faithful representations of specific 
historical or contemporary locations. Instead, in The Game of War, the 
abstraction of its terrain features focuses the players’ attention on the 
theoretical analysis of coup d’oeil: the positioning of troops of different 
capabilities to take maximum advantage of the local psychogeography. 
When they laid out the pieces for their book’s exemplary game in 
similar opening positions to the Pump House scenario shown in 
Diagram 1 on page 110, Becker-Ho and Debord chose an initial 
deployment which optimised the territorial peculiarities of their side 
of the board. North began the game with its units placed in a block 
on the western escarpment of the vertical mountain range. With 
its left flank protected by this impassable obstacle, the infantry and 
artillery pieces were ready to swing into the central plain while the 
cavalry units out on the right flank had the option of either taking 
South’s western arsenal by themselves or launching a combined shock 
attack with their compatriots into the middle of the board. Tellingly, 
her opponent mirrored this deployment with his forces concentrated 
around his central fort. From this pivotal position, South could either 
push forwards to seize the enemy’s eastern arsenal or occupy the middle 
plain. When they opted for these opening layouts, both Becker-Ho 
and Debord could take pleasure in their expertise in the practical skill 
of coup d’oeil.237 
According to the rules of The Game of War, the two players are allowed 
to choose their own initial deployment.238 However, as Class Wargames 
soon discovered, this direction impels both sides to mass their forces 
into one large group which tends to slow down the pace of play. In 
our Marengo scenario shown in Diagram 3 on page 226, the opening 
layout is instead decided for the two sides. With their pieces already 
placed on the board, North and South are set the task of practising 
237 See Alice Becker-Ho and Guy Debord, A Game of War, pages 39–59.
238 See Alice Becker-Ho and Guy Debord, A Game of War, page 13.
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their coup d’oeil through this ludic abstraction of military history. 
When refighting the Marengo campaign at our ICA event in 2010, 
Fabian’s team had realised from the outset that the French main army 
at the back of the board has to attack as quickly as possible before two 
Austrian flanks could unite their forces in the central plain. Playing 
South on that night, he and Elena succeeded in smashing North’s 
right wing before Russell had realised that his side’s army was going 
down in defeat. A year later at Raylab, they found themselves instead 
commanding the Austrian side. Learning from their ICA victory as the 
French, Fabian and Elena conducted a cunning fighting retreat on their 
western flank until their army was massed in sufficient strength in the 
centre to launch the deadly counter-attack which decided the match. 
The skilful general could play as North or as South in the Marengo 
scenario – and win as both of them. With sufficient practice, every 
player of The Game of War can acquire the special gift of coup d’oeil. 
In the 2008 Reds versus Reds contest at the Winter Palace, the 
commanders of the two rival armies of Russian Civil War figurines 
were also faced with the problem of working out how to take the best 
advantage of the terrain of battle. As shown in Diagram 4 on page 
228, Mark’s Social Democrats began in what appeared to be a very 
strong defensive  position. However, when my team of Bolsheviks was 
discussing tactics before play commenced, we noticed that the main 
road leading into the middle of the village had created a vulnerable 
opening in the centre of the enemy’s line. If we pinned down Mark’s 
left and right flanks with diversionary attacks, then our elite Kronstadt 
sailors could be sent in to assault this weak spot and – once they’d 
broken through – outflank the rest of the Social Democratic army’s 
defences. Fortunately for us, this understanding of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the terrain resulted in a stunning success on the Kazan 
battlefield on that night at the Hermitage. Like The Game of War, 
playing Reds versus Reds was a practical lesson in coup d’oeil. 
On the battlefield, skilful generals are able to intimidate and cajole their 
way to victory: psyching the opponent. As Clausewitz emphasised, 
the fighting quality of an army is decided as much by the morale of 
its troops as the numbers in its ranks. Armed combat is a test of will 
306 307
and resolution for both sides: whose nerve will break first?239 Placed 
under intense physical pressure, military commanders require a special 
combination of mental toughness and emotional lucidity to make 
intelligent decisions at speed.240 If blessed with this ability, they can 
benefit from the exponential rewards of success in warfare. While their 
own side’s morale soars with each triumph, the enemy’s soldiers and 
civilians are thrown further and further into despondency with every 
reverse.241 Victory is always due as much to mental stamina as material 
superiority. Persuading the opponent to concede is the most elegant 
way to win.
During his 1800s rampages across Europe, Bonaparte demonstrated a 
supreme mastery in the skill of psyching his military antagonists. One 
after another, the armies of the great powers went down to catastrophic 
defeats at the hands of the French emperor. Facing this genius general 
who’d won so many battles, his enemies were already half-convinced 
that they’d lost before the two sides had even started fighting. 
Looking back at this dangerous period, the Duke of Wellington 
ruefully observed that ‘... [Bonaparte’s] presence on the field made a 
difference of 40,000 men.’242 What eventually shattered this aura of 
invincibility was the disastrous French invasion of Russia in 1812. 
After the retreat from Moscow, Bonaparte had lost not only most 
of his best troops, but also much of his military reputation. Slowly 
but surely, France’s imperialist rivals combined their forces in the 
final titanic struggle against the upstart emperor. Still intimidated by 
Bonaparte’s charisma, the leaders of the European powers relied upon 
overwhelming numbers to accomplish the overthrow of the scourge of 
Europe. Even during the 1814 and 1815 campaigns, when the odds 
were massively in their favour, their generals had only advanced against 
the French army with extreme caution. Right up to the very end of his 
 
 
239 See Carl von Clausewitz, On War, pages 216–228.
240 See Jean-Baptiste Vachée, Napoleon at Work, pages 174–176; and Rory Muir, Tactics 
and the Experience of Battle in the Age of Napoleon, pages 149–150.
241 See Carl von Clausewitz, On War, pages 300–305.
242 Arthur Wellesley in Charles Esdaile, The Wars of Napoleon, page 66.
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career, Bonaparte was unsurpassed in the military skill of psyching the 
opponent.243 
At the beginning of Becker-Ho and Debord’s exemplary game, the 
South sent two of his cavalry pieces forward in an attempt to seize 
North’s eastern arsenal. However, when the opposition in response 
moved her army across the pass to reinforce the centre, he’d quickly 
retreated these units believing that their lines of communications 
were now vulnerable. Unfortunately, by making this decision, South 
had also taken the option which would eventually lose the game.244 
By repeatedly refighting this match between Becker-Ho and Debord 
during our 2007 training sessions, Class Wargames soon discovered 
that the best move instead would have been to risk everything by 
persevering with the cavalry attack against North’s eastern arsenal. 
Once deprived of this supply base, the enemy’s main army lost its 
manoeuvrability in the central plain – and was susceptible to being 
destroyed in detail. From our re-enactments of this model game, 
Class Wargames realised that the North had succeeded in bluffing the 
South into making a premature withdrawal. As its creator intended, by 
playing The Game of War, we’d become diligent students of Clausewitz’s 
military theory of psyching the opponent. Unlike Reds versus Reds or 
Commands & Colors: Napoleonics, Debord’s ludic invention made no 
provision in its rules for checking the morale of the two sides’ units. 
Rather this mental struggle was recreated within the stressful ebb-and-
flow of its competitive play.245 Learning from Becker-Ho and Debord’s 
game, Fabian took great pleasure in psyching his opponents whenever 
possible during our public performances. Like Bonaparte, he was an 
expert at making the other side believe that they’d lost the battle despite 
the outcome still being in doubt. Even after his mounted general had 
been removed from the board in the 2008 Pump House game, Fabian 
kept on claiming that his victory was inevitable until the very moment 
that he was forced to concede the match. At our 2010 ICA and 2011 
 
243 See Carl von Clausewitz, Campagne de 1814, pages 53–62; Campagne de 1815 en 
France, pages 23–31.
244 See Alice Becker-Ho and Guy Debord, A Game of War, pages 51–59.
245 See Alice Becker-Ho and Guy Debord, A Game of War, page 25.
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Raylab games, this self-confidence had much more substance. Whether 
North or South, the army with Fabian on the team possessed the 
strategic and tactical skills to outwit with verve the less experienced 
players of the other side. When facing this genius general on the ludic 
battlefield, the opposition had good reason to be psyched. 
During the opening moves of the 2012 match of our hacked scenario 
for Command & Colors: Napoleonics shown in Diagram 6 on page 338, 
Christian and Tuesday’s Haitian army quickly seized the initiative as 
their guard infantry regiments routed the defenders of Fort Bedourete 
and took control over the centre of the board. As their left flank rapidly 
moved up in support, these re-enactors of Toussaint confidently 
predicted that victory would soon be theirs. By demoralising the enemy, 
this success would inevitably lead to greater successes. Unfortunately 
for them, Marc and David refused to be psyched by their opponent. 
Regrouping the shattered French forces, they formed a defensive line 
which – after a fierce firefight – repelled the Haitian assault. As the 
Bonapartists began advancing across the battlefield, it was now Marc 
and David’s turn to engage in Clausewitz’s stratagem of psychological 
intimidation. With their best units having suffered heavy losses, the 
Haitians must accept that they had little chance of winning the battle. 
When Toussaint’s cavalry reserve was wiped out, Christian and Tuesday 
were forced to agree with this dismal prognosis and conceded the game. 
This time, the enemy had been psyched.   
In combat, skilful generals are focused upon massing their troops into 
the strongest possible fighting system: the concentration of forces. As 
both strategy and tactics, numerical superiority can deliver victory 
on its own. For Clausewitz, this imperative to achieve a quantitative 
advantage represents the fundamental principle of warfare.246 Since 
defence is more powerful than attack, a larger sized army is usually 
required to overcome this qualitative edge. Military commanders 
understand that they must concentrate their offensive strike at one 
key point while making the enemy divide their forces as widely as 
246 ‘... there is no higher and simpler law of strategy than that of keeping one’s forces 
concentrated. No force should ever be detached from the main body unless the need 
is definite and urgent.’  Carl von Clausewitz, On War, page 240. Emphasis in the 
original.
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possible along the frontline. If manoeuvred with boldness and finesse, 
this kinetic mass can overwhelm almost all resistance to its forward 
advance. By destroying the other side’s defences, the concentration of 
forces is the most basic – and effective – method of winning a war.247 
Throughout his illustrious career, Bonaparte demonstrated his 
expertise in this martial technique. Even with inferior numbers, he 
was able to achieve quantitative superiority at the vital location. While 
besieging Mantua during the winter of 1796–7, Bonaparte’s smaller 
French army attacked and defeated in turn the divided columns of the 
much bigger Austrian army which were trying to relieve this North 
Italian city. At the 1807 battle of Friedland, the emperor overcame his 
numerical inferiority in comparison with the Russians by launching a 
massed infantry, cavalry and artillery attack which routed the enemy’s 
exposed left flank.248 As both a strategist and tactician, Bonaparte’s 
skill at concentrating his forces again and again delivered the decisive 
blow against the opposition. In his maxims, he stressed that the good 
commander always commits as many soldiers as possible to the fray: 
‘A single battalion sometimes decides the day.’249 However, eventually, 
the enemies of Bonaparte learnt how to become like Bonaparte 
themselves. At the 1813 battle of Leipzig, the Russians, Prussians 
and Austrians managed to commit twice as many troops to the fight 
as the French imperial army which gave a quantitative edge to them 
that no amount of clever manoeuvring could offset. During the 1814 
campaign, these allies’ numerical superiority had become so great that 
even a bravura display of Bonaparte’s strategic and tactical brilliance 
was unable to halt their advance into the heartland of his realm.250 In 
1815, the emperor made one last attempt to reap the benefits of his 
artful skill at organising the localised concentration of forces. Before 
the Russians and Austrians were able to mobilise their troops, he’d 
launched a surprise attack against the British and Prussian armies in 
Belgium. By attacking each opponent in turn, the French would enjoy 
247 See Carl von Clausewitz, On War, pages 427–470, 753–755; and Notes sur la Prusse 
dans sa Grande Catastrophe, pages 90–91. 
248 See David Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon, pages 53–125, 572–585.
249 Napoléon Bonaparte, Military Maxims, page 34.
250 See Carl von Clausewitz, Campagne de 1814, pages 53–62, On War, pages 335–337, 
764–771; and David Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon, pages 865–1004.
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the quantitative advantage in both engagements. Yet, when the battle 
of Waterloo was fought, Bonaparte went down to defeat for failing to 
observe his own maxim. Overconfident, he’d foolishly detached one 
third of his troops to chase the Prussians who still managed to arrive at 
the key moment to reinforce the British line.251 This skilful general had 
been outfoxed in his favourite military manoeuvre of the concentration 
of forces. The imitators of Bonaparte had triumphed over the original 
version.
The Game of War is a training tool for learning the necessity of massing 
troops. According to its combat table, infantry and artillery pieces are 
both much stronger in defence than attack. Only the cavalry units 
are endowed with superior offensive power.252 In this ludic model 
of Clausewitz’s military theory, the two sides must manoeuvre their 
equally balanced armies of 15 fighting pieces to achieve local superiority 
in firepower at vital points of the board. When the moment is correct, 
the players should launch combined attacks of infantry, cavalry and 
artillery units that are strong enough to batter down the opposition’s 
defences.253 In the play of their exemplary game, Becker-Ho and 
Debord implemented the Clausewitzian logic of this Situationist 
simulation. Both sides chose opening positions which grouped their 
pieces into one big block. North had massed her forces around the 
western arsenal. South’s main army was positioned next to his central 
fort. Over the next two dozen moves, Becker-Ho and Debord tried 
to outmanoeuvre each other with faints and probes. By the end of 
the game, North and South were racing to concentrate their forces in 
centre of board for the final decisive battle. In this ludic abstraction of 
Clausewitz’s military theory, the eventual winner was the player who’d 
gained quantitative dominance over these key squares on the board.254 
After re-enacting Becker-Ho and Debord’s game many times, Class 
Wargames devised the initial layout of our Marengo scenario to prevent 
North and South from the outset concentrating their troops at the 
251 See Carl von Clausewitz, Campagne de 1815 en France, pages 40–45, 139–158; and 
David Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon, pages 1008–1095.
252 See Alice Becker-Ho and Guy Debord, A Game of War, pages 12, 14–16.
253 See Alice Becker-Ho and Guy Debord, A Game of War, page 21.
254 See Alice Becker-Ho and Guy Debord, A Game of War, pages 22–23,  39–149.
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most advantageous position on their side of the board. The Austrians 
are split equally into two forces on both flanks. The French main army 
starts on the back row of squares. During our 2010 ICA and 2011 
Raylab performances, Fabian and Elena had won the game both times 
by skilfully manoeuvring their side’s units to focus a concentrated 
offensive power on the weakest points in their opponent’s defences. 
Even when retreating, they’d been able to launch sneaky counter-
attacks that took pieces off the enemy. Like Bonaparte, Fabian and 
Elena were excellent practitioners of Clausewitz’s military theory of 
the concentration of forces. Defence may be stronger than attack, but 
battles are only won by going over to the offensive. 
During our 2012 performance of Little Wars at CCANW, the audience 
had included a boisterous group of small children who were very 
amused by the sight of serious grown-ups playing with toy soldiers. 
Yet, despite its simplistic rules, even H.G. Wells’ ludic invention can be 
used to teach Clausewitz’s principles of military theory. By calculating 
casualties in hand-to-hand combat according to the relative numbers 
on each side, Little Wars encourages the formation of big battalions by 
both sides. Above all, the players who can mass their Britains’ artillery 
pieces to bombard the enemy’s troops are almost always rewarded with 
success. In the CCANW game shown in Diagram 7 on page 340, Ben 
and Lisa had instinctively understood this Clausewitzian imperative 
embedded within the rules of Little Wars. The French infantry assault 
on the British right flank had initially prevailed due to their superior 
numbers over the defenders until they were beaten back by deadly 
cannon fire. Happily, by bringing all three of their model artillery 
pieces to bear on Stefan and Tara’s troops, Ben and Lisa were soon able 
to reverse this potentially disastrous set-back – and eventually emerge 
the winners of the match. Through this CCANW performance, Class 
Wargames had shown why Wells’ toy soldier playtime wasn’t just an 
entertaining diversion. As in The Game of War, the players of Little Wars 
were learning Clausewitz’s stratagem of the concentration of forces on 
this ludic battlefield. 
In warfare, skilful generals seek to manoeuvre their troops around the 
enemy’s frontline to attack them in the rear: outflanking the enemy. As 
Clausewitz emphasised, it is very difficult to make victorious frontal 
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assaults against inherently stronger defensive positions.255 Fortunately, 
successful flanking stratagems will not only minimise the offensive side’s 
losses, but also wreck the resisting side’s morale. Modern warriors are 
adept at moving with great speed across the terrain to take advantage 
of any gaps in the opponent’s defences: ‘the war of manoeuvre’.256 On 
the battlefield, their main force should pin down the enemy’s forward 
troops until the reserve is ready to launch the decisive attack on the 
rear that will decide the day. As both strategy and tactics, turning the 
flank is the most effective method for negating the superior strength 
of the defence. All military commanders must be masters of this basic 
principle of armed aggression.257  
Lacking the blind obedience of professionals, the citizen-soldiers of 
the French republican forces had been very reluctant to risk their 
lives in frontal attacks against enemy positions. Instead, they much 
preferred going around the royalist frontline to make an assault on 
its unprotected rear.258 As a political general of this revolutionary 
army, Bonaparte embraced this spontaneous stratagem as his favourite 
manoeuvre.259  In his military maxims, he laid down a clear instruction 
to his admirers: ‘... never to attack a position from the front which you 
can gain by turning.’260 At the 1793 siege of Toulon, the Jacobin army 
had been repeatedly repulsed in its attempts to storm this Provençal 
city’s walls. Taking command, Bonaparte instead ordered these troops 
to seize the hill which overlooked its harbour. As soon as his artillery 
were successfully positioned on this dominant position, the British and 
their local allies had no choice but to abandon Toulon to the besieging 
French republicans.261 Similarly, during the 1796 battle of Castiglione, 
Bonaparte had craftily manoeuvred his forces around the Austrian 
army’s left flank to launch the attack on its rear which had decided the 
255 See Carl von Clausewitz, On War, pages 485–490.
256 See Carl von Clausewitz, On War, pages 622–625, 653–665.
257 See Carl von Clausewitz, On War, pages 394–415, 746–7.
258 See Paddy Griffith, The Art of War of Revolutionary France, pages 195–199.
259 See Carl von Clausewitz, On War, pages 284–290; and David Chandler, The 
Campaigns of Napoleon, pages 161–170.
260 Napoléon Bonaparte, Military Maxims, page 23.
261 See David Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon, pages 17–29.
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engagement.262 When planning the 1800 Marengo campaign, the First 
Consul applied this tactical principle at the strategical level. By first 
moving into Switzerland and then crossing the Alps, the French reserve 
was able to cut the line of communications of the Austrian army in 
North Italy. In 1805, Bonaparte secured one of his most celebrated 
victories through his expertise in this military technique. When the 
Austrian army in South Germany had advanced towards the Rhine, 
the emperor’s soldiers carried out a daring manoeuvre around its right 
flank which completely severed its supply line with Vienna. Almost 
without a shot being fired, the Austrians were forced into a humiliating 
surrender at Ulm.263 For aspirant generals, studying Bonaparte’s 
brilliant career is the best possible lesson in the military efficacy of 
outflanking the opposition.
In the opening moves of their exemplary game, both Becker-Ho and 
Debord attempted to manoeuvre their units onto the enemy’s rear. The 
North detached one cavalry piece which successfully destroyed South’s 
western arsenal. However, Debord decided to abandon his assault 
against Becker-Ho’s eastern arsenal when his lines of communications 
were threatened. From then onwards, South’s position had deteriorated 
until the match was finally lost.264 When Class Wargames replayed 
this contest at our 2007 training sessions, we were also slowly able 
to acquire the skill of carrying out outflanking attacks. Above all, we 
came to understand that practised players could win the game with this 
military technique without needing to take many of the opponent’s 
pieces. When their link to the arsenals was broken, these units were 
helpless.265 In the Marengo layout, both sides are given different starting 
positions for the tricky task of manoeuvring their pieces to smash their 
opponent’s lines of communications. During our ICA performance, 
Fabian and Elena led the French to victory by committing their reserve 
to turning the Austrians’ right flank. When playing the same scenario as 
North in Raylab, they’d launched a counter-attack in the centre which 
threatened South’s line of communications to its western arsenal. As 
262 See David Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon, pages 191–201.
263 See David Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon, pages 390–402.
264 See Alice Becker-Ho and Guy Debord, A Game of War, pages 22–109.
265 See Alice Becker-Ho and Guy Debord, A Game of War, pages 17–19.
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Debord intended, The Game of War was the ludic manifestation of 
Napoleonic military theory. In this Clausewitz simulator, both sides 
must fiercely compete to realise the same difficult ambition: ‘the flanker 
will be flanked’.266 
Through our participatory performances, Class Wargames sought to 
teach this indispensable stratagem with other military simulations. 
When my team was formulating our tactics for the 2008 Reds versus 
Reds game at the Hermitage, we’d initially thought that the Bolsheviks 
should try to outflank the left of the Social Democrats’ front line 
which was defended by unreliable peasant conscripts. However, after 
examining the layout of this miniature Kazan countryside in more 
detail, we decided instead to carry out this manoeuvre with a direct 
assault on the centre of the village. Once this open terrain had been 
successfully seized, the Bolsheviks’ crack regiment of Kronstadt sailors 
was then able to outflank both wings of the Social Democratic army. 
Given his side’s untenable position, Mark had to concede the game. 
Similarly, in the concluding moves of the 2012 Commands & Colors: 
Napoleonics contest at Furtherfield Gallery, Marc and David’s French 
forces had launched a vigorous counter-attack against the right flank 
of the battered Haitian army. As their troops advanced along the river, 
they succeeded in pushing their opponent’s remaining units into 
the centre of the battlefield. Deprived of any room to manoeuvre, a 
Haitian infantry regiment was destroyed soon afterwards when it was 
forced to retreat off the board. The French had now achieved their 
victory conditions and the game was won. Although lacking the 
theoretical sophistication of The Game of War, both Reds versus Reds 
and Commands & Colors: Napoleonics were teachers of Clausewitz’s 
outflanking principle of military theory. Ludic détournement is 
Situationist enlightenment. 
In combat, skilful generals know how to follow up a victory over 
the enemy’s forces with relentless energy: hot pursuit. According to 
Clausewitz, the primary task of the triumphant army is ensuring that 
its opponent’s demoralised troops don’t have the opportunity to recover 
from any reverse. By maintaining the utmost pressure upon its rival, 
266 Alice Becker-Ho and Guy Debord, A Game of War, page 23.
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the attacking side can force the complete dissolution of the defender’s 
military might.267 Total victory is the theoretical imperative of Absolute 
War.268 For this Prussian officer, the military principle of hot pursuit 
must be realised with extreme urgency. Under the friction of war, each 
move forward into the opposition’s terrain weakens the invading army. 
By preventing defeated troops from rallying, the determined attacker 
can maintain its advantage despite these losses until the enemy is finally 
forced to surrender. For its adepts, the successful implementation of 
hot pursuit is achieved through not only intellectual ingenuity, but also 
emotional strength. There can be no slackening of the pace up to the 
great moment when complete victory is achieved.269 
During his military career, Bonaparte was an expert practitioner of 
hot pursuit. Both at the strategic and tactical levels, this clever general 
always kept reserves which could be committed to follow up any 
breakthrough against the opposition.270 At the battle of Marengo, the 
Austrians failed to make the most of their initial surprise attack against 
the French troops around this Italian town. However, when Desaix’s 
reinforcements arrived to save the day, the First Consul didn’t make the 
same mistake. In successive counter-attacks, he routed the Austrians 
and took possession of the field.271 During the 1806 Jena-Auerstädt 
campaign, Bonaparte demonstrated his mastery of hot pursuit as a 
strategic principle. After winning this famous battle, he unceasingly 
harried the defeated Prussians until their whole army disintegrated and 
surrendered.272 Eventually, the tables were turned on Bonaparte himself. 
During the 1812 retreat from Moscow, the French army fell to pieces 
under the Russians’ persistent attacks.273 Refusing any compromise, the 
Tsar over the next two years pursued the upstart emperor all the way 
267 See Carl von Clausewitz, On War, pages 268–278, 312–321; Campagne de 1815 en 
France, pages 165–167.
268 See Carl von Clausewitz, On War, pages 700–703.
269 See Carl von Clausewitz, On War, pages 633–640, 684–688, 755–758.
270 See Carl von Clausewitz, On War, pages 240–249.
271 See David Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon, pages 286–301.
272 See Carl von Clausewitz, Notes sur la Prusse dans sa Grande Catastrophe, pages 145–
162; and David Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon, pages 479–506. 
273 See Carl von Clausewitz, The Campaign of 1812 in Russia, pages 98–100; and David 
Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon, pages 767–861.
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to his lair in Paris. Total victory had been denied to the most skilful 
general of Absolute War.
The Game of War is a simulation which teaches the military theory of 
hot pursuit. When they gain the initiative on the board, the best players 
intensify their offensive to deprive their opponent of any opportunity 
to launch a counter-attack.274 In Becker-Ho and Debord’s exemplary 
game, South failed to follow through with his initial assault into the 
centre. Instead, North took the lead with her army’s bold manoeuvre 
across the pass to defend the eastern arsenal. Once massed in the centre, 
these pieces were then able to push the South’s army to the back of the 
board until the match was conceded. Relentless pursuit had delivered 
complete victory.275 At our 2008 Pump House game, Fabian had 
uncharacteristically fumbled his application of this military technique 
when – despite securing the initial advantage – he’d lost his mounted 
general to my cavalry charge. However, when the Marengo scenario 
was played at both the ICA and Raylab, he and Elena demonstrated 
their superiority in the ludic implementation of hot pursuit. As the 
French, they’d kept up their assaults on the Austrian army until it was 
no longer able to defend itself. Switching sides to North at Raylab, 
Fabian and Elena had been at first forced to carry out a fighting retreat 
while concentrating their pieces in the centre. But, once this task was 
completed, they switched over to a succession of counter-attacks which 
destroyed South’s offensive capability. In The Game of War as on the 
battlefield, relentless determination is the leitmotif of total victory. 
When playing other military simulations, Class Wargames discovered 
how their game engines also favoured the players who could apply 
Clausewitz’s principle of hot pursuit. In the 2008 Reds versus Reds 
match at the Winter Palace, my side had prevailed because one of 
our Bolshevik commissars had prevented a wavering regiment from 
retreating at a vital moment. Having survived this momentary crisis, 
this regiment of regulars was immediately thrown back into action 
against the Social Democrat conscripts defending Mark’s left flank. 
With our elite Kronstadt sailors now advancing fast towards the 
274 See Alice Becker-Ho and Guy Debord, A Game of War, page 23.
275 See Alice Becker-Ho and Guy Debord, A Game of War, pages 131–149.
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centre of the village, the Bolsheviks soon won the battle of Kazan 
by maintaining constant pressure upon the enemy without allowing 
them any time to recover. Similarly, in the 2012 Commands & Colors: 
Napoleonics game at Furtherfield, Marc and David’s French army had 
recovered from their initial reverses to launch a relentless counter-attack 
which ended up sweeping Christian and Tuesday’s Haitian troops off 
the board. During the 2012 CCANW performance of Little Wars, Ben 
and Lisa’s British troops had continued their advance under heavy fire 
until they’d been able to reduce Stefan and Tara’s forces to one lonely 
toy soldier. In each of these three games, the winning side had been the 
best players of the military principle of hot pursuit.
During the third stage of our campaign of ludic subversion, Class 
Wargames promoted The Game of War, Reds versus Reds, Commands 
& Colors: Napoleonics and Little Wars as Clausewitz simulators for 
libertarian communists. By taking part in these mock combats, their 
players were learning the five key principles of this Prussian officer’s 
military philosophy: coup d’oeil; psyching the opponent; concentration 
of forces; outflanking the enemy; and hot pursuit. Crucially, these 
participants were understanding by doing. When making choices over 
where to move their pieces on the board or their toy soldiers across the 
terrain, the rules rewarded them for successfully putting Clausewitz’s 
theoretical insights into ludic practice. By repeatedly playing these 
military simulations, Left activists could train themselves in the 
skills of generalship required to prevail on the social battlefield. In a 
détournement of Augusto Boal’s famous observation about community 
theatre, Class Wargames paid homage to Debord as the heroic pioneer 
of ludic subversion by proudly affirming that: ‘Perhaps [The Game of 
War] is not revolutionary in itself; but have no doubts, it is the rehearsal 
of revolution!’276
276 Augusto Boal, Theatre of the Oppressed, page 155.
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3.8: Making History
In the early evening of Wednesday 31st October 2012, a small crowd 
gathered inside Housmans Bookshop in London to celebrate the 
launch of the new pamphlet which compiled the extended script for 
our 2009 film along with the nine Communiqués that we’d released 
to accompany our performances over the previous five years: Richard 
Barbrook and Fabian Tompsett’s Class Wargames Presents Guy Debord’s 
The Game of War. But, what for us on that autumn night should have 
been a joyous occasion was overshadowed by a terrible personal tragedy. 
Only a month earlier, Elena Vorontsova Duffield had been struck down 
by cervical cancer and suddenly died at the shockingly young age of 37. 
In the two years since the 2010 Chto Delat? event at the ICA, she’d 
become an integral member of our Situationist project. Above all, it’d 
been thanks to her translating and organising skills that we’d been able 
to produce the Russian language version of the Class Wargames movie 
in 2011. Now, almost inexplicably, Elena was no longer with us. At 
the Housmans launch, before we began our talk about the pamphlet, 
Fabian and I said a few poignant sentences in honour of our fallen 
comrade. However, there was nothing that could be put into words 
which would express the searing pain of this traumatic loss.277 We 
somehow expected Elena to walk through the door of Housmans and, 
smiling mischievously, join in the festivities. Class Wargames deeply 
missed her presence in our ranks on that evening – and we still do to 
this day.
Not surprisingly, the horrible reality of Elena’s demise forced us 
to reflect upon the macabre metaphors which animated our ludic 
artworks. In all of the four games that we played at our performances, 
the taking of pieces on the board symbolised the taking of lives on the 
battlefield. When the cruelty of losing a dear friend was fresh in the 
memory, pretending to kill and maim other human beings could seem 
to be in very bad taste. What is more, Class Wargames was launching 
its pamphlet in Housmans Bookshop which had been founded in 1945 
by the Peace Pledge Union. For over six decades, pacifist groups based in 
this building had been campaigning against the British establishment’s 
277 Pictures were better at communicating our grief: Ilze Black, Elena – in Memoriam.
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expensive infatuation with nuclear weapons, regimental pride and 
imperialist adventures.278 The more literal minded adherents of the 
Left might be forgiven for thinking that the performances of The Game 
of War and Commands & Colors: Napoleonics which Housmans had 
scheduled to promote our new pamphlet were completely incompatible 
with the founding principles of this pacifist venue. Even when staged 
as simulations, military violence must be an anathema to all civilised 
people.
While talking with the audiences at our events over the years, Class 
Wargames has been amused to discover that lots of male lefties – and 
a select few of their female comrades – were enthusiastic wargamers 
in their teens. Although they’d have no problem in declaring their 
admiration for Trotsky, Che and other glamorous men in uniform, 
they were almost always embarrassed to admit that they might still 
enjoy refighting battles from the past. By inventing The Game of 
War, Debord had challenged the political prejudices of not only the 
hobbyist and professional practitioners of military simulations, but 
also, most wonderfully, these bashful activists, artists and academics of 
the Left. Through our performances, exhibitions, publications, videos 
and website, Class Wargames was encouraging socialist wargamers to 
come out of the closet. There was no shame in playing with toy soldiers 
as an ideologically aware adult. As Debord had proved, wargames 
could be both avant-garde artworks and political proselytisers. Best of 
all, his ludic creation facilitated the democratisation of Clausewitz’s 
military teachings amongst the civilian population. As pacifists, the 
staff and patrons of Housmans may have detested the butchery of 
the battlefield. But, they would be foolish if they refused learn the 
lessons of armed combat which had been revealed at such a huge 
cost in human suffering. By playing at war, fighters for peace were 
gaining the specialised knowledge of how to defeat the masters of war 
at their own game. When every proletarian becomes a skilful general, 
the bourgeoisie will no longer be able to dominate the global system 
through its martial prowess.   
On the Sunday afternoon preceding the launch of our pamphlet 
278 See Housmans Bookshop, ‘The Story of Housmans’.
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at Housmans Bookshop, Class Wargames hosted a participatory 
performance of the Marengo scenario for The Game of War shown in 
Diagram 3 on page 226. After dividing the first time players at this 
event into two teams, Stefan took on the role of military attaché for the 
Austrians while Fabian mentored their French opponents. Over the next 
few hours, Clausewitz’s combat theories were put into ludic practice. 
Pointing out the strengths and weaknesses of their starting positions 
on the asymmetrical board, Stefan and Fabian gave the first lesson 
in generalship to the newbie commanders of North and South: the 
importance of coup d’oeil. The Austrians might look strong advancing 
aggressively on both flanks against a weak defensive line, but their forces 
were vulnerable to a concentrated counter-attack by the French reserve. 
As Stefan now recommended, their opening moves must be focused 
on closing this worrying gap in the middle of the board. Imitating 
their predecessors in the 2011 Raylab game, the North team ordered 
their pieces on the right flank across the pass to meet up with the rest 
of their troops in the central plain. While this complex manoeuvre 
was happening, the South’s reserve force was being moved forward at 
great speed to meet them. Within a dozen turns, the rival armies had 
become engaged in a fierce struggle around the forts in the middle 
of the board. As Stefan and Fabian’s second lesson in Clausewitzian 
theory, the Austrian and French teams were now encouraged to engage 
in psyching the enemy. Boasting about the inevitability of their total 
victory in the game would spread despondency and defeatism amongst 
the other side. But, as the third and fourth principles of the Prussian 
warrior intellectual emphasised, this mental intimidation had to be 
backed up with decisive actions on the battlefield. By this point in 
the match at Housmans Bookshop, neither the North or the South 
were able to outflank their opponent’s army with any hope of success. 
Instead, they would have to prevail by implementing Bonaparte’s 
second favourite stratagem: the concentration of forces. In this race 
to control the middle of the board, it was the French who were able 
to achieve local superiority over the Austrians. Helped by Fabian’s 
tactical expertise, they would eventually come out on top in the costly 
fighting within the central plain. Implementing the fifth lesson of this 
Clausewitz simulator, the soldiers of the South were soon in hot pursuit 
of the shattered army of the North. After a few more moves, unable to 
resist any further, the Austrians reluctantly conceded the match to the 
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French.279 In Housmans Bookshop as in history, Bonaparte had won the 
Marengo campaign. More importantly, as Debord had planned, both 
teams were victorious in their mutual quest for Situationist knowledge. 
By playing The Game of War, the pacifists in Housmans Bookshop had 
overcome their abhorrence of military bloodletting and learnt how to 
conquer on the social battlefield. The Left must understand how to be 
a skilful general.
Three days later, as the preliminary to the launch of our pamphlet, 
Class Wargames organised a collective re-staging of the 1802 battle of 
Fort Bedourete remix of Commands & Colors: Napoleonics shown in 
Diagram 6 on page 338. For this engagement at Housmans Bookshop, 
the Haitian Jacobins were led by Kateryna Onyiliogwu with Fabian as 
her trusted advisor while the French Bonapartists were commanded 
by James Moulding aided by Robin Halpin from Dialectica Principia. 
Although Richard Borg’s board game was missing the theoretical depth 
of Debord’s ludic invention, our hack could still be used to teach some 
basic military nostrums. As in the summer match at Furtherfield gallery, 
the Haitians in a bravura display of coup d’oeil opened hostilities by 
sending their centre column to seize control of Fort Bedourete with 
their left flank simultaneously moving up in support. Refusing to 
be psyched by the opponent, the French responded by launching a 
counter-attack to retake the eponymous bastion while also massing 
the troops on their left for a rapid advance forward. Unfortunately 
for them, James and Robin’s clever schemes would soon be foiled by 
the other side’s helpful order cards and lucky dice throws. Both their 
concentration of Bonapartist forces in the centre and their outflanking 
manoeuvre on the left ended in grief as these French units were 
decimated by the Haitians’ dexterity in musketry and hand-to-hand 
fighting. Having achieved this tactical advantage, Kateryna and Fabian 
now committed their remaining troops to the hot pursuit of the enemy. 
Within a few more moves, the French had lost their Charles Leclerc 
piece and the game was definitely over for the Bonapartists.280 In this 
re-enactment as in reality, Toussaint and his Jacobins were triumphant 
279 For photographs of this first game at Housmans, see the Events 2012 section of the 
Class Wargames website.
280 For photographs of this second game at Housmans, see the Events 2012 section of 
the Class Wargames website.
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at the battle of Fort Bedourete. This time around, the course of history 
hadn’t been changed. 
With these two performances at Housmans Bookshop, Class Wargames 
had decisively entered the third phase of its hard fought campaign of 
ludic subversion. Debord’s The Game of War had been described as 
his most autobiographical work and – over the previous five years – 
we’d had the great pleasure of retracing the career of this Situationist 
insurgent through our exertions across three continents. In the first 
stage, we’d played The Game of War as an avant-garde artwork. The 
second period was focused upon propagating its political message of 
collective revolutionary leadership. Now, in its third manifestation, 
Class Wargames’ interventions were devoted to teaching the skills of 
military combat to Left activists. Over these five years, the successive 
phases of our campaign of ludic subversion had always stayed true to 
its underlying unity of purpose: the theoretical and practical critique 
of the integrated spectacle. During the opening manoeuvres of our 
campaign, Class Wargames had acted as a homage to the English 
Section’s punk appropriation of Situationism. We’d carried out the 
provocation of playing wargames within the pacifist culture of the Left. 
We’d detourned hobbyist military simulations for our own political 
advantage. We’d revelled in the psychogeography of both the locations 
of our performances and the game board itself. We’d facilitated transient 
moments of participatory creativity when every player of The Game of 
War and Reds versus Reds became an artist. In the lineage of the Sex 
Pistols, the Haçienda and Banksy, the first iteration of our campaign 
was an exhilarating fiesta of Pop Situationism.
While pleased at the enthusiastic reception for our interventions, Class 
Wargames was also aware of the inherent limitations of adopting this 
strategy of aesthetic dissidence within contemporary Europe. Over 
in Putin’s Russia, the Situationists’  four tactics of avant-garde art did 
still retain their potency as insurrectionary weapons. Trumping the 
Lettrists’ 1950 intervention at Notre Dame, Pussy Riot’s 2012 scratch 
performance of their Punk Prayer in Moscow’s Cathedral of Christ 
the Saviour so enraged this nation’s reactionary political and religious 
authorities that two of its members were sent to prison after a farcical 
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trial.281 As Chto Delat? emphasised, their comrades’ Situationist shock 
tactic had succeeded in achieving its primary goal: disturbing the 
univocal spectacle of political hypocrisy within Russia.282 Compared to 
this audacious action, Class Wargames’ avant-garde art performances, 
exhibitions, films and publications were quite safe. Far from being 
persecuted, we were lauded for our expertise in the four techniques of 
Pop Situationist cultural rebellion. Most gratifyingly, Class Wargames 
was sometimes paid for putting on events, contributing to shows and 
making videos. More than three decades after the Sex Pistols first 
played in London, provocation, remixing, psychogeography and user 
generated content had been thoroughly recuperated in England as smart 
business techniques for cutting-edge artists and media entrepreneurs. 
With Deller now representing his country at the 2013 Venice Biennale, 
even our joyful mocking of the po-faced aesthetes’ disdain for the 
hobbyist subculture of wargaming was no longer outrageous.283 In the 
Post-Modernist funfair of avant-garde entertainment, everyone was 
given the opportunity to be a Pop Situationist. 
Retracing the trajectory of the 1962 split in the International, Class 
Wargames responded to this recuperatory danger by opening the 
second phase of our campaign of ludic subversion. Inspired by our 2008 
expedition to St Petersburg, we became focused upon how Debord had 
constructed The Game of War as his masterpiece of Situationist political 
propaganda. Before its publication in 1977, he’d fearlessly promoted 
the proletarian revolutionary cause in print, at exhibitions and on 
film. Now, with this ludic experiment, Debord had provided a more 
interactive – and subtle – method for learning about the theoretical 
concepts and practical solutions of libertarian communism. In this 
second phase of our campaign of ludic subversion, Class Wargames 
281 See Pussy Riot, Punk Prayer. For the global campaign deploring the band’s harsh 
punishment, see the Free Pussy Riot website.
282 ‘This is exactly the kind of iconic image [that] the [anti-Putin] protest movement 
has been trying to avoid, with its emphatically anti-revolutionary rhetoric, its 
consolidation around patriotic ... values, and its respectful avoidance of any critique 
aimed at the Russian Orthodox Church as one of the state-ideological apparatuses 
that has filled the void left behind by the ...[Stalinist] Party.’ David Riff, ‘A 
Representation which is Divorced from the Consciousness.’
283 For the artist’s own thoughts about this show, see Mark Rappolt, ‘Jeremy Deller 
Interview’.
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took its inspiration from his pioneering work. At our participatory 
performances of The Game of War, by moving their pieces across its 
board, the rival teams of North and South could personally experience 
the Situationist refutation of vanguard politics. When they ordered 
their 28mm Bolshevik or Social Democrat figurines into combat, the 
two sides in Reds versus Reds were reliving the militarised recuperation 
of socialism into the concentrated and diffuse versions of spectacular 
domination for themselves. Playing games was debating politics by 
other means.
In this second stage of our campaign of ludic subversion, Class 
Wargames was determined to keep faith with Debord’s historical 
imperative. While we were touring from Belo Horizonte to Irkutsk, 
popular resistance to the depredations of neoliberal globalisation was 
growing in numbers and intensity across the world. As C.L.R. James 
had predicted, only the mobilised masses in their millions possessed the 
social power to challenge the technocratic monopolisers of power and 
wealth. But, like the New Left before them, this emerging generation of 
radicals also had a big problem with history. On the one hand, for the 
McLuhanist boosters of social media, the Net was reconstructing politics 
in its own hi-tech image. There was no longer any need for revolutionary 
leaders when everyone had access to email, blogs, Facebook and Twitter. 
On the other hand, for the admirers of Left sects, the path to the utopian 
future meant returning to a mythical past. Eisenstein’s fictional portrayal 
of the 1917 storming of the Winter Palace in his 1927 October movie was 
still the essence of 21st century vanguard politics. With the second phase 
of our campaign, Class Wargames launched its offensive against both 
of these ideological errors. As a disorientating outflanking manoeuvre, 
our interventions now lauded Debord’s The Game of War and Peers’ Reds 
versus Reds as analogue simulations of vanguard politics. After working as 
an alienated individual on a screen all day, the tactile and social pleasures 
of moving pieces or figurines were a refutation of futurist fantasies in 
themselves. However wonderful, new media technologies couldn’t save 
humanity by themselves.
At our performances, the explanatory commentary always congratulated 
Debord for avoiding inventing a faddish game of his own times which 
replicated either the street fighting in Paris between students and 
gendarmes during the May ‘68 Revolution or rural guerrillas combatting 
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the military might of American imperialism somewhere in the South. 
Instead, he’d deliberately chosen to model the armed conflicts of two 
centuries earlier during the traumatic birth pangs of capitalist Europe. 
Contrary to the McLuhanist prophecies, the new information society was 
just the latest upgrade of the old capitalist system. All of the competing 
currents of today’s Left had their origins in the primordial politics of 
this distant past. Each new generation of radicals must build upon what 
had already been achieved by their forebears. Through our participatory 
performances, the players of The Game of War and Reds versus Reds were 
now able to trace the tumultuous events of May ‘68 in Debord’s own 
lifetime back through the Bolshevik mythology of October 1917 to what 
– along with Hegel – he’d believed was the formative moment of the 
modern world: the 1789 French Revolution.284 The Jacobins were the 
pioneers of the Bolshevik style of vanguard politics. Bonaparte’s liberal 
autocracy was the forerunner of Stalin’s totalitarian tyranny. The failings 
of the Left in the present had their roots in its mistakes in the past.
Emphasising this long view of history, Class Wargames created the 1802 
battle of Fort Bedourete scenario for Commands & Colors: Napoleonics to 
add to our ludic repertoire. As Donkor’s painting commemorated, the 
first global rebellion against exploitation and injustice had taken place over 
two hundred years ago in the common struggle of the Jacobins on both 
sides of the Atlantic. Above all, through the influence of James’ writings, 
the Haitian slaves’ desire for liberation from bondage had reemerged in 
the Situationists’ enthusiasm for the ascendency of the workers’ councils 
over everyday life. By playing The Game of War, Reds versus Reds and 
Commands & Colors: Napoleonics, the participants at our performances 
were absorbing these ludic lessons in revolutionary history. Understanding 
the victories and defeats of the past was the precondition for devising the 
successful strategy and tactics for prevailing on the social battlefields of 
the future. Everyone must experience the excitements and temptations 
of being a little Bonaparte, Trotsky or Che for themselves. As Debord 
recommended, perceptive remembering can liberate the mind from both 
the forgetting and the mythologising of the integrated spectacle.
284 Based in London, Class Wargames would – one day – like to trace in ludic form this 
historical caesura further back to our own country’s original version of 1789 and 
1917: the 1642 English Revolution.  
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In this second phase of our campaign, Class Wargames became 
fascinated with how Debord’s ludic invention materialised the 
Situationist critique of revolutionary leadership. The fatal flaw of all of 
the Left sects in the 2010s was that they were still minority movements. 
Whether they denied the occult choreography of spontaneous 
mobilisations or championed the enlightened guidance of the diffuse 
vanguard, their activists were perpetuating the hallowed tradition of 
finding comfort in the ideological exclusivities of Social Democracy, 
Anarchism, Bolshevism and Autonomism. As Donkor’s painting so 
brilliantly highlighted, these elitist dreams of collective emancipation 
have all too often become embodied in the charismatic personality 
of the great revolutionary leader: Toussaint, Lenin and Nkrumah. If 
some of these heroes have shamefully failed their followers, the primary 
causes lay in their moral flaws and political megalomania: Bonaparte, 
Mussolini and Mao. Hopefully, armed with the latest version of the 
correct ideology, the next Marat on horseback might be able to lead 
the masses to ultimate victory. With the publication of The Game of 
War in 1977, Debord had offered his own idiosyncratic alternative 
to this old solution of the New Left. Learning from this founding 
father of ludic subversion, instead of pining for a 21st century update 
of Robespierre, Trotsky or Cohn-Bendit, today’s militants must 
understand that they themselves have to become the skilful general 
who will guide the proletarian struggle to ultimate victory. In the 
second stage of our campaign of ludic subversion, Class Wargames 
propagated this Situationist wisdom amongst the participants of our 
performances. Gathered around its board, the players of The Game 
of War, Reds versus Reds, Commands & Colors: Napoleonics and Little 
Wars were anticipating the direct democracy of the workers’ councils 
in microcosm. By competing fiercely with each other, these admirers 
of Debord were co-operating to learn how revolutionary leadership 
should be exercised collectively in the libertarian communist future. 
Playing wargames was making Situationist political propaganda in 
ludic guise.
By 2012, our campaign of cultural rebellion had reached its third 
phase of offensive operations. Having successfully performed The 
Game of War, Reds versus Reds, Commands & Colors: Napoleonics and 
Little Wars first as avant-garde artworks and then as proselytisers for 
libertarian communism, Class  Wargames now embraced Debord’s 
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call for wargames to be played as interactive training exercises in 
Clausewitzian military theory. Unfortunately, during the May ‘68 
French Revolution, the skilful generalship of de Gaulle had triumphed 
over the raw recruits of the New Left on the social battlefield. Next time, 
the militants of the workers’ councils must be much better prepared. 
Unlike their Social Democratic, Anarchist, Bolshevik and Autonomist 
comrades, the Situationists remained suspicious of any attempts to 
prefigure the communist future within the capitalist present. Avoiding 
this recuperative temptation, Debord proposed that proletarian 
revolutionaries should instead concentrate on teaching themselves the 
five theoretical principles of Clausewitz’s On War: coup d’oeil; psyching 
the opponent; concentration of forces; outflanking the enemy; and hot 
pursuit. By fighting each other with model armies, the players of North 
and South could acquire the craft skills of revolutionary leadership for 
themselves. The specialist knowledge of the chosen few was now being 
transformed into the common understanding of the insurgent masses. 
As Socialisme ou Barbarie had advocated, the division of labour between 
order-givers and order-takers within the Left must be overcome. While 
patiently waiting for the coming libertarian communist insurrection, 
Situationists would be training hard with Clausewitz simulators 
to ensure that the decisive victory was theirs next time around. For 
Debord, The Game of War was On War remixed into a board game. Our 
task was to build upon this insight by playing military simulations to 
educate the Left in the skills of Situationist generalship. 
In the participatory performances for the third stage of our campaign of 
ludic subversion, Class Wargames counterposed Debord’s détournement 
of Clausewitz’s writings with the Cold War interpretations of this 
Prussian soldier’s ideas championed by both Bolshevik autocrats 
and RAND consultants. Like Kriegsspiel, The Game of War was an 
immersive teaching tool which enabled its players to turn military 
theory into ludic practice. But, unlike the professional simulations 
which were designed for training the officer corps, Debord’s creation 
was made for everyone. At our events, Class Wargames was almost 
always teaching first timers how to play the game. For the acolytes of 
both Lenin and Kahn, Clausewitz’s military theory had been esoteric 
knowledge which elevated the ruling elite above the rest of humanity. 
But, by studying hard with The Game of War, the rebellious masses 
could now also become proficient in his five key concepts of armed 
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combat. If interpreted with awareness, the co-operative experience of 
playing Reds versus Reds, Commands & Colors: Napoleonics and Little 
Wars at our events could also impart important strategic and tactical 
insights as well. When giving orders to their toy soldiers or wooden 
blocks, the commanders of these simulations’ miniature armies were 
learning how to take the best advantage of terrain features, intimidate 
their opponent with bravado, manoeuvre around defensive positions, 
maximise numerical superiority in fighting and ensure that the enemy’s 
retreating troops never had the opportunity to rally. Embarrassed that 
they might be mistaken for fascists or imperialists, hobbyist wargamers 
were obsessed with the nerdy historical details of the uniforms and 
weaponry of the valiant warriors of their chosen period. Inspired by 
Debord, Class Wargames challenged these apolitical enthusiasts to 
embrace the hidden subversive possibilities of this amusing leisure 
activity. Playing with toy soldiers democratised the specialist skills of 
generalship. When everyone was trained in Clausewitz’s five principles 
of armed struggle, the insurgent proletariat would be capable of 
exercising revolutionary leadership collectively.  
Alongside this détournement of hobbyist wargames, the third 
phase of our campaign of ludic subversion also targeted the Left’s 
own mythologising of its glorious past. After five years of hosting 
participatory performances, Class Wargames had finally understood 
why so many adult activists had amassed large armies of toy soldiers 
lovingly painted in the correct uniforms when they’d been teenagers. 
Even if they refused to admit it now, their political identity as adults 
was profoundly influenced by these military simulations of their youth. 
Like hobbyist wargamers deciding to concentrate on refighting one 
particular historical period of warfare, each of the rival factions of the 
Left was fascinated by its own chosen moment of political emancipation 
from the last century: 1917 Petrograd, 1936 Barcelona, 1945 London 
and 1977 Milan. Like members of historical re-enactment societies, 
the adherents of Bolshevism, Anarchism, Social Democracy and 
Autonomism were – almost unconsciously – engaged in live action role-
playing. In contrast to the McLuhanists who proclaimed that nothing 
can be learnt about the post-industrial future from the industrial past, 
they could only experience the present as a mythologised facsimile of 
their favourite transformative times from long ago. In the third stage 
of our campaign, Class Wargames offered its ludic antidote to these 
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geeky fantasies which were constricting the political imagination of 
the Left. By recovering their teenage horde of toy soldiers left in their 
parents’ house, grown-up militants could indulge their obsession with 
the high points of labour history without confusing the past with 
the present. Freeing themselves from the delusion of resurrecting 
Lenin’s vanguard party in the 21st century, contemporary admirers 
of Bolshevism should instead purchase Russian Civil War figurines 
from Copplestone Castings and enjoy playing at being a little Trotsky 
with Chris Peers’ Reds versus Reds rules. Best of all, unlike in real life, 
the only casualties of their anachronistic political practice on this 
simulated social battlefield would be their model soldiers. As we’d 
proved with our 2008 intervention at the Hermitage, re-enacting the 
1917 Russian Revolution with 28mm miniatures was a most delightful 
– and efficacious – method of exorcising the temptations of Bolshevism 
amongst the members of today’s anti-capitalist movements. 
In the first stage of our campaign of cultural dissidence, Class 
Wargames had briefly thought about creating a May ‘68 version of 
The Game of War. Fortunately, Rod had dissuaded us from acting upon 
this naive misconception. Five years later, in the third phase of the 
campaign, we now fully understood why making this commemorative 
set would have been such a grave political error. Crucially, in the early-
1970s, Debord had first ruthlessly purged and then peremptorily 
dissolved the International to sabotage any attempt to recuperate 
Situationism as a 1968 Paris historical re-enactment society. Realising 
that they were now living in harder times, many of today’s young 
militants have sought solace in the intoxicating memory of their 
elders’ experiences during this almost revolution. In The Society of 
the Spectacle, they’ve found the theoretical manifesto of what might 
have been in the ‘Red Decades’ of the 1960s and 1970s.285 Surpassing 
their Social Democrat, Anarchist, Bolshevik and Autonomist rivals, 
the Situationists have now become the epitome of the extreme left of 
the New Left. However, Debord would have been horrified by such 
fervent adulation of the International. Tragically, these admirers were 
determined to freeze the distinctive Situationist programme in time. 
As good Marxists, the International had developed its innovative 
285 See McKenzie Wark, The Spectacle of Disintegration, pages 47–48.
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theoretical insights and radical practical solutions in response to the 
very specific historical circumstances within which they’d been living 
between the 1950s and the 1970s. What had distinguished them 
from the rest of the Left was precisely their keen appreciation of the 
novelty of the Fordist stage of capitalism. Anticipating the ascendency 
of neoliberal globalisation, Debord argued that the 1970s generation 
must continue this permanent revolution in libertarian communist 
thought and practice to meet the unexpected challenges of their own 
times. New problems would demand new answers. Unfortunately, 
most of the contemporary groupies of Situationism are instead much 
more interested in transforming the temporary expedients of May ‘68 
into a rigid ahistorical ideology. By asserting their ownership of this 
mythical past, they aspire to control the confusing circumstances of 
the present. Above all, like their Social Democrat, Anarchist, Bolshevik 
and Autonomist peers, these faux Situationists are another iteration of 
the persistence of vanguard politics within the Left.
In the second phase of our campaign of ludic subversion, Class 
Wargames had promoted The Game of War as Debord’s antidote to his 
own recuperation. By moving its pieces across the board, the players 
of North and South were becoming little Toussaints, Trotskys and 
Cohn-Bendits. As the commentary at our participatory performances 
stressed, the Situationist politics of this ludic propaganda were 
unambiguous. When everyone was a skilful general, then no vanguard 
could monopolise the leadership of the proletarian revolution. By the 
time that we were engaged in the third stage of our campaign, Class 
Wargames was concentrating on the practical applications of not only 
Debord’s The Game of War, but also Reds versus Reds, Commands & 
Colors: Napoleonics and Little Wars. While fighting battles in miniature 
with each other, libertarian communists were teaching themselves 
Clausewitz’s five principles of armed combat. If revolutionary leadership 
was to be exercised collectively, then everyone must be educated in the 
craft skills of generalship. 
Equipped with this Situationist knowledge, the Left could now free 
itself from its thrall to ahistorical ideologies. The political strategy 
and artistic tactics of the International might have been innovative 
when they’d first been applied. But, in the same way that the military 
opponents of Bonaparte eventually learnt how to beat the emperor 
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by imitating his innovative strategy and tactics, much of what had 
been threatening to bourgeois order in Situationism has long been 
domesticated. In the third phase of our campaign, Class Wargames 
facilitated the dissemination of Debord’s pedagogical remedy for the 
corrupting inevitability of political recuperation. By playing The Game 
of War, Reds versus Reds, Commands & Colors: Napoleonics and Little 
Wars, today’s rebels were acquiring the mental discipline required to 
devise the novel strategy and tactics for winning their generation’s 
struggle against the obtuse tyranny of neoliberal globalisation. If they 
wanted to master the passage of time, the activists of the Left must no 
longer be slaves to a dead ideology.
In this third stage of our cultural offensive, Class Wargames eulogised 
the self- obsolescence of the Situationist International. The Game of War 
was Debord’s ludic lesson in Do-It-Yourself politics. By acquiring the 
technical skills of Clausewitzian generalship on its board, libertarian 
communists would then be able to play the different sects of the Left as 
the infantry, cavalry and artillery pieces of the social battlefield. Each 
tendency had combat modifiers which reflected its own strengths and 
weaknesses. Social Democrats were great for fighting elections, but 
no good at scrapping with the cops. Anarchists had big bonuses in 
rioting, but were heavily penalised when trying to get out the vote. 
Bolsheviks were excellent for organising demonstrations, but awful 
at persuading uncommitted people to join the cause. Autonomists 
gained extras for social media activism, but had a reduced score for 
mobilising outside their bohemian bastions. Above all, there were no – 
and never could be any – Situationist pieces on the board of this game 
of proletarian insurrection. As Debord boasted: ‘I’m not a philosopher, 
I’m a strategist.’286
In the revolutionary army, there were reserve units of intransigent 
intellectuals who could be deployed to make fierce denunciations of 
any signs of recuperation amongst the Left sects. However, having 
finally left the 20th century, what truly fulfilled James and Debord’s 
prophecies of mass insurrection were the increasing number of newbies 
286 Guy Debord in Giorgio Agamben, ‘Difference and Repetition’, page 313. Ironically, 
the author of this article didn’t seem to realise that this quip made to him by Debord 
was carefully aimed against his own semiotic structuralist errors. 
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reinforcing the Red side of the board. By participating in Class 
Wargames performances, these first time players could teach themselves 
how to become the collective skilful general. Like hobbyists allocating 
points to choose how many infantry, cavalry and artillery figurines 
should make up a toy soldier army, their world-historic mission was to 
assemble the optimal mix of Left tendencies for the cataclysmic struggle 
ahead.287 As taught in both The Game of War and Commands & Colors: 
Napoleonics, a combined attack of different pieces was the deadliest 
form of assault. This co-operative leader’s first task was imposing some 
self-discipline upon the squabbling soldiery of the fractured Left. 
Fighting each other was the worst way to fight the enemy. Every piece 
on the board must contribute to the collective struggle. Just as a Horse-
and-Musket wargamer would be foolish to pick an army consisting 
only of infantry, cavalry or artillery miniatures, the premier proletarian 
team in the class struggle also couldn’t be composed solely of Social 
Democrats, Anarchists, Bolsheviks or Autonomists. Depending upon 
the specific historical circumstances and territorial peculiarities, each 
combat unit had its own advantages and disadvantages. Once these 
different regiments had been rallied under a common banner, then the 
revolutionary army would be ready for the fray. The collective skilful 
general must decide when, where and with what troops that it would 
be most advantageous for the Left to engage its capitalist opponent 
with protests, elections, strikes, riots, lobbying, sabotage, occupations 
and propaganda.288 As Clausewitz taught, there were no fixed strategies 
and tactics in the long history of warfare. Each victory on the social 
battlefield must be won in its own unique way. 
By this third stage of our campaign, Class Wargames was hosting 
participatory performances of not only The Game of War, but also 
other interesting political-military simulations. Following Debord’s 
own career as a Situationist subversive, we’d opened our offensive 
with an assault against the elitism of avant-garde art, then moved on 
287 Chris Peers’ Reds versus Reds game was derived from the Russian Civil War army lists 
created for his Contemptible Little Armies set of rules.
288 ‘[Political] ... theories are only made to die in the war of time. Like military units, 
they must be sent into battle at the right moment; and whatever their merits or 
insufficiencies, they can only be used if they’re at hand when they’re needed.’ Guy 
Debord, In Girum Imus Nocte et Consumimur Igni, pages 150–151.
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to questioning the authoritarianism of vanguard sects and now, after 
five years of frenetic activity, found ourselves training the troops in 
Clausewitz’s military thinking. As Debord intended, The Game of War 
was an excellent pedagogical tool. If played with intelligence, Reds 
versus Reds, Commands & Colors: Napoleonics and Little Wars could also 
provide fascinating tactical insights for new recruits to the libertarian 
communist cause. As long the Left sects defined their identity by being 
the re-enactment society of their favourite period of radical history, 
then refighting old battles with model soldiers was more politically 
honest. Unlike many Social Democrats, Anarchists, Bolsheviks and 
Autonomists, at least the protagonists at Class Wargames’ performances 
knew that they were engaged in make-believe. 
At the sessions of the Ludic Science Club in the Fleapit and Firebox 
cafés in London, we also explored the political savvy to be gained from 
playing some fascinating non-military simulations: Jim Dunnigan’s 
Chicago-Chicago!; Brian Train’s Red Guard; Anders Fager’s Comrade 
Koba; Francis Tresham and Mick Uhl’s Civilization and Martin 
Wallace’s Liberté. Whether commended for their factual accuracy 
or castigated for misreading their chosen epoch, the empathy of 
immersion within these ludic re-enactments was always rewarding in 
itself. Instead of passively observing famous struggles from the past 
between classes, nations and personalities, players could now actively 
make the decisions which had changed the course of human history. 
The most effective pedagogy was learning by doing. Building on this 
experience, Fabian and I in 2011 initiated a module for the BA in 
Politics at the University of Westminster which required its students 
not only to study these commercially available games, but also to 
invent their own prototype simulations of real or imagined social 
struggles.289 Inspired by Debord’s ludic détournement of Clausewitz’s 
On War, James Moulding and Kateryna Onyiliogwu from its 2013 
cohort transformed Lenin’s flawed 1917 booklet on imperialism into a 
289 ‘... the greatest insight to be gained from conflict simulations comes from designing 
them rather than merely playing them.’ Philip Sabin, Simulating War, page 40. For 
more details about this module, see the SPIR608 Political Simulation and Gaming 
module’s Wikiversity pages.
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card-and-plastic space colonisation contest.290 The smartest critique of 
Bolshevik political theory was still Situationist ludic practice. 
After five years on campaign, Class Wargames had acquired much 
expertise in training Left activists in military reasoning. By learning 
Clausewitz’s five principles of combat, they could avoid fighting on 
the battlefields of the future with the maps of past struggles. Coming 
together to play political simulations, these militants were practising at 
becoming the collective skilful general. Under their unifying command, 
the rival tendencies of Social Democrats, Anarchists, Bolsheviks and 
Autonomists would become different pieces on the board – each 
with its own pluses and minuses. Rejecting ahistorical ideologies, 
proletarian warriors must be committed to developing the innovative 
strategy and tactics required for fighting in the special circumstances 
of our own times. On the other side of the board, state, corporate 
and military bureaucracies have long been reliant on role-playing 
exercises and other simulations to plan their responses to national 
emergencies and geopolitical crises. With the formulas of game theory, 
their neoliberal ideologues even found mathematic rationality within 
the social irrationality of the winner-take-all mentality of capitalist 
competition. By the third phase of our campaign of ludic subversion, 
Class Wargames had discovered the Situationist answer to the riddle of 
history. If the modern Left wanted to challenge the dominant order, 
its activists would have to know how to beat the bourgeoisie at their 
own game. In this 21st century iteration of Hegel’s world-historic 
contest between the masters and the slaves, victory will go to the most 
skilful protagonists. In training sessions with The Game of War and 
other political simulations, the collective leadership of the libertarian 
communist future is now being forged. Enthused by the utopian 
possibilities of the better times to come, new types of pieces with their 
own advanced combat modifiers are already beginning to appear on 
the Red side of the board. With the smartest players on its team, the 
revolutionary proletariat is making ready to transform our troubled 
world into a truly human civilisation.
‘The Empire’s been ripe to fall for decades; it needed a big push, but it 
290 For their account of the development of this game, see James Moulding and 
Kateryna Onyiliogwu, ‘Imperialism in Space’.
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could always go. [Above all] ... the [ruling class] game itself ... had to 
be discredited. It is what held the Empire together for all these years – 
the linchpin; but that made it the most vulnerable point too. ... You’ve 
spent all your life learning games; there can’t be a rule, move, concept 
or idea ... [that] you haven’t encountered ten times before in other 
games ... These guys never stood a chance.’291
 
291 Iain Banks, The Player of Games, page 296.
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Diagram 5
1805 battle of Austerlitz scenario for Guy Debord’s The Game of 
War
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Diagram 6
1802 battle of Fort Bedourete scenario for Richard Borg’s Com-
mands & Colors: Napoleonics
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Diagram 7
Haldon Forest opening positions for H.G. Wells’ Little Wars.
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